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Silk Road Reporters
Aug 25 2014
Azerbaijan's Missed Opportunity in Karabakh
Published by Joshua Noonan
August 25, 2014
Amid the deepening crisis in Ukraine, Azerbaijan has missed a crucial
opportunity to achieve a stated core national goal of the
reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and surrounding
territories.
This region since the 1990s has been occupied by separatist Armenians
with the support of the Russian Federation. The non-use of the forced
reintegration of the more than 15% of the landmass of Azerbaijan has
been a missed opportunity by the Aliyev Regime in achieving its
priority of ensuring control over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
regions. This fleeting possibility to achieve Azerbaijan's goal
existed while Russia, the widely regarded patron of the occupiers was
engaged in wresting control of Crimea, Ukraine.
Since the Nagorno-Karabakh War, hundreds of thousands of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) have been living in public buildings and
camps throughout Azerbaijan. This was due to the actions of the
separatist. Many of the ethnic Armenians, claiming self-determination
conducted a campaign on ethnic cleansing throughout Nagorno-Karabakh
and the surrounding seven regions.
With the rise of Heydar Aliyev as president the cooling of the
conflict was signaled through the institution of the Bishkek Protocol.
Nevertheless, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan as in
Armenia has been a useful galvanizing force in these fractious
countries. Peace negotiations are conducted under the aegis of the
Minsk Group. The Minsk Group was created on 24 March 1992 by the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the
predecessor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). Throughout its first few years of existence a settlement was
nearly reached on several occasions.
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that any possibility of peace
was scuttled by the assassination of Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan
and Parliamentary Speaker Karen Demirchyan and six others and the
injuring of 30 at the Parliament of Armenia in Yerevan on October 27
1999. Former Russia's Federal Security Service, Colonel Alexander
Litvinenko claimed on May 3 2005 that the attack carried out by
Armenian nationals was a Russian plot to disrupt the Peace Process.
Nevertheless, the Armenian's Karabakhi faction also benefited from the
attack as witnessed by aversions by the president of Armenia Levon
Ter-Petrosyan "If you vote for Serzh Sargsyan on 19 February you will
vote for Nairi Hunanyan. He who elects Serzh Sarkisian would desecrate
the holy graves of Karen Demirchian and Vazgen Sarkisian". Thus the
continuation of the conflict could be seen as partially driven by
internecine Armenian fights.
With President Ilham Aliyev taking his father's place, the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the return of the territory to Baku's
control became even more used in legitimizing the regime. This paired
with the hagiography of the deceased President Aliyev has been used to
bolster the status of the regime. This rhetoric has been followed by a
spending binge on foreign defense materiel fueled by the oil and
natural gas boom from the opening of the various pipelines connecting
Azerbaijan to Georgia, Turkey, and soon with the development of the
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), piping gas to the European Union.
Nevertheless, the leverage that this economic and military clout have
given has not been used to further the goals of reunification.
This is heightened in the recent Ukraine Crisis where Russian policy
bandwidth was at capacity throughout the occupation of Crimea and the
continued provocations throughout Eastern Ukraine. While Armenian CSTO
membership guarantees its protection by Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh as an
internationally unrecognized entity is not and thus could be lost
without any treaty obligation actions by the Russian Federation.
With the constraints the Russian Federation faced in policy bandwidth,
Special Forces, military deployments, and fiscal tools, the Ukraine
Crisis provided an opportune time for the consolidation of Azerbaijani
territory. The actions of Azerbaijan in the Minsk Group should have
signaled enough goodwill to ameliorate the international backlash of a
ground offensive. The political benefits would also be apparent in a
spike in popularity and the signaling of President Aliyev as the
unifier of Azerbaijani lands. The reintegration of these territories
would create an opportunity for high levels of infrastructure spending
for the Akkord Group as well as other regime affiliated firms and
would be seen as a major windfall through the recycling of government
reserves into the private sector.
The more than 500,000 IDPs which were displaced from the region would
be resettled in their hometowns and villages throughout Karabakh. In
the long run, this would strengthen the bottom line of the government
which currently spends more than three percent of GDP on subsiding the
IDPs with special schools, utilities support, and other benefits. With
the consolidation of territory, a peace could be made with Armenia
allowing for more normal relationship and economic activity to take
place in the South Caucasus. This would allow for the continued
diminution of Russian influence in the region and the enabling of the
interests of the people of the respective states to be at the
forefront of the discussion.
This counterfactual begs the question of the Aliyev Regime's inaction
when Russian interference would be minimal at best. The continuation
of the status quo in the long run is untenable due to the fact that it
being conducted as a mutually hurting stalemate. Other reasons for
sustaining the status quo include the desire to resolve the problem
peacefully, the fear of Russian intervention, the conservation of
state resources, or the usefulness of the conflict as a galvanizing
force within the state. I would conclude that the last is the most
likely driver of inaction within the Aliyev Regime.
The centrifugal force derived from the continuation of the Karabakh
that benefits the regime is the key driver for their inaction during
the Ukraine Crisis. Though the Azerbaijani military peaked in relative
strength vis-à-vis Armenia, the force is easily deployable and has
been modernized since the oil boom started. The state too has been
partially modernized since the start of the oil boom, thus placing
increasing power in the hands of President Aliyev. While factionalism
remains within the Cabinet of Ministers, the recent sacking of
ministers demonstrates where the locus of power remains, with
President Aliyev.
While the South Caucasus' foremost frozen conflict could have ended,
it is the question of regime stability instead of the enforcement of
territorial integrity that plays the deciding factor despite the
favorable conditions presented by the Ukraine Crisis. Such an
opportunity may be the last for some time for the swift resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. This lost chance could be seen as the
subservience of the national interest to parochial ones, and the
long-term enabling of the Russian Federation to have a stronger role
in the South Caucasus.
Joshua Noonan is an Azerbaijan and Caucasus News Analyst; John Hopkins
SAIS MA in Russian and Eurasian Studies, International Economics and
is a Presidential Management Fellowship Finalist.
http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/08/25/azerbaijan-missed-opportunity-resolve-nagorno-karabakh/
Aug 25 2014
Azerbaijan's Missed Opportunity in Karabakh
Published by Joshua Noonan
August 25, 2014
Amid the deepening crisis in Ukraine, Azerbaijan has missed a crucial
opportunity to achieve a stated core national goal of the
reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and surrounding
territories.
This region since the 1990s has been occupied by separatist Armenians
with the support of the Russian Federation. The non-use of the forced
reintegration of the more than 15% of the landmass of Azerbaijan has
been a missed opportunity by the Aliyev Regime in achieving its
priority of ensuring control over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
regions. This fleeting possibility to achieve Azerbaijan's goal
existed while Russia, the widely regarded patron of the occupiers was
engaged in wresting control of Crimea, Ukraine.
Since the Nagorno-Karabakh War, hundreds of thousands of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) have been living in public buildings and
camps throughout Azerbaijan. This was due to the actions of the
separatist. Many of the ethnic Armenians, claiming self-determination
conducted a campaign on ethnic cleansing throughout Nagorno-Karabakh
and the surrounding seven regions.
With the rise of Heydar Aliyev as president the cooling of the
conflict was signaled through the institution of the Bishkek Protocol.
Nevertheless, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan as in
Armenia has been a useful galvanizing force in these fractious
countries. Peace negotiations are conducted under the aegis of the
Minsk Group. The Minsk Group was created on 24 March 1992 by the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the
predecessor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). Throughout its first few years of existence a settlement was
nearly reached on several occasions.
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that any possibility of peace
was scuttled by the assassination of Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan
and Parliamentary Speaker Karen Demirchyan and six others and the
injuring of 30 at the Parliament of Armenia in Yerevan on October 27
1999. Former Russia's Federal Security Service, Colonel Alexander
Litvinenko claimed on May 3 2005 that the attack carried out by
Armenian nationals was a Russian plot to disrupt the Peace Process.
