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RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARDS ARMENIA: BIG STICK AND SMALL CARROT
New Eastern Europe
Sept 5 2013
Author: Konrad Zasztowt
During his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on
September 3rd President Serzh Sargsyan's declared Armenia's will to
join the Customs Union. This decision may undermine Armenia's economic
rapprochement with the European Union despite the fact the country
accomplished its technical negotiations on the DCFTA with the EU in
July. It came as a surprise not only to EU officials in Brussels, but
also to many Armenian observers of Yerevan's foreign policies. One may
ask if it was a surprise for Sargsyan as well? Most probably, he didn't
intend to go so far with declarations about Armenia's integration
with economic structure. However, Putin had a number of arguments to
influence the Armenian leader's decision, the most serious of which is
about the security of the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh separatist state.
This territory officially doesn't belong to Armenia, which means it
is not protected by Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). After the Georgian attempt to reunite separatist South Ossetia
in 2008, which failed because of Russian intervention, Azerbaijan
has become less eager to choose military solutions to regain the
lost territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia's image of the mighty
protector of all post-Soviet separatist entities deterred Baku from
taking actions against Armenians. Thus, even if outside of the CSTO,
Nagorno-Karabakh was secure thanks to Moscow. However, it was clear
that this situation may not last forever. Vladimir Putin's Russian
foreign policy resembles the old Soviet style. It is not about
universal values or even Russia's economic interest. These may be
declared goals. The real goal is to maintain Russian hegemony in
the former Soviet Union. Once Armenia became too self-confident in
declaring its wish to integrate economically with the EU within the
framework of the Eastern Partnership, Putin decided to act.
Russia heavily criticised Ukraine for selling weapons to Georgia,
which it used in the 2008 war in South Ossetia. However, since July
this year Russians have begun delivering tanks, artillery cannons and
rocket launchers worth 1 billion US dollars to Azerbaijan, forgetting
the fact that this equipment might be used in the Karabakh conflict.
For the Armenian government it was a clear signal: Russia easily
switches sides (like it has already done in past) and support
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Putin's visit to Baku on
August 13th - the first since 2006 - only fuelled Armenian leadership's
fears. Azerbaijan's leader, Ilham Aliyev, acknowledged that his country
has already spent 4 billion US dollars on Russian weapons since 2010.
Clearly, Russia has also offered Armenia a positive agenda. During
Sargsyan's visit to Moscow, Putin informed him that Russian Railways
are ready to invest 15 billion Russian roubles in developing Armenia's
railway system. However, less obvious are Armenian profits from
integration with the Custom's Union. The current predicament in
economic relations between Russia and Belarus, both members and
founders of the organisation, reveals the illusive nature of the
Moscow-led Eurasian economic structure. Therefore, the Armenian
leadership should recognise main difference between the EU's Eastern
Partnership and Russia's Customs Union proposals. The EU project's
agenda is focusing on Armenia's internal reforms, modernisation
and sustainable development. Russia's proposal doesn't require any
reforms. However, it does demand resignation from any independent
foreign policy goals, which may strengthen Armenian statehood and
weaken Moscow's influence on Yerevan.
Konrad Zasztowt is an analyst at the Polish Institute of International
Affairs and specialises in the South Caucasus and Central Asia
regions. Previously he worked at the National Security Bureau
(2008-2010), where he monitored international security issues in
the Black Sea and Caspian regions. He is a graduate of the Institute
of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology and East European Studies at
University of Warsaw and also studied at Yeditepe University in Turkey
(2003-2005). His areas of interest include international relations and
energy security issues in the Black Sea region (Ukraine, the Caucasus,
Turkey) and Central Asia, ethnic and religious minorities as well as
the issue of Islam in the former Soviet Union.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/936
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
New Eastern Europe
Sept 5 2013
Author: Konrad Zasztowt
During his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on
September 3rd President Serzh Sargsyan's declared Armenia's will to
join the Customs Union. This decision may undermine Armenia's economic
rapprochement with the European Union despite the fact the country
accomplished its technical negotiations on the DCFTA with the EU in
July. It came as a surprise not only to EU officials in Brussels, but
also to many Armenian observers of Yerevan's foreign policies. One may
ask if it was a surprise for Sargsyan as well? Most probably, he didn't
intend to go so far with declarations about Armenia's integration
with economic structure. However, Putin had a number of arguments to
influence the Armenian leader's decision, the most serious of which is
about the security of the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh separatist state.
This territory officially doesn't belong to Armenia, which means it
is not protected by Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). After the Georgian attempt to reunite separatist South Ossetia
in 2008, which failed because of Russian intervention, Azerbaijan
has become less eager to choose military solutions to regain the
lost territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia's image of the mighty
protector of all post-Soviet separatist entities deterred Baku from
taking actions against Armenians. Thus, even if outside of the CSTO,
Nagorno-Karabakh was secure thanks to Moscow. However, it was clear
that this situation may not last forever. Vladimir Putin's Russian
foreign policy resembles the old Soviet style. It is not about
universal values or even Russia's economic interest. These may be
declared goals. The real goal is to maintain Russian hegemony in
the former Soviet Union. Once Armenia became too self-confident in
declaring its wish to integrate economically with the EU within the
framework of the Eastern Partnership, Putin decided to act.
Russia heavily criticised Ukraine for selling weapons to Georgia,
which it used in the 2008 war in South Ossetia. However, since July
this year Russians have begun delivering tanks, artillery cannons and
rocket launchers worth 1 billion US dollars to Azerbaijan, forgetting
the fact that this equipment might be used in the Karabakh conflict.
For the Armenian government it was a clear signal: Russia easily
switches sides (like it has already done in past) and support
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Putin's visit to Baku on
August 13th - the first since 2006 - only fuelled Armenian leadership's
fears. Azerbaijan's leader, Ilham Aliyev, acknowledged that his country
has already spent 4 billion US dollars on Russian weapons since 2010.
Clearly, Russia has also offered Armenia a positive agenda. During
Sargsyan's visit to Moscow, Putin informed him that Russian Railways
are ready to invest 15 billion Russian roubles in developing Armenia's
railway system. However, less obvious are Armenian profits from
integration with the Custom's Union. The current predicament in
economic relations between Russia and Belarus, both members and
founders of the organisation, reveals the illusive nature of the
Moscow-led Eurasian economic structure. Therefore, the Armenian
leadership should recognise main difference between the EU's Eastern
Partnership and Russia's Customs Union proposals. The EU project's
agenda is focusing on Armenia's internal reforms, modernisation
and sustainable development. Russia's proposal doesn't require any
reforms. However, it does demand resignation from any independent
foreign policy goals, which may strengthen Armenian statehood and
weaken Moscow's influence on Yerevan.
Konrad Zasztowt is an analyst at the Polish Institute of International
Affairs and specialises in the South Caucasus and Central Asia
regions. Previously he worked at the National Security Bureau
(2008-2010), where he monitored international security issues in
the Black Sea and Caspian regions. He is a graduate of the Institute
of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology and East European Studies at
University of Warsaw and also studied at Yeditepe University in Turkey
(2003-2005). His areas of interest include international relations and
energy security issues in the Black Sea region (Ukraine, the Caucasus,
Turkey) and Central Asia, ethnic and religious minorities as well as
the issue of Islam in the former Soviet Union.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/936
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress