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US-ARMENIA: EVOLUTION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS
By Samson Martirosyan on April 8, 2014
The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia's Foreign Policy in Focus
The U.S. was quick in acknowledging the independence of the Soviet
breakaway countries, and was one of the first to acknowledge the
Republic of Armenia on Dec. 25, 1991. Not long after that, on Jan. 7,
1992, the two countries established diplomatic relations. The U.S.
Embassy in Yerevan was opened a year later, on Feb. 3, 1993. Armenia,
as well as the other 14 countries that once formed an integral part
of the Soviet Union, started to be referred to as the NIS (Newly
Independent States). The U.S. immediately adopted a policy to assist
these countries in humanitarian, political, and economic terms to
ensure their survival.
Armenians gather as Lenin's statue is toppled in Republic (once,
Lenin) square.
For the U.S., it was vital to see Armenia step onto a path of
sustainable development mostly because of the latter's geographic
position, coupled with the fact that it's a mono-ethnic country with
a majority Christian population, as well as some other geopolitical
peculiarities. Armenia was seen as a country the U.S. could establish
friendly relations with and use as a positive actor in the U.S.-Iran
and U.S.-Russia relations, as well as in other broader Middle Eastern
issues. Armenia was also an essential corridor through which the north
was connected to the south, and the east to the west. Vast Caspian
resources could be transferred over Armenia's territory. Having a
reliable partner with such a strategic geographic position could
strengthen the U.S.'s presence in the South Caucasus.
For most of the NIS states, and particularly for Armenia, independence
was much desired. However, Armenia was unprepared to adequately deal
with it. This was mostly due to the fact that it inherited inefficient
economic and political systems, and had an extremely complex process of
dissolution, which gave rise to new challenges that were even harder
to deal with. In Armenia's case, independence was accompanied with
the escalation of conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Not long before Armenia gained independence, a tragic earthquake had
hit its northern part in 1988, taking the lives of more than 20,000
people and resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe. Meanwhile,
the Azerbaijani government was pushing for an economic blockade,
and was soon joined by Turkey--proof of the brotherhood between
these two countries. The situation was made even more difficult by
the enormous flow of Armenian refugees from Baku, Sumgait, and other
areas of Azerbaijan, where a campaign of ethnic cleansing was ongoing.
Taking into consideration this and other similarly challenging
situations in the NIS, the U.S. Congress adopted the FREEDOM Support
Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open
Markets Support Act; FSA). The FSA aimed at helping NIS countries and
was the main mechanism of humanitarian and other types of assistance,
including economic, political technical, and democratic assistance.
Armenia was included in this act and in the early and mid-1990's
received more assistance from the U.S. government than any
other NIS country--a large fraction of the $41 billion in total
aid. Amendment 907 of the FSA, which prohibited support to the
Azerbaijani government because of the economic blockade on Armenia,
was another form of support from the U.S. The establishment of the
Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues in 1995 further strengthened
the bilateral relations between Armenia and the U.S. This Caucus
was the result of consistent work by Armenian Americans aiming to
coordinate work on Armenian issues, promoting legislative initiatives
in Congress, and strengthening Diaspora-Armenia relations. Armenia was
also able to participate in numerous U.S.-supported programs aimed at
strengthening civil society, disseminating democratic values, raising
the qualifications of Armenian workers, scholars, and students, and
improving the electoral and judicial systems. This was done through
a provision of governmental grants to different NGOs, individuals,
and institutions working in these fields.
Programs like Enterprise Development and Market Competitiveness
(EDMC), Partners for Financial Stability (PFS), Tax Reform Project
(TRP), and Entrepreneurship and Civic Activism for Young People were
just a few of the projects implemented by USAID in Armenia starting
in the early 1990's. The opening of the American University of Armenia
(AUA) contributed enormously to bilateral cooperation in the sphere of
education and science. Numerous student and teacher exchange programs
gave Armenians a chance to improve their professional qualifications
in the U.S. and later contribute their knowledge in the state-building
mission in Armenia.
Such fruitful U.S.-Armenian cooperation would have been impossible
without friendly relations with high-ranking officials and working
visits. Former Foreign Minister Vahan Papazian visited the U.S. in
1993, former President Levon Ter-Petrosian followed suit with an
official working visit in 1994, and former Prime Minister Vazgen
Sargsyan was in the U.S. in 1999. From the American side, Secretary
of State James Baker visited Armenia in 1992 and Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbot came in 1999.
Despite the cooperation between these two countries, political
developments in Armenia turned out to be quite negative for such
cooperation. The presidential election of 1996, which was described by
Former President Levon Ter-Petrosian (Photo: Photolur)
most observers as non-transparent, was the main reason for this. A
New York Times article reflected the situation more clearly:
"Armenia has drifted towards dictatorship... Presidential elections
this fall were found to be so deeply flawed that the United States,
which provides more foreign aid to Armenia per person than to any
country except Israel, declined to offer routine congratulations to
the winner, Levon Ter-Petrosian. It has been a year of diminishing
press freedom and rising human-rights violations. Most of all, it
has been a year in which Ter-Petrosian, once revered as the man who
brought democracy to Armenia, appears to have completed a journey from
liberal intellectual to stony autocrat."1 The tragic event in 1999,
when Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, Speaker of Parliament Karen
Demirchyan, and six other high-ranking officials were killed during
a terrorist attack on parliament, was another negative factor that
affected Armenia's positive image in the eyes of the U.S. Armenia
was no longer considered a stability spot in the South Caucasus when
compared to Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Overall, the 1990's can be described as a time when both sides
were working actively to establish ties. These were indispensable
for Armenia to develop its infrastructure, heal its economy, and
build a civil society using financial, technical, and other types
of American support. For the U.S., it was a time when aid to Armenia
could bring positive effects to the entire region. Armenia was a main
actor here, and any instability in the Nagorno-Karabagh region could
shatter the fragile security of the South Caucasus. Moreover, because
Armenia relied on Iran (its only stable border; Georgia plunged into
ethno-political conflicts, and Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their
borders) and Russia backed the CSTO to ensure its security, the U.S.
didn't have any direct leverage on Armenia, which meant friendly
relations were vital for both sides. The Clinton Administration looked
to establish new energy routes, through which Caspian resources could
flow to the West. Unfortunately, Armenia was excluded from these
regional projects because of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the
open policy of isolating Armenia actively pursued by Azerbaijan and
Turkey. These routes also bypassed the territories of Iran and Russia.
September 11 had a huge impact on U.S. foreign policy, more or
less defining the next eight years of U.S. policy abroad. The
Bush Administration sought more stability and security, which was
accompanied with its fight against terrorism. The South Caucasus rose
in importance, as they were territories through which the U.S. could
secure its air corridor. The close proximity of Iran to the region
was another factor. The U.S. needed the South Caucasus mainly for
its broader plans and policy regarding Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.
Whereas military cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan
deepened--the former had a pro-Western-oriented government and the
latter had vast energy resources--Armenia remained marginalized and
isolated from these developments. This is partly due to the fact
that Armenia relied on Russia on security issues; there is still a
Russian military base in Armenia's second largest city of Gyumri. While
programs for democratization and assistance continued, and the U.S.
remained actively engaged in the peace talks between Armenia and
Azerbaijan (in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group), aside from
political rhetoric, relations between these two countries proceeded
at a slow pace--for several reasons.
