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Turkey goes for Chinese take-away defense
By Peter Lee
Sept. 27, 2013
On September 26, 2013, Turkey made the rather eyebrow-raising decision
to put its long range missile defense eggs in a Chinese basket,
announcing it had awarded a US$3 billion contract to the People's
Republic of China for its truck-mounted "shoot and scoot" FD-2000
system.
The Chinese FD-2000 is based on the Hong Qi missile, which has been
around since the 1990s. The FD-2000 is an export version of the HQ-9
that appeared in 2009 and is marketed as a next-generation improvement
on the Russian S-300 system, but whose fire control radar looks more
like the radar matching US-based Raytheon's Patriot missile system
(with the implication that the PRC filched the technology, maybe with
some help from Israel). [1]
Defense correspondent Wendell Minick relayed the description of the
FD-2000 that China provided at a 2010 Asian arms show:
It can target cruise missiles (7-24 km), air-to-ground missiles (7-50
km), aircraft (7-125 km), precision-guided bombs and tactical
ballistic missiles (7-25 km). "FD-2000 is mainly provided for air
force and air defense force for asset air defense to protect core
political, military and economic targets," according to the brochure
of China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC),
the manufacturer of the system. It can also coordinate with other air
defense systems to "form a multi-layer air defense system for regional
air defense." [2]
Turkey is procuring 12 of these systems (it had originally requested
20 Patriot systems when Syria heated up and got six for a year, since
renewed).
The FD-2000 looks great on paper. However, it appears to be untested
in combat - and even the Patriot system is apparently not effective
against cruise missiles, implying that the Chinese system isn't going
to do any better. Political issues aside - and there were a lot of
political issues - the deciding factor for Turkey was probably low
price, and China's willingness to do co-production and technology
transfer.
Maybe the Chinese government are eager to put the FD-2000 in some
foreign hot spot in the hopes of getting some real, battlefield data
and make some upgrades before the cruise missiles start flying toward
Beijing. [3]
Press reports from June already implied that Turkey was leaning toward
the Chinese system. However, Turkey's announcement in the midst of the
Syrian chemical weapons negotiations still looks like a slap at the
United States, which makes the Patriot missile system, and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is now manning six Patriot
batteries at present installed in Turkey. [4]
Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan certainly is feeling piqued at the
US-led detour into chemical weapon destruction in Syria, instead of
support for the quick regime collapse that he has been craving ever
since he made the precipitous and rather premature decision to call
for the fall of Bashar al-Assad in the summer of 2011.
Turkey's aggressive regime-change posture has always carried with it
the risk of Syrian chemical weapon retaliation, as a Xinhua piece
pointed out in early November:
'Turkey's army build up on its Syrian border continued, with some 400
chemical, biological and nuclear units arriving in the region as a
measure against a possible chemical threat.
While some analysts cited NATO anti-missile defense systems deployed
in Turkey, others doubted their effectiveness."The citizens in the
southern border have not been given adequate equipment to protect
themselves, especially from chemical attacks," said Turkish academic
Soli Ozel. "Let's say that one battery misses one missile ... The
smart missile may not be so smart." [5]'
Suspicion of the Patriot's missile-busting awesomeness seems to be
endemic in Turkey:
"Sait Yilmaz, an expert, told Turkish daily Today's Zaman that
Patriots - the anti-ballistic missiles provided by NATO - would not be
effective against short-distance missiles. He said that if Syria fired
a large number of missiles on Turkish targets at such a short
distance, most would go uncountered. [6]"
The general consensus seems to be that if Syria unleashed a barrage of
short-range missiles the Patriot missiles would not do a sensational
job; indeed, the suspicion is that the six batteries are in Turkey
merely as a symbolic show of NATO support for Turkey. Presumably, the
protection provided by the FD-2000 would also be less than 100%.
Syria, however, is something of a sideshow in Turkey's missile defense
game.
Turkey's decision to procure these missile defense assets goes back to
2011 and was part of Turkey's ambiguous dance with the United States,
NATO, and Iran and the threat of Iran's long range missiles.
In 2011, the Obama administration announced that Turkey's
participation in the US/NATO integrated ballistic missile defense
system would be limited to hosting a radar station at Malatya -
without any NATO provided missile defense. Unsurprisingly, Iran
announced that a NATO radar station in Turkey would have a bull's eye
painted on it and Turkey was left to its own devices to deal with the
Iranian threat. Therefore, the Turkish government embarked on its
procurement odyssey seeking a defense against long range (ie Iranian)
missiles, which ended with the announcement of the purchase of the
FD-2000.
