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Putin's hint at possible agreement with Azerbaijan became determinant
for Sargsyan's decision to join the Customs Union
ArmInfo's Interview with Thomas de Waal, Senior Associate in the
Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, author of the book Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through
Peace and War
by David Stepanyan
Saturday, September 7, 14:55
Earlier you said that Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan hinted that
Armenia would inevitably join the Customs Union. Can one say after the
Putin-Sargsyan meeting in Moscow that Yerevan has taken the hint? What
role has Karabakh played in this decision?
I think that Vladimir Putin's broad hint that Russia can easily agree
on a range of issues with Azerbaijan was a determinant factor for
Armenian President Sargsyan's decision on Armenia's membership of the
Customs Union. Even the smallest threat of losing Russia's military
protection seemed too fearful to Yerevan. Another matter that what
happened in Moscow was a result of Armenia's insufficiently flexible
policy of many years towards Russia and Europe. It was not hard for
Yerevan to stay economically dependent on Russia for long years,
though, the country's leaders should have realized that the country
would sooner or later have to pay a political price for that. The
administrations of both Serzh Sargsyan and ex-president Robert
Kocharyan allowed takeover of Armenia's economy by Russia, which
helped them retain political control over Armenia. When Serzh Sargsyan
tried to revise that deal with great caution, he had no options left.
Does Armenia's membership of the Customs Union mean automatic
maintenance of the status quo around Karabakh for years to come given
the military balance of the Karabakh conflict parties? The Kremlin
sells weapons worth billions to Azerbaijan and 'compensates' for that
with delivery of weapons to Armenia on preferential terms. How
successful is the Kremlin's policy?
Russia is interested in either preserving the status quo in the
Karabakh conflict or settling it without any painful efforts. The
Russian authorities try their best to preserve the military balance.
Meanwhile, it would be wrong to say that Russia can keep the situation
in the Karabakh conflict zone fully under control. Never before has
Moscow controlled the situation around Karabakh. And now, the decision
to either unleash conflict or maintain the status quo rests upon
Azerbaijan, first of all. The arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and new stockpiling of arms make both the countries realize that
dancing on a volcano is becoming more and more dangerous. On the other
hand, the arms race means that any new conflict will quickly get out
of control.
Despite Armenia's willingness to join the Customs Union, the
Association Agreement with the EU has not been cancelled yet. Has the
EuroAtlantic community got any levers to use the Karabakh conflict to
exert pressure on Yerevan at the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit
in Vilnius?
No, it has not. Actually, the EU is, first of all, a technical and
bureaucratic union. I am sure that most Europeans engaged in the
Eastern Partnership little communicate with the Minsk Group and have a
very general idea of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
It appears that Baku places its stake on economic growth,
particularly, on sales of energy resources. It connects the Karabakh
conflict settlement with its further strengthening in the
international arena. How grounded are these aspirations?
Certainly, now Azerbaijan is stronger and wealthier than it was 20
years ago during the Karabakh war. This gives Baku a new profile and
an opportunity to promote itself more efficiently and to use the
international structures to lobby the Azerbaijani stance in the
Karabakh conflict. The new status of Azerbaijan creates many problems
for Armenia, because Baku successfully blocks any attempts to
recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an international subject. However,
Armenians, for their part, are capable of hurting Azerbaijan by simply
maintaining the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it.
Therefore, I have repeatedly qualified the current situation as a
suicide pact.
Iran has repeatedly made it clear that in case of foreign
interference in the Syrian conflict it will take retaliatory measures.
Won't U.S. President Obama's decision on military strike against Syria
lead to a large-scale war in the region? What consequences will it
have in the South Caucasus?
