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Hurriyet Daily News
april 26 2014
Erdošan and the Armenians
by Mutafa Akyol
Right on the eve of April 24, the day that Armenians all across the
world commemorate the Meds Yeghern, or the "Great Calamity" that Turks
inflicted on them in 1915, Turkey's Prime Minister Tayyip Erdošan took
a surprising step. He published a two-page message, which honored the
loss of the Armenians in a way that no Turkish statesmen has before.
"We wish that the Armenians who lost their lives in the context of the
early 20th century rest in peace," Erdošan said. "And we convey our
condolences to their grandchildren."
This certainly fell short of submitting to the common Armenian demand
of "recognizing the genocide," which I doubt will ever happen. Because
most Turks see 1915 as an ethnic cleansing in an era in which, they,
too, were subjected to the same horrors in other parts of the
crumbling empire.
Yet still, published in nine different languages, including "West
Armenian" and "East Armenian," Erdošan's message was clearly a
well-calculated effort to reach out to the Armenians at a time when
the centennial of 1915, which is expected be globally significant, is
only one year ahead. It also comes at a time when Erdošan was
criticized, at home and in the world, for his authoritarianism and
conspiracy-theory-rich nationalism.
In other words, one can say this was a pragmatic move, rather than a
conscientious mea culpa. But it was still a significant step for
Turkey, which used to either deny or trivialize the suffering of the
Armenians. Hence, Erdošan deserves to be commended for taking it, no
matter how "political" his feelings were.
At this point, let me also note that this relatively more open-minded
stance on "the Armenian issue" by Erdošan and his party, compared to
the rigidity of former political elites of Turkey, has some
ideological roots as well. In a nutshell, Erdošan's "Ottomanism"
simply gives him more room to be reformist vis-a-vis the Armenians
(and the Kurds, for that matter), than the "Turkish nationalism" that
the former elites subscribed to.
The reason is "Ottomanism" implies a broad umbrella under which Turks
co-existed peacefully with other peoples of the empire, including the
Armenians and the Kurds. The tragic expulsion of Armenians in 1915 was
not an outcome of this pluralist Ottoman paradigm. It was an outcome
of the fall of that paradigm. The Young Turks, who decided on the
exodus, were subscribers of a new ideology called "Turkish
nationalism," which was, as one must see, a response to the Serbian,
Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms of the Balkans.
Soon after the foundation of the Republic, the more secularist version
of the Young Turk ideology evolved into Kemalism and became the
official creed. Today, Erdošan's AKP (Justice and Development Party),
which had defeated the Kemalist establishment, is building a
post-Kemalist Turkey. In this view, the expulsion of Armenians and the
forced assimilation of the Kurds are historic mistakes that should be
corrected.
In short, the very ideology of the AKP allows itself to take formerly
unthinkable steps to reconcile with the Kurds and Armenians. Yet, the
same ideology is not an asset, but a roadblock when it comes to
reconciling with Alevis or secular Turks - and no wonder Erdošan's
problems with these two camps are deepening, because, as the Americans
say, there is no free lunch. Every ideological hegemony comes with new
strengths, but also new shortcomings.
april 26 2014
Erdošan and the Armenians
by Mutafa Akyol
Right on the eve of April 24, the day that Armenians all across the
world commemorate the Meds Yeghern, or the "Great Calamity" that Turks
inflicted on them in 1915, Turkey's Prime Minister Tayyip Erdošan took
a surprising step. He published a two-page message, which honored the
loss of the Armenians in a way that no Turkish statesmen has before.
"We wish that the Armenians who lost their lives in the context of the
early 20th century rest in peace," Erdošan said. "And we convey our
condolences to their grandchildren."
This certainly fell short of submitting to the common Armenian demand
of "recognizing the genocide," which I doubt will ever happen. Because
most Turks see 1915 as an ethnic cleansing in an era in which, they,
too, were subjected to the same horrors in other parts of the
crumbling empire.
Yet still, published in nine different languages, including "West
Armenian" and "East Armenian," Erdošan's message was clearly a
well-calculated effort to reach out to the Armenians at a time when
the centennial of 1915, which is expected be globally significant, is
only one year ahead. It also comes at a time when Erdošan was
criticized, at home and in the world, for his authoritarianism and
conspiracy-theory-rich nationalism.
In other words, one can say this was a pragmatic move, rather than a
conscientious mea culpa. But it was still a significant step for
Turkey, which used to either deny or trivialize the suffering of the
Armenians. Hence, Erdošan deserves to be commended for taking it, no
matter how "political" his feelings were.
At this point, let me also note that this relatively more open-minded
stance on "the Armenian issue" by Erdošan and his party, compared to
the rigidity of former political elites of Turkey, has some
ideological roots as well. In a nutshell, Erdošan's "Ottomanism"
simply gives him more room to be reformist vis-a-vis the Armenians
(and the Kurds, for that matter), than the "Turkish nationalism" that
the former elites subscribed to.
The reason is "Ottomanism" implies a broad umbrella under which Turks
co-existed peacefully with other peoples of the empire, including the
Armenians and the Kurds. The tragic expulsion of Armenians in 1915 was
not an outcome of this pluralist Ottoman paradigm. It was an outcome
of the fall of that paradigm. The Young Turks, who decided on the
exodus, were subscribers of a new ideology called "Turkish
nationalism," which was, as one must see, a response to the Serbian,
Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms of the Balkans.
Soon after the foundation of the Republic, the more secularist version
of the Young Turk ideology evolved into Kemalism and became the
official creed. Today, Erdošan's AKP (Justice and Development Party),
which had defeated the Kemalist establishment, is building a
post-Kemalist Turkey. In this view, the expulsion of Armenians and the
forced assimilation of the Kurds are historic mistakes that should be
corrected.
In short, the very ideology of the AKP allows itself to take formerly
unthinkable steps to reconcile with the Kurds and Armenians. Yet, the
same ideology is not an asset, but a roadblock when it comes to
reconciling with Alevis or secular Turks - and no wonder Erdošan's
problems with these two camps are deepening, because, as the Americans
say, there is no free lunch. Every ideological hegemony comes with new
strengths, but also new shortcomings.