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US ANALYST ON TURKISH TURMOIL, UKRAINIAN UPRISING AND AZERBAIJAN
Turan Information Agency
February 4, 2014 Tuesday
Gerald Robbins, Senior Fellow at the US Foreign Policy Research
Institute (FPRI), who specializes in analyzing Turkey and the Caucasus,
described the recent development in the region in an interview with
Turan's Washington DC correspondent.
Mr. Robbins served as Program Director for Freedom House in Baku
during the mid 1990's, where he managed post-Soviet political and
economic programs.
Q. What is happening in Turkey right now and how could it affect the
regional dimension ahead?
A. A serious split has occurred between two of the most powerful
factions within the ruling AKP administration. Administrative matters
have devolved into factional rifts, resulting in an environment of
political and economic uncertainty. It's an ongoing situation whose
impact reverberates throughout Turkey's neighboring environment
and beyond.
Q. How would you describe the main differences between Gulenists's
and Erdogan's overviews of Turkey and the entire region's future? Are
they on the same page or do they have different views?
A.It's important to note that the AK party was never a homogenous
entity. While it espouses an Islamist philosophy, there are different
outlooks and interpretations. This is noticeably reflected in the
viewpoints of the Gulen movement and Prime Minister Erdogan. Generally
speaking, the Gulenist's adhere to a Sufi-oriented philosophy, which
perceives Islam's societal role in less doctrinaire terms. Conversely,
Mr. Erdogan espouses a more traditional interpretation.
There's a noticeable disparity between Gulenists and Erdogan regarding
Turkey's regional status. The Prime Minister envisions what's known as
a "neo-Ottoman" concept, namely reviving the heyday of that Empire's
grandeur and influence to present-day circumstances. The Arab world is
particularly targeted for this idea, namely turbulent societies that
would benefit from Turkish tutelage. This outreach to once Ottoman
domains comes at Israel's expense, which is ironically castigated
for practicing neo-colonialism.
There's a different regional priority for the Gulenists. Much of the
movement's outreach is aimed towards Central Asia and the Caucasus
region. It exhibits a more Pan Turkic outlook. The imperial homage
prevalent in Erdogan's neo-Ottoman rationale is noticeably absent in
the Gulenist version. Furthermore Israel is viewed with less antipathy.
Q. Gulenists have long been very actively involved in Turkish
regional diplomacy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Will the recent
developments in Turkey affect Ankara's policy in countries like
Azerbaijan?
A.It's unlikely that Turkey's Foreign Ministry will be subject to
the bureaucratic purges currently occurring at other agencies. The
Foreign Ministry's personnel are predominantly secularist in their
orientation and therefore exempt from the government's allegations
of Gulenist infiltration and "parallel states."
Q. What are your expectations from next year's election in Turkey?
A.Unclear - much depends on what the outcome is with the upcoming
local election in March and August's Presidential vote. There's still
a lot of political theater to watch between now and 2015.
Q. How would you describe the role and existence of Islam in the
region?In Azerbaijan, many are afraid that the religion is replacing
the regular opposition.
A.The common factor behind the regional turmoil is bad governance.
Russia's management of its Northern Caucasus territory has been
disastrous. Two decades of post-Soviet rule has resulted in rampant
corruption and a growing Islamic militancy. The upcoming Winter
Olympics in Sochi will have little impact placating sullen and
disaffected communities. Although the current situation isn't as dire
in Azerbaijan, there's cause for concern. Baku won't remain immune
from the problems north of its border, especially if it doesn't begin
to enact meaningful reforms.
Q. While looking at the broader region, do you see any effect of
the Vilnius summit results as well as Ukrainian uprising for the
democratic transition of the Caucasus nations?
A. The Ukraine and Azerbaijan have a common Soviet legacy, but
otherwise are different stories. The conditions causing Ukraine's
current situation vary from the challenges facing the Caucasus. There
are different political narratives, economic factors along with
cultural and historical aspects to consider.
Q. What lessons would you highlight for the people the Middle East and
the Caucasus, where people suffer from the oil-reach authoritarian
governments, corruptions and have similar problems, which took
Ukrainian protesters to the streets?
A. The same criteria applies to the Middle East which I pointed out
in a prior interview... Granted they all suffer from corruption and
oppression, but their respective circumstances aren't the same.
The basic answer to solving Ukraine's/the Middle East's/Azerbaijan's
dilemmas is establishing democratic societies and rule of law. How this
gets enacted depends on a nation's level of political and economic
development. Ukraine's "democratic transition" is at a different
stage than Azerbaijan's which varies from the Middle East.
The same goes for integrating the South Caucasus nations into
Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly when you compare Georgia to
Azerbaijan, much less Armenia.