It can be assumed that Turkey, eager to maintain its regional clout as
an independent security actor, made the conscious decision to stick a
finger in Iran's eye by siding with the US and NATO on the radar
(while stipulating that Iran must never be formally identified as the
radar's target), and to try to manage Iran's extreme displeasure by
deploying a more Turkish, non-NATO, presumably less confrontationally
managed missile defense system. [7]
Performance questions aside, the Syrian trauma has reinforced Turkey's
desire for a non-NATO missile defense system. As an analysis on the
Carnegie Europe website pointed out, Turkey's feelings of being
slighted by the US and NATO on Syria are no accident and translate
rather directly into an independent defense policy:
"In a little-known episode of NATO history, the only Article 5
[collective self defense] crisis-management exercise ever conducted by
the organization ended in disagreement. Coincidentally, the scenario
for the exercise, held in 2002, was designed to simulate an Article 5
response to a chemical weapons attack by Amberland, a hypothetical
southern neighbor of Turkey.
Amberland was known to have several Scud missiles, tipped with
biological and chemical warheads, aimed at Turkey. During the
seven-day exercise, the United States and Turkey reportedly took a
more hardline stance in support of preemptive strikes, while Germany,
France, and Spain preferred to defuse the crisis through more
political means.
The exercise apparently ended with NATO members disagreeing about the
prospective NATO response before any attack was carried out or Article
5 was officially invoked. [8]"
As Turkey sees it, in other words, maybe the danger on Iran is that
NATO will go too far and embroil Turkey in a regional confrontation it
does not desire; on Syria, the reality is that NATO doesn't go far
enough, and is leaving Turkey vulnerable to Syrian retaliation for
Erdogan's perilous overreach on Syrian regime change.
Even though the FD-2000 is not well-suited to coping with a Syrian
short range missile threat, the missile defense batteries could also
assist in enforcing a no-fly zone at the Syrian-Turkish border,
something that NATO has specifically ruled out for its Patriot
batteries in Turkey (which are for the most part safely out of range
of the Syrian border and whose main purpose seems to be protecting
NATO and US military installations) without an enabling UN resolution
or suitable coalition.
Turkey would probably be happy to have this independent capability in
its security/Syria destabilization portfolio though, at a cost of
hundreds of thousands of dollars per pop, it will probably think twice
about a shooting spree of FD-2000 missiles at Syrian planes.Erdogan is
also unhappy with Russia's frontline support of the Syrian regime
militarily as well as diplomatically, especially compared with Chinese
discretion, and that's probably why he didn't choose the S-300 option.
Iran, which has experienced the headaches of politicized supply (or,
to be more accurate, non-supply) of its S-300 missile defense system
by Russia, is also reportedly considering the FD-2000 (its
manufacturer, CPMIEC, was sanctioned by the United States for
unspecified Iran-related transgressions presumably relating to Chinese
willingness to transfer missile technology) ... but maybe Iran is
thinking long and hard about the rumor that the fire control radar
technology passed through Israel's hands on its way to China.
Apparently a Western marketing point steering Turkey away from Russian
or Chinese systems was the argument that inoperability with NATO
equipment would be a problem and the missile defense batteries would
be sitting there without vital linkages to NATO theater-scale radar
and missile-killing capabilities (though Greece, with an inventory of
Russian S-300s, somehow managed to make do).
Well, maybe that's the point. Erdogan is implying he doesn't want to
rely on the United States or NATO - which might demand Turkey's
diplomatic and security subservience and NATO control over Turkish
missile defense assets - to keep his missile defense system working,
while exposing both missile sites and the radar facility to Iranian
NATO-related wrath.
Perhaps Erdogan has abandoned his dreams of full partnership with NATO
and the European Union, and doesn't see Turkey as Europe's front line
state in the Middle East. He wants his own, independent missile
defense capability to protect distinctly Turkish targets and manage
his relationships with Iran and Syria on a more bilateral basis.
And as far as the People's Republic of China is concerned, it can
mollify Iran with the observation that China, by stepping up and
providing the system in place of Raytheon or a French/Italian
consortium, was preventing the full integration of Turkey into the
NATO missile defense bloc.
In which case, Turkey's name on the NATO membership rolls should
include an asterisk denoting its special status. Or maybe it should be
a red star.
Notes:
1. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HQ-9
2. See http://minnickarticles.blogspot.com/2012/10/china-pushes-new-advanced-weapons-at-dsa.html
3. See http://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/
4. See http://www.armyrecognition.com/june_2013_news_defence_security_industry_military/turkey_could_adopt_chinese_air_defense_missile_sys tem_hq-9_fd-2000_for_t-loramids_program_2606133.html
5. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-09/07/c_132700569.htm
6. See http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130907/DEFREG04/309070010/Syria-Threat-Shows-Turkey-s-Need-Chemical-Weapons-Protection
7. See http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.com/2012/08/08/turkeys-plans-for-missile-defense-are-shaping-up/
8. See http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/09/26/not-real-deal-ankara-s-take-on-syria-agreement/gobn.
Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their
intersection with US foreign policy.
