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EU Bulletin
Aug 25 2014
EUROPEAN THINK-TANK REVIEW - XXVI. (August 2014)
Towards a Fresh Deal for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their
Neighbourhood Policies : 15 Steps
Michael Emerson (Centre for European Policy Studies)
In this commentary, Michael Emerson proposes 15 steps to be taken by
Ukraine, the EU and Russia in order to establish a stable economic
situation in the Ukraine region and reinforce positive mutual
relations.
First of all, the newly elected President Poroschenko must secure the
peace and unity of Ukraine. Putin could try harder to contribute
towards this objective. Poroschenko's second step should be to join
Moldova and Georgia in signing the Association Agreement with the EU
(this step has already been realized). The author also recommends that
the EU, Russia and Ukraine would engage in a regular trilateral
cooperation process. However, such arrangement is hardly possible at
this time when the context is one of overt confrontation. Furthermore,
Emerson suggests that the EU move rapidly to conclude visa-free
agreements with Ukraine and Georgia, and work towards this goal with
Russia once the current crisis of relations had been deescalated. In
the realm of Ukrainian domestic policy, Emerson stresses the need for
Ukraine to declare military neutrality and complete the revision of
its constitution, including appropriate safeguards for the Russian
language. Examples of bi- or multilingualism being handled in a
sustainable way could be found in Western and Northern Europe. One of
the steps urges the EU to scrap the sanctions it imposed against
Russia.
Many of Emerson's recommendations are trade-related. According to one,
Russia should agree to align the price of its gas sales to Ukraine on
the average German import price, thereby removing this item from the
political agenda once and for all. According to another, Ukraine and
the customs union comprising Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (RBK)
should engage in negotiations for a high quality free trade agreement
(FTA). Furthermore, the EU and the RBK customs union should open
negotiations for a free trade agreement, on the understanding that
Belarus and Kazakhstan would accede to the WTO during the course of
the negotiations. Finally, Russia should propose its customs union
partners to adopt European and international industrial standards for
tradable goods as the standards of the Eurasian Economic Union.
One of the steps deals with Transnistria. The EU, Moldova (Chisinau
and Transnistria) and Russia should work out arrangements for
Transnistria to profit from Moldova's signing of the DCFTA with the
EU. Transnistria would be subject to an additional Protocol for basic
free trade with the EU, with zero tariffs and acceptance of EU
industrial standards. The last step is concerned with Armenia, whose
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was made difficult, if not
impossible, by its request of 900 exemptions from the common external
tariff. Practical solutions should be found, enabling simpler free
trade with both the customs union and the EU, while Armenia could
still otherwise integrate with the Eurasian Economic Union if it so
wished.
(The study can be downloaded here:
http://ceps.eu/book/towards-fresh-deal-ukraine-eu-and-russia-and-their-neighbourhood-policies-15-steps)
Russia's Pivot to Eurasia
Kadri Liik (European Council on Foreign Relations)
The Eurasian Union is ever more widely considered to constitute an
anti-Western alliance. Some politicians, such as the former US Foreign
Secretary Hillary Clinton, condemned the project as an attempt to
revive the Soviet Union, even though the logic behind the founding of
the Union is not specifically anti-Western. Rather, the Union is to
serve Russia and its allies in attaining greater political leverage in
an increasingly globalised world. This rationale is shared with the
European integration project.
The reason for Russia's eastward pivot lies in its disappointment with
the West rather than a vision of better conditions or greater profits
from cooperation with the East. Antecedents of such a disappointment
may be classified into three categories: values, economy, and the
West's behaviour in the global theatre. Concerning values, the
progressive societal attitudes that are taking hold in the EU have
received a negative reaction in Russia. In economic matters, the
recent financial crisis took its toll on international relations in
general. The current sanctions concerning gas and oil exports serve to
further deepen the divide between Russia and Europe.
As for the international standing of the West, Russia perceives itself
as the victim who agreed to the German reunification, NATO expansion,
the building of new US military bases in central Asia and other steps
which directly benefitted the transatlantic power bloc, and was
rewarded with an anti-ballistic missile system in central Europe. This
device, although built solely for defensive purposes, grants the U.S.
a first-strike advantage in the sense that it should eliminate any
missiles fired by Russia in response to a U.S.-initiated aggression.
However outlandish this fear may seem, in nuclear matters
psychological deterrence plays a vital role. Russia feels it is
becoming increasingly surrounded and cornered, and thus naturally
adopted an ideologically defensive position.
Although cooperation between Russia and China is not new, the current
crisis in Ukraine motivated the Russians to seek out an ever closer
association. The EU will for some time remain Russia's top trading
partner, but the recent gas export agreement and the organisation of
common army exercises with China point to visible Russian efforts to
play a bigger role in Asia than before.
(The study can be downloaded here:
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/russias_pivot_to_eurasia310)
Obstacles for a Strengthened Role of National Parliaments in the European Union
Adriaan Schout, Judith Hoevenaars a Jan Marinus Wiersma (Clingendael -
Netherlands Institute of International Relations)
As a consequence of the financial crisis, there is a mounting support
for strengthening the accountability of 'Brussels' at the national
level, particularly in the context of economic governance. Calls for
greater involvement of national parliaments in the European Union are
growing in several European capitals. While putting an emphasis on the
Netherlands, this study examines the discourse around this debate and
looks for the limits of the national governments' demands.
Attempts have been made - in the Treaty of Lisbon which entered into
force in late 2009 but also in earlier treaties - to better involve
national parliaments in European decision-making, for example by
introducing the 'yellow card' system to increase scrutiny of the
subsidiarity principle. Nevertheless, the Dutch government continues
to work on strengthening the role of national parliaments and the
democratic accountability of the EU at the national level. The Dutch
Lower House has assigned a special rapporteur for democratic
legitimacy, Liberal MP Rene? Leegte, to explore ways in which a
greater influence can be exercised on European decision-making.
In the quest for a stronger role for national parliaments, much
attention has been given to the subsidiarity check. The second Rutte
cabinet has presented an alternative vision of Europe as a
counterpoint to political union: less Europe in some policy areas, and
more Europe where necessary. However, subsidiarity is hardly
applicable with regards to political control over distribution,
especially given that the government and also a number of opposition
parties are in favour of further integration of the EMU.
A second method of strengthening the role of national parliaments is
through inter-parliamentary cooperation. The Conference of Community
and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union
(COSAC, established in 1989) is the primary forum for the exchange of
information and best practices. Minister Timmermans and the Dutch
parliament believe that there is potential here, especially with
regard to the process of coalition formation in the yellow-card
system.
However, the aim of strengthening the role of national parliaments
stands in stark contrast to the trend of deeper European integration
and an increased role for the European Parliament. Since they are
mainly interested in the implications of EU policies on their own
country, national governments can hardly follow the political
procedures of the EU which are set for the EMU as a whole. It is also
debatable whether nationally elected parliamentarians can rise above
their inclination to make cost-benefit analyses at the national level.
As for the yellow-card system, it was seldom used since it was
introduced and attempts to strengthen this instrument by forming
coalitions through inter-parliamentary cooperation are likely to be
cumbersome. At the same time, there are signs indicating that European
institutions do not see inter-parliamentary cooperation as the
solution to its problem of legitimacy.
Serious doubts have been expressed about the ability of national
parliaments to monitor European decision-making, which involves
shaping policy and working out the different scenarios for 28 Member
States. National parliaments are too removed from supranational
European issues and too self-centred to be able to fulfil this complex
role. If national parliaments are unable to take on the task of making
Europe more accountable, who will? The Commission is extending its
functions under the supervision of the European Parliament, which will
also inevitably widen its portfolio. In this discussion, it is not
enough -- and can even be misleading -- to repeat the prevailing mantra
about strengthening the role of national parliaments.
(The study can be downloaded here:
http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/obstacles-strengthened-role-national-parliaments-eu)
http://eubulletin.com/3273-european-think-tank-review-xxvi-august-2014.html
Aug 25 2014
EUROPEAN THINK-TANK REVIEW - XXVI. (August 2014)
Towards a Fresh Deal for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their
Neighbourhood Policies : 15 Steps
Michael Emerson (Centre for European Policy Studies)
In this commentary, Michael Emerson proposes 15 steps to be taken by
Ukraine, the EU and Russia in order to establish a stable economic
situation in the Ukraine region and reinforce positive mutual
relations.
First of all, the newly elected President Poroschenko must secure the
peace and unity of Ukraine. Putin could try harder to contribute
towards this objective. Poroschenko's second step should be to join
Moldova and Georgia in signing the Association Agreement with the EU
(this step has already been realized). The author also recommends that
the EU, Russia and Ukraine would engage in a regular trilateral
cooperation process. However, such arrangement is hardly possible at
this time when the context is one of overt confrontation. Furthermore,
Emerson suggests that the EU move rapidly to conclude visa-free
agreements with Ukraine and Georgia, and work towards this goal with
Russia once the current crisis of relations had been deescalated. In
the realm of Ukrainian domestic policy, Emerson stresses the need for
Ukraine to declare military neutrality and complete the revision of
its constitution, including appropriate safeguards for the Russian
language. Examples of bi- or multilingualism being handled in a
sustainable way could be found in Western and Northern Europe. One of
the steps urges the EU to scrap the sanctions it imposed against
Russia.
Many of Emerson's recommendations are trade-related. According to one,
Russia should agree to align the price of its gas sales to Ukraine on
the average German import price, thereby removing this item from the
political agenda once and for all. According to another, Ukraine and
the customs union comprising Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (RBK)
should engage in negotiations for a high quality free trade agreement
(FTA). Furthermore, the EU and the RBK customs union should open
negotiations for a free trade agreement, on the understanding that
Belarus and Kazakhstan would accede to the WTO during the course of
the negotiations. Finally, Russia should propose its customs union
partners to adopt European and international industrial standards for
tradable goods as the standards of the Eurasian Economic Union.
One of the steps deals with Transnistria. The EU, Moldova (Chisinau
and Transnistria) and Russia should work out arrangements for
Transnistria to profit from Moldova's signing of the DCFTA with the
EU. Transnistria would be subject to an additional Protocol for basic
free trade with the EU, with zero tariffs and acceptance of EU
industrial standards. The last step is concerned with Armenia, whose
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was made difficult, if not
impossible, by its request of 900 exemptions from the common external
tariff. Practical solutions should be found, enabling simpler free
trade with both the customs union and the EU, while Armenia could
still otherwise integrate with the Eurasian Economic Union if it so
wished.
(The study can be downloaded here:
http://ceps.eu/book/towards-fresh-deal-ukraine-eu-and-russia-and-their-neighbourhood-policies-15-steps)
Russia's Pivot to Eurasia
Kadri Liik (European Council on Foreign Relations)
The Eurasian Union is ever more widely considered to constitute an
anti-Western alliance. Some politicians, such as the former US Foreign
Secretary Hillary Clinton, condemned the project as an attempt to
revive the Soviet Union, even though the logic behind the founding of
the Union is not specifically anti-Western. Rather, the Union is to
serve Russia and its allies in attaining greater political leverage in
an increasingly globalised world. This rationale is shared with the
European integration project.
The reason for Russia's eastward pivot lies in its disappointment with
the West rather than a vision of better conditions or greater profits
from cooperation with the East. Antecedents of such a disappointment
may be classified into three categories: values, economy, and the
West's behaviour in the global theatre. Concerning values, the
progressive societal attitudes that are taking hold in the EU have
received a negative reaction in Russia. In economic matters, the
recent financial crisis took its toll on international relations in
general. The current sanctions concerning gas and oil exports serve to
further deepen the divide between Russia and Europe.
As for the international standing of the West, Russia perceives itself
as the victim who agreed to the German reunification, NATO expansion,
the building of new US military bases in central Asia and other steps
which directly benefitted the transatlantic power bloc, and was
rewarded with an anti-ballistic missile system in central Europe. This
device, although built solely for defensive purposes, grants the U.S.
a first-strike advantage in the sense that it should eliminate any
missiles fired by Russia in response to a U.S.-initiated aggression.
However outlandish this fear may seem, in nuclear matters
psychological deterrence plays a vital role. Russia feels it is
becoming increasingly surrounded and cornered, and thus naturally
adopted an ideologically defensive position.
Although cooperation between Russia and China is not new, the current
crisis in Ukraine motivated the Russians to seek out an ever closer
association. The EU will for some time remain Russia's top trading
partner, but the recent gas export agreement and the organisation of
common army exercises with China point to visible Russian efforts to
play a bigger role in Asia than before.
(The study can be downloaded here:
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/russias_pivot_to_eurasia310)
Obstacles for a Strengthened Role of National Parliaments in the European Union
Adriaan Schout, Judith Hoevenaars a Jan Marinus Wiersma (Clingendael -
Netherlands Institute of International Relations)
As a consequence of the financial crisis, there is a mounting support
for strengthening the accountability of 'Brussels' at the national
level, particularly in the context of economic governance. Calls for
greater involvement of national parliaments in the European Union are
growing in several European capitals. While putting an emphasis on the
Netherlands, this study examines the discourse around this debate and
looks for the limits of the national governments' demands.
Attempts have been made - in the Treaty of Lisbon which entered into
force in late 2009 but also in earlier treaties - to better involve
national parliaments in European decision-making, for example by
introducing the 'yellow card' system to increase scrutiny of the
subsidiarity principle. Nevertheless, the Dutch government continues
to work on strengthening the role of national parliaments and the
democratic accountability of the EU at the national level. The Dutch
Lower House has assigned a special rapporteur for democratic
legitimacy, Liberal MP Rene? Leegte, to explore ways in which a
greater influence can be exercised on European decision-making.
In the quest for a stronger role for national parliaments, much
attention has been given to the subsidiarity check. The second Rutte
cabinet has presented an alternative vision of Europe as a
counterpoint to political union: less Europe in some policy areas, and
more Europe where necessary. However, subsidiarity is hardly
applicable with regards to political control over distribution,
especially given that the government and also a number of opposition
parties are in favour of further integration of the EMU.
A second method of strengthening the role of national parliaments is
through inter-parliamentary cooperation. The Conference of Community
and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union
(COSAC, established in 1989) is the primary forum for the exchange of
information and best practices. Minister Timmermans and the Dutch
parliament believe that there is potential here, especially with
regard to the process of coalition formation in the yellow-card
system.
However, the aim of strengthening the role of national parliaments
stands in stark contrast to the trend of deeper European integration
and an increased role for the European Parliament. Since they are
mainly interested in the implications of EU policies on their own
country, national governments can hardly follow the political
procedures of the EU which are set for the EMU as a whole. It is also
debatable whether nationally elected parliamentarians can rise above
their inclination to make cost-benefit analyses at the national level.
As for the yellow-card system, it was seldom used since it was
introduced and attempts to strengthen this instrument by forming
coalitions through inter-parliamentary cooperation are likely to be
cumbersome. At the same time, there are signs indicating that European
institutions do not see inter-parliamentary cooperation as the
solution to its problem of legitimacy.
Serious doubts have been expressed about the ability of national
parliaments to monitor European decision-making, which involves
shaping policy and working out the different scenarios for 28 Member
States. National parliaments are too removed from supranational
European issues and too self-centred to be able to fulfil this complex
role. If national parliaments are unable to take on the task of making
Europe more accountable, who will? The Commission is extending its
functions under the supervision of the European Parliament, which will
also inevitably widen its portfolio. In this discussion, it is not
enough -- and can even be misleading -- to repeat the prevailing mantra
about strengthening the role of national parliaments.
(The study can be downloaded here:
http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/obstacles-strengthened-role-national-parliaments-eu)
http://eubulletin.com/3273-european-think-tank-review-xxvi-august-2014.html