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American Professor: Nagorno-Karabakh is a case of remedial secession 15:48
19/04/2014 - INTERVIEWS Panorama.am presents an interview with Dr. William
Slomanson, Professor of Law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law and visiting
Professor at Pristina University. Dr. Slomanson argues that
Nagorno-Karabakh qualifies as a case of remedial secession under the
International Law.
- Dr. Slomanson, in one of your articles you argue that the cases of
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Kosovo do not qualify as remedial secession,
while in your article `Nagorno-Karabakh: An Alternative Legal Approach
To Its Quest For Legitimacy' you argue that Nagorno-Karabakh presents
such a case. How exactly does Nagorno-Karabakh qualify as a case of
remedial secession and according to you what are the strongest points
in NK's argument of remedial secession?
- The internationally accepted sources of International Law include
=80` treaties, state practice and judicial decisions (as embedded in
ICJ Statute, Article 38d). There is no treaty on secession, and there
never will be, as that would be a political suicide for states. As for
state practice, it has characterized three of the last four unilateral
secessions as being unique (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Kosovo-with no
word yet on Crimea). There have otherwise been numerous conflicting
state approaches to the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The remaining
recognized source on secession in the International Law is thus
judicial decisions - those issued by national/international courts.
In this regard the undisputed lead case is the Canadian Supreme Court
Quebec Secession case, with its three prongs. According to the first
prong there must be a `People,' for which Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians
within Azerbaijan no doubt qualify. Second, there must be `gross human
rights violations' against this people - these violations were in
place starting in 1915, when NK emptied out most of its Armenian
population because of Turkish regional policies. These policies
continued through and including 1989 (the Armenian population declined
considerably as a result of gross human rights violations over many
decades). In 1989 the US Senate-House passed Resolution 178 that
expressed a concern on the ongoing violence in Nagorno-Karabakh -
`seeking (2) Soviet re-establishment of economic and supply routes';
(4) `urge[s] ... investigation of the violence against the people of
Nagorno-Karabakh;' and (5) `express[es] the serious concern of the
American people about the ongoing violence ... interfer[ing] with
international relief efforts.'
The Quebec decision's third prong is `no alternative but
secession'. Given the fact that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was
altered for a number of times - in 1919 (when the United Kingdom
forced NK authorities to conclude an interim agreement with
Azerbaijan), in 1921 (when Moscow annexed NK to the Azerbaijan SSR),
in 1988 (by war) and in 1991 (by the declaration of independence) as
well as taking into account the 2004 Minsk Group statement that NK
independence is not possible under the USSR statute of 03 April 1990
(all of which are addressed in my 2012 article) I do not see how one
could logically suggest that there is an alternative to secession.
- If Nagorno-Karabakh presents a strong case for remedial secession what
implications can this have, given that the right to remedial secession is
not a hard law?
- Given the non-existence of a secession treaty, multiple changes in
sovereign status of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as national/international
concerns (such as those expressed in the above US Congressional position),
the above-mentioned recognized sources of International Law leave only one
logical source for supporting Nagorno-Karabakh's bid for legitimacy - a
national (Canadian) Supreme Court decision on a matter of International
Law. While not a primary source, such as State practice, it is a recognized
source of International Law. If by `soft' law you mean enforceability, the
arguable lack thereof is a discrete political point, while the Quebec
elements are widely acclaimed and thus are more akin to hard law than soft
law.
- Azerbaijan has officially adopted a stance that unless the conflict is
resolved by peaceful means Azerbaijan has the `right' to take back
Nagorno-Karabakh by force, appealing to the right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter and referring to alleged `occupation' of its
territory. Is this stance of Azerbaijan compatible with international law
or not (considering its international obligations and the 1994 ceasefire
agreement)?
- Citing the UN Charter Article 51 self-defense by Azerbaijan is illogical,
given the comparative size of both the Azeri land mass and military
strength. NK, for example, does not have the Israeli drones that the Azeris
use for patrolling the border. As 2006 Russian-American Dartmouth
Conference report indicates, no single document (i.e., the 1994 ceasefire
agreement) will supplant the need for all necessary parties to come to the
table to hammer out a peace accord. One result of that not happening is the
Azeri threat to use its military force to shoot down any plane/helicopter
attempting to make the trip between the Yerevan and NK airports. So it
would be NK, not Azerbaijan, that would end up with a decent Art 51 defense
argument in this context.
