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THE FAILURE OF THE NEO-OTTOMAN PROJECT
Mideast Mirror
February 7, 2014 Friday
Despite hopes to the contrary, Turkish PM Erdogan and his government
cannot change course and are doomed to fail, says Mohammad Noureddin
in today's Emirates' al-Khaleej
Hopes that Turkish PM Erdogan's visit to Tehran's last week may
indicate a change of course for Turkish policy towards Syria and Iraq
are misplaced, suggests a Lebanese commentator in a Gulf daily.
GREAT INTEREST: "Observers have shown great interest in Turkish PM's
visit to Tehran [this week]," writes Lebanese Turkish affairs analyst
Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.
It was the first such visit in two years. Relations between the
two countries had become troubled due to the situation in Syria and
Turkey's attempts to topple the Syrian regime, Iran's ally. Tensions
subsequently grew after Turkey agreed to deploy NATO's Missile Defense
Shield that targets Iranian and Russian missiles in Malatya [Turkey].
We should first note that relations between Turkey and Iran had been
stable for the last 300 years, with no wars between the two despite
their historical and confessional differences, and the competition
between them. In fact, mutual economic interests took precedence
over other aspects of their relationship. Their current ambition to
increase the level of annual commercial relations between them to 30
billion dollars is therefore not that difficult to realize.
However, setting aside their direct bilateral relations, the two
countries have often been in (sometimes intense) competition with
each other, as is the case now over Syria, Iraq, and the Southern
Caucasus - that is, the Azeri/Armenian conflict, with Iran siding
with the Armenians against the Azeris who have been coordinating with
Israel and Turkey.
But one major issue dominated Erdogan's latest visit that some have
been wagering on - namely, that Turkey may be ready to change course
on Syria. However, in order to examine this matter further we need
to go beyond Erdogan's visit to Tehran and consider a number of signs
that should answer the most important questions concerning this issue.
Over the course of the last year - 2013 - Turkey faced some of
its worst foreign policy setbacks and defeats. On the one hand,
its wager on toppling the Syrian regime did not succeed. Instead,
it had negative repercussions for its borders and its relations
with some of the armed groups in Syria. Turkey also lost the backing
of a number of states thanks to its attitude towards the June 30th
[anti-Mursi] Revolution in Egypt. It lost one of the main pillars
of its Middle East project, namely the Muslim Brotherhood regime in
Egypt. In fact, as far as Erdogan and his team - including President
Abdullah Gul whom some people count as a 'moderate'- are concerned,
Egypt had turned into what resembles a domestic Turkish province,
with no attention paid to the most basic principle of not intervening
in other countries' affairs.
Turkey's loss of Egypt and the harm done to its relations with most
of the Arab Gulf states further shook up the 'neo-Ottoman' project
whose bases were developed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu,
and which was adopted by Erdogan with the support of the rest of the
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Moreover, Turkey now finds itself totally isolated in light of the
lack of progress in relations with Israel for domestic Turkish reasons,
and not because Erdogan is opposed to these relations. To this should
be added the domestic pressures that Erdogan has been facing, such as
the [summer 2013] Gezi Park protests, and most recently the corruption
scandal in which a number of AKP ministers and leaders were involved -
including Erdogan's son, Bilal.
Given all the above, Erdogan has been trying to create a breach in the
wall besieging him. He has found that relations with Iran may benefit
him, at least in preventing the collapse of one of the dams that
protect him in power, namely the economic dimension. This explains
his visit to Iran, which coincided with a partial lifting of the
sanctions imposed on Tehran - an injection that may help him survive.
This is the limit of Turkey's change of course which goes no further,
whether regarding Syria or Iraq. This is because a project as vast and
profound as that of dominating the entire region via Muslim Brotherhood
groups and a strong economy, and the policy of breaking up then burning
all boats by employing unwarranted sharp slogans, means that this
project will not and cannot accept any change. This Turkish project
has placed itself before a single equation: It either wins or loses.
But it has already lost--in political terms at least. No new change
will be of any use not even at the merely formal or verbal level. Any
such change will face enormous scepticism after the collapse of the
wall of trust that had been built between Turkey and the Arab states
in recent years, after decades of tensions and sensitivities.
Moreover, it is impossible for this project to collapse without those
behind it collapsing as well. It is impossible for them to remain in
power. Erdogan and his team may be able to hang on to office for a
few additional years for domestic ideological reasons; but this will
merely be a countdown of days or years for a project that has lost its
moral compass - thanks to its corruption, repression, and tyranny -
and its foreign credibility - thanks to its attempt at domination
and unilateral hegemony. It has come to an end.
