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All's well that ends well: The new Turkey's PM rise to the top

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  • All's well that ends well: The new Turkey's PM rise to the top

    Russia Today
    Aug 28 2014

    All's well that ends well: The new Turkey's PM rise to the top


    Dr. Can Erimtan is an independent scholar residing in Ä°stanbul, with a
    wide interest in the politics, history and culture of the Balkans and
    the Greater Middle East.

    For the past 90 years Turkey, NATO's most eastern member and the
    Islamic world's gateway to the West, has been a nation state comprised
    of a manifold of ethnic groups and sub-groups bonded by the religion
    of Islam.

    Even though Kemalist social engineering and effective rewriting of
    national history and identity (1923-1994/2002) successfully
    transformed the Ottoman banner into a symbol of Turkish nationalism,
    adherence to the Muslim creed has always been the common core of
    Turkish citizenship. The mere existence of a Directorate of Religious
    Affairs since 1924 all but underlines this fact.

    This Muslim undertow of Turkish nationalism has always been quietly
    accepted and even acknowledged; for example, non-Muslim Turkish
    citizens (such as Jews, Greek Orthodox, Armenians of various Christian
    denominations, or Assyrians) were, and still are, not really accepted
    as `equal Turks' by the majority of the population, and even the
    nation's administration and courts, as persuasively argued for by the
    member of Antalya Bar Association, Nazım Tural.

    But it was not until the municipal elections of 1994, when Islamist
    politician Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP)
    gained the majority of the national votes, promoting the now notorious
    Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the position of Mayor of Metropolitan
    Istanbul, that this undertow suddenly came to the fore and was slowly
    transformed into the political current it is today.

    Throughout the remainder of the 1990s the expectedly unexpected RP's
    victory, arguably in part necessitated by the constitutional effects
    of the 1980 military coup, determined the flow of Turkish politics
    until the party was banned following a "harsh army-led secularist
    campaign.'

    But the genie had been let out of the bottle, and slowly but surely
    Islam became an openly accredited determinant in the social and
    political life of Turkey once more. And once Erdogan founded his
    Justice and Development Party (or AKP), the floodgates were well and
    truly wide open, inundating the Lausanne Treaty-agreed upon
    territories forming the successor nation state to the multi-ethnic,
    poly-religious yet staunchly Islamic Ottoman State with "Pure Water
    for Thirsty Muslims,' to use the words of the Ottoman poet and
    bureaucrat Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali Efendi (1541-1600).

    Prime Minister Erdogan has ruled Turkey for more than ten years now,
    and following the outcome of the recent presidential elections
    (gaining 52% of the popular vote) he will arguably continue to play an
    important part in Turkish life after he moves to the presidential
    residence in Ankara on 28 August.

    The compliant successor?

    At the moment, the question whether he will actually push for a
    constitutional change that would transform Turkey's regime from a
    parliamentary into a presidential system seems to have taken a
    backseat. Instead, attention is now focused on the wily Foreign
    Minister Ahmed Davutoglu who has been "appointed" the future party
    leader and PM by Erdogan on 21 August 2014. Erdogan said that the
    "candidate for party leadership and prime minister will realize the
    ideal of a new Turkey and the AKP's targets for 2023.' Do these words
    indicate that Davutoglu will be nothing but a compliant and malleable
    successor, fashioned into an agreeable and useful shape by
    puppet-master Erdogan? After all, the Associated Press confidently
    reports that the new President of Turkey "has made no secret of his
    ambition to strengthen the powers of the presidency, until now largely
    ceremonial. He has indicated he intends to keep his grip on the
    executive by making use of the presidency's seldom-used powers,
    including calling and presiding over Cabinet meetings. Analysts said
    Erdogan wanted to install a friendly prime minister who will allow him
    to largely control government."

    Underestimating the considerable command and resourcefulness of the
    as-yet still FM Davutoglu appears somewhat naive and possibly
    misguided, particularly if one were to keep in mind that both men
    share the same ideology and harbor similar, if not downright
    identical, ambitions for Turkey domestically as well as
    internationally.

    As expressed by the pan-Arab Al Jazeera, "Davutoglu has steered
    Turkey's foreign policy since 2009 and as an adviser to Erdogan before
    that." Before leaping on to the political stage, Prof. Dr. Ahmed
    Davutoglu was a somewhat unassuming academic specializing in the now
    presumably "hot" field of international relations. In addition, he was
    also recognized internationally as an Islamist thinker of high
    standing in the ivory tower world of academia.