Interview by Nvard Chalikyan
http://www.panorama.am/en/interviews/2014/04/19/william-slomanson/
19/04/2014 - INTERVIEWS Panorama.am presents an interview with Dr. William
Slomanson, Professor of Law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law and visiting
Professor at Pristina University. Dr. Slomanson argues that
Nagorno-Karabakh qualifies as a case of remedial secession under the
International Law.
- Dr. Slomanson, in one of your articles you argue that the cases of
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Kosovo do not qualify as remedial secession,
while in your article `Nagorno-Karabakh: An Alternative Legal Approach
To Its Quest For Legitimacy' you argue that Nagorno-Karabakh presents
such a case. How exactly does Nagorno-Karabakh qualify as a case of
remedial secession and according to you what are the strongest points
in NK's argument of remedial secession?
- The internationally accepted sources of International Law include
=80` treaties, state practice and judicial decisions (as embedded in
ICJ Statute, Article 38d). There is no treaty on secession, and there
never will be, as that would be a political suicide for states. As for
state practice, it has characterized three of the last four unilateral
secessions as being unique (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Kosovo-with no
word yet on Crimea). There have otherwise been numerous conflicting
state approaches to the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The remaining
recognized source on secession in the International Law is thus
judicial decisions - those issued by national/international courts.
In this regard the undisputed lead case is the Canadian Supreme Court
Quebec Secession case, with its three prongs. According to the first
prong there must be a `People,' for which Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians
within Azerbaijan no doubt qualify. Second, there must be `gross human
rights violations' against this people - these violations were in
place starting in 1915, when NK emptied out most of its Armenian
population because of Turkish regional policies. These policies
continued through and including 1989 (the Armenian population declined
considerably as a result of gross human rights violations over many
decades). In 1989 the US Senate-House passed Resolution 178 that
expressed a concern on the ongoing violence in Nagorno-Karabakh -
`seeking (2) Soviet re-establishment of economic and supply routes';
(4) `urge[s] ... investigation of the violence against the people of
Nagorno-Karabakh;' and (5) `express[es] the serious concern of the
American people about the ongoing violence ... interfer[ing] with
international relief efforts.'
The Quebec decision's third prong is `no alternative but
secession'. Given the fact that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was
altered for a number of times - in 1919 (when the United Kingdom
forced NK authorities to conclude an interim agreement with
Azerbaijan), in 1921 (when Moscow annexed NK to the Azerbaijan SSR),
in 1988 (by war) and in 1991 (by the declaration of independence) as
well as taking into account the 2004 Minsk Group statement that NK
independence is not possible under the USSR statute of 03 April 1990
(all of which are addressed in my 2012 article) I do not see how one
could logically suggest that there is an alternative to secession.
- If Nagorno-Karabakh presents a strong case for remedial secession what
implications can this have, given that the right to remedial secession is
not a hard law?
- Given the non-existence of a secession treaty, multiple changes in
sovereign status of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as national/international
concerns (such as those expressed in the above US Congressional position),
the above-mentioned recognized sources of International Law leave only one
logical source for supporting Nagorno-Karabakh's bid for legitimacy - a
national (Canadian) Supreme Court decision on a matter of International
Law. While not a primary source, such as State practice, it is a recognized
source of International Law. If by `soft' law you mean enforceability, the
arguable lack thereof is a discrete political point, while the Quebec
elements are widely acclaimed and thus are more akin to hard law than soft
law.
- Azerbaijan has officially adopted a stance that unless the conflict is
resolved by peaceful means Azerbaijan has the `right' to take back
Nagorno-Karabakh by force, appealing to the right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter and referring to alleged `occupation' of its
territory. Is this stance of Azerbaijan compatible with international law
or not (considering its international obligations and the 1994 ceasefire
agreement)?
- Citing the UN Charter Article 51 self-defense by Azerbaijan is illogical,
given the comparative size of both the Azeri land mass and military
strength. NK, for example, does not have the Israeli drones that the Azeris
use for patrolling the border. As 2006 Russian-American Dartmouth
Conference report indicates, no single document (i.e., the 1994 ceasefire
agreement) will supplant the need for all necessary parties to come to the
table to hammer out a peace accord. One result of that not happening is the
Azeri threat to use its military force to shoot down any plane/helicopter
attempting to make the trip between the Yerevan and NK airports. So it
would be NK, not Azerbaijan, that would end up with a decent Art 51 defense
argument in this context.
Interview by Nvard Chalikyan
http://www.panorama.am/en/interviews/2014/04/19/william-slomanson/