Tweet
Daily Sabah, Turkey
April 24 2014
WHY DO ARMENIANS INSIST ON CALLING IT GENOCIDE?
Genocide became the cement of the Armenian diaspora's identity. It
became the diaspora's homeland, a new space in which imagined victims
take refuge in defining who they are by determining whom they are
against
Published : 24.04.2014 01:47:34
M. Hakan Yavuz *
Armenians originally termed the events of 1915 "aghed," (catastrophe)
or "yeghern" (pogrom), while some scholars have also used
"darakrutiun" (deportation) and "aksor" (exile). After 1965, due to a
number of reasons, especially the concerted efforts of the Soviet
Union, the Armenian diaspora under the leadership of the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (ARF), redefined the events of 1915 as
genocide.
Some Armenians insisted on the redefinition of the events as genocide,
while some extremists committed high-profile terrorist attacks and
assassinations of Turkish diplomats. Along with aggressive lobbying
toward the recognition of events as genocide, Armenians narrowed their
own options of reconciliation but provided a new arsenal for outside
forces to be used as leverage against Turkey and Armenians at the same
time.
Those countries that want Turkey to do something for them play the
"genocide card." As a consequence, the Armenian issue has become an
international bargaining chip. The European Union countries and
especially the U.S. use the "recognition issue" to get concessions on
a number of matters. If the Armenians did not frame the issue within
the concept of genocide but rather within aghed, there might have been
much better prospects for reconciliation between the two sides.
For instance, it was possible, but not easy, to bring some Turkish
intellectuals together around the concept of the Great Catastrophe to
organize an online apology for the mass killings of Armenians during
World War I.
Many of these intellectuals would not have signed on if it was framed
as genocide. This indicates that the word genocide stops all kinds of
dialogue.
In other words, the term genocide leads to a prosecutorial tone of
accusation against the Turks, where as catastrophe opens more room for
contemplating what happened. Marc Nichamian, a French-Armenian
scholar, offers a powerful argument about the negative implications of
this shift from "catastrophe" to "genocide."
He says, "We have to prove that it is genocide. But the opposite is
true as well, and that is what is terrible. It was genocide, and we
need to prove it for that reason. We need to enter into the endless
game of proving it... There is not genocide without denial. More than
that, the essence of genocide is denial."
In fact, this shift did not help reconciliation but rather further
radicalized historiographies, and genocide became the refuge of the
contemporary Armenian identity.
The paradox of the situation is that as a result of genocide, Armenian
identity becomes dependent on the politics of the Turkish side. It
constantly requires recognition from its "enemy," the Turks. When that
recognition is not forthcoming it consumes all the energy and
resources of the community. Since the Turkish state and many scholars
reject the depiction of the events of 1915 as genocide, it deepens
anxiety and leads to a crisis in the definition of being an Armenian.
Why did this shift in terminology take place? Why do Armenians today
insist on the recognition of their sufferings as genocide but nothing
else? Genocide allows scholars to read causes of the 1915 events from
their consequences. It turns the historical debate into a moralist
narrative that seeks to rewrite the chain of events according to a
predetermined concept.
Memory is situated in emotion and solidarity. The Armenian memory of
1915 hinges largely on a trauma that is represented as genocide.
Trauma survives, restructures itself, and becomes the core of identity
through memory. Armenians seek to express their loyalty, anxiety, and
rage in terms of genocide. Genocide captures all these diverse
feelings while providing an essential social glue to establish the
borders of Armenian nationalism and unite the Armenian people. Yet,
they carefully avoid facing or discussing the decision of the Armenian
elite to collaborate with Russia. Genocide as a cover The Armenian
diaspora insists on the use of genocide alone to describe what
happened. In a sense, the study of WWI and the entire Armenian history
in the Ottoman Empire is reduced to the concept of genocide.
Why is this the case? First, genocide keeps emotions in the debate and
especially solidifies a genocide-centric Armenian identity. In other
words, genocide marshals powerful emotions among Armenians to form
powerful political bonds and create a sense of community.
Genocide becomes the cement of the Armenian diaspora identity.
According to a prominent Armenian scholar, genocide is a new religion
for Armenians and there is a competition for the position of high
priest in this new faith. It becomes a diaspora homeland, a new space
in which imagined victims take refuge in defining who they are by
determining who they are against.