Turkey goes for Chinese take-away defense
By Peter Lee
Sept. 27, 2013
On September 26, 2013, Turkey made the rather eyebrow-raising decision
to put its long range missile defense eggs in a Chinese basket,
announcing it had awarded a US$3 billion contract to the People's
Republic of China for its truck-mounted "shoot and scoot" FD-2000
system.
The Chinese FD-2000 is based on the Hong Qi missile, which has been
around since the 1990s. The FD-2000 is an export version of the HQ-9
that appeared in 2009 and is marketed as a next-generation improvement
on the Russian S-300 system, but whose fire control radar looks more
like the radar matching US-based Raytheon's Patriot missile system
(with the implication that the PRC filched the technology, maybe with
some help from Israel). [1]
Defense correspondent Wendell Minick relayed the description of the
FD-2000 that China provided at a 2010 Asian arms show:
It can target cruise missiles (7-24 km), air-to-ground missiles (7-50
km), aircraft (7-125 km), precision-guided bombs and tactical
ballistic missiles (7-25 km). "FD-2000 is mainly provided for air
force and air defense force for asset air defense to protect core
political, military and economic targets," according to the brochure
of China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC),
the manufacturer of the system. It can also coordinate with other air
defense systems to "form a multi-layer air defense system for regional
air defense." [2]
Turkey is procuring 12 of these systems (it had originally requested
20 Patriot systems when Syria heated up and got six for a year, since
renewed).
The FD-2000 looks great on paper. However, it appears to be untested
in combat - and even the Patriot system is apparently not effective
against cruise missiles, implying that the Chinese system isn't going
to do any better. Political issues aside - and there were a lot of
political issues - the deciding factor for Turkey was probably low
price, and China's willingness to do co-production and technology
transfer.
Maybe the Chinese government are eager to put the FD-2000 in some
foreign hot spot in the hopes of getting some real, battlefield data
and make some upgrades before the cruise missiles start flying toward
Beijing. [3]
Press reports from June already implied that Turkey was leaning toward
the Chinese system. However, Turkey's announcement in the midst of the
Syrian chemical weapons negotiations still looks like a slap at the
United States, which makes the Patriot missile system, and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is now manning six Patriot
batteries at present installed in Turkey. [4]
Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan certainly is feeling piqued at the
US-led detour into chemical weapon destruction in Syria, instead of
support for the quick regime collapse that he has been craving ever
since he made the precipitous and rather premature decision to call
for the fall of Bashar al-Assad in the summer of 2011.
Turkey's aggressive regime-change posture has always carried with it
the risk of Syrian chemical weapon retaliation, as a Xinhua piece
pointed out in early November:
'Turkey's army build up on its Syrian border continued, with some 400
chemical, biological and nuclear units arriving in the region as a
measure against a possible chemical threat.
While some analysts cited NATO anti-missile defense systems deployed
in Turkey, others doubted their effectiveness."The citizens in the
southern border have not been given adequate equipment to protect
themselves, especially from chemical attacks," said Turkish academic
Soli Ozel. "Let's say that one battery misses one missile ... The
smart missile may not be so smart." [5]'
Suspicion of the Patriot's missile-busting awesomeness seems to be
endemic in Turkey:
"Sait Yilmaz, an expert, told Turkish daily Today's Zaman that
Patriots - the anti-ballistic missiles provided by NATO - would not be
effective against short-distance missiles. He said that if Syria fired
a large number of missiles on Turkish targets at such a short
distance, most would go uncountered. [6]"
The general consensus seems to be that if Syria unleashed a barrage of
short-range missiles the Patriot missiles would not do a sensational
job; indeed, the suspicion is that the six batteries are in Turkey
merely as a symbolic show of NATO support for Turkey. Presumably, the
protection provided by the FD-2000 would also be less than 100%.
Syria, however, is something of a sideshow in Turkey's missile defense
game.
Turkey's decision to procure these missile defense assets goes back to
2011 and was part of Turkey's ambiguous dance with the United States,
NATO, and Iran and the threat of Iran's long range missiles.
In 2011, the Obama administration announced that Turkey's
participation in the US/NATO integrated ballistic missile defense
system would be limited to hosting a radar station at Malatya -
without any NATO provided missile defense. Unsurprisingly, Iran
announced that a NATO radar station in Turkey would have a bull's eye
painted on it and Turkey was left to its own devices to deal with the
Iranian threat. Therefore, the Turkish government embarked on its
procurement odyssey seeking a defense against long range (ie Iranian)
missiles, which ended with the announcement of the purchase of the
FD-2000.