Nevertheless, the Armenian's Karabakhi faction also benefited from the
attack as witnessed by aversions by the president of Armenia Levon
Ter-Petrosyan "If you vote for Serzh Sargsyan on 19 February you will
vote for Nairi Hunanyan. He who elects Serzh Sarkisian would desecrate
the holy graves of Karen Demirchian and Vazgen Sarkisian". Thus the
continuation of the conflict could be seen as partially driven by
internecine Armenian fights.
With President Ilham Aliyev taking his father's place, the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the return of the territory to Baku's
control became even more used in legitimizing the regime. This paired
with the hagiography of the deceased President Aliyev has been used to
bolster the status of the regime. This rhetoric has been followed by a
spending binge on foreign defense materiel fueled by the oil and
natural gas boom from the opening of the various pipelines connecting
Azerbaijan to Georgia, Turkey, and soon with the development of the
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), piping gas to the European Union.
Nevertheless, the leverage that this economic and military clout have
given has not been used to further the goals of reunification.
This is heightened in the recent Ukraine Crisis where Russian policy
bandwidth was at capacity throughout the occupation of Crimea and the
continued provocations throughout Eastern Ukraine. While Armenian CSTO
membership guarantees its protection by Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh as an
internationally unrecognized entity is not and thus could be lost
without any treaty obligation actions by the Russian Federation.
With the constraints the Russian Federation faced in policy bandwidth,
Special Forces, military deployments, and fiscal tools, the Ukraine
Crisis provided an opportune time for the consolidation of Azerbaijani
territory. The actions of Azerbaijan in the Minsk Group should have
signaled enough goodwill to ameliorate the international backlash of a
ground offensive. The political benefits would also be apparent in a
spike in popularity and the signaling of President Aliyev as the
unifier of Azerbaijani lands. The reintegration of these territories
would create an opportunity for high levels of infrastructure spending
for the Akkord Group as well as other regime affiliated firms and
would be seen as a major windfall through the recycling of government
reserves into the private sector.
The more than 500,000 IDPs which were displaced from the region would
be resettled in their hometowns and villages throughout Karabakh. In
the long run, this would strengthen the bottom line of the government
which currently spends more than three percent of GDP on subsiding the
IDPs with special schools, utilities support, and other benefits. With
the consolidation of territory, a peace could be made with Armenia
allowing for more normal relationship and economic activity to take
place in the South Caucasus. This would allow for the continued
diminution of Russian influence in the region and the enabling of the
interests of the people of the respective states to be at the
forefront of the discussion.
This counterfactual begs the question of the Aliyev Regime's inaction
when Russian interference would be minimal at best. The continuation
of the status quo in the long run is untenable due to the fact that it
being conducted as a mutually hurting stalemate. Other reasons for
sustaining the status quo include the desire to resolve the problem
peacefully, the fear of Russian intervention, the conservation of
state resources, or the usefulness of the conflict as a galvanizing
force within the state. I would conclude that the last is the most
likely driver of inaction within the Aliyev Regime.
The centrifugal force derived from the continuation of the Karabakh
that benefits the regime is the key driver for their inaction during
the Ukraine Crisis. Though the Azerbaijani military peaked in relative
strength vis-à-vis Armenia, the force is easily deployable and has
been modernized since the oil boom started. The state too has been
partially modernized since the start of the oil boom, thus placing
increasing power in the hands of President Aliyev. While factionalism
remains within the Cabinet of Ministers, the recent sacking of
ministers demonstrates where the locus of power remains, with
President Aliyev.
While the South Caucasus' foremost frozen conflict could have ended,
it is the question of regime stability instead of the enforcement of
territorial integrity that plays the deciding factor despite the
favorable conditions presented by the Ukraine Crisis. Such an
opportunity may be the last for some time for the swift resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. This lost chance could be seen as the
subservience of the national interest to parochial ones, and the
long-term enabling of the Russian Federation to have a stronger role
in the South Caucasus.
Joshua Noonan is an Azerbaijan and Caucasus News Analyst; John Hopkins
SAIS MA in Russian and Eurasian Studies, International Economics and
is a Presidential Management Fellowship Finalist.
http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/08/25/azerbaijan-missed-opportunity-resolve-nagorno-karabakh/