It projects a unified victim group (Armenians) under the guise of
genocide and prevents Armenians from acknowledging their own history
by ignoring internal diversity and intra-power struggle within the
Armenian communities, while at the same time reducing hostility among
Armenian political parties.
For instance, the ARF, which was established in 1890 in Tbilisi and
still dominates the diaspora with its nongovernmental structure, is a
political-communal organization that went through several
transmutations and used the genocide discourse for a number of
reasons. It hid successfully behind the politics of the genocide
debate to avoid facing its own past, especially its close political
cooperation with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). ARF also
sought to control the various Armenian communities under the genocide
banner and to police the intellectual debate on genocide and the
history of the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire. It also
transformed itself into a secular church to protect and perpetuate
genocide as a new religion. Those who would deviate from the ARF
version of history were and are disciplined through excommunication.
Second, genocide homogenizes the Armenians as victim and the Turks as
perpetrators. Genocide also privileges victims' memory and ignores the
memory and suffering of Turks. It allows Armenians to attract the
sympathy of world public opinion by claiming a unique victimhood. This
also forces scholars who disagree with the Armenian genocide narrative
to become more careful in developing counter arguments so as not to be
treated as denialists. In other words, genocide censors and sanitizes
the counter argument and morality rests with the accuser.
Third, genocide allows Armenians to use anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish
images and consolidate the image of the "terrible Turk" or "bloody
Turk." It uses Islamophobia along with Turcophobia to dehumanize the
Turks as a "genocidal people." It justifies not only Armenian violence
against Turkish diplomats but also the occupation of one-fifth of the
territory of Azerbaijan, and the killing and ethnic cleansing of Azeri
Turks from the Karabakh region. In fact, the Republic of Armenia
further invested in the cause of genocide in order to mobilize
diaspora communities to justify its ethnic cleansing of Azeri Turks.
By insisting on the label of genocide, the debate in fact radicalized
some Armenian youths and morally armed them to use violence. The
perception of being a victim inadvertently justifies and provides
moral ground to become a victimizer. For instance, in the 1980s, the
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) killed 46
Turkish diplomats, including several high-ranking ambassadors, to
force Turkey to recognize the events of 1915 as genocide, pay
reparations and cede territory for Armenia. These organized killings
and several shock attacks, like the one at Orly Airport in Paris in
1983 that resulted in the killing of eight people and the attack on
Esenbo?Ä?a Airport in Ankara in 1982 that resulted in the killing of
nine, brought the Armenian issue to the attention of the Turkish
public within the context of terrorism. Indeed, before these attacks,
the Turkish public had forgotten the events of 1915 and there was no
debate about what happened to the Armenians in eastern Anatolia. In
other words, forcing the Turkish state and the public to remember and
face the history of 1915 through these high-level attacks helped to
create a more defensive and dismissive literature about the events of
1915. The key term that was framed to discuss and remember what took
place became "Ermeni Mezalimi" (Armenian atrocities).
In the centennial commemoration of WWI, the Armenians coin the ethnic
cleansing of the Armenian communities from Anatolia genocide, while
the Turkish collective memory appears to be different from that of the
Armenians by glorifying the battles won and celebrating its triumphs
while ignoring darker episodes during WWI. The Armenians, on the other
hand, want to turn the centennial commemoration into a public mourning
of what they lost. Unfortunately, there is very little hope to move
beyond these two diametrically opposed narratives and build bridges
between them.
Gerard Libaridian, the most thoughtful historian of the Armenian
diaspora, aptly sums up the problems of both sides. He says, "The
entrenched position of each side is now part of their [Armenians' and
Turks'] respective identities, identities that not only define the
boundaries of the ethno-cultural self-definitions but also the
socio-political context within which they see their present and
project the future." Indeed, there is very little hope if they do not
free themselves from the cages of identities to understand what took
place. Thus, neither of these identity-based narratives provides a
satisfactory historical account that attempts to understand what
happened and why.
The longer version of this essay will be published in "Middle East
Critique," June 2014). * Professor, the University of Utah
http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/24/why-do-armenians-insist-on-calling-it-genocide
From: Baghdasarian
April 24 2014
WHY DO ARMENIANS INSIST ON CALLING IT GENOCIDE?
