Tweet
EurasiaNet.org
Jan 2 2013
For 2014, What To Watch In Eurasia?
January 2, 2014 - 5:45am, by Joshua Kucera
In discussions of Eurasian security, "2014" has become a byword for a
turning point in the region. WIth the planned pullout of U.S. and NATO
combat troops from Afghanistan, Central Asia (and to a lesser extent
the Caucasus) is entering an uncertain future. Predicting the future
is obviously a futile endeavor, but for the sake of discussion, here's
what The Bug Pit expects to be covering over the next 12 months:
SECURITY FLASHPOINTS
1. Nagorno Karabakh. This is a no-brainer. There were some positive
signs toward the end of 2013, with the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan meeting for the first time in two years. Nevertheless, the
cross-border skirmishes continued, and the large forces that have made
things between the two countries so tense -- like Azerbaijan's rapid
military buildup and each country's dehumanization of the people on
the other side of the border -- have not abated. So the renewal of
conflict seems only a matter of time.
2. The Pamirs. After Tajikistan's central government suffered a
humiliating defeat in its attempt to bring the region under its
control in the July 2012 military operation in Khorog, it has been the
conventional wisdom that the government will eventually try again. Now
the presidential elections have passed, and tensions have risen again.
3. The Ferghana Valley. This is probably the most underreported
security story in the region, but there has been a steady stream of
tense incidents in this remote area between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan. David Trilling did a good roundup of the year's
activity on the Kyrgzstan-Tajikistan border, and Kyrgyzstan brought in
the new year by accusing Tajikistan of massing armored vehicles on the
border (Dushanbe denied the report).
GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The expansion of the CSTO. The Collective Security Treaty
Organization is the military component of Russia's renewed efforts to
expand its influence into its former Soviet republics. It's still not
clear what the CSTO actually DOES, but at least on paper it continues
to expand, getting closer to fielding rapid-reaction forces and a
joint air force. And it could have an impact on any of the above
conflict scenarios as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia are CSTO
members, and Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are not.
2. Russian pressure on Georgia. Georgia enjoyed a bit of a respite
from Russian pressure after the election victories of Bidzina
Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream coalition and the sidelining of Russian
bugaboo Mikheil Saakashvili. But as Georgia's new leadership has made
clear that it intends to continue its process of accession to NATO,
the Kremlin has again ratcheted up its rhetoric and constructed
provocative "border" fences on the de-facto South Ossetia boundary.
Meanwhile, Georgia just announced plans to rearm with primarily
Western military equipment. This seems unlikely to result again in
conflict, but there will be a lot of interesting dynamics between
Russia, Georgia, and Western countries as Georgia continues to
determine its geopolitical place in the world.
3. Azerbaijan's isolation. This seems to be the underreported
geopolitical development in the region. Its problems with Armenia are
well known, but over 2013 its relations deteriorated with a number of
other countries, as well. There have been a number of sources of
tension with Iran, from border skirmishes to "terror" plots to Caspian
Sea militarization. The U.S. has been increasingly critical of
Azerbaijani government repression. Russia engaged in a brief
flirtation with Baku but then it became clear that was only to make
Armenia jealous; then Russia explicitly said it would fight Azerbaijan
in a conflict over Karabakh. And even "big brother" Turkey has been
making apparently serious overtures toward Armenia, raising questions
about how long Ankara intends to continue effectively subcontracting
out its Armenia policy to Baku.
In addition to all of the above, there is obviously the pullout from
Afghanistan, and the resulting impact on security in Central Asia and
U.S. policy toward the region. Will there be "spillover" of insecurity
from Afghanistan to Central Asia? Will the U.S. give Central Asian
countries its leftover military equipment from Afghanistan? Will the
U.S. departure from the U.S. air base at Manas change its relationship
with Kyrgyzstan? My guess is that the security situation won't change
much, and that while the question of the U.S. is an interesting one
(especially for Americans) it is relatively insignificant to how
things actually develop in the region.
It's also worth noting that I sketched out this post on a long bus
trip without internet, and then when I looked at my year-end post from
a year ago, there were a lot of similarities. Karabakh and the Pamirs
were the top potential flashpoints a year ago, too, and Georgia's
geopolitical balancing act, potential Central Asian succession crises
and the CSTO were all mentioned. While neither Karabakh nor the Pamirs
blew up, they do seem closer today to conflict than they were 12
months ago. And Georgia and the CSTO did prove to be interesting
stories in 2013; they will probably be even more so in 2014.
Disagree with any of those assessments, or think something is missing?
Reply on twitter. In any event, 2014 promises to be an eventful year.
Thanks for continuing to read!