Turkey, as a key NATO member and a military partner of the U.S.,
granted the U.S. the exceptional right to use its territory and air
space for troop deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. In this sense,
it was vital to maintain close ties with Turkey. As it is widely
known, Turkey and Armenia have no bilateral relations. While the
Armenian lobby in the U.S. pushed for the recognition of the Armenian
Genocide in Congress, the Bush Administration could not neglect its
close military ties with Turkey, which led to the rejection of the
Armenian Genocide bill. Bush himself said, "We all deeply regret the
tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915. But this
resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings
and its passage would do great harm to relations with a key ally in
NATO, and to the war on terror."2
The second reason is related to Azerbaijan's role, specifically the
importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Azerbaijan's air
space, through which the U.S. launched operations in Afghanistan.
Because relations with Azerbaijan were assessed higher, Bush waived
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in the early 2000s, although
the total cancellation of Section 907 did not succeed.
The third reason involves Georgia and its openly declared course
towards NATO and the West. Bush's two-day visit to Georgia is proof
of this. Armenia had a smaller role, if any role at all.
With the election of President Barack Obama, U.S. foreign policy began
to gradually change. The Iran nuclear issue, the "Arab Spring," the
global economic crisis, problems with North Korea, and other factors
helped shape U.S. foreign policy. Regarding the South Caucasus, it
is worth mentioning that Obama's decision to "reset" relations with
Russia consequently affected U.S. attitude towards the region.
U.S.-Armenia relations were marked with positive change, when the U.S.
started pressuring Turkey over Armenian-Turkish reconciliation.
Although the Turkish-Armenian protocols currently are frozen and
both sides do not seem eager to continue this process, evaluating
U.S.-Armenia relations in the framework of Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation can be viewed in a mostly positive light, when one
bears in mind the initial enthusiasm of the Armenian government in
initiating bilateral relations with Turkey.
The U.S. is also still actively involved in the OSCE Minsk Group and
is working towards ensuring that a new war over Nagorno-Karabagh does
not materialize and destabilize the region. U.S. financial assistance
to Nagorno-Karabagh also continues (it is the only country other than
Armenia to provide financial support, clearly due to active Armenian
lobbying efforts in Congress), although the former does not officially
recognize Karabagh.
A commemorative stamp issued in honor of the murdered officials in
the 1999 terrorist attack on Parliament.
Nevertheless, neither Armenia nor the South Caucasus as a whole has
been top priorities for the U.S. Of course, there are some projects
related to government reforms, democratization, rule of law, and
civil society implemented by USAID. But for almost a decade now,
Armenia has been losing the importance it once signified to the
U.S. The South Caucasus are mostly seen from Washington as a bone of
contention with Russia.
Yet, it's reasonable to predict more involvement and a stronger desire
on the part of the U.S. to deepen ties with Armenia in the near
future. Now that President Serge Sarkisian has decided to embrace
Putin's Russia even more fondly with his September 2013 decision to
join the Russia-led Customs Union, the U.S. will not want Russia to
have complete and unchallenged dominance in the region, particularly
in Armenia. There may not open confrontation with Russia, but we're
likely to see more active U.S. involvement in Armenia.
The role of the Armenian Diaspora and its effectiveness is of high
importance for U.S.-Armenia relations, but Armenia here is the side
that gains most. The Armenian Genocide, which is critically important
for both Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora, still remains a sore point
in U.S.-Armenia relations. U.S. leaders have time and again refused
to officially recognize the genocide, and use it as leverage against
Turkey. Obama hasn't kept his promise of recognizing the Armenian
Genocide, instead making references to attempts at Armenia-Turkey
reconciliation. However, the closer we get to the 100th anniversary of
the Armenian Genocide, the more tense Armenia-Turkey relations become.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is expected to visit Armenia as
part of his regional tour at the end of 2014; the U.S. will most
probably call for or even initiate another attempt at normalization
of Armenia-Turkey relations, thus avoiding tensions and once again
breaking Obama's election-time promise. Expecting Obama to recognize
the Armenian Genocide would be naïve; for, however bad or good its
relations with Turkey, the latter is still one of the largest NATO
members, with aspirations to lead the Middle East. The U.S. simply
cannot afford to break ties with Turkey, as any loss from that move
will outweigh the gains.
The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is another important area of cooperation
between Armenia and the U.S., which has always been active in the
OSCE Minsk Group, advocating for a peace deal between the two sides.
However, resolution of the conflict can hardly be dictated from
third parties due to high risks of enflaming the region. Whatever the
solution, Armenia and Azerbaijan should reach it themselves--and the
U.S. seems to realize that.
Regarding economic cooperation with the U.S., Armenian Americans and
other investors have raised concerns that the Armenian government
does not take firm steps to secure foreign investments. Several local
oligarchs almost entirely control the market, stifling the growth
of startups. Investments are not entirely secure if they somehow
hinder monopolies. There are three major factors that explain the
lack of U.S. investment in the Armenian economy: the Armenian market
is relatively small; Armenia continues to stay isolated, with its
closed borders; and finally, many of the strategically important
sectors are under the direct control of Russia.
Another key factor affecting overall U.S. relations with almost all
of the countries involved is related to human rights. The U.S. has
sometimes been critical towards human rights violations in Armenia,
which has included excessive use of power by the government, clashes
with police, restrictions on pluralism, political prisoners, electoral
fraud, etc. However, overall the U.S. has not been critical enough,
as it wishes to maintain good relations with Sarkisian. Priority is
instead given to Turkey-Armenia relations and the Nagorno Karabagh
conflict.
U.S.-Armenia relations have gone through ups and downs, but they have
never been on the brink or at a peak. The political, economic, and
military ties between the two countries can certainly be deepened,
but this depends largely on the political will of the U.S. This
political will, from another perspective, can be boosted by Armenia,
which can increase the levels of cooperation as it needs more support
from the West.
Notes
[1] Specter, Michael "Drift To Dictatorship Clouds Armenia's
Happiness," New York Times, Jan. 3, 1997.
2 Knowlton, Bryan "Bush urges Congress to reject Armenian Genocide
resolution," New York Times, Oct. 10, 2007.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/04/08/us-armenia-evolution-of-bilateral-relations/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Samson Martirosyan on April 8, 2014
The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia's Foreign Policy in Focus
The U.S. was quick in acknowledging the independence of the Soviet
breakaway countries, and was one of the first to acknowledge the
Republic of Armenia on Dec. 25, 1991. Not long after that, on Jan. 7,
1992, the two countries established diplomatic relations. The U.S.
Embassy in Yerevan was opened a year later, on Feb. 3, 1993. Armenia,
as well as the other 14 countries that once formed an integral part
of the Soviet Union, started to be referred to as the NIS (Newly
Independent States). The U.S. immediately adopted a policy to assist
these countries in humanitarian, political, and economic terms to
ensure their survival.
Armenians gather as Lenin's statue is toppled in Republic (once,
Lenin) square.
For the U.S., it was vital to see Armenia step onto a path of
sustainable development mostly because of the latter's geographic
position, coupled with the fact that it's a mono-ethnic country with
a majority Christian population, as well as some other geopolitical
peculiarities. Armenia was seen as a country the U.S. could establish
friendly relations with and use as a positive actor in the U.S.-Iran
and U.S.-Russia relations, as well as in other broader Middle Eastern
issues. Armenia was also an essential corridor through which the north
was connected to the south, and the east to the west. Vast Caspian
resources could be transferred over Armenia's territory. Having a
reliable partner with such a strategic geographic position could
strengthen the U.S.'s presence in the South Caucasus.
For most of the NIS states, and particularly for Armenia, independence
was much desired. However, Armenia was unprepared to adequately deal
with it. This was mostly due to the fact that it inherited inefficient
economic and political systems, and had an extremely complex process of
dissolution, which gave rise to new challenges that were even harder
to deal with. In Armenia's case, independence was accompanied with
the escalation of conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Not long before Armenia gained independence, a tragic earthquake had
hit its northern part in 1988, taking the lives of more than 20,000
people and resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe. Meanwhile,
the Azerbaijani government was pushing for an economic blockade,
and was soon joined by Turkey--proof of the brotherhood between
these two countries. The situation was made even more difficult by
the enormous flow of Armenian refugees from Baku, Sumgait, and other
areas of Azerbaijan, where a campaign of ethnic cleansing was ongoing.
Taking into consideration this and other similarly challenging
situations in the NIS, the U.S. Congress adopted the FREEDOM Support
Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open
Markets Support Act; FSA). The FSA aimed at helping NIS countries and
was the main mechanism of humanitarian and other types of assistance,
including economic, political technical, and democratic assistance.
Armenia was included in this act and in the early and mid-1990's
received more assistance from the U.S. government than any
other NIS country--a large fraction of the $41 billion in total
aid. Amendment 907 of the FSA, which prohibited support to the
Azerbaijani government because of the economic blockade on Armenia,
was another form of support from the U.S. The establishment of the
Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues in 1995 further strengthened
the bilateral relations between Armenia and the U.S. This Caucus
was the result of consistent work by Armenian Americans aiming to
coordinate work on Armenian issues, promoting legislative initiatives
in Congress, and strengthening Diaspora-Armenia relations. Armenia was
also able to participate in numerous U.S.-supported programs aimed at
strengthening civil society, disseminating democratic values, raising
the qualifications of Armenian workers, scholars, and students, and
improving the electoral and judicial systems. This was done through
a provision of governmental grants to different NGOs, individuals,
and institutions working in these fields.
Programs like Enterprise Development and Market Competitiveness
(EDMC), Partners for Financial Stability (PFS), Tax Reform Project
(TRP), and Entrepreneurship and Civic Activism for Young People were
just a few of the projects implemented by USAID in Armenia starting
in the early 1990's. The opening of the American University of Armenia
(AUA) contributed enormously to bilateral cooperation in the sphere of
education and science. Numerous student and teacher exchange programs
gave Armenians a chance to improve their professional qualifications
in the U.S. and later contribute their knowledge in the state-building
mission in Armenia.
Such fruitful U.S.-Armenian cooperation would have been impossible
without friendly relations with high-ranking officials and working
visits. Former Foreign Minister Vahan Papazian visited the U.S. in
1993, former President Levon Ter-Petrosian followed suit with an
official working visit in 1994, and former Prime Minister Vazgen
Sargsyan was in the U.S. in 1999. From the American side, Secretary
of State James Baker visited Armenia in 1992 and Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbot came in 1999.
Despite the cooperation between these two countries, political
developments in Armenia turned out to be quite negative for such
cooperation. The presidential election of 1996, which was described by
Former President Levon Ter-Petrosian (Photo: Photolur)
most observers as non-transparent, was the main reason for this. A
New York Times article reflected the situation more clearly:
"Armenia has drifted towards dictatorship... Presidential elections
this fall were found to be so deeply flawed that the United States,
which provides more foreign aid to Armenia per person than to any
country except Israel, declined to offer routine congratulations to
the winner, Levon Ter-Petrosian. It has been a year of diminishing
press freedom and rising human-rights violations. Most of all, it
has been a year in which Ter-Petrosian, once revered as the man who
brought democracy to Armenia, appears to have completed a journey from
liberal intellectual to stony autocrat."1 The tragic event in 1999,
when Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, Speaker of Parliament Karen
Demirchyan, and six other high-ranking officials were killed during
a terrorist attack on parliament, was another negative factor that
affected Armenia's positive image in the eyes of the U.S. Armenia
was no longer considered a stability spot in the South Caucasus when
compared to Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Overall, the 1990's can be described as a time when both sides
were working actively to establish ties. These were indispensable
for Armenia to develop its infrastructure, heal its economy, and
build a civil society using financial, technical, and other types
of American support. For the U.S., it was a time when aid to Armenia
could bring positive effects to the entire region. Armenia was a main
actor here, and any instability in the Nagorno-Karabagh region could
shatter the fragile security of the South Caucasus. Moreover, because
Armenia relied on Iran (its only stable border; Georgia plunged into
ethno-political conflicts, and Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their
borders) and Russia backed the CSTO to ensure its security, the U.S.
didn't have any direct leverage on Armenia, which meant friendly
relations were vital for both sides. The Clinton Administration looked
to establish new energy routes, through which Caspian resources could
flow to the West. Unfortunately, Armenia was excluded from these
regional projects because of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the
open policy of isolating Armenia actively pursued by Azerbaijan and
Turkey. These routes also bypassed the territories of Iran and Russia.
September 11 had a huge impact on U.S. foreign policy, more or
less defining the next eight years of U.S. policy abroad. The
Bush Administration sought more stability and security, which was
accompanied with its fight against terrorism. The South Caucasus rose
in importance, as they were territories through which the U.S. could
secure its air corridor. The close proximity of Iran to the region
was another factor. The U.S. needed the South Caucasus mainly for
its broader plans and policy regarding Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.
Whereas military cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan
deepened--the former had a pro-Western-oriented government and the
latter had vast energy resources--Armenia remained marginalized and
isolated from these developments. This is partly due to the fact
that Armenia relied on Russia on security issues; there is still a
Russian military base in Armenia's second largest city of Gyumri. While
programs for democratization and assistance continued, and the U.S.
remained actively engaged in the peace talks between Armenia and
Azerbaijan (in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group), aside from
political rhetoric, relations between these two countries proceeded
at a slow pace--for several reasons.
Turkey, as a key NATO member and a military partner of the U.S.,
granted the U.S. the exceptional right to use its territory and air
space for troop deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. In this sense,
it was vital to maintain close ties with Turkey. As it is widely
known, Turkey and Armenia have no bilateral relations. While the
Armenian lobby in the U.S. pushed for the recognition of the Armenian
Genocide in Congress, the Bush Administration could not neglect its
close military ties with Turkey, which led to the rejection of the
Armenian Genocide bill. Bush himself said, "We all deeply regret the
tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915. But this
resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings
and its passage would do great harm to relations with a key ally in
NATO, and to the war on terror."2
The second reason is related to Azerbaijan's role, specifically the
importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Azerbaijan's air
space, through which the U.S. launched operations in Afghanistan.
Because relations with Azerbaijan were assessed higher, Bush waived
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in the early 2000s, although
the total cancellation of Section 907 did not succeed.
The third reason involves Georgia and its openly declared course
towards NATO and the West. Bush's two-day visit to Georgia is proof
of this. Armenia had a smaller role, if any role at all.
With the election of President Barack Obama, U.S. foreign policy began
to gradually change. The Iran nuclear issue, the "Arab Spring," the
global economic crisis, problems with North Korea, and other factors
helped shape U.S. foreign policy. Regarding the South Caucasus, it
is worth mentioning that Obama's decision to "reset" relations with
Russia consequently affected U.S. attitude towards the region.
U.S.-Armenia relations were marked with positive change, when the U.S.
started pressuring Turkey over Armenian-Turkish reconciliation.
Although the Turkish-Armenian protocols currently are frozen and
both sides do not seem eager to continue this process, evaluating
U.S.-Armenia relations in the framework of Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation can be viewed in a mostly positive light, when one
bears in mind the initial enthusiasm of the Armenian government in
initiating bilateral relations with Turkey.
The U.S. is also still actively involved in the OSCE Minsk Group and
is working towards ensuring that a new war over Nagorno-Karabagh does
not materialize and destabilize the region. U.S. financial assistance
to Nagorno-Karabagh also continues (it is the only country other than
Armenia to provide financial support, clearly due to active Armenian
lobbying efforts in Congress), although the former does not officially
recognize Karabagh.
A commemorative stamp issued in honor of the murdered officials in
the 1999 terrorist attack on Parliament.