Genocide became the cement of the Armenian diaspora's identity. It
became the diaspora's homeland, a new space in which imagined victims
take refuge in defining who they are by determining whom they are
against
Published : 24.04.2014 01:47:34
M. Hakan Yavuz *
Armenians originally termed the events of 1915 "aghed," (catastrophe)
or "yeghern" (pogrom), while some scholars have also used
"darakrutiun" (deportation) and "aksor" (exile). After 1965, due to a
number of reasons, especially the concerted efforts of the Soviet
Union, the Armenian diaspora under the leadership of the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (ARF), redefined the events of 1915 as
genocide.
Some Armenians insisted on the redefinition of the events as genocide,
while some extremists committed high-profile terrorist attacks and
assassinations of Turkish diplomats. Along with aggressive lobbying
toward the recognition of events as genocide, Armenians narrowed their
own options of reconciliation but provided a new arsenal for outside
forces to be used as leverage against Turkey and Armenians at the same
time.
Those countries that want Turkey to do something for them play the
"genocide card." As a consequence, the Armenian issue has become an
international bargaining chip. The European Union countries and
especially the U.S. use the "recognition issue" to get concessions on
a number of matters. If the Armenians did not frame the issue within
the concept of genocide but rather within aghed, there might have been
much better prospects for reconciliation between the two sides.
For instance, it was possible, but not easy, to bring some Turkish
intellectuals together around the concept of the Great Catastrophe to
organize an online apology for the mass killings of Armenians during
World War I.
Many of these intellectuals would not have signed on if it was framed
as genocide. This indicates that the word genocide stops all kinds of
dialogue.
In other words, the term genocide leads to a prosecutorial tone of
accusation against the Turks, where as catastrophe opens more room for
contemplating what happened. Marc Nichamian, a French-Armenian
scholar, offers a powerful argument about the negative implications of
this shift from "catastrophe" to "genocide."
He says, "We have to prove that it is genocide. But the opposite is
true as well, and that is what is terrible. It was genocide, and we
need to prove it for that reason. We need to enter into the endless
game of proving it... There is not genocide without denial. More than
that, the essence of genocide is denial."
In fact, this shift did not help reconciliation but rather further
radicalized historiographies, and genocide became the refuge of the
contemporary Armenian identity.
The paradox of the situation is that as a result of genocide, Armenian
identity becomes dependent on the politics of the Turkish side. It
constantly requires recognition from its "enemy," the Turks. When that
recognition is not forthcoming it consumes all the energy and
resources of the community. Since the Turkish state and many scholars
reject the depiction of the events of 1915 as genocide, it deepens
anxiety and leads to a crisis in the definition of being an Armenian.
Why did this shift in terminology take place? Why do Armenians today
insist on the recognition of their sufferings as genocide but nothing
else? Genocide allows scholars to read causes of the 1915 events from
their consequences. It turns the historical debate into a moralist
narrative that seeks to rewrite the chain of events according to a
predetermined concept.
Memory is situated in emotion and solidarity. The Armenian memory of
1915 hinges largely on a trauma that is represented as genocide.
Trauma survives, restructures itself, and becomes the core of identity
through memory. Armenians seek to express their loyalty, anxiety, and
rage in terms of genocide. Genocide captures all these diverse
feelings while providing an essential social glue to establish the
borders of Armenian nationalism and unite the Armenian people. Yet,
they carefully avoid facing or discussing the decision of the Armenian
elite to collaborate with Russia. Genocide as a cover The Armenian
diaspora insists on the use of genocide alone to describe what
happened. In a sense, the study of WWI and the entire Armenian history
in the Ottoman Empire is reduced to the concept of genocide.
Why is this the case? First, genocide keeps emotions in the debate and
especially solidifies a genocide-centric Armenian identity. In other
words, genocide marshals powerful emotions among Armenians to form
powerful political bonds and create a sense of community.
Genocide becomes the cement of the Armenian diaspora identity.
According to a prominent Armenian scholar, genocide is a new religion
for Armenians and there is a competition for the position of high
priest in this new faith. It becomes a diaspora homeland, a new space
in which imagined victims take refuge in defining who they are by
determining who they are against.
It projects a unified victim group (Armenians) under the guise of
genocide and prevents Armenians from acknowledging their own history
by ignoring internal diversity and intra-power struggle within the
Armenian communities, while at the same time reducing hostility among
Armenian political parties.
For instance, the ARF, which was established in 1890 in Tbilisi and
still dominates the diaspora with its nongovernmental structure, is a
political-communal organization that went through several
transmutations and used the genocide discourse for a number of
reasons. It hid successfully behind the politics of the genocide
debate to avoid facing its own past, especially its close political
cooperation with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). ARF also
sought to control the various Armenian communities under the genocide
banner and to police the intellectual debate on genocide and the
history of the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire. It also
transformed itself into a secular church to protect and perpetuate
genocide as a new religion. Those who would deviate from the ARF
version of history were and are disciplined through excommunication.
Second, genocide homogenizes the Armenians as victim and the Turks as
perpetrators. Genocide also privileges victims' memory and ignores the
memory and suffering of Turks. It allows Armenians to attract the
sympathy of world public opinion by claiming a unique victimhood. This
also forces scholars who disagree with the Armenian genocide narrative
to become more careful in developing counter arguments so as not to be
treated as denialists. In other words, genocide censors and sanitizes
the counter argument and morality rests with the accuser.
Third, genocide allows Armenians to use anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish
images and consolidate the image of the "terrible Turk" or "bloody
Turk." It uses Islamophobia along with Turcophobia to dehumanize the
Turks as a "genocidal people." It justifies not only Armenian violence
against Turkish diplomats but also the occupation of one-fifth of the
territory of Azerbaijan, and the killing and ethnic cleansing of Azeri
Turks from the Karabakh region. In fact, the Republic of Armenia
further invested in the cause of genocide in order to mobilize
diaspora communities to justify its ethnic cleansing of Azeri Turks.
By insisting on the label of genocide, the debate in fact radicalized
some Armenian youths and morally armed them to use violence. The
perception of being a victim inadvertently justifies and provides
moral ground to become a victimizer. For instance, in the 1980s, the
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) killed 46
Turkish diplomats, including several high-ranking ambassadors, to
force Turkey to recognize the events of 1915 as genocide, pay
reparations and cede territory for Armenia. These organized killings
and several shock attacks, like the one at Orly Airport in Paris in
1983 that resulted in the killing of eight people and the attack on
Esenbo?Ä?a Airport in Ankara in 1982 that resulted in the killing of
nine, brought the Armenian issue to the attention of the Turkish
public within the context of terrorism. Indeed, before these attacks,
the Turkish public had forgotten the events of 1915 and there was no
debate about what happened to the Armenians in eastern Anatolia. In
other words, forcing the Turkish state and the public to remember and
face the history of 1915 through these high-level attacks helped to
create a more defensive and dismissive literature about the events of
1915. The key term that was framed to discuss and remember what took
place became "Ermeni Mezalimi" (Armenian atrocities).
In the centennial commemoration of WWI, the Armenians coin the ethnic
cleansing of the Armenian communities from Anatolia genocide, while
the Turkish collective memory appears to be different from that of the
Armenians by glorifying the battles won and celebrating its triumphs
while ignoring darker episodes during WWI. The Armenians, on the other
hand, want to turn the centennial commemoration into a public mourning
of what they lost. Unfortunately, there is very little hope to move
beyond these two diametrically opposed narratives and build bridges
between them.
Gerard Libaridian, the most thoughtful historian of the Armenian
diaspora, aptly sums up the problems of both sides. He says, "The
entrenched position of each side is now part of their [Armenians' and
Turks'] respective identities, identities that not only define the
boundaries of the ethno-cultural self-definitions but also the
socio-political context within which they see their present and
project the future." Indeed, there is very little hope if they do not
free themselves from the cages of identities to understand what took
place. Thus, neither of these identity-based narratives provides a
satisfactory historical account that attempts to understand what
happened and why.
The longer version of this essay will be published in "Middle East
Critique," June 2014). * Professor, the University of Utah
http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/24/why-do-armenians-insist-on-calling-it-genocide
From: Baghdasarian