ARMENIA: WONDERING ABOUT RUSSIA'S MOTIVES IN KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS
Eurasia Review
Aug 15 2014
By Marianna Grigoryan, EurasiaNet
Amid the recent escalation of hostilities surrounding the contested
Nagorno-Karabakh territory, authorities and experts in both Armenia and
Azerbaijan are engaging in the old Soviet practice of identifying the
outside power that most benefits from conflict. For many in Armenia,
the answer is straightforward enough - Russia.
Russia has long exerted a high degree of economic and military
influence over Yerevan: that influence is underscored by Armenia's
decision to join Moscow's Customs Union, which the Kremlin hopes will
evolve into an alternative for ex-Soviet republics to the European
Union. Many Armenians believe the Kremlin's sway has reached such
heights that Yerevan is now vulnerable to potential pressure from
Moscow to settle the 26-year-old Karabakh conflict on terms perceived
in Yerevan as unfavorable.
Seen as a troublemaker in Ukraine via its support for pro-Russian
separatists, Putin's Russia appears to be trying to style itself a
peacemaker in the Caucasus. For this reason, Armenian analysts say,
the August 9-10 meetings between Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan,
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Russian President Vladimir
Putin in Sochi, Russia, did not occur by chance.
Political scientist Ruben Mehrabian from Yerevan's Center for
Political and International Studies made a connection between recent
events in eastern Ukraine and the Armenian-Azerbaijani standoff over
Karabakh. "Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine are prompting a tough
[Western] response [especially sanctions], so [Russia] attempts
to balance this out through its so-called potential for peace,"
Mehrabian said. "The escalation of hostilities on the [Karabakh]
border was Aliyev's precious gift to Putin."
He added that Moscow "did not score a goal" with the Sochi summit.
Even so, the situation along the frontline has remained relatively
calm since the talks.
Notably, Putin acted alone, convening the Armenian and Azerbaijani
leaders without the fellow American and French co-chairs of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk Group,
the entity that ostensibly oversees the Nagorno-Karabakh.
"Russia has long held the advantage of proximity and presence over
its fellow mediators, France and the United States," noted Richard
Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan.
"Moscow may seek to collude, but no longer cooperate with Western
interests in mediating the Karabakh conflict, and a new attempt by
Moscow to push out Paris and Washington from equal footing in the
mediation effort is more than likely, given the new anti-Western
refrain from the Putin camp."
There has been sniping and occasional firefights all along the
so-called Karabakh contact line since the signing of a ceasefire
agreement in 1994. But the clashes that occurred from July 28-August
3 featured perhaps the heaviest fighting in 20 years. According to
the Armenian Defense Ministry, the recent round of fighting left 25
Azerbaijani soldiers dead and over 30 wounded, while five Armenian
servicemen were killed in action and seven wounded.
In recent days, the patriotic mood has swelled in Armenia, stoking
sentiment among the general public in for an all-out offensive against
Azerbaijan. Some believe that Russia cannot be trusted to uphold
Armenian interests in the stalemated peace process and Armenia must
remain self-reliant: they argue that volunteers should be recruited
and deployed on the frontline; state-aligned Azerbaijani media claims
that Azeri volunteers already have started to press the Azerbaijani
government in Baku for such a mission.
"Russia is our strategic partner, but it sells weapons to Azerbaijan
which kill our soldiers and fires on our villages with those arms,"
stressed Ashot Makarian, a 39-year-old Yerevan construction worker.
"Despite all this, the spirit of the Armenian army is very strong. We
cannot be defeated. Today, it would be better for us to go to the
front than send our children there tomorrow."
Some analysts wonder whether Russia has made a secret deal with
Azerbaijan, in which Russia would compel Armenia to accept territorial
concessions concerning Karabakh, and in exchange Azerbaijan would
join the Kremlin-led Customs Union. Neither Russia nor Azerbaijan
has given any hint such a quid-pro-quo has ever been considered;
and such speculation does not have wide currency outside Armenia.
"Armenia has to find a way out of this Eurasian Union path, as it is
something that Russia wants to sell to Azerbaijan through Armenia,"
Mehrabian argued.
Political expert Ara Papian, head of the Modus Vivendi Center,
a think-tank, argues that concerns about a Russian sell-out are
overblown. Papian added that President Sargsyan - a Karabakhi
native who led the territory's armed forces from 1989 until 1993,
and served as Armenian defense minister at the time of the 1994
ceasefire agreement - would backtrack on Karabakh at this time.
"The Russians have already realized that they can dictate many things
to Armenia and even gain concessions from it, but they cannot make us
give away Karabakh because we've paid too dear a price for it," Papian
said in reference to the thousands of ethnic Armenians killed, wounded
or made refugees during the 1988-1994 war with Azerbaijan. "Karabakh
is not a distribution network or a power plant; it's much bigger,
a part of our homeland."
