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Anchorage Daily News, Alaska
Sept 21 2013
Russian leaders don't deal in soft power
Published: September 20, 2013
By ANNE APPLEBAUM
LONDON -- "Right makes might -- not the other way around," President
Obama said in the Rose Garden a few weeks ago. We all know what he
meant: In this age of soft power, great countries can win friends not
through the use of brute force but through their books and movies,
their sophisticated economies, their technological innovations and,
above all, through their attractive and inspiring national ideals.
Maybe that's true, some of the time. But for those who find soft power
difficult to wield, hard power is still available. Indeed, in the same
week that the American president made his Rose Garden speech, events
on the other side of the globe were proving that might certainly can
make right. Even while the world's attention was fixed on
Russian-American diplomacy in Syria, back home the Russian president,
Vladimir Putin, was pulling off a much quieter but potentially more
significant diplomatic coup. After three years of intensive
negotiations, Armenia, Russia's neighbor, had been on the brink of
signing an association agreement, including a comprehensive trade
deal, with the European Union. But on Sept. 3 -- right in the middle
of the Syria crisis -- the Armenian government abruptly declared that
it would drop the whole project. Rather than aligning itself with the
world's largest free-trade zone and some of the world's most
sophisticated democracies, Armenia decided to stick with Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan and opted to join the Eurasian Customs Union.
No one pretends that Armenia was attracted by Russia's soft power. By
way of explanation, President Serge Sarkisian has said that Armenia
depends on Russia for its security and that Armenia has a large
diaspora living in Russia. This sounds odd: Most security alliances,
NATO included, do not require their members to join a customs union,
and the presence of immigrants in one country doesn't usually affect
trade policy in another. But Armenia has been made anxious in recent
weeks by Russian diplomatic overtures to Azerbaijan, Armenia's main
rival, as well as by anti-immigrant rhetoric from Russian officials.
The Armenians took the hint: If they signed the trade deal with
Europe, Russia might sell more arms to their rival and expel the
Armenians who live in Russia.
The Armenians were no doubt watching Russian moves elsewhere in their
immediate neighborhood, where a distinct pattern is emerging. On Sept.
11, Russia banned the import of Moldovan wine on the grounds that it
is a "health hazard." Ukrainian chocolates have suffered the same
fate. Another old tactic, the use of gas pricing and supply as a tool
of political influence, is being resurrected in Ukraine. In essence --
and I'm summarizing here -- the Russians have let the Ukrainians
understand that if they drop their own negotiations with Europe and
join the Eurasian Customs Union, the price of gas they import from
Russia could drop by more than half.
It's an excellent offer, so much so that -- examined objectively -- it
seems extraordinary that the Ukrainians have not accepted it already.
But Ukraine is still deliberating, and has been for some time. Even
its most Russophilic politicians know that the decision represents not
a short-term financial decision but a long-term civilizational choice,
between the relatively open markets and open politics of Europe and
the close world of the former Soviet Union. One Armenian opposition
politician explained the consequences of his country's decision to
choose Russia over Europe like this: "Armenia, by choosing the customs
union instead of agreements with the EU, will remain a country of
oligarchs and monopolies just like Russia."
Yet when examined objectively, it seems extraordinary that the
Russians want their neighbors to make that kind of choice, too. Surely
it is in Russia's own interests to share borders with countries that
have broad international contacts, faster economic growth, access to
Western markets and, therefore, wealthier domestic consumers who could
buy Russian goods. Surely it is in Russia's interests, in the long
term, to have similar access to Western markets itself. There's no
reason to think that if Europe did manage to craft association
agreements with Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, a similar arrangement
with Russia would not eventually follow.
The explanation is as straightforward as it is sad: Russia's ruling
elite, led by Putin, does not act in Russia's interests. Russian
elites act in their own interests. At the moment, they are convinced
that economic nationalism and the language of neo-imperialism will win
them popular support, and possibly private profits. I wonder how long
the rest of the Russians will put up with it.
http://www.adn.com/2013/09/20/3085760/anne-applebaum-russian-leaders.html
Sept 21 2013
Russian leaders don't deal in soft power
Published: September 20, 2013
By ANNE APPLEBAUM
LONDON -- "Right makes might -- not the other way around," President
Obama said in the Rose Garden a few weeks ago. We all know what he
meant: In this age of soft power, great countries can win friends not
through the use of brute force but through their books and movies,
their sophisticated economies, their technological innovations and,
above all, through their attractive and inspiring national ideals.
Maybe that's true, some of the time. But for those who find soft power
difficult to wield, hard power is still available. Indeed, in the same
week that the American president made his Rose Garden speech, events
on the other side of the globe were proving that might certainly can
make right. Even while the world's attention was fixed on
Russian-American diplomacy in Syria, back home the Russian president,
Vladimir Putin, was pulling off a much quieter but potentially more
significant diplomatic coup. After three years of intensive
negotiations, Armenia, Russia's neighbor, had been on the brink of
signing an association agreement, including a comprehensive trade
deal, with the European Union. But on Sept. 3 -- right in the middle
of the Syria crisis -- the Armenian government abruptly declared that
it would drop the whole project. Rather than aligning itself with the
world's largest free-trade zone and some of the world's most
sophisticated democracies, Armenia decided to stick with Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan and opted to join the Eurasian Customs Union.
No one pretends that Armenia was attracted by Russia's soft power. By
way of explanation, President Serge Sarkisian has said that Armenia
depends on Russia for its security and that Armenia has a large
diaspora living in Russia. This sounds odd: Most security alliances,
NATO included, do not require their members to join a customs union,
and the presence of immigrants in one country doesn't usually affect
trade policy in another. But Armenia has been made anxious in recent
weeks by Russian diplomatic overtures to Azerbaijan, Armenia's main
rival, as well as by anti-immigrant rhetoric from Russian officials.
The Armenians took the hint: If they signed the trade deal with
Europe, Russia might sell more arms to their rival and expel the
Armenians who live in Russia.
The Armenians were no doubt watching Russian moves elsewhere in their
immediate neighborhood, where a distinct pattern is emerging. On Sept.
11, Russia banned the import of Moldovan wine on the grounds that it
is a "health hazard." Ukrainian chocolates have suffered the same
fate. Another old tactic, the use of gas pricing and supply as a tool
of political influence, is being resurrected in Ukraine. In essence --
and I'm summarizing here -- the Russians have let the Ukrainians
understand that if they drop their own negotiations with Europe and
join the Eurasian Customs Union, the price of gas they import from
Russia could drop by more than half.
It's an excellent offer, so much so that -- examined objectively -- it
seems extraordinary that the Ukrainians have not accepted it already.
But Ukraine is still deliberating, and has been for some time. Even
its most Russophilic politicians know that the decision represents not
a short-term financial decision but a long-term civilizational choice,
between the relatively open markets and open politics of Europe and
the close world of the former Soviet Union. One Armenian opposition
politician explained the consequences of his country's decision to
choose Russia over Europe like this: "Armenia, by choosing the customs
union instead of agreements with the EU, will remain a country of
oligarchs and monopolies just like Russia."
Yet when examined objectively, it seems extraordinary that the
Russians want their neighbors to make that kind of choice, too. Surely
it is in Russia's own interests to share borders with countries that
have broad international contacts, faster economic growth, access to
Western markets and, therefore, wealthier domestic consumers who could
buy Russian goods. Surely it is in Russia's interests, in the long
term, to have similar access to Western markets itself. There's no
reason to think that if Europe did manage to craft association
agreements with Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, a similar arrangement
with Russia would not eventually follow.
The explanation is as straightforward as it is sad: Russia's ruling
elite, led by Putin, does not act in Russia's interests. Russian
elites act in their own interests. At the moment, they are convinced
that economic nationalism and the language of neo-imperialism will win
them popular support, and possibly private profits. I wonder how long
the rest of the Russians will put up with it.
http://www.adn.com/2013/09/20/3085760/anne-applebaum-russian-leaders.html