Nevertheless, neither Armenia nor the South Caucasus as a whole has
been top priorities for the U.S. Of course, there are some projects
related to government reforms, democratization, rule of law, and
civil society implemented by USAID. But for almost a decade now,
Armenia has been losing the importance it once signified to the
U.S. The South Caucasus are mostly seen from Washington as a bone of
contention with Russia.
Yet, it's reasonable to predict more involvement and a stronger desire
on the part of the U.S. to deepen ties with Armenia in the near
future. Now that President Serge Sarkisian has decided to embrace
Putin's Russia even more fondly with his September 2013 decision to
join the Russia-led Customs Union, the U.S. will not want Russia to
have complete and unchallenged dominance in the region, particularly
in Armenia. There may not open confrontation with Russia, but we're
likely to see more active U.S. involvement in Armenia.
The role of the Armenian Diaspora and its effectiveness is of high
importance for U.S.-Armenia relations, but Armenia here is the side
that gains most. The Armenian Genocide, which is critically important
for both Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora, still remains a sore point
in U.S.-Armenia relations. U.S. leaders have time and again refused
to officially recognize the genocide, and use it as leverage against
Turkey. Obama hasn't kept his promise of recognizing the Armenian
Genocide, instead making references to attempts at Armenia-Turkey
reconciliation. However, the closer we get to the 100th anniversary of
the Armenian Genocide, the more tense Armenia-Turkey relations become.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is expected to visit Armenia as
part of his regional tour at the end of 2014; the U.S. will most
probably call for or even initiate another attempt at normalization
of Armenia-Turkey relations, thus avoiding tensions and once again
breaking Obama's election-time promise. Expecting Obama to recognize
the Armenian Genocide would be naïve; for, however bad or good its
relations with Turkey, the latter is still one of the largest NATO
members, with aspirations to lead the Middle East. The U.S. simply
cannot afford to break ties with Turkey, as any loss from that move
will outweigh the gains.
The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is another important area of cooperation
between Armenia and the U.S., which has always been active in the
OSCE Minsk Group, advocating for a peace deal between the two sides.
However, resolution of the conflict can hardly be dictated from
third parties due to high risks of enflaming the region. Whatever the
solution, Armenia and Azerbaijan should reach it themselves--and the
U.S. seems to realize that.
Regarding economic cooperation with the U.S., Armenian Americans and
other investors have raised concerns that the Armenian government
does not take firm steps to secure foreign investments. Several local
oligarchs almost entirely control the market, stifling the growth
of startups. Investments are not entirely secure if they somehow
hinder monopolies. There are three major factors that explain the
lack of U.S. investment in the Armenian economy: the Armenian market
is relatively small; Armenia continues to stay isolated, with its
closed borders; and finally, many of the strategically important
sectors are under the direct control of Russia.
Another key factor affecting overall U.S. relations with almost all
of the countries involved is related to human rights. The U.S. has
sometimes been critical towards human rights violations in Armenia,
which has included excessive use of power by the government, clashes
with police, restrictions on pluralism, political prisoners, electoral
fraud, etc. However, overall the U.S. has not been critical enough,
as it wishes to maintain good relations with Sarkisian. Priority is
instead given to Turkey-Armenia relations and the Nagorno Karabagh
conflict.
U.S.-Armenia relations have gone through ups and downs, but they have
never been on the brink or at a peak. The political, economic, and
military ties between the two countries can certainly be deepened,
but this depends largely on the political will of the U.S. This
political will, from another perspective, can be boosted by Armenia,
which can increase the levels of cooperation as it needs more support
from the West.
Notes
[1] Specter, Michael "Drift To Dictatorship Clouds Armenia's
Happiness," New York Times, Jan. 3, 1997.
2 Knowlton, Bryan "Bush urges Congress to reject Armenian Genocide
resolution," New York Times, Oct. 10, 2007.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/04/08/us-armenia-evolution-of-bilateral-relations/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress