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  • Cory Welt: Azerbaijan's military success is unlikely, which prevents

    Cory Welt: Azerbaijan's military success is unlikely, which prevents
    escalation to full-scale war

    18:14 26/08/2014 >> INTERVIEWS


    On Azerbaijani recent military aggression against the Nagorno Karabakh
    Republic and the RA, the security issue of the people of Nagorno
    Karabakh as well as the prospects of the Customs Union Panorama.am has
    spoken to Associate Director and Associate Research Professor of
    International Affairs at the Institute for European, Russian and
    Eurasian StudiesDr. Cory Welt.

    - Dr. Welt, recently there has been a marked escalation of hostilities
    in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone while Azerbaijan's president has
    openly threatened Armenia with war. What do you think this is
    preconditioned by?

    - It is always difficult to say exactly why a new outbreak of
    hostilities occurs along the line of contact. With each summer's
    violence worse than the last, the risk of escalation spinning out of
    control is very high. Unfortunately, as hostilities die down each
    year, we tend to forget this risk.

    It is also hard to understand exactly what the intentions of President
    Aliyev are, but his speech about war did not seem to be a direct
    threat. It sounded more like a warning that Azerbaijan has not given
    up on its lost territories and does not intend to, while serving as a
    rhetorical way for Aliyev to end this latest round of hostilities.

    At the same time, Aliyev saw this summer how much the West supported
    Ukraine in its efforts to fight externally-supported separatism in the
    Donbas, as well as Israel's use of force in Gaza. He is surely
    convinced that Azerbaijan, too, has the legitimate right to use force;
    it is only a question of whether he can succeed. For now, Azerbaijan's
    military success remains a very big question mark, which fortunately
    helps put a brake on escalation to full-scale war.

    - Can we say that Europe would be more interested to stop Azerbaijan
    from waging a war now than it was in 1991 (when no one stopped the
    Azeri aggression), given the fact that Azerbaijan is now an exporter
    of gas and oil to Europe, with BP having big shares in the Caspian,
    which will be endangered in case of the resumption of military
    hostilities? To what extent can this factor actually constitute a
    deterrent against possible Azerbaijani aggression?

    - I would like to think that Europeans worry more about the human cost
    of a full-scale war in the Caucasus than they do about the potential
    risk to the pipelines, which for now supply relatively little energy
    to Europe and would, in the worst case, only be down temporarily. I
    also don't think the potential European reaction to an attack on the
    pipeline is a deterrent to Azerbaijan, if it was truly determined to
    wage war. Those concerned about the fate of the pipeline would likely
    blame whichever side directly attacked the pipeline, not who started
    the conflict.

    - The recent Azerbaijani attacks on Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia,
    growing anti-Armenianism in Azerbaijan (most vividly demonstrated by
    the Safarov case), complete refusal to accept NKR as a reality as well
    as official statements to use of force to retake the NK constitute
    direct existential threats to the population of Nagorno Karabakh.
    Under these circumstances, how should the security of the population
    of NK be guaranteed even if a peace agreement is signed between the
    sides? What confidence building measures should Azerbaijan undertake
    to reassure that it poses no threat to Armenians?

    - Regrettably, we're not at a moment in time when Azerbaijan is able
    to credibly offer security guarantees to the population of
    Nagorno-Karabakh. This is one of the major obstacles to a resolution
    of the conflict, together with the unwillingness of Nagorno-Karabakh
    to relinquish occupied territories around the former NKAO. If there
    were a peace agreement, it would have to include an international
    peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan would not
    have the right to evict, as well as at least unarmed observers in
    neighbouring territories that would themselves have to constitute a
    demilitarized zone. We are far away from such a solution, however. In
    the meantime, confidence-building measures that could be implemented
    are simple, on both sides, if there were only political will - a
    lessening of war rhetoric, a drawdown of snipers, safe treatment and
    return of detainees, and at least partial demining.

    - Dr. Welt, what future do you see for the Russia-led Customs Union
    and the Eurasian Union? How can the current confrontation between
    Russia and the West over Ukraine impact this project and its members?

    - I suspect that these integration projects will ultimately be
    successful only to the extent that they reflect the genuine interests
    of their members and prospective members. We have already seen
    significant signs of pushback from Kazakhstan and Belarus against the
    most ambitious forms of these projects, which their leaders do not
    view to be in their national interests.

    The current confrontation in Ukraine is not between Russia and the
    West. It is between Moscow and Kyiv. I do not think this confrontation
    itself is key to the success of failure of Moscow-led integration
    projects. You'll notice that it really hasn't changed any country's
    position, even Ukraine's - those opposed to membership continue to
    oppose, those who supported membership continue to support (even if
    they are unhappy about it). Unless Moscow genuinely has the power to
    force integration on its neighbours, Soviet-style (which I doubt), the
    fate of these projects depends on their economic attractiveness as
    compared to the attractiveness of alternative models such as those the
    EU offers. The greatest opportunity for the Customs Union/Eurasian
    Union is if greater integration with the EU fails to provide the
    anticipated economic benefits. Disillusionment in Moldova, Georgia,
    and Ukraine would be the greatest stimulus for the success of these
    Russia-led projects.


    http://www.panorama.am/en/interviews/2014/08/26/interview/


    From: Baghdasarian
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