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Cory Welt: Azerbaijan's military success is unlikely, which prevents
escalation to full-scale war
18:14 26/08/2014 >> INTERVIEWS
On Azerbaijani recent military aggression against the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic and the RA, the security issue of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh as well as the prospects of the Customs Union Panorama.am has
spoken to Associate Director and Associate Research Professor of
International Affairs at the Institute for European, Russian and
Eurasian StudiesDr. Cory Welt.
- Dr. Welt, recently there has been a marked escalation of hostilities
in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone while Azerbaijan's president has
openly threatened Armenia with war. What do you think this is
preconditioned by?
- It is always difficult to say exactly why a new outbreak of
hostilities occurs along the line of contact. With each summer's
violence worse than the last, the risk of escalation spinning out of
control is very high. Unfortunately, as hostilities die down each
year, we tend to forget this risk.
It is also hard to understand exactly what the intentions of President
Aliyev are, but his speech about war did not seem to be a direct
threat. It sounded more like a warning that Azerbaijan has not given
up on its lost territories and does not intend to, while serving as a
rhetorical way for Aliyev to end this latest round of hostilities.
At the same time, Aliyev saw this summer how much the West supported
Ukraine in its efforts to fight externally-supported separatism in the
Donbas, as well as Israel's use of force in Gaza. He is surely
convinced that Azerbaijan, too, has the legitimate right to use force;
it is only a question of whether he can succeed. For now, Azerbaijan's
military success remains a very big question mark, which fortunately
helps put a brake on escalation to full-scale war.
- Can we say that Europe would be more interested to stop Azerbaijan
from waging a war now than it was in 1991 (when no one stopped the
Azeri aggression), given the fact that Azerbaijan is now an exporter
of gas and oil to Europe, with BP having big shares in the Caspian,
which will be endangered in case of the resumption of military
hostilities? To what extent can this factor actually constitute a
deterrent against possible Azerbaijani aggression?
- I would like to think that Europeans worry more about the human cost
of a full-scale war in the Caucasus than they do about the potential
risk to the pipelines, which for now supply relatively little energy
to Europe and would, in the worst case, only be down temporarily. I
also don't think the potential European reaction to an attack on the
pipeline is a deterrent to Azerbaijan, if it was truly determined to
wage war. Those concerned about the fate of the pipeline would likely
blame whichever side directly attacked the pipeline, not who started
the conflict.
- The recent Azerbaijani attacks on Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia,
growing anti-Armenianism in Azerbaijan (most vividly demonstrated by
the Safarov case), complete refusal to accept NKR as a reality as well
as official statements to use of force to retake the NK constitute
direct existential threats to the population of Nagorno Karabakh.
Under these circumstances, how should the security of the population
of NK be guaranteed even if a peace agreement is signed between the
sides? What confidence building measures should Azerbaijan undertake
to reassure that it poses no threat to Armenians?
- Regrettably, we're not at a moment in time when Azerbaijan is able
to credibly offer security guarantees to the population of
Nagorno-Karabakh. This is one of the major obstacles to a resolution
of the conflict, together with the unwillingness of Nagorno-Karabakh
to relinquish occupied territories around the former NKAO. If there
were a peace agreement, it would have to include an international
peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan would not
have the right to evict, as well as at least unarmed observers in
neighbouring territories that would themselves have to constitute a
demilitarized zone. We are far away from such a solution, however. In
the meantime, confidence-building measures that could be implemented
are simple, on both sides, if there were only political will - a
lessening of war rhetoric, a drawdown of snipers, safe treatment and
return of detainees, and at least partial demining.
- Dr. Welt, what future do you see for the Russia-led Customs Union
and the Eurasian Union? How can the current confrontation between
Russia and the West over Ukraine impact this project and its members?
- I suspect that these integration projects will ultimately be
successful only to the extent that they reflect the genuine interests
of their members and prospective members. We have already seen
significant signs of pushback from Kazakhstan and Belarus against the
most ambitious forms of these projects, which their leaders do not
view to be in their national interests.
The current confrontation in Ukraine is not between Russia and the
West. It is between Moscow and Kyiv. I do not think this confrontation
itself is key to the success of failure of Moscow-led integration
projects. You'll notice that it really hasn't changed any country's
position, even Ukraine's - those opposed to membership continue to
oppose, those who supported membership continue to support (even if
they are unhappy about it). Unless Moscow genuinely has the power to
force integration on its neighbours, Soviet-style (which I doubt), the
fate of these projects depends on their economic attractiveness as
compared to the attractiveness of alternative models such as those the
EU offers. The greatest opportunity for the Customs Union/Eurasian
Union is if greater integration with the EU fails to provide the
anticipated economic benefits. Disillusionment in Moldova, Georgia,
and Ukraine would be the greatest stimulus for the success of these
Russia-led projects.
http://www.panorama.am/en/interviews/2014/08/26/interview/
From: Baghdasarian
escalation to full-scale war
18:14 26/08/2014 >> INTERVIEWS
On Azerbaijani recent military aggression against the Nagorno Karabakh
Republic and the RA, the security issue of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh as well as the prospects of the Customs Union Panorama.am has
spoken to Associate Director and Associate Research Professor of
International Affairs at the Institute for European, Russian and
Eurasian StudiesDr. Cory Welt.