Q. As for the democratic transition, some in the west mention that
it is getting difficult for the international community and partners
to deal with Azerbaijan. Would you agree with that?
A. Yes, I agree..
Q. Last week, two top Senators -John McCain and Ben Cardin --introduced
a new bill that extends the reach of the 2012 Magnitsky Act, aimed
to block human rights abusers from any country, not just Russia,
from entering the U.S. and using its financial institutions.
What should be the message of the new bill to the rights violators
in the countries like Azerbaijan?
A. Extending the Magnitsky Act to other nations besides Russia
reinforces America's commitment to individual freedom and the right to
dissent. These are necessary foundations for establishing more open,
democratic societies. It serves notice to Azerbaijan that human rights
will become a significant part in determining relations.
Q. On Nagorno-Karabakh, as tension along the front line has escalated
dramatically over the last couple of days, at the time when peace
process seemed to have gotten back on its feet, some worry that
violence might underline the risk of a conflict... Why do you think
this is happening now?
A. It appears the upticks in cross-border incidents are incitements
aimed at derailing the foreign minister talks. This might be a
recurring matter for the near future. Note that WWI's centennial might
partially explain the recent escalation, particularly when it comes to
the Armenian viewpoint. What occurred to their population then is still
an open wound. Even though Azerbaijan was never part of the Ottoman
Empire and its policies during that period, Armenian extremists see
otherwise. Conversely, there are certain Azeri perspectives viewing
the Nagorno-Karabakh impasse in extremist terms.
As long as these emotional topics remain unresolved, they are subject
to manipulated narratives and extremist provocations.
Q. Secretary Kerry last year made clear that the US sees a serious
commitment to substantial talks as the Administration was prepared
to invest more resources in supporting it. What do you think the US
could do to facilitate the process and encourage both sides to the
long-term peace?
A.Regarding Secretary Kerry, he's the latest in a long line of
State Department executives declaring their focus to resolving
Nagorno-Karabakh. Simultaneously, he also declared a serious intent
towards finding a solution between Israel and the Palestinians. It
therefore appears that the Secretary is overstretched as to where he
can place substantive time and effort. Unless the Obama Adminstration
perceives Nagorno-Karabakh as a prime example of their "lead from
behind" diplomacy, the Secretary's commitment sounds like rhetoric.
A.Raufoglu
Washington, DC
Turan Information Agency
February 4, 2014 Tuesday
Gerald Robbins, Senior Fellow at the US Foreign Policy Research
Institute (FPRI), who specializes in analyzing Turkey and the Caucasus,
described the recent development in the region in an interview with
Turan's Washington DC correspondent.
Mr. Robbins served as Program Director for Freedom House in Baku
during the mid 1990's, where he managed post-Soviet political and
economic programs.
Q. What is happening in Turkey right now and how could it affect the
regional dimension ahead?
A. A serious split has occurred between two of the most powerful
factions within the ruling AKP administration. Administrative matters
have devolved into factional rifts, resulting in an environment of
political and economic uncertainty. It's an ongoing situation whose
impact reverberates throughout Turkey's neighboring environment
and beyond.
Q. How would you describe the main differences between Gulenists's
and Erdogan's overviews of Turkey and the entire region's future? Are
they on the same page or do they have different views?
A.It's important to note that the AK party was never a homogenous
entity. While it espouses an Islamist philosophy, there are different
outlooks and interpretations. This is noticeably reflected in the
viewpoints of the Gulen movement and Prime Minister Erdogan. Generally
speaking, the Gulenist's adhere to a Sufi-oriented philosophy, which
perceives Islam's societal role in less doctrinaire terms. Conversely,
Mr. Erdogan espouses a more traditional interpretation.
There's a noticeable disparity between Gulenists and Erdogan regarding
Turkey's regional status. The Prime Minister envisions what's known as
a "neo-Ottoman" concept, namely reviving the heyday of that Empire's
grandeur and influence to present-day circumstances. The Arab world is
particularly targeted for this idea, namely turbulent societies that
would benefit from Turkish tutelage. This outreach to once Ottoman
domains comes at Israel's expense, which is ironically castigated
for practicing neo-colonialism.
There's a different regional priority for the Gulenists. Much of the
movement's outreach is aimed towards Central Asia and the Caucasus
region. It exhibits a more Pan Turkic outlook. The imperial homage
prevalent in Erdogan's neo-Ottoman rationale is noticeably absent in
the Gulenist version. Furthermore Israel is viewed with less antipathy.
Q. Gulenists have long been very actively involved in Turkish
regional diplomacy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Will the recent
developments in Turkey affect Ankara's policy in countries like
Azerbaijan?
A.It's unlikely that Turkey's Foreign Ministry will be subject to
the bureaucratic purges currently occurring at other agencies. The
Foreign Ministry's personnel are predominantly secularist in their
orientation and therefore exempt from the government's allegations
of Gulenist infiltration and "parallel states."
Q. What are your expectations from next year's election in Turkey?
A.Unclear - much depends on what the outcome is with the upcoming
local election in March and August's Presidential vote. There's still
a lot of political theater to watch between now and 2015.
Q. How would you describe the role and existence of Islam in the
region?In Azerbaijan, many are afraid that the religion is replacing
the regular opposition.
A.The common factor behind the regional turmoil is bad governance.
Russia's management of its Northern Caucasus territory has been
disastrous. Two decades of post-Soviet rule has resulted in rampant
corruption and a growing Islamic militancy. The upcoming Winter
Olympics in Sochi will have little impact placating sullen and
disaffected communities. Although the current situation isn't as dire
in Azerbaijan, there's cause for concern. Baku won't remain immune
from the problems north of its border, especially if it doesn't begin
to enact meaningful reforms.
Q. While looking at the broader region, do you see any effect of
the Vilnius summit results as well as Ukrainian uprising for the
democratic transition of the Caucasus nations?
A. The Ukraine and Azerbaijan have a common Soviet legacy, but
otherwise are different stories. The conditions causing Ukraine's
current situation vary from the challenges facing the Caucasus. There
are different political narratives, economic factors along with
cultural and historical aspects to consider.
Q. What lessons would you highlight for the people the Middle East and
the Caucasus, where people suffer from the oil-reach authoritarian
governments, corruptions and have similar problems, which took
Ukrainian protesters to the streets?
A. The same criteria applies to the Middle East which I pointed out
in a prior interview... Granted they all suffer from corruption and
oppression, but their respective circumstances aren't the same.
The basic answer to solving Ukraine's/the Middle East's/Azerbaijan's
dilemmas is establishing democratic societies and rule of law. How this
gets enacted depends on a nation's level of political and economic
development. Ukraine's "democratic transition" is at a different
stage than Azerbaijan's which varies from the Middle East.
The same goes for integrating the South Caucasus nations into
Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly when you compare Georgia to
Azerbaijan, much less Armenia.
Q. As for the democratic transition, some in the west mention that
it is getting difficult for the international community and partners
to deal with Azerbaijan. Would you agree with that?
A. Yes, I agree..
Q. Last week, two top Senators -John McCain and Ben Cardin --introduced
a new bill that extends the reach of the 2012 Magnitsky Act, aimed
to block human rights abusers from any country, not just Russia,
from entering the U.S. and using its financial institutions.
What should be the message of the new bill to the rights violators
in the countries like Azerbaijan?
A. Extending the Magnitsky Act to other nations besides Russia
reinforces America's commitment to individual freedom and the right to
dissent. These are necessary foundations for establishing more open,
democratic societies. It serves notice to Azerbaijan that human rights
will become a significant part in determining relations.
Q. On Nagorno-Karabakh, as tension along the front line has escalated
dramatically over the last couple of days, at the time when peace
process seemed to have gotten back on its feet, some worry that
violence might underline the risk of a conflict... Why do you think
this is happening now?
A. It appears the upticks in cross-border incidents are incitements
aimed at derailing the foreign minister talks. This might be a
recurring matter for the near future. Note that WWI's centennial might
partially explain the recent escalation, particularly when it comes to
the Armenian viewpoint. What occurred to their population then is still
an open wound. Even though Azerbaijan was never part of the Ottoman
Empire and its policies during that period, Armenian extremists see
otherwise. Conversely, there are certain Azeri perspectives viewing
the Nagorno-Karabakh impasse in extremist terms.
As long as these emotional topics remain unresolved, they are subject
to manipulated narratives and extremist provocations.
Q. Secretary Kerry last year made clear that the US sees a serious
commitment to substantial talks as the Administration was prepared
to invest more resources in supporting it. What do you think the US
could do to facilitate the process and encourage both sides to the
long-term peace?
A.Regarding Secretary Kerry, he's the latest in a long line of
State Department executives declaring their focus to resolving
Nagorno-Karabakh. Simultaneously, he also declared a serious intent
towards finding a solution between Israel and the Palestinians. It
therefore appears that the Secretary is overstretched as to where he
can place substantive time and effort. Unless the Obama Adminstration
perceives Nagorno-Karabakh as a prime example of their "lead from
behind" diplomacy, the Secretary's commitment sounds like rhetoric.
A.Raufoglu
Washington, DC