It can be assumed that Turkey, eager to maintain its regional clout as
an independent security actor, made the conscious decision to stick a
finger in Iran's eye by siding with the US and NATO on the radar
(while stipulating that Iran must never be formally identified as the
radar's target), and to try to manage Iran's extreme displeasure by
deploying a more Turkish, non-NATO, presumably less confrontationally
managed missile defense system. [7]
Performance questions aside, the Syrian trauma has reinforced Turkey's
desire for a non-NATO missile defense system. As an analysis on the
Carnegie Europe website pointed out, Turkey's feelings of being
slighted by the US and NATO on Syria are no accident and translate
rather directly into an independent defense policy:
"In a little-known episode of NATO history, the only Article 5
[collective self defense] crisis-management exercise ever conducted by
the organization ended in disagreement. Coincidentally, the scenario
for the exercise, held in 2002, was designed to simulate an Article 5
response to a chemical weapons attack by Amberland, a hypothetical
southern neighbor of Turkey.
Amberland was known to have several Scud missiles, tipped with
biological and chemical warheads, aimed at Turkey. During the
seven-day exercise, the United States and Turkey reportedly took a
more hardline stance in support of preemptive strikes, while Germany,
France, and Spain preferred to defuse the crisis through more
political means.
The exercise apparently ended with NATO members disagreeing about the
prospective NATO response before any attack was carried out or Article
5 was officially invoked. [8]"
As Turkey sees it, in other words, maybe the danger on Iran is that
NATO will go too far and embroil Turkey in a regional confrontation it
does not desire; on Syria, the reality is that NATO doesn't go far
enough, and is leaving Turkey vulnerable to Syrian retaliation for
Erdogan's perilous overreach on Syrian regime change.
Even though the FD-2000 is not well-suited to coping with a Syrian
short range missile threat, the missile defense batteries could also
assist in enforcing a no-fly zone at the Syrian-Turkish border,
something that NATO has specifically ruled out for its Patriot
batteries in Turkey (which are for the most part safely out of range
of the Syrian border and whose main purpose seems to be protecting
NATO and US military installations) without an enabling UN resolution
or suitable coalition.
Turkey would probably be happy to have this independent capability in
its security/Syria destabilization portfolio though, at a cost of
hundreds of thousands of dollars per pop, it will probably think twice
about a shooting spree of FD-2000 missiles at Syrian planes.Erdogan is
also unhappy with Russia's frontline support of the Syrian regime
militarily as well as diplomatically, especially compared with Chinese
discretion, and that's probably why he didn't choose the S-300 option.
Iran, which has experienced the headaches of politicized supply (or,
to be more accurate, non-supply) of its S-300 missile defense system
by Russia, is also reportedly considering the FD-2000 (its
manufacturer, CPMIEC, was sanctioned by the United States for
unspecified Iran-related transgressions presumably relating to Chinese
willingness to transfer missile technology) ... but maybe Iran is
thinking long and hard about the rumor that the fire control radar
technology passed through Israel's hands on its way to China.
Apparently a Western marketing point steering Turkey away from Russian
or Chinese systems was the argument that inoperability with NATO
equipment would be a problem and the missile defense batteries would
be sitting there without vital linkages to NATO theater-scale radar
and missile-killing capabilities (though Greece, with an inventory of
Russian S-300s, somehow managed to make do).
Well, maybe that's the point. Erdogan is implying he doesn't want to
rely on the United States or NATO - which might demand Turkey's
diplomatic and security subservience and NATO control over Turkish
missile defense assets - to keep his missile defense system working,
while exposing both missile sites and the radar facility to Iranian
NATO-related wrath.
Perhaps Erdogan has abandoned his dreams of full partnership with NATO
and the European Union, and doesn't see Turkey as Europe's front line
state in the Middle East. He wants his own, independent missile
defense capability to protect distinctly Turkish targets and manage
his relationships with Iran and Syria on a more bilateral basis.
And as far as the People's Republic of China is concerned, it can
mollify Iran with the observation that China, by stepping up and
providing the system in place of Raytheon or a French/Italian
consortium, was preventing the full integration of Turkey into the
NATO missile defense bloc.
In which case, Turkey's name on the NATO membership rolls should
include an asterisk denoting its special status. Or maybe it should be
a red star.
Notes:
1. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HQ-9
2. See http://minnickarticles.blogspot.com/2012/10/china-pushes-new-advanced-weapons-at-dsa.html
3. See http://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/
4. See http://www.armyrecognition.com/june_2013_news_defence_security_industry_military/turkey_could_adopt_chinese_air_defense_missile_sys tem_hq-9_fd-2000_for_t-loramids_program_2606133.html
5. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-09/07/c_132700569.htm
6. See http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130907/DEFREG04/309070010/Syria-Threat-Shows-Turkey-s-Need-Chemical-Weapons-Protection
7. See http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.com/2012/08/08/turkeys-plans-for-missile-defense-are-shaping-up/
8. See http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/09/26/not-real-deal-ankara-s-take-on-syria-agreement/gobn.
Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their
intersection with US foreign policy.