Of course, the escalation of the conflict in Syria will have a
negative impact on the neighboring countries. However, I foresee no
direct consequences for the South Caucasus. From the political point
of view, the South Caucasus countries are a long way from the Syrian
conflict. By the way, Iran itself has enough problems and it is not
interested in destabilization in its northern neighboring countries.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=02212FF0-17AC-11E3-9C1B0EB7C0D21663
for Sargsyan's decision to join the Customs Union
ArmInfo's Interview with Thomas de Waal, Senior Associate in the
Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, author of the book Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through
Peace and War
by David Stepanyan
Saturday, September 7, 14:55
Earlier you said that Vladimir Putin's visit to Azerbaijan hinted that
Armenia would inevitably join the Customs Union. Can one say after the
Putin-Sargsyan meeting in Moscow that Yerevan has taken the hint? What
role has Karabakh played in this decision?
I think that Vladimir Putin's broad hint that Russia can easily agree
on a range of issues with Azerbaijan was a determinant factor for
Armenian President Sargsyan's decision on Armenia's membership of the
Customs Union. Even the smallest threat of losing Russia's military
protection seemed too fearful to Yerevan. Another matter that what
happened in Moscow was a result of Armenia's insufficiently flexible
policy of many years towards Russia and Europe. It was not hard for
Yerevan to stay economically dependent on Russia for long years,
though, the country's leaders should have realized that the country
would sooner or later have to pay a political price for that. The
administrations of both Serzh Sargsyan and ex-president Robert
Kocharyan allowed takeover of Armenia's economy by Russia, which
helped them retain political control over Armenia. When Serzh Sargsyan
tried to revise that deal with great caution, he had no options left.
Does Armenia's membership of the Customs Union mean automatic
maintenance of the status quo around Karabakh for years to come given
the military balance of the Karabakh conflict parties? The Kremlin
sells weapons worth billions to Azerbaijan and 'compensates' for that
with delivery of weapons to Armenia on preferential terms. How
successful is the Kremlin's policy?
Russia is interested in either preserving the status quo in the
Karabakh conflict or settling it without any painful efforts. The
Russian authorities try their best to preserve the military balance.
Meanwhile, it would be wrong to say that Russia can keep the situation
in the Karabakh conflict zone fully under control. Never before has
Moscow controlled the situation around Karabakh. And now, the decision
to either unleash conflict or maintain the status quo rests upon
Azerbaijan, first of all. The arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and new stockpiling of arms make both the countries realize that
dancing on a volcano is becoming more and more dangerous. On the other
hand, the arms race means that any new conflict will quickly get out
of control.
Despite Armenia's willingness to join the Customs Union, the
Association Agreement with the EU has not been cancelled yet. Has the
EuroAtlantic community got any levers to use the Karabakh conflict to
exert pressure on Yerevan at the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit
in Vilnius?
No, it has not. Actually, the EU is, first of all, a technical and
bureaucratic union. I am sure that most Europeans engaged in the
Eastern Partnership little communicate with the Minsk Group and have a
very general idea of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
It appears that Baku places its stake on economic growth,
particularly, on sales of energy resources. It connects the Karabakh
conflict settlement with its further strengthening in the
international arena. How grounded are these aspirations?
Certainly, now Azerbaijan is stronger and wealthier than it was 20
years ago during the Karabakh war. This gives Baku a new profile and
an opportunity to promote itself more efficiently and to use the
international structures to lobby the Azerbaijani stance in the
Karabakh conflict. The new status of Azerbaijan creates many problems
for Armenia, because Baku successfully blocks any attempts to
recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an international subject. However,
Armenians, for their part, are capable of hurting Azerbaijan by simply
maintaining the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it.
Therefore, I have repeatedly qualified the current situation as a
suicide pact.
Iran has repeatedly made it clear that in case of foreign
interference in the Syrian conflict it will take retaliatory measures.
Won't U.S. President Obama's decision on military strike against Syria
lead to a large-scale war in the region? What consequences will it
have in the South Caucasus?
Of course, the escalation of the conflict in Syria will have a
negative impact on the neighboring countries. However, I foresee no
direct consequences for the South Caucasus. From the political point
of view, the South Caucasus countries are a long way from the Syrian
conflict. By the way, Iran itself has enough problems and it is not
interested in destabilization in its northern neighboring countries.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=02212FF0-17AC-11E3-9C1B0EB7C0D21663