TURKEY ADRIFT
The New York Times Blogs
(Latitude)
October 23, 2013 Wednesday
by ANDREW FINKEL
Ankara's decision to buy a weapons system from a Chinese company
signals that Turkey has lost its way on foreign policy.
ISTANBUL - Turkey's announcement last month that it would buy a
long-range defense system from a Chinese company is the latest sign
that Ankara's attempts to strike an independent foreign policy have
gone wrong.
To its credit, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.) has
tried during its decade in power to play a constructive role in
the region - as a mediator between its NATO allies and Turkey's
troubled neighbors. The so-called zero problems policy seeks to
deal pragmatically with Syria and Iran, to resolve its long-standing
dispute with Armenia, and come to terms with problems at home, mainly
the demands of its own Kurdish population. In 2008, Turkey even tried
to broker a deal between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza strip.
It was never going to be easy: There has been war across its border
in Iraq, insurrection in Syria and growing concern over an Iran's
nuclear ambitions.
But now Ankara, long a key NATO ally, has dropped the ball. The plan
to buy a defense system from China shocked Washington and Brussels:
The system would be incompatible with NATO's defenses. Moreover,
the Chinese manufacturer is on a U.S. sanctions list for violating
the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
Asked on Tuesday to rate her concern on a scale of one to five, Oana
Lungescu, the NATO defense spokeswoman in Brussels, threw up her
hands. "What matters to us is the interoperability" of the Chinese
technology with "NATO's connected defense system. And in that regard,
that number is five."
Turkey spent years considering rival bids for the missile system. The
top contenders were the U.S. makers of Patriot missiles and their
French-Italian equivalent - or so everyone thought.
No one should feel sorry for the Western defense contractors. The
Chinese undercut the nearest bid by a $1 billion. And the Chinese take
a more liberal attitude about transferring technology - they will,
for example, allow Turkish co-production of the weapons. The Chinese
sweetened the deal by promising to build a new technology park close
to an Istanbul airport.
The fact that the defense system may not work seems to have been
overlooked.
The big problem is the Chinese weapons cannot be integrated with
NATO's radar technology. No NATO country is going to hand over to
the Chinese the radar codes that would allow the defensive missiles
to detect friend from foe.
The deal is not yet final and it may well be that the announcement to
buy from a Chinese company is a ploy to get the Westerners to lower
their prices. But even if the deal stalls, it is a signal that Turkey
has lost its way with foreign policy.
"Zero problems" has notoriously become "nothing but problems." The
attempt to mend fences with Armenia was shelved in 2010 when Ankara
allowed a deal that would have re-opened a border closed since 1993
to be overruled by an energy provider in Azerbaijan. Also in 2010,
relations with Israel collapsed with the infamous Mavi Marmara
incident, in which Israeli commandos killed nine peace activists on
a Turkish-registered ship trying to run the Gaza blockade.
Relations with Syria have been the most striking failure. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had personally led a diplomatic effort
to broker peace between President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian
rebels. But pragmatism turned into blind enmity when the Syrian leader
refused to follow a Turkish recipe for reform. Ankara then started to
covertly arm radical elements of the opposition, only to backtrack
when it realized it risked nurturing an Al Qaeda-style movement in
its own backyard.
All these setbacks are a source of frustration to a Turkish government
that came to power in 2002 hoping to put behind the Cold War divisions
of "us and them" and to carve for itself an independent role. Instead,
all those uncertainties on its Eastern borders mean that Ankara appears
more reliant than ever on its old Western friends. Buying weapons
from the Chinese may be a way to reassert that sense of self-reliance.
It may also be a way of reprimanding old allies. After a long hiatus,
Turkey is about to open a new chapter in its attempt to join the
European Union, but no one pretends negotiations are on track. The
Erdogan government feels beleaguered. It faced a summer of protests in
major cities fueled by accusations that Ankara has little understanding
of democratic dissent. And far from winning support for his policy of
trying to bring down the Syrian regime, the Turkish prime minister
feels betrayed by the suspicion that Washington will settle for far
less - the dismantling of Assad's chemical weapons.
Erdogan has strong domestic support. He is on the verge of becoming
the next president. Yet his influence abroad has never been less. The
foreign press and, increasingly, Western governments, make no secret
that they think the protesters this summer had it right.
But the answer for Erdogan is not to alienate Turkey's old friends
by buying Chinese missiles, even if they are a bargain.
The New York Times Blogs
(Latitude)
October 23, 2013 Wednesday
by ANDREW FINKEL
Ankara's decision to buy a weapons system from a Chinese company
signals that Turkey has lost its way on foreign policy.
ISTANBUL - Turkey's announcement last month that it would buy a
long-range defense system from a Chinese company is the latest sign
that Ankara's attempts to strike an independent foreign policy have
gone wrong.
To its credit, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.) has
tried during its decade in power to play a constructive role in
the region - as a mediator between its NATO allies and Turkey's
troubled neighbors. The so-called zero problems policy seeks to
deal pragmatically with Syria and Iran, to resolve its long-standing
dispute with Armenia, and come to terms with problems at home, mainly
the demands of its own Kurdish population. In 2008, Turkey even tried
to broker a deal between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza strip.
It was never going to be easy: There has been war across its border
in Iraq, insurrection in Syria and growing concern over an Iran's
nuclear ambitions.
But now Ankara, long a key NATO ally, has dropped the ball. The plan
to buy a defense system from China shocked Washington and Brussels:
The system would be incompatible with NATO's defenses. Moreover,
the Chinese manufacturer is on a U.S. sanctions list for violating
the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
Asked on Tuesday to rate her concern on a scale of one to five, Oana
Lungescu, the NATO defense spokeswoman in Brussels, threw up her
hands. "What matters to us is the interoperability" of the Chinese
technology with "NATO's connected defense system. And in that regard,
that number is five."
Turkey spent years considering rival bids for the missile system. The
top contenders were the U.S. makers of Patriot missiles and their
French-Italian equivalent - or so everyone thought.
No one should feel sorry for the Western defense contractors. The
Chinese undercut the nearest bid by a $1 billion. And the Chinese take
a more liberal attitude about transferring technology - they will,
for example, allow Turkish co-production of the weapons. The Chinese
sweetened the deal by promising to build a new technology park close
to an Istanbul airport.
The fact that the defense system may not work seems to have been
overlooked.
The big problem is the Chinese weapons cannot be integrated with
NATO's radar technology. No NATO country is going to hand over to
the Chinese the radar codes that would allow the defensive missiles
to detect friend from foe.
The deal is not yet final and it may well be that the announcement to
buy from a Chinese company is a ploy to get the Westerners to lower
their prices. But even if the deal stalls, it is a signal that Turkey
has lost its way with foreign policy.
"Zero problems" has notoriously become "nothing but problems." The
attempt to mend fences with Armenia was shelved in 2010 when Ankara
allowed a deal that would have re-opened a border closed since 1993
to be overruled by an energy provider in Azerbaijan. Also in 2010,
relations with Israel collapsed with the infamous Mavi Marmara
incident, in which Israeli commandos killed nine peace activists on
a Turkish-registered ship trying to run the Gaza blockade.
Relations with Syria have been the most striking failure. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had personally led a diplomatic effort
to broker peace between President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian
rebels. But pragmatism turned into blind enmity when the Syrian leader
refused to follow a Turkish recipe for reform. Ankara then started to
covertly arm radical elements of the opposition, only to backtrack
when it realized it risked nurturing an Al Qaeda-style movement in
its own backyard.
All these setbacks are a source of frustration to a Turkish government
that came to power in 2002 hoping to put behind the Cold War divisions
of "us and them" and to carve for itself an independent role. Instead,
all those uncertainties on its Eastern borders mean that Ankara appears
more reliant than ever on its old Western friends. Buying weapons
from the Chinese may be a way to reassert that sense of self-reliance.
It may also be a way of reprimanding old allies. After a long hiatus,
Turkey is about to open a new chapter in its attempt to join the
European Union, but no one pretends negotiations are on track. The
Erdogan government feels beleaguered. It faced a summer of protests in
major cities fueled by accusations that Ankara has little understanding
of democratic dissent. And far from winning support for his policy of
trying to bring down the Syrian regime, the Turkish prime minister
feels betrayed by the suspicion that Washington will settle for far
less - the dismantling of Assad's chemical weapons.
Erdogan has strong domestic support. He is on the verge of becoming
the next president. Yet his influence abroad has never been less. The
foreign press and, increasingly, Western governments, make no secret
that they think the protesters this summer had it right.
But the answer for Erdogan is not to alienate Turkey's old friends
by buying Chinese missiles, even if they are a bargain.