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APPRAISING TURKISH-ARMENIAN RECONCILIATION
[ Part 2.2: "Attached Text" ]
[Keghart-Logo-Banner.jpg] Editorial, 8 December 2014
On Nov 17, 2014, the e-zine Jadaliyya published an interview with Dr.
Anny Bakalian conducted by Dr. Sinem Adar titled “Armenian
Diaspora Tourism in Turkey.”
[Reconciliation.jpg]
This conversation between a Turkish and Armenian academic seems
designed to introduce Muslim audiences to the history and experience of
Western Armenians before and after 1915. One aspect of the interview
appears to be to defuse enmity between Turks and Armenians by showing
how their ancestors allegedly shared a common heritage prior to
the Genocide.
Interviewee Bakalian recounts her family history in Western Armenia
and Cilicia; her participation in pilgrimages to these lands; and
answers questions about her thoughts and experiences as a descendant
of Armenian exiles. Bakalian’s comments will undoubtedly inform
Muslim readers about Armenian history.
Intellectual exchanges such as this are welcome, but they also
present problems. The successful implementation of Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation seems to require that both sides presuppose common
historical and cultural attributes that are not necessarily accurate
or complete. Indeed, this interview at times risks equalizing the
culpability of Armenians and Turks for antagonisms existing before
and after the Armenian Genocide. A few instances that point to this
include the following comments from Bakalian:
· That many Armenians in 19th century Cilicia and parts of W.
Armenia spoke Turkish as their ‘mother tongue.’ Turkish may
have been the Lingua Franca, given that occupied peoples were using
the dominant, official language of the Turkish Empire, but to call
it the mother tongue of the Armenians is inaccurate and disingenuous.
· That Armenians had a "shared culture" with Turks that included
cuisine, music and Khoja stories. Had Bakalian mentioned that many
indigenous traditions were appropriated or destroyed by centuries of
harsh Turkish occupation, this would render the picture in a different
light...that of Armenian tourists witnessing the co-optation and
weakening of their suppressed culture.
· That Armenians from Lebanon in the 1980s wishing to travel to
Western Armenia would have encountered the refusal of a Turkish
visa because The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA) was murdering Turkish diplomats. Were all Lebanese Armenians
wishing to travel refused a Turkish visa? Was the mention of ASALA
in the interview done to equalize purported “shared pain”
between Turks and Armenians, without mentioning that the assassination
of diplomats is an inevitable tactic of the disenfranchised and
dispossessed? Was it necessary for Bakalian to refer to a Tashnag
ancestor and his descendant as "defiant” -- which smack of the
derogative terms used to justify the Turkish narrative that Armenian
revolts were responsible for the Genocide?
· That “some Armenians really want an apology from the
Turkish government [for the commission of genocide]. Some people
would be happy to receive a personal expression of regret.”
While this reflects Bakalian’s personal opinion, it does not
represent a position to which the entire global Armenian community
adheres, nor does an apology suffice or portend a larger political
solution. To her credit, Bakalian ends the interview by saying that
“if the Turkish citizens lobby their government to change
the policy of genocide denial, they may eventually achieve this
[acknowledgment]. Ultimately, the onus is on the Turkish people,
beginning with the intelligentsia.” Unfortunately, Bakalian
stops at governmental acknowledgment as a proposed final solution.
· That “witnessing the villages, towns, and cities of their
parents, grandparents, and great grandparents reconnects [Armenian]
travelers with their roots and heals displacement. The trip [to Western
Armenia] is psychologically therapeutic not only for the travelers,
but also for Diaspora Armenians back home. When the pilgrims return to
their everyday lives, they share their experiences and impressions with
their family, friends, and community. While family stories of Turkish
atrocities are not forgotten, the new narratives offer the promise
of closure.” Many Armenians do not agree with Bakalian’s
opinion that tourism to occupied Western Armenia is the "healing"
solution for exiled Armenians and their descendants. In fact, some
might consider traveling to areas cleansed of Armenians and their
culture a form of re-traumatization, especially when Turkish state
policy is still one of full-blown denial.
There have been, in the last 20 years, a number of misconceptions
inherent in the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process.
Reconciliation begs the question of whether and under which
circumstances a victim group with little support from the international
community should: engage with an unrepentant perpetrating nation;
share responsibility for their victimization in exchange for dialogue;
and if the process puts the appropriately greater onus on the dominant
perpetrator group.
This interview became a springboard for our compiling a list of
misconceptions, presented below.
Ten Key Presuppositions of Turkish-Armenian
“Reconciliation”
1) That reconciliation rectifies an estrangement between peoples
who were once co-equal citizens and good friends residing within a
tolerant Ottoman Empire. False. Armenians were generally second-class
citizens in an oppressive environment.
2) That both peoples are equally responsible for their rift, for what
caused and perpetuates it, for establishing a peaceful resolution, and
have equal power to do so. False. Turkey was the perpetrating state;
Armenians were the victims. The power asymmetry still holds today.
3) That cultural exchanges to ‘bridge misunderstanding’
can overcome historic hostility; such exchanges are enough to help
two sides reach an equitable solution to their problems; and if
exchanges cannot lead to restorative justice, they could minimize
or supplant it. False. There are real political issues that separate
Turkey and Armenia: Turkey's closure of the border, Turkey's attempts
to interfere in the Artsakh/Karabagh issue, and Turkey's pan-Turkist
ambitions to expand to the East.
4) That apologies by Turks in regard to the Armenian Genocide -
individually, collectively or on a government level -- may speak
for all concerned and will finally resolve the problem. False, as
financial and territorial reparations are also necessary to completely
make amends for the unprecedented act of genocide committed.
5) That it is up to Armenians to work hand-in-hand with Turks to
educate and transform Turkish society (whether this ultimately helps
the Armenian Cause or not) and that only such transformed Turks from
within Turkey (rather than international pressure upon Turkey) can
establish lasting peace with Armenians. False. Armenians should not
be placed in the position of being the Turks' psychiatrists.
6) That interminable exchanges, dialogue and dissection of history
should take the place of Armenian political activism for reparations
and restoration or, at the very least, should persuade political
entities to neutralize reparations efforts. False. Dialogue in
perpetuity could indefinitely delay and defuse restorative justice.
7) That the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border is not being
pursued to satisfy the political ambitions of the West, but rather,
is being pursued because it is solely beneficial to the parties
involved. False. The West has much to gain by an opened border,
including the East-West transport of Western-controlled Central Asian
energy resources and political and military penetration by NATO.
Incentives presented to Turks include improving their international
image and boosting the impoverished Turkish economy. For Armenians,
besides some unproven economic gains, purported incentives are that
simply visiting Western Armenia will, in and of itself, satisfy and
give closure to those who carry genocide trauma and the desire to
permanently return to W. Armenia. This may, in fact, complete the
act of genocide.
8) That motives for reconciliation are the same among Turks and
Armenians. False. Some Turks may wish to correct historic wrongs.
Others wish to achieve economic gain; improve a tarnished image;
build democracy in their own nation; and neutralize the reparations
movement. Some Armenians may truly seek restorative justice. Others
wish to obtain career opportunities and advancement, access to power
and personal fame.
9) That the majority of Turks of today are liberal thinkers and
entirely unlike the Turks of the past. And that the reconciliation
movement is widespread and has great public support. False. The
intellectual class that recognizes the Armenian Genocide makes up
a small percentage of the Turkish population. The recent, racially
motivated Turkic assassinations of Armenians such as Hrant Dink,
Sultan Aykar, Marissa Kucuk, Sevan Balikji and Gurgen Makaryan are
still fresh, as are the invasions of Kessab and the bombing of the Der
Zor Memorial. The reconciliation movement is not extensive and does
not have widespread public support. The same group of individuals
are participating in the reconciliation process again and again,
only sometimes with their identities concealed.
10) That so much has changed in the past 100 years and that,
aside from a hostile, paranoid Armenian Diaspora, Turkey is of no
particular threat to Armenia. That those Armenians who question the
asymmetry of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process are fanatics
who harbor hatred for Turks, do not wish to see progress, and are
preventing Armenia from making peace with Turkey. False. Those who
point out the power asymmetry between Turkey and Armenians should
not be silenced or marginalized. Diaspora Armenians are looked
upon as hostile interventionists who will spoil Turkish-Armenian
initiatives. In truth, the Diaspora represents the direct outcome
of the genocidal process and the main aggrieved party who remains
stateless and without reparation or restitution.
We urge those who wish to see meaningful dialogue between Turks and
Armenians to consider the points above. On the eve of the Armenian
Genocide Centennial and as reconciliation initiatives proliferate,
every Armenian must ask him or herself the following: “Do I
believe that the Armenians should abandon the dream of returning to
the indigenous lands and properties stolen from Armenians, or should
Armenians cherish their dream the way Martin Luther King, Jr. did,
and for which he paid with his life? His followers have not given up
that dream despite all of the hardships and ridicule.
Let us assume that there are high-minded Armenians who are invested in
the “reconciliation” process as a means of restoring the
lost homeland of the Armenians and seek a way to establish a foothold
in Western Armenia. If this is so, they must take into account that
today’s Assyrians invited to repurchase and resettle into
their ancestral properties in their historic homeland, confiscated
during the (still-ongoing) Genocide, are once again being ousted from
“modern” Turkey.
http://www.keghart.com/Editorial-Appraising-Reconciliation
[ Part 2.2: "Attached Text" ]
[Keghart-Logo-Banner.jpg] Editorial, 8 December 2014
On Nov 17, 2014, the e-zine Jadaliyya published an interview with Dr.
Anny Bakalian conducted by Dr. Sinem Adar titled “Armenian
Diaspora Tourism in Turkey.”
[Reconciliation.jpg]
This conversation between a Turkish and Armenian academic seems
designed to introduce Muslim audiences to the history and experience of
Western Armenians before and after 1915. One aspect of the interview
appears to be to defuse enmity between Turks and Armenians by showing
how their ancestors allegedly shared a common heritage prior to
the Genocide.
Interviewee Bakalian recounts her family history in Western Armenia
and Cilicia; her participation in pilgrimages to these lands; and
answers questions about her thoughts and experiences as a descendant
of Armenian exiles. Bakalian’s comments will undoubtedly inform
Muslim readers about Armenian history.
Intellectual exchanges such as this are welcome, but they also
present problems. The successful implementation of Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation seems to require that both sides presuppose common
historical and cultural attributes that are not necessarily accurate
or complete. Indeed, this interview at times risks equalizing the
culpability of Armenians and Turks for antagonisms existing before
and after the Armenian Genocide. A few instances that point to this
include the following comments from Bakalian:
· That many Armenians in 19th century Cilicia and parts of W.
Armenia spoke Turkish as their ‘mother tongue.’ Turkish may
have been the Lingua Franca, given that occupied peoples were using
the dominant, official language of the Turkish Empire, but to call
it the mother tongue of the Armenians is inaccurate and disingenuous.
· That Armenians had a "shared culture" with Turks that included
cuisine, music and Khoja stories. Had Bakalian mentioned that many
indigenous traditions were appropriated or destroyed by centuries of
harsh Turkish occupation, this would render the picture in a different
light...that of Armenian tourists witnessing the co-optation and
weakening of their suppressed culture.
· That Armenians from Lebanon in the 1980s wishing to travel to
Western Armenia would have encountered the refusal of a Turkish
visa because The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA) was murdering Turkish diplomats. Were all Lebanese Armenians
wishing to travel refused a Turkish visa? Was the mention of ASALA
in the interview done to equalize purported “shared pain”
between Turks and Armenians, without mentioning that the assassination
of diplomats is an inevitable tactic of the disenfranchised and
dispossessed? Was it necessary for Bakalian to refer to a Tashnag
ancestor and his descendant as "defiant” -- which smack of the
derogative terms used to justify the Turkish narrative that Armenian
revolts were responsible for the Genocide?
· That “some Armenians really want an apology from the
Turkish government [for the commission of genocide]. Some people
would be happy to receive a personal expression of regret.”
While this reflects Bakalian’s personal opinion, it does not
represent a position to which the entire global Armenian community
adheres, nor does an apology suffice or portend a larger political
solution. To her credit, Bakalian ends the interview by saying that
“if the Turkish citizens lobby their government to change
the policy of genocide denial, they may eventually achieve this
[acknowledgment]. Ultimately, the onus is on the Turkish people,
beginning with the intelligentsia.” Unfortunately, Bakalian
stops at governmental acknowledgment as a proposed final solution.
· That “witnessing the villages, towns, and cities of their
parents, grandparents, and great grandparents reconnects [Armenian]
travelers with their roots and heals displacement. The trip [to Western
Armenia] is psychologically therapeutic not only for the travelers,
but also for Diaspora Armenians back home. When the pilgrims return to
their everyday lives, they share their experiences and impressions with
their family, friends, and community. While family stories of Turkish
atrocities are not forgotten, the new narratives offer the promise
of closure.” Many Armenians do not agree with Bakalian’s
opinion that tourism to occupied Western Armenia is the "healing"
solution for exiled Armenians and their descendants. In fact, some
might consider traveling to areas cleansed of Armenians and their
culture a form of re-traumatization, especially when Turkish state
policy is still one of full-blown denial.
There have been, in the last 20 years, a number of misconceptions
inherent in the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process.
Reconciliation begs the question of whether and under which
circumstances a victim group with little support from the international
community should: engage with an unrepentant perpetrating nation;
share responsibility for their victimization in exchange for dialogue;
and if the process puts the appropriately greater onus on the dominant
perpetrator group.
This interview became a springboard for our compiling a list of
misconceptions, presented below.
Ten Key Presuppositions of Turkish-Armenian
“Reconciliation”
1) That reconciliation rectifies an estrangement between peoples
who were once co-equal citizens and good friends residing within a
tolerant Ottoman Empire. False. Armenians were generally second-class
citizens in an oppressive environment.
2) That both peoples are equally responsible for their rift, for what
caused and perpetuates it, for establishing a peaceful resolution, and
have equal power to do so. False. Turkey was the perpetrating state;
Armenians were the victims. The power asymmetry still holds today.
3) That cultural exchanges to ‘bridge misunderstanding’
can overcome historic hostility; such exchanges are enough to help
two sides reach an equitable solution to their problems; and if
exchanges cannot lead to restorative justice, they could minimize
or supplant it. False. There are real political issues that separate
Turkey and Armenia: Turkey's closure of the border, Turkey's attempts
to interfere in the Artsakh/Karabagh issue, and Turkey's pan-Turkist
ambitions to expand to the East.
4) That apologies by Turks in regard to the Armenian Genocide -
individually, collectively or on a government level -- may speak
for all concerned and will finally resolve the problem. False, as
financial and territorial reparations are also necessary to completely
make amends for the unprecedented act of genocide committed.
5) That it is up to Armenians to work hand-in-hand with Turks to
educate and transform Turkish society (whether this ultimately helps
the Armenian Cause or not) and that only such transformed Turks from
within Turkey (rather than international pressure upon Turkey) can
establish lasting peace with Armenians. False. Armenians should not
be placed in the position of being the Turks' psychiatrists.
6) That interminable exchanges, dialogue and dissection of history
should take the place of Armenian political activism for reparations
and restoration or, at the very least, should persuade political
entities to neutralize reparations efforts. False. Dialogue in
perpetuity could indefinitely delay and defuse restorative justice.
7) That the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border is not being
pursued to satisfy the political ambitions of the West, but rather,
is being pursued because it is solely beneficial to the parties
involved. False. The West has much to gain by an opened border,
including the East-West transport of Western-controlled Central Asian
energy resources and political and military penetration by NATO.
Incentives presented to Turks include improving their international
image and boosting the impoverished Turkish economy. For Armenians,
besides some unproven economic gains, purported incentives are that
simply visiting Western Armenia will, in and of itself, satisfy and
give closure to those who carry genocide trauma and the desire to
permanently return to W. Armenia. This may, in fact, complete the
act of genocide.
8) That motives for reconciliation are the same among Turks and
Armenians. False. Some Turks may wish to correct historic wrongs.
Others wish to achieve economic gain; improve a tarnished image;
build democracy in their own nation; and neutralize the reparations
movement. Some Armenians may truly seek restorative justice. Others
wish to obtain career opportunities and advancement, access to power
and personal fame.
9) That the majority of Turks of today are liberal thinkers and
entirely unlike the Turks of the past. And that the reconciliation
movement is widespread and has great public support. False. The
intellectual class that recognizes the Armenian Genocide makes up
a small percentage of the Turkish population. The recent, racially
motivated Turkic assassinations of Armenians such as Hrant Dink,
Sultan Aykar, Marissa Kucuk, Sevan Balikji and Gurgen Makaryan are
still fresh, as are the invasions of Kessab and the bombing of the Der
Zor Memorial. The reconciliation movement is not extensive and does
not have widespread public support. The same group of individuals
are participating in the reconciliation process again and again,
only sometimes with their identities concealed.
10) That so much has changed in the past 100 years and that,
aside from a hostile, paranoid Armenian Diaspora, Turkey is of no
particular threat to Armenia. That those Armenians who question the
asymmetry of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process are fanatics
who harbor hatred for Turks, do not wish to see progress, and are
preventing Armenia from making peace with Turkey. False. Those who
point out the power asymmetry between Turkey and Armenians should
not be silenced or marginalized. Diaspora Armenians are looked
upon as hostile interventionists who will spoil Turkish-Armenian
initiatives. In truth, the Diaspora represents the direct outcome
of the genocidal process and the main aggrieved party who remains
stateless and without reparation or restitution.
We urge those who wish to see meaningful dialogue between Turks and
Armenians to consider the points above. On the eve of the Armenian
Genocide Centennial and as reconciliation initiatives proliferate,
every Armenian must ask him or herself the following: “Do I
believe that the Armenians should abandon the dream of returning to
the indigenous lands and properties stolen from Armenians, or should
Armenians cherish their dream the way Martin Luther King, Jr. did,
and for which he paid with his life? His followers have not given up
that dream despite all of the hardships and ridicule.
Let us assume that there are high-minded Armenians who are invested in
the “reconciliation” process as a means of restoring the
lost homeland of the Armenians and seek a way to establish a foothold
in Western Armenia. If this is so, they must take into account that
today’s Assyrians invited to repurchase and resettle into
their ancestral properties in their historic homeland, confiscated
during the (still-ongoing) Genocide, are once again being ousted from
“modern” Turkey.
http://www.keghart.com/Editorial-Appraising-Reconciliation