"The logic of history implies that it is illogical and impossible for
such a project to collapse without its creators and sponsors losing
power as well," concludes Noureddin.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Mideast Mirror
February 7, 2014 Friday
Despite hopes to the contrary, Turkish PM Erdogan and his government
cannot change course and are doomed to fail, says Mohammad Noureddin
in today's Emirates' al-Khaleej
Hopes that Turkish PM Erdogan's visit to Tehran's last week may
indicate a change of course for Turkish policy towards Syria and Iraq
are misplaced, suggests a Lebanese commentator in a Gulf daily.
GREAT INTEREST: "Observers have shown great interest in Turkish PM's
visit to Tehran [this week]," writes Lebanese Turkish affairs analyst
Mohammad Noureddin in Friday's UAE daily al-Khaleej.
It was the first such visit in two years. Relations between the
two countries had become troubled due to the situation in Syria and
Turkey's attempts to topple the Syrian regime, Iran's ally. Tensions
subsequently grew after Turkey agreed to deploy NATO's Missile Defense
Shield that targets Iranian and Russian missiles in Malatya [Turkey].
We should first note that relations between Turkey and Iran had been
stable for the last 300 years, with no wars between the two despite
their historical and confessional differences, and the competition
between them. In fact, mutual economic interests took precedence
over other aspects of their relationship. Their current ambition to
increase the level of annual commercial relations between them to 30
billion dollars is therefore not that difficult to realize.
However, setting aside their direct bilateral relations, the two
countries have often been in (sometimes intense) competition with
each other, as is the case now over Syria, Iraq, and the Southern
Caucasus - that is, the Azeri/Armenian conflict, with Iran siding
with the Armenians against the Azeris who have been coordinating with
Israel and Turkey.
But one major issue dominated Erdogan's latest visit that some have
been wagering on - namely, that Turkey may be ready to change course
on Syria. However, in order to examine this matter further we need
to go beyond Erdogan's visit to Tehran and consider a number of signs
that should answer the most important questions concerning this issue.
Over the course of the last year - 2013 - Turkey faced some of
its worst foreign policy setbacks and defeats. On the one hand,
its wager on toppling the Syrian regime did not succeed. Instead,
it had negative repercussions for its borders and its relations
with some of the armed groups in Syria. Turkey also lost the backing
of a number of states thanks to its attitude towards the June 30th
[anti-Mursi] Revolution in Egypt. It lost one of the main pillars
of its Middle East project, namely the Muslim Brotherhood regime in
Egypt. In fact, as far as Erdogan and his team - including President
Abdullah Gul whom some people count as a 'moderate'- are concerned,
Egypt had turned into what resembles a domestic Turkish province,
with no attention paid to the most basic principle of not intervening
in other countries' affairs.
Turkey's loss of Egypt and the harm done to its relations with most
of the Arab Gulf states further shook up the 'neo-Ottoman' project
whose bases were developed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu,
and which was adopted by Erdogan with the support of the rest of the
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Moreover, Turkey now finds itself totally isolated in light of the
lack of progress in relations with Israel for domestic Turkish reasons,
and not because Erdogan is opposed to these relations. To this should
be added the domestic pressures that Erdogan has been facing, such as
the [summer 2013] Gezi Park protests, and most recently the corruption
scandal in which a number of AKP ministers and leaders were involved -
including Erdogan's son, Bilal.
Given all the above, Erdogan has been trying to create a breach in the
wall besieging him. He has found that relations with Iran may benefit
him, at least in preventing the collapse of one of the dams that
protect him in power, namely the economic dimension. This explains
his visit to Iran, which coincided with a partial lifting of the
sanctions imposed on Tehran - an injection that may help him survive.
This is the limit of Turkey's change of course which goes no further,
whether regarding Syria or Iraq. This is because a project as vast and
profound as that of dominating the entire region via Muslim Brotherhood
groups and a strong economy, and the policy of breaking up then burning
all boats by employing unwarranted sharp slogans, means that this
project will not and cannot accept any change. This Turkish project
has placed itself before a single equation: It either wins or loses.
But it has already lost--in political terms at least. No new change
will be of any use not even at the merely formal or verbal level. Any
such change will face enormous scepticism after the collapse of the
wall of trust that had been built between Turkey and the Arab states
in recent years, after decades of tensions and sensitivities.
Moreover, it is impossible for this project to collapse without those
behind it collapsing as well. It is impossible for them to remain in
power. Erdogan and his team may be able to hang on to office for a
few additional years for domestic ideological reasons; but this will
merely be a countdown of days or years for a project that has lost its
moral compass - thanks to its corruption, repression, and tyranny -
and its foreign credibility - thanks to its attempt at domination
and unilateral hegemony. It has come to an end.
"The logic of history implies that it is illogical and impossible for
such a project to collapse without its creators and sponsors losing
power as well," concludes Noureddin.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress