RUSSIA'S EMPIRE STRIKES BACK
Slate
Sept 19 2013
Vladimir Putin's empire-building has little to do with Russia's
interests. It's all about what's good for him and his cronies.
By Anne Applebaum|Posted Thursday, Sept. 19, 2013, at 7:26 PM
"Right makes might, and not the other way around," President Obama
said in the Rose Garden a few weeks ago. We all know what he meant:
In this age of soft power, great countries can win friends not
through the use of brute force but through their books and movies,
their sophisticated economies, their technological innovations, and,
above all, through their attractive and inspiring national ideals.
Maybe that's true, some of the time. But for those who find soft
power difficult to wield, hard power is still available. Indeed, in
the very same week that the American president made his Rose Garden
speech, events on the other side of the globe were proving that might
certainly can make right. Even while the world's attention was fixed
on Russian-American diplomacy in Syria, back home Russian President
Vladimir Putin was pulling off a much quieter but potentially
more significant diplomatic coup. After three years of intensive
negotiations, Armenia, Russia's neighbor, had been on the brink of
signing an association agreement, including a comprehensive trade
agreement, with the European Union. But on Sept. 3-right in the middle
of the Syria crisis-the Armenian government abruptly declared that
it would drop the whole project. Rather than aligning itself with
the world's largest free-trade zone and some of the world's most
sophisticated democracies, Armenia decided to stick with Russia,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and to join the Eurasian Customs Union
instead.
No one pretends that Armenia was attracted by Russia's soft power. By
way of explanation, President Serzh Sargsyan explained that Armenia
depends on Russia for it security, and that Armenia has a large
diaspora living in Russia. This sounds odd: Most security alliances,
NATO included, don't require their members to join a customs union, and
the presence of immigrants in one country doesn't usually affect trade
policy in another. But Armenia has been made anxious in recent weeks by
Russian diplomatic overtures toward Azerbaijan, Armenia's main rival,
as well as by anti-immigrant rhetoric from Russian officials. The
Armenians took the hint: If they signed the trade deal with Europe,
Russia might sell more arms to their rival and expel the Armenians
who live in Russia.
The Armenians were no doubt watching Russian moves elsewhere in their
immediate neighborhood, where a distinct pattern is emerging. On Sept.
11, Russia banned the import of Moldovan wine, on the grounds that
it is a "health hazard." Ukrainian chocolates have suffered the same
fate. Another old tactic, the use of gas pricing and supply as a tool
of political influence, is being resurrected in Ukraine as well. In
essence-and I'm summarizing here-the Russians have let the Ukrainians
understand that if they drop their own negotiations with Europe and
join the Eurasian Customs Union, the price of the gas they import
from Russia could drop by more than half.
It's an excellent offer, so much so that-examined objectively-it seems
extraordinary that the Ukrainians have not accepted it already. But
Ukraine is hesitating, and has been for some time. Even the country's
most Russo-philic politicians know that the decision represents not a
short-term financial decision but a long-term civilizational choice,
between the relatively open markets and open politics of Europe and
the closed world of the former Soviet Union. One Armenian opposition
politician explained the consequences of his country's decision
to choose Russia over Europe like this: "Armenia, by choosing the
customs union instead of agreements with the EU will remain a country
of oligarchs and monopolies just like Russia."
Advertisement
Yet when examined objectively, it seems extraordinary that the Russians
want their neighbors to make that kind of choice, too. Surely it's in
Russia's own interests to share borders with countries that have broad
international contacts, faster economic growth, access to Western
markets, and therefore wealthier domestic consumers, who could buy
Russian goods. Surely it's in Russia's own interests, in the long
term, to have similar access to Western markets itself. If Europe
did manage to craft association agreements with Armenia, Ukraine,
and Moldova, there's no reason to think that a similar arrangement
with Russia would not eventually follow.
The explanation is as straightforward as it is sad: Russia's ruling
elite, led by President Putin, does not act in Russia's interests.
Russian elites act in their own interests. At the moment, they are
convinced that economic nationalism and the language of neo-imperialism
will win them popular support, and possibly private profits. I wonder
how long the rest of the Russians will put up with it.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/09/vladimir_putin_s_wins_back_armenia_the_russian_pre sident_is_expanding_russia.html
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Slate
Sept 19 2013
Vladimir Putin's empire-building has little to do with Russia's
interests. It's all about what's good for him and his cronies.
By Anne Applebaum|Posted Thursday, Sept. 19, 2013, at 7:26 PM
"Right makes might, and not the other way around," President Obama
said in the Rose Garden a few weeks ago. We all know what he meant:
In this age of soft power, great countries can win friends not
through the use of brute force but through their books and movies,
their sophisticated economies, their technological innovations, and,
above all, through their attractive and inspiring national ideals.
Maybe that's true, some of the time. But for those who find soft
power difficult to wield, hard power is still available. Indeed, in
the very same week that the American president made his Rose Garden
speech, events on the other side of the globe were proving that might
certainly can make right. Even while the world's attention was fixed
on Russian-American diplomacy in Syria, back home Russian President
Vladimir Putin was pulling off a much quieter but potentially
more significant diplomatic coup. After three years of intensive
negotiations, Armenia, Russia's neighbor, had been on the brink of
signing an association agreement, including a comprehensive trade
agreement, with the European Union. But on Sept. 3-right in the middle
of the Syria crisis-the Armenian government abruptly declared that
it would drop the whole project. Rather than aligning itself with
the world's largest free-trade zone and some of the world's most
sophisticated democracies, Armenia decided to stick with Russia,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and to join the Eurasian Customs Union
instead.
No one pretends that Armenia was attracted by Russia's soft power. By
way of explanation, President Serzh Sargsyan explained that Armenia
depends on Russia for it security, and that Armenia has a large
diaspora living in Russia. This sounds odd: Most security alliances,
NATO included, don't require their members to join a customs union, and
the presence of immigrants in one country doesn't usually affect trade
policy in another. But Armenia has been made anxious in recent weeks by
Russian diplomatic overtures toward Azerbaijan, Armenia's main rival,
as well as by anti-immigrant rhetoric from Russian officials. The
Armenians took the hint: If they signed the trade deal with Europe,
Russia might sell more arms to their rival and expel the Armenians
who live in Russia.
The Armenians were no doubt watching Russian moves elsewhere in their
immediate neighborhood, where a distinct pattern is emerging. On Sept.
11, Russia banned the import of Moldovan wine, on the grounds that
it is a "health hazard." Ukrainian chocolates have suffered the same
fate. Another old tactic, the use of gas pricing and supply as a tool
of political influence, is being resurrected in Ukraine as well. In
essence-and I'm summarizing here-the Russians have let the Ukrainians
understand that if they drop their own negotiations with Europe and
join the Eurasian Customs Union, the price of the gas they import
from Russia could drop by more than half.
It's an excellent offer, so much so that-examined objectively-it seems
extraordinary that the Ukrainians have not accepted it already. But
Ukraine is hesitating, and has been for some time. Even the country's
most Russo-philic politicians know that the decision represents not a
short-term financial decision but a long-term civilizational choice,
between the relatively open markets and open politics of Europe and
the closed world of the former Soviet Union. One Armenian opposition
politician explained the consequences of his country's decision
to choose Russia over Europe like this: "Armenia, by choosing the
customs union instead of agreements with the EU will remain a country
of oligarchs and monopolies just like Russia."
Advertisement
Yet when examined objectively, it seems extraordinary that the Russians
want their neighbors to make that kind of choice, too. Surely it's in
Russia's own interests to share borders with countries that have broad
international contacts, faster economic growth, access to Western
markets, and therefore wealthier domestic consumers, who could buy
Russian goods. Surely it's in Russia's own interests, in the long
term, to have similar access to Western markets itself. If Europe
did manage to craft association agreements with Armenia, Ukraine,
and Moldova, there's no reason to think that a similar arrangement
with Russia would not eventually follow.
The explanation is as straightforward as it is sad: Russia's ruling
elite, led by President Putin, does not act in Russia's interests.
Russian elites act in their own interests. At the moment, they are
convinced that economic nationalism and the language of neo-imperialism
will win them popular support, and possibly private profits. I wonder
how long the rest of the Russians will put up with it.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/09/vladimir_putin_s_wins_back_armenia_the_russian_pre sident_is_expanding_russia.html
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress