Tweet
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Aug 25 2014
Matthew Bryza: "The United Nations has no mechanism to enforce
Karabakh resolution"
25 August 2014 - 1:56pm
One of the most informed Western experts on the South Caucasus, a
former U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan and former co-chair of the OSCE
Minsk Group, Matthew Bryza, told Vestnik Kavkaza about his views on
prospects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- What are the current U.S. approaches toward conflicts in the South
Caucasus? How have American views on the conflict changed? What place
do the conflicts take in U.S. foreign policy?
- In the United States government, regulation of the conflicts in the
South Caucasus region now occurs only at the bureaucratic level,
(event though those U.S. officials are highly skilled and
experienced). This marks a change from the period before 2009, when
the President of the United States and Secretary of State paid
necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) attention to the conflicts
involving the territory of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Such attention
brought the parties close to a framework agreement for the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on the Madrid Principles, which was
undermined when the U.S. decided to press for normalization of
Armenia-Turkey relations without a breakthrough on resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
A key reason for this change in the U.S. approach toward the South
Caucasus was President Obama's "Russia Reset" policy, according to
which the United States would make a friendlier relationship with
Russia a top priority. This included a naïve and dangerous
recognition of Russia's "special interests" in the countries of the
South Caucasus. The colossal failure of this approach is now evident
in Ukraine, where President Putin demonstrated little concern about
any potential diplomatic or economic costs for pursuing a version of
the policy of Hitler's Germany in invading and annexing the territory
of a friendly neighbor.
- What does the United States think about Russia's peace initiative,
which resulted in a meeting between the Russian, Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents in Sochi? Is the U.S. ready to cooperate with
Russia in the sphere of resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus
and the world?
- Though I am no longer a U.S. Government official, I sense that my
former colleagues in Washington do not take Russian President Putin's
"peace initiative" with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh seriously. In my
opinion, the United States does not see any opportunities to cooperate
with Russia to regulate conflicts in the South Caucasus and elsewhere
in the world. This is primarily because of Russia's illegal behavior
in Ukraine, where it has generated, supported, and participated in the
creation of a new frozen conflict, seizing part of its territory
despite its obligation to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity.
Moreover, even before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia proved to be a
major obstacle to achieving the goals of the U.S. and its Allies in
Syria.
- Why were the UN resolutions on Libya and Iraq and other countries
implemented, while the UN resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
haven't been enforced for more than 20 years? What is the U.S.
position on the issue? Why doesn't the U.S. contribute to
implementation of the resolutions?
- The United Nations has no mechanism to enforce its resolutions,
whether of the General Assembly or Security Council. Consequently,
most Security Council resolutions are never implemented. Remember
that it took over 10 years until Security Council resolutions
pertaining to Iraq were enforced, and even then, only as the result of
an enormous diplomatic and military effort by the United States in
response to what President George W. Bush viewed as an imminent threat
to U.S. national security.
Unfortunately, the four Security Council resolutions pertaining to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict fall into the more common category of UN
resolutions that are not enforced for three reasons. First, Armenia's
friends in Diaspora organizations like the Armenian National Congress
of America (ANCA), whose former president was convicted in the United
States of illegal possession of explosives and accused of terrorism,
launched a one-sided propaganda campaign that portrayed Azerbaijan as
the aggressor and Armenia as the victim. This propaganda undermined
the consensus in the UN Security Council demanding Armenia's
withdrawal from the Azerbaijani territory it occupies.
Second, shortly following passage of the four UN Security Council
resolutions in the early-1990's, the OSCE launched what became the
Minsk Group process to pursue a negotiated settlement of the NK
conflict. Armenia's withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territory
became a central element of that negotiated settlement. Therefore,
once the OSCE negotiations began, the search for a compromise between
Armenia and Azerbaijan overshadowed enforcement of the UN Security
Council resolutions demanding immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops.
Third, during President Putin's second presidency, Russia has not been
serious about reaching a framework agreement to settle the NK
conflict. While then-President Medvedev helped to energize the Minsk
Group process, the progress he helped generate toward finalizing the
Madrid Principles vanished when President Putin returned to the
Kremlin. Today, Russia seems to seek to sustain rather than resolve
the NK conflict, as in Ukraine, with the recent meeting in Sochi among
the presidents serving to mask President Putin's underlying
intentions.
With regard to the UN Security Council resolutions related to Libya
and Iraq, they were enforced because two Security Council members,
France and the United States (respectively), perceived imminent
threats to the security of themselves, their friends and allies, and
the citizens of Libya and Iraq, which required the use of military
force. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, three Security
Council members are Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, which makes them
responsible for finding a negotiated compromise that will result in
enforcement of those four UN Security Council resolutions.
As mentioned above, the United States position regard to the four UN
Security Council resolutions is that de facto enforcement will occur
once a negotiated settlement of the NK conflict is reached through the
Minsk Group process.
In my opinion, the United States must do more at the political level
to encourage a breakthrough in the Minsk Group. Personal engagement
by President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry are required to: (1)
Provide Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan the political support they need
to agree to compromises that will be unpopular in Azerbaijan and
Armenia (respectively); and (2) Convince Russia that a positive
relationship with the United States requires a genuine effort by
Moscow to reach a settlement of the NK conflict. Unfortunately, point
2 is impossible to achieve under current circumstances, when the
President of Russia is committed to fomenting rather than resolving
conflicts
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/59208.html
From: A. Papazian
Aug 25 2014
Matthew Bryza: "The United Nations has no mechanism to enforce
Karabakh resolution"
25 August 2014 - 1:56pm
One of the most informed Western experts on the South Caucasus, a
former U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan and former co-chair of the OSCE
Minsk Group, Matthew Bryza, told Vestnik Kavkaza about his views on
prospects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- What are the current U.S. approaches toward conflicts in the South
Caucasus? How have American views on the conflict changed? What place
do the conflicts take in U.S. foreign policy?