    When Tayyip Erdogan took over the reins of government on March 14,
    2003, Davutoglu continued being active as prime ministerial Chief
    Advisor. At the same time, as ambassador, he was nevertheless able to
    act as a prime-mover on Turkey's behalf in the shuttle diplomacy
    conducted to reach a settlement in the Israel`Gaza conflict, Operation
    Cast Lead (27 December 2008-18 January 2009). The violence and
    bloodshed in Gaza caused quite an uproar in Turkey, with PM Erdogan
    overtly condemning Israeli aggression and publicly speaking as the
    voice of oppressed Muslims in Palestine (and beyond arguably).

    Sometime after the end of Israel's onslaught the Turkish PM travelled
    to Davos, to attend that year's World Economic Forum. On 29 January
    2009 Erdogan famously requested `one minute' from the moderator David
    Ignatius in a panel discussion with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
    Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, and notably Israeli
    President Shimon Peres. Before walking off the stage in anger and
    outrage, Tayyip Erdogan exclaimed: `One minute! One minute! No! One
    minute!.. Mr. Peres you are older than me. Your voice is very loud. I
    know that you are speaking aloud because of the requirement of a sense
    of guilt. My voice will not be that loud.'

    Moving into unfriendly waters

    Could it be that Erdogan's determined stance on Palestine (and Israel)
    and particularly his momentous performance in Switzerland were in no
    small measure inspired by words uttered by his Chief Advisor, the
    Islamist intellectual and IR specialist Prof. Dr. Ahmed Davutoglu?

    In fact, Erdogan appeared very pleased with the services rendered by
    Davutoglu, so pleased that on May 1, 2009, he appointed him Minister
    of Foreign Affairs. And since then, the wily FM has "steered Turkey's
    foreign policy" into a hitherto unknown direction and region.

    I have earlier used the term "pseudo-Ottoman" to refer to this Turkish
    policy aimed at the erstwhile Ottoman hinterland and beyond, as a
    policy attempting to reap commercial and tactical benefits from
    countries and regions that had previously been ignored by the
    Eurocentric Turkey. For the first time in its relatively short history
    Turkey started engaging its Arab neighbors. Turkey's esteem and
    reputation was on a high in the wider Islamic world, especially after
    Erdogan's arguably carefully scripted Davos stunt. In fact, the
    Palestinian-American journalist Jamal Dajani at the time proclaimed
    that the "new hero of the Arab street is Turkish Prime Minister Recep
    Tayyip Erdogan.' Arguably, this revised and revived appreciation of a
    Turkish politician by his Arab contemporaries was all down to the
    tactical scheming of Davutoglu, the man behind the scenes.

    >From his safe spot away from the madding crowd and irritating
    spotlights, the wily Davutoglu secured Turkish support for the
    toppling of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya; encouraged the Tahrir Square
    uprising and the subsequent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt;
    opposed the Shiite-led government in Baghdad by granting asylum to the
    disgraced Sunni Tariq al-Hashimi; and finally, cooperated with Barack
    Obama and others to depose Syria's Bashar al-Assad, in the process
    apparently freely supporting such extreme organizations as the Jabhat
    al-Nusra and ISIS (now known as the Islamic State led by Caliph
    Ibrahim, aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). Pseudo-Ottoman Turkey has indeed
    travelled far in the past five years.

    As a result, the peaceful pseudo-Ottoman course advocated by the
    dynamic duo Erdogan- Davutoglu, a course leading to maximized profits
    and heightened prestige, has taken a sharp turn over the past months.

    Rather than fostering commercial relations and friendly ties inside
    the wider Islamic world, the erstwhile advisor-turned-FM-turned-PM
    Davutoglu seems to have guided the Turkish state's ship into the
    decidedly unfriendly waters of the Sunni-Shia rivalry that I have
    elsewhere referred to as the intra-Islamic Cold War.

    Dr. Behlul Ozkan's, Assistant Professor in IR at Istanbul's Marmara
    University and a former student of Davutoglu's, believes that Prime
    Minister Davutoglu would aim to establish an Islamic Union. Ozkan sees
    the politician as a "Pan-Islamist, as he is not [acting in a]
    defensive [manner], but [rather] expansionistically; not passive but
    rather [pro-] active". He goes as far as saying that Davutoglu regards
    Turkey as the centre of the Middle East, a Muslim realm that would
    also include such places like Albania and Bosnia (Muslim areas of the
    Ottoman Balkans), and Davutoglu's "Pan-Islamist world is an order
    dominated by the Sunni creed".

    Davutoglu's foreign policy adventures in Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq
    all but underline his Ottomanist strand, supporting a Sunni insurgence
    in the wider Ottoman hinterland, stretching from Tripoli to Baghdad
    and from Cairo to Damascus. Will the new PM really "realize the ideal
    of a new Turkey and the AKP's targets for 2023," as Tayyip Erdogan
    hopefully claimed some time ago? Time will tell.

    The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely
    those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.


    http://rt.com/op-edge/183464-new-turkey-prime-minister/




    From: A. Papazian
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