- Dr. Welt, recently there has been a marked escalation of hostilities
in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone while Azerbaijan's president has
openly threatened Armenia with war. What do you think this is
preconditioned by?
- It is always difficult to say exactly why a new outbreak of
hostilities occurs along the line of contact. With each summer's
violence worse than the last, the risk of escalation spinning out of
control is very high. Unfortunately, as hostilities die down each
year, we tend to forget this risk.
It is also hard to understand exactly what the intentions of President
Aliyev are, but his speech about war did not seem to be a direct
threat. It sounded more like a warning that Azerbaijan has not given
up on its lost territories and does not intend to, while serving as a
rhetorical way for Aliyev to end this latest round of hostilities.
At the same time, Aliyev saw this summer how much the West supported
Ukraine in its efforts to fight externally-supported separatism in the
Donbas, as well as Israel's use of force in Gaza. He is surely
convinced that Azerbaijan, too, has the legitimate right to use force;
it is only a question of whether he can succeed. For now, Azerbaijan's
military success remains a very big question mark, which fortunately
helps put a brake on escalation to full-scale war.
- Can we say that Europe would be more interested to stop Azerbaijan
from waging a war now than it was in 1991 (when no one stopped the
Azeri aggression), given the fact that Azerbaijan is now an exporter
of gas and oil to Europe, with BP having big shares in the Caspian,
which will be endangered in case of the resumption of military
hostilities? To what extent can this factor actually constitute a
deterrent against possible Azerbaijani aggression?
- I would like to think that Europeans worry more about the human cost
of a full-scale war in the Caucasus than they do about the potential
risk to the pipelines, which for now supply relatively little energy
to Europe and would, in the worst case, only be down temporarily. I
also don't think the potential European reaction to an attack on the
pipeline is a deterrent to Azerbaijan, if it was truly determined to
wage war. Those concerned about the fate of the pipeline would likely
blame whichever side directly attacked the pipeline, not who started
the conflict.
- The recent Azerbaijani attacks on Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia,
growing anti-Armenianism in Azerbaijan (most vividly demonstrated by
the Safarov case), complete refusal to accept NKR as a reality as well
as official statements to use of force to retake the NK constitute
direct existential threats to the population of Nagorno Karabakh.
Under these circumstances, how should the security of the population
of NK be guaranteed even if a peace agreement is signed between the
sides? What confidence building measures should Azerbaijan undertake
to reassure that it poses no threat to Armenians?
- Regrettably, we're not at a moment in time when Azerbaijan is able
to credibly offer security guarantees to the population of
Nagorno-Karabakh. This is one of the major obstacles to a resolution
of the conflict, together with the unwillingness of Nagorno-Karabakh
to relinquish occupied territories around the former NKAO. If there
were a peace agreement, it would have to include an international
peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan would not
have the right to evict, as well as at least unarmed observers in
neighbouring territories that would themselves have to constitute a
demilitarized zone. We are far away from such a solution, however. In
the meantime, confidence-building measures that could be implemented
are simple, on both sides, if there were only political will - a
lessening of war rhetoric, a drawdown of snipers, safe treatment and
return of detainees, and at least partial demining.
- Dr. Welt, what future do you see for the Russia-led Customs Union
and the Eurasian Union? How can the current confrontation between
Russia and the West over Ukraine impact this project and its members?
- I suspect that these integration projects will ultimately be
successful only to the extent that they reflect the genuine interests
of their members and prospective members. We have already seen
significant signs of pushback from Kazakhstan and Belarus against the
most ambitious forms of these projects, which their leaders do not
view to be in their national interests.
The current confrontation in Ukraine is not between Russia and the
West. It is between Moscow and Kyiv. I do not think this confrontation
itself is key to the success of failure of Moscow-led integration
projects. You'll notice that it really hasn't changed any country's
position, even Ukraine's - those opposed to membership continue to
oppose, those who supported membership continue to support (even if
they are unhappy about it). Unless Moscow genuinely has the power to
force integration on its neighbours, Soviet-style (which I doubt), the
fate of these projects depends on their economic attractiveness as
compared to the attractiveness of alternative models such as those the
EU offers. The greatest opportunity for the Customs Union/Eurasian
Union is if greater integration with the EU fails to provide the
anticipated economic benefits. Disillusionment in Moldova, Georgia,
and Ukraine would be the greatest stimulus for the success of these
Russia-led projects.
http://www.panorama.am/en/interviews/2014/08/26/interview/
From: Baghdasarian