- In the United States government, regulation of the conflicts in the
South Caucasus region now occurs only at the bureaucratic level,
(event though those U.S. officials are highly skilled and
experienced). This marks a change from the period before 2009, when
the President of the United States and Secretary of State paid
necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) attention to the conflicts
involving the territory of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Such attention
brought the parties close to a framework agreement for the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on the Madrid Principles, which was
undermined when the U.S. decided to press for normalization of
Armenia-Turkey relations without a breakthrough on resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
A key reason for this change in the U.S. approach toward the South
Caucasus was President Obama's "Russia Reset" policy, according to
which the United States would make a friendlier relationship with
Russia a top priority. This included a naïve and dangerous
recognition of Russia's "special interests" in the countries of the
South Caucasus. The colossal failure of this approach is now evident
in Ukraine, where President Putin demonstrated little concern about
any potential diplomatic or economic costs for pursuing a version of
the policy of Hitler's Germany in invading and annexing the territory
of a friendly neighbor.
- What does the United States think about Russia's peace initiative,
which resulted in a meeting between the Russian, Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents in Sochi? Is the U.S. ready to cooperate with
Russia in the sphere of resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus
and the world?
- Though I am no longer a U.S. Government official, I sense that my
former colleagues in Washington do not take Russian President Putin's
"peace initiative" with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh seriously. In my
opinion, the United States does not see any opportunities to cooperate
with Russia to regulate conflicts in the South Caucasus and elsewhere
in the world. This is primarily because of Russia's illegal behavior
in Ukraine, where it has generated, supported, and participated in the
creation of a new frozen conflict, seizing part of its territory
despite its obligation to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity.
Moreover, even before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia proved to be a
major obstacle to achieving the goals of the U.S. and its Allies in
Syria.
- Why were the UN resolutions on Libya and Iraq and other countries
implemented, while the UN resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
haven't been enforced for more than 20 years? What is the U.S.
position on the issue? Why doesn't the U.S. contribute to
implementation of the resolutions?
- The United Nations has no mechanism to enforce its resolutions,
whether of the General Assembly or Security Council. Consequently,
most Security Council resolutions are never implemented. Remember
that it took over 10 years until Security Council resolutions
pertaining to Iraq were enforced, and even then, only as the result of
an enormous diplomatic and military effort by the United States in
response to what President George W. Bush viewed as an imminent threat
to U.S. national security.
Unfortunately, the four Security Council resolutions pertaining to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict fall into the more common category of UN
resolutions that are not enforced for three reasons. First, Armenia's
friends in Diaspora organizations like the Armenian National Congress
of America (ANCA), whose former president was convicted in the United
States of illegal possession of explosives and accused of terrorism,
launched a one-sided propaganda campaign that portrayed Azerbaijan as
the aggressor and Armenia as the victim. This propaganda undermined
the consensus in the UN Security Council demanding Armenia's
withdrawal from the Azerbaijani territory it occupies.
Second, shortly following passage of the four UN Security Council
resolutions in the early-1990's, the OSCE launched what became the
Minsk Group process to pursue a negotiated settlement of the NK
conflict. Armenia's withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territory
became a central element of that negotiated settlement. Therefore,
once the OSCE negotiations began, the search for a compromise between
Armenia and Azerbaijan overshadowed enforcement of the UN Security
Council resolutions demanding immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops.
Third, during President Putin's second presidency, Russia has not been
serious about reaching a framework agreement to settle the NK
conflict. While then-President Medvedev helped to energize the Minsk
Group process, the progress he helped generate toward finalizing the
Madrid Principles vanished when President Putin returned to the
Kremlin. Today, Russia seems to seek to sustain rather than resolve
the NK conflict, as in Ukraine, with the recent meeting in Sochi among
the presidents serving to mask President Putin's underlying
intentions.
With regard to the UN Security Council resolutions related to Libya
and Iraq, they were enforced because two Security Council members,
France and the United States (respectively), perceived imminent
threats to the security of themselves, their friends and allies, and
the citizens of Libya and Iraq, which required the use of military
force. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, three Security
Council members are Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, which makes them
responsible for finding a negotiated compromise that will result in
enforcement of those four UN Security Council resolutions.
As mentioned above, the United States position regard to the four UN
Security Council resolutions is that de facto enforcement will occur
once a negotiated settlement of the NK conflict is reached through the
Minsk Group process.
In my opinion, the United States must do more at the political level
to encourage a breakthrough in the Minsk Group. Personal engagement
by President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry are required to: (1)
Provide Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan the political support they need
to agree to compromises that will be unpopular in Azerbaijan and
Armenia (respectively); and (2) Convince Russia that a positive
relationship with the United States requires a genuine effort by
Moscow to reach a settlement of the NK conflict. Unfortunately, point
2 is impossible to achieve under current circumstances, when the
President of Russia is committed to fomenting rather than resolving
conflicts
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/59208.html
From: A. Papazian