Marianna Grigoryan is a freelance reporter based in Yerevan and editor
of MediaLab.am.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15082014-armenia-wondering-russias-motives-karabakh-peace-process/
Eurasia Review
Aug 15 2014
By Marianna Grigoryan, EurasiaNet
Amid the recent escalation of hostilities surrounding the contested
Nagorno-Karabakh territory, authorities and experts in both Armenia and
Azerbaijan are engaging in the old Soviet practice of identifying the
outside power that most benefits from conflict. For many in Armenia,
the answer is straightforward enough - Russia.
Russia has long exerted a high degree of economic and military
influence over Yerevan: that influence is underscored by Armenia's
decision to join Moscow's Customs Union, which the Kremlin hopes will
evolve into an alternative for ex-Soviet republics to the European
Union. Many Armenians believe the Kremlin's sway has reached such
heights that Yerevan is now vulnerable to potential pressure from
Moscow to settle the 26-year-old Karabakh conflict on terms perceived
in Yerevan as unfavorable.
Seen as a troublemaker in Ukraine via its support for pro-Russian
separatists, Putin's Russia appears to be trying to style itself a
peacemaker in the Caucasus. For this reason, Armenian analysts say,
the August 9-10 meetings between Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan,
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Russian President Vladimir
Putin in Sochi, Russia, did not occur by chance.
Political scientist Ruben Mehrabian from Yerevan's Center for
Political and International Studies made a connection between recent
events in eastern Ukraine and the Armenian-Azerbaijani standoff over
Karabakh. "Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine are prompting a tough
[Western] response [especially sanctions], so [Russia] attempts
to balance this out through its so-called potential for peace,"
Mehrabian said. "The escalation of hostilities on the [Karabakh]
border was Aliyev's precious gift to Putin."
He added that Moscow "did not score a goal" with the Sochi summit.
Even so, the situation along the frontline has remained relatively
calm since the talks.
Notably, Putin acted alone, convening the Armenian and Azerbaijani
leaders without the fellow American and French co-chairs of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk Group,
the entity that ostensibly oversees the Nagorno-Karabakh.
"Russia has long held the advantage of proximity and presence over
its fellow mediators, France and the United States," noted Richard
Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan.
"Moscow may seek to collude, but no longer cooperate with Western
interests in mediating the Karabakh conflict, and a new attempt by
Moscow to push out Paris and Washington from equal footing in the
mediation effort is more than likely, given the new anti-Western
refrain from the Putin camp."
There has been sniping and occasional firefights all along the
so-called Karabakh contact line since the signing of a ceasefire
agreement in 1994. But the clashes that occurred from July 28-August
3 featured perhaps the heaviest fighting in 20 years. According to
the Armenian Defense Ministry, the recent round of fighting left 25
Azerbaijani soldiers dead and over 30 wounded, while five Armenian
servicemen were killed in action and seven wounded.
In recent days, the patriotic mood has swelled in Armenia, stoking
sentiment among the general public in for an all-out offensive against
Azerbaijan. Some believe that Russia cannot be trusted to uphold
Armenian interests in the stalemated peace process and Armenia must
remain self-reliant: they argue that volunteers should be recruited
and deployed on the frontline; state-aligned Azerbaijani media claims
that Azeri volunteers already have started to press the Azerbaijani
government in Baku for such a mission.
"Russia is our strategic partner, but it sells weapons to Azerbaijan
which kill our soldiers and fires on our villages with those arms,"
stressed Ashot Makarian, a 39-year-old Yerevan construction worker.
"Despite all this, the spirit of the Armenian army is very strong. We
cannot be defeated. Today, it would be better for us to go to the
front than send our children there tomorrow."
Some analysts wonder whether Russia has made a secret deal with
Azerbaijan, in which Russia would compel Armenia to accept territorial
concessions concerning Karabakh, and in exchange Azerbaijan would
join the Kremlin-led Customs Union. Neither Russia nor Azerbaijan
has given any hint such a quid-pro-quo has ever been considered;
and such speculation does not have wide currency outside Armenia.
"Armenia has to find a way out of this Eurasian Union path, as it is
something that Russia wants to sell to Azerbaijan through Armenia,"
Mehrabian argued.
Political expert Ara Papian, head of the Modus Vivendi Center,
a think-tank, argues that concerns about a Russian sell-out are
overblown. Papian added that President Sargsyan - a Karabakhi
native who led the territory's armed forces from 1989 until 1993,
and served as Armenian defense minister at the time of the 1994
ceasefire agreement - would backtrack on Karabakh at this time.
"The Russians have already realized that they can dictate many things
to Armenia and even gain concessions from it, but they cannot make us
give away Karabakh because we've paid too dear a price for it," Papian
said in reference to the thousands of ethnic Armenians killed, wounded
or made refugees during the 1988-1994 war with Azerbaijan. "Karabakh
is not a distribution network or a power plant; it's much bigger,
a part of our homeland."
Marianna Grigoryan is a freelance reporter based in Yerevan and editor
of MediaLab.am.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15082014-armenia-wondering-russias-motives-karabakh-peace-process/