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67907
Jan 2 2013
For 2014, What To Watch In Eurasia?
January 2, 2014 - 5:45am, by Joshua Kucera
In discussions of Eurasian security, "2014" has become a byword for a
turning point in the region. WIth the planned pullout of U.S. and NATO
combat troops from Afghanistan, Central Asia (and to a lesser extent
the Caucasus) is entering an uncertain future. Predicting the future
is obviously a futile endeavor, but for the sake of discussion, here's
what The Bug Pit expects to be covering over the next 12 months:
SECURITY FLASHPOINTS
1. Nagorno Karabakh. This is a no-brainer. There were some positive
signs toward the end of 2013, with the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan meeting for the first time in two years. Nevertheless, the
cross-border skirmishes continued, and the large forces that have made
things between the two countries so tense -- like Azerbaijan's rapid
military buildup and each country's dehumanization of the people on
the other side of the border -- have not abated. So the renewal of
conflict seems only a matter of time.
2. The Pamirs. After Tajikistan's central government suffered a
humiliating defeat in its attempt to bring the region under its
control in the July 2012 military operation in Khorog, it has been the
conventional wisdom that the government will eventually try again. Now
the presidential elections have passed, and tensions have risen again.
3. The Ferghana Valley. This is probably the most underreported
security story in the region, but there has been a steady stream of
tense incidents in this remote area between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan. David Trilling did a good roundup of the year's
activity on the Kyrgzstan-Tajikistan border, and Kyrgyzstan brought in
the new year by accusing Tajikistan of massing armored vehicles on the
border (Dushanbe denied the report).
GEOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The expansion of the CSTO. The Collective Security Treaty
Organization is the military component of Russia's renewed efforts to
expand its influence into its former Soviet republics. It's still not
clear what the CSTO actually DOES, but at least on paper it continues
to expand, getting closer to fielding rapid-reaction forces and a
joint air force. And it could have an impact on any of the above
conflict scenarios as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia are CSTO
members, and Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are not.
2. Russian pressure on Georgia. Georgia enjoyed a bit of a respite
from Russian pressure after the election victories of Bidzina
Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream coalition and the sidelining of Russian
bugaboo Mikheil Saakashvili. But as Georgia's new leadership has made
clear that it intends to continue its process of accession to NATO,
the Kremlin has again ratcheted up its rhetoric and constructed
provocative "border" fences on the de-facto South Ossetia boundary.
Meanwhile, Georgia just announced plans to rearm with primarily
Western military equipment. This seems unlikely to result again in
conflict, but there will be a lot of interesting dynamics between
Russia, Georgia, and Western countries as Georgia continues to
determine its geopolitical place in the world.
3. Azerbaijan's isolation. This seems to be the underreported
geopolitical development in the region. Its problems with Armenia are
well known, but over 2013 its relations deteriorated with a number of
other countries, as well. There have been a number of sources of
tension with Iran, from border skirmishes to "terror" plots to Caspian
Sea militarization. The U.S. has been increasingly critical of
Azerbaijani government repression. Russia engaged in a brief
flirtation with Baku but then it became clear that was only to make
Armenia jealous; then Russia explicitly said it would fight Azerbaijan
in a conflict over Karabakh. And even "big brother" Turkey has been
making apparently serious overtures toward Armenia, raising questions
about how long Ankara intends to continue effectively subcontracting
out its Armenia policy to Baku.
In addition to all of the above, there is obviously the pullout from
Afghanistan, and the resulting impact on security in Central Asia and
U.S. policy toward the region. Will there be "spillover" of insecurity
from Afghanistan to Central Asia? Will the U.S. give Central Asian
countries its leftover military equipment from Afghanistan? Will the
U.S. departure from the U.S. air base at Manas change its relationship
with Kyrgyzstan? My guess is that the security situation won't change
much, and that while the question of the U.S. is an interesting one
(especially for Americans) it is relatively insignificant to how
things actually develop in the region.
It's also worth noting that I sketched out this post on a long bus
trip without internet, and then when I looked at my year-end post from
a year ago, there were a lot of similarities. Karabakh and the Pamirs
were the top potential flashpoints a year ago, too, and Georgia's
geopolitical balancing act, potential Central Asian succession crises
and the CSTO were all mentioned. While neither Karabakh nor the Pamirs
blew up, they do seem closer today to conflict than they were 12
months ago. And Georgia and the CSTO did prove to be interesting
stories in 2013; they will probably be even more so in 2014.
Disagree with any of those assessments, or think something is missing?
Reply on twitter. In any event, 2014 promises to be an eventful year.
Thanks for continuing to read!
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67907