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  • Artsakh's Prospects for the Future

    Artsakh's Prospects for the Future

    http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/01/05/artsakhs-prospects-for-the-future/
    By Michael Mensoian // January 5, 2014

    Special to the Armenian Weekly

    Ever since the 1994 ceasefire brought a semblance of peace to Artsakh,
    its people have made great strides in democratic self-governance and
    in rebuilding and improving the economic and social infrastructure
    wantonly destroyed by Azerbaijan during the Karabagh War. During these
    difficult years the people have maintained a collective esprit and
    energy that confounds the Azeri leadership.

    Ever since the 1994 ceasefire brought a semblance of peace to Artsakh,
    its people have made great strides in democratic self-governance and
    in rebuilding and improving the economic and social infrastructure
    wantonly destroyed by Azerbaijan during the Karabagh War. (Photo by
    Arevik Danielian)

    The ultimate concern, whether we live in Artsakh or beyond, is the
    future viability of this historic Armenian land liberated through the
    heroic efforts of its people. There are several questions that must be
    affirmatively answered: Would Artsakh (and Armenia) be able to
    withstand renewed hostilities by Azerbaijan? Can Artsakh's interests
    be protected through negotiations? Does Artsakh have the resources to
    develop a robust economy, not only for its present population, but as
    a future frontier beckoning Diasporan Armenians wishing to return
    home?

    Confronting renewed hostilities

    Any number of reasons would - or should - deter Azerbaijan from renewing
    hostilities; if they did not exist, President Ilham Aliyev would have
    already exercised his oft-threatened military option. Yet, there is
    always the possibility that internal pressures or his outsized ego
    could override prudent judgment. This analysis will only consider the
    military strategy that Azerbaijan is likely to adopt if it were to
    resume hostilities, and the difficulties that a tactical
    implementation of that strategy would involve. Given these apparent
    difficulties, one might question why the strategy would even be
    considered. It is based primarily on the reality that the
    international community, and especially the neighboring countries,
    would not tolerate a protracted war. This reality requires a strategy
    that would (1) seek to occupy strategic objectives within a window of
    opportunity of from 12-15 days; (2) seek to breach the heavily
    fortified frontier, preferably at both Agdam and Fizuli, within the
    first 48-72 hours; (3) engage the defenders along the entire front
    (the Northern, Central, and Southern Sectors); and (4) require the
    deployment of all 3 army corps, or significant elements thereof,
    currently positioned along the Armenian-Artsakh border from Georgia to
    Iran.

    Presently Azerbaijan has five army corps in the field. The first Army
    Corps is concentrated in the vicinity of Ganja. It is responsible for
    the Northern Sector and the Armenian frontier. The third is stationed
    in the vicinity of Barda (Central Sector), and the second in the
    vicinity of Agdzhabedi/Beylagan (Southern Sector). The second also has
    responsibility for the Iranian frontier. The fourth Army Corps is
    stationed in the capital district of Baku, and the fifth is deployed
    in Nakhitchevan.

    Yusif Agayev, an Azeri military expert who fought in the Karabagh War,
    doesn't believe `...the society of my country is ready for war. I think
    it would be a month or two. That is the amount of time the armed
    forces could fight for. If it drags on longer, then it will be a war
    that society will have to participate in, not just the army.' It is
    not likely that Azerbaijan will have the month or two that Agayev
    suggests. A window of opportunity of about 12-15 days would be more
    likely. That is why the first 48-72 hours is so critical. Within
    minutes of the first shot being fired there would be an international
    demand for a ceasefire led by Russia, Iran, Georgia, and possibly
    Turkey supported by Western Europe and the United States (covertly
    backed by international oil interests). Given the observable signs of
    an Azeri offensive build-up, these nations would not wait for the
    first shot to be fired before diplomatic pressure is applied. Although
    the conflict occupies a limited geographic area, its ramifications - the
    `unintended consequences' - could easily destabilize the entire region.
    Russia, Iran, Georgia, and Turkey each have ethnic minorities with
    long-standing socio-economic and political grievances who seek either
    independence or effective local autonomy. This conflict could be the
    spark that ignites this historic geographic tinderbox.

    Since Azerbaijan realizes a protracted war is not viable, the strategy
    is to engage the Armenian defenders along the entire frontier. This
    can only be accomplished by simultaneously committing elements of the
    three army corps responsible for monitoring the Artsakh border. Given
    this strategy, the obvious objectives would be Agdam and Fizuli. To
    support these two major offensives, units of the second and third
    corps would engage the Armenian defenders in such tactical movements
    as holding actions to deny the redeployment of Armenian units to
    critical sectors of the front; diversionary maneuvers that seek to
    mislead or confuse the defenders; and diversionary attacks that would
    seek to relieve the pressure on the main forces attacking Agdam and
    Fizuli.

    Diversionary attacks from Tartar toward Mardakert would relieve the
    pressure on the Agdam forces as well as protect their northern or
    right flank. At the same time a diversionary attack toward Martuni by
    elements of the second Army Corps would assist the main force
    attacking Fizuli and protect their eastern or right flank. The first
    Army Corps at Ganja would most likely engage in diversionary maneuvers
    and hold actions along the mountainous Northern Sector. Depending on
    the resistance encountered, the Azeris could commit elements of the
    first to a full-scale diversionary attack from Shahumian toward
    Mardakert.

    The former United States ambassador to Azerbaijan, Matthew Bryza, has
    suggested that `the Azeris can't retake Artsakh now. They are
    militarily incapable of doing it.' He further suggested that he
    `...didn't think they could dislodge the Armenian forces from the high
    ground. Wayne Merry, a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy
    Council, agrees, saying that `a key factor is the topography, the
    extent to which Nagorno-Karabagh has created defenses in depth.
    Progress would come at a high cost.'

    In addition to controlling the high ground, the Armenian defenders
    have had nearly 20 years to develop fortifications in depth, as well
    as construct obstacles that would impede and channel men and
    mechanized equipment into prepared fields of fire. To achieve the
    quick breakthrough required, the Azeris would seek to overwhelm the
    defenders by deploying a numerically superior concentration of
    infantry and mechanized units. Against heavily fortified positions a
    disproportionate ratio of perhaps four to five Azeri casualties to one
    Armenian casualty could be expected. These excessive battlefield
    losses would have a demoralizing impact on the Azeri units, keeping in
    mind that possibly 7 out of 10 men are either 12- or 18-month
    conscripts in addition to reservists who might be called-up to augment
    the professional army. Loss of morale would have a debilitating impact
    on unit effectiveness, which would contribute to an increased casualty
    count. Every tactical plan is dependent on an integrated hierarchy of
    units from squad, platoon, on up, with each unit supporting the
    mission of the next higher command, which could be a reinforced
    company or a brigade. All units involved must operate as one cohesive
    force with one overriding objective to have any chance of success.

    Engaging the Armenians along the entire front is sound strategy given
    the realities of the situation, but it is also a catch-22 situation. A
    phased deployment of units would favor the defenders, while committing
    significant elements of its three army corps simultaneously in a
    tactical bid to overwhelm them before an expected ceasefire can be
    enforced is no guarantee of success, and would most likely result in
    unacceptable losses in men and equipment. It is highly unlikely that
    the civilian population (if aware of the losses) or the field
    commanders (senior officers) who must follow orders would tolerate
    such losses.

    The prize Azeri objective would be Agdam. To the east of Agdam is the
    Kura River floodplain, part of which is below sea level (the Kura
    River empties into the Caspian Sea, which is about 90 feet below sea
    level). From this floodplain the elevation rises westward in a
    step-like fashion to the high plains just west of Agdam (which is
    about 1,200 feet above sea level) that give way to the hillier terrain
    toward Stepanakert. If Agdam is occupied, it would allow the Azeri
    forces to spill out onto this plain, thereby facilitating the
    increased deployment of mechanized equipment such as tanks, armored
    troop carriers, self-propelled artillery, and rocket launchers for a
    final push toward Stepanakert and Shushi, with a smaller force moving
    south to join the attack on Martuni.

    To the south, a second major offensive would be underway toward
    Fizuli. A diversionary attack on Martuni would seek to ease the
    pressure on the Fizuli force as well as protect its eastern or right
    flank. Holding actions at Hadrut would protect the western or left
    flank of the Fizuli force. If Fizuli were to be occupied, the main
    force would most likely split with the larger force wheeling eastward
    toward Martuni. Should this happen, the Martuni defenders would face a
    three-pronged enveloping maneuver that would either force them to fall
    back or be cut off from the main Armenian forces (assuming the Azeri
    offensive could succeed).

    The second smaller force would augment the Azeri units engaged at
    Hadrut. If Martuni were occupied, the combined Azeri forces would then
    move toward Shushi/Stepanakert from the southeast to support the Agdam
    forces attacking from the northeast. The Azeri Hadrut units would be
    given the mission to protect the western or left flank of this final
    thrust toward Artsakh's core area.

    While this might be the essence of the Azeri strategy, its success is
    far from assured; the deterrents are many. First and foremost, this
    analysis does not consider the defensive and offensive capabilities of
    the Armenian forces, who have played out the various strategies the
    Azeris might adopt. An instant problem for the Azeris is the
    recognition by unbiased observers that the Armenian military force is
    much better prepared. Also it is unlikely that the Azeri soldier has
    the emotional and psychological stamina or determination of the
    Armenian soldier, who is prepared to fight for his family, his land,
    his children's future, and for his right to live as an Armenian. What
    reasons would the Azeri soldier have to sacrifice his life in a war he
    might neither accept nor understand?

    It is the expected immediate international call for a ceasefire that
    would require Azerbaijan's massive deployment of men and equipment in
    a military gamble that seeks to overwhelm the defenders and breach
    their fortifications. It is this tactical decision that could result
    in extremely high battlefield losses against a determined, entrenched
    defensive force. It is not possible for Azerbaijan to gain any
    advantage from a surprise attack because the intelligence gathering
    technology available to the Armenian military allows for the real-time
    gathering of information. This intelligence effort is likely aided by
    Russian input and, during a conflict, possibly by covert Iranian
    input.

    Every strategic target within Azerbaijan is within the effective
    retaliatory capability of the Armenian defenders. Pre-selected targets
    would be engaged immediately, some of which may have a devastating
    impact on Azerbaijan's war effort. So much emphasis has been placed on
    the publicized expansion of its army that it is accepted as doctrine
    that numerical superiority in men, which is not the same as the
    principle of force concentration (achieving numerical superiority at a
    given time at a given place), is the key element on the battlefield.
    It is not! The Armenian defenders have the ability to achieve force
    concentration to gain a tactical advantage at any sector of the front
    based on their shorter interior lines of communication that facilitate
    the rapid deployment of troops and equipment. In addition, a defending
    force occupying heavily fortified positions may have a ratio of three-
    or four- to one advantage over the attacking forces: The Azeri staging
    areas where units are readied for movement to the front; their
    approaches to the line of contact; as well as their supply and
    resupply routes, are all vulnerable to effective Armenian
    counter-measures.

    Adding to the deterrents is the sophisticated level of planning,
    coordination, and execution required and the real-time evaluation and
    response to evolving situations at the fronts that may require
    immediate tactical changes; the augmentation or redeployment of units;
    resupply; and the evacuation of battlefield casualties. It is highly
    problematic if the Azeri military command has this capability at the
    level required. Some of the officers and a smaller number of
    non-commissioned officers (NCO) may be veterans of the Karabagh War.
    Assuming the publicized expansion of the army is accurate, most of the
    junior officers (captain and below) who fill the majority of the
    combat slots in any unit, as well as the NCO's, may well be the weak
    link in the Azeri command structure in terms of training, leadership,
    and indoctrination. A resumption of hostilities is not likely to
    provide President Aliyev the solution he seeks.

    Can negotiations protect Artsakh's interests?

    The principles advanced by the Minsk Group (represented by Russia,
    France, and the United States) to guide the negotiations, no matter
    how nuanced they have been over time, continually stress (1) the
    inviolability of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and (2) that when
    and how Artsakh's final status is determined, it will be no better
    than limited autonomy under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. This raises an
    important question: If Artsakh had the legal right to declare its
    independence under the principles of remedial cessation or
    self-determination, or under the laws of the soviet constitution, the
    negotiators, including the Artsakh representatives, should be
    discussing the timing of Artsakh's recognition; indemnification for
    displaced people/refugees (both Armenian and Azeri); its final
    boundaries; and the status of Shahumian, and the occupied border areas
    of Mardakert and Martuni. It may be difficult to accept, but some
    adjustments in the area to be included in Artsakh may have to be
    considered. An offer giving Azeris married to Armenians (possibly
    including their extended families) the right of return to Artsakh
    might also be considered.

    Azerbaijan continues to claim that its territorial integrity is being
    violated by Armenia. This is a specious argument ostensibly supported
    by the Minsk Group. Azerbaijan is purposely misinterpreting Principle
    4 under Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations,
    which prevents a state from threatening the territorial integrity of a
    neighboring state. It is the Artsakh Armenians who threatened the
    territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by having legally declared their
    independence. However, Principle 4 does not apply to Artsakh.
    Armenia's intervention was limited to providing humanitarian and
    military assistance to protect a beleaguered population from the
    indiscriminate use of military force by the Azeris. The present
    Armenian presence in Artsakh represents a stabilizing influence that
    facilitates the recovery effort and a preventive measure against a
    renewal of hostilities.

    Economic development

    Artsakh's natural resource base is more than adequate to support at
    least 10 times its present population of approximately 140,000.
    However, several interrelated factors - a reverse domino
    effect - represent serious obstacles that must be addressed before a
    robust economy can develop. The most obvious are (1) Artsakh's tenuous
    political status, which (2) inhibits foreign investment, which (3)
    discourages in-migration.

    Tenuous political status

    Artsakh declared its independence in 1991 and has, since the 1994
    ceasefire, met all of the `unofficial' requirements for de jure
    recognition. (Unfortunately, recognition is a highly subjective
    political decision.) Until recognition is granted, it is vital that
    Artsakh continue to invite foreign government leaders, as it did
    recently with Uruguayan parliamentarians. While recognition will not
    come solely or immediately from these visits, they will lay the
    groundwork as well as the perception that recognition is highly likely
    to occur. It is an important first step (which Stepanakert already
    recognizes) if investment is to be encouraged. Dependence on the level
    of aid presently received is not adequate to stimulate a robust
    economy that can independently sustain Artsakh. However, this aid has
    made significant improvements in basic infrastructure that has
    improved the quality of life for the people - the foundation upon which
    Artsakh's future will be built.

    To facilitate this process Artsakh must continue to expand its public
    relations effort through the various political, humanitarian, and
    philanthropic organizations that are already committed to its cause.
    Without getting into the political aspects of the Artsakh issue, its
    long-term viability should represent the most significant issue on the
    Armenian national agenda. The more the Armenian Diaspora know about
    Artsakh - its achievements and potential - the greater its response to aid
    in Artsakh's development.

    Measured population increase

    Increasing the population should go hand-in-hand with economic
    development. However what is required and doable is a measured
    increase in population as a means to meet political and economic
    needs. Politically it is difficult to claim `empty' lands however
    justified that claim may be when the lands are not reasonably
    integrated with the core area. We should have learned from the Turkish
    inspired genocide that emptied historic western Armenia of our people
    to weaken if not eliminate potential territorial claims by Armenia. A
    program of selective immigration would seek to meet the political and
    economic objectives identified by a government master plan for
    strategic resettlement. (See `The Strategic Resettlement of Artsakh,'
    The Armenian Weekly, February 19, 2011) Stepanakert must be prepared
    to effectively assist these newcomers to Artsakh. It cannot be
    expected that these 21st century Armenians are pioneers able or
    willing to `tame' the wilderness. That type of settlement program is a
    prescription for disaster.

    As Stepanakert increases its connections with various organizations
    and institutions beyond its borders; as it cultivates relations with
    foreign governments; and as the world community (including our
    Diaspora) are given reasons to support Artsakh, an aura of
    inevitability with respect to recognition will encourage greater
    interest from foreign investors, including Armenians. Although Artsakh
    has already benefited from visionary diasporan entrepreneurs, de jure
    recognition is essential to open the floodgate for foreign investment

    Renewable energy sources

    Present available data for Nagorno-Karabagh indicate a significant
    potential for the development of renewable energy. This is important
    given the absence of carboniferous energy resources. Several sites in
    the vicinity of Jermajur and Vaghuhas in the north and in the
    Stepanakert-Shushi region have been identified as `most appropriate'
    for constructing wind turbines to generate electric power. Other
    secondary sites exist, as well as sites in Kashatagh that have yet to
    be fully evaluated.

    The region receives an average of about 23 inches of precipitation
    annually which is sufficient for agriculture supplemented by
    irrigation if or when necessary. Precipitation generally increases
    from the south/southeast toward the higher elevations to the
    north/northwest. In the Kashatagh Region precipitation increases north
    toward the Eastern Sevan/Mrav Mountains. Surface flow and the many
    deep narrow valleys provide sites that may be used to construct dams
    for water storage, hydroelectric generation and irrigation as well as
    preventing floods from the annual Spring snow melt from the higher
    elevations that dominate the north and northwestern portions of
    Artsakh. The average precipitation would suggest a greater proportion
    of days with less than one/quarter of the sky covered by clouds. This
    would result in more hours of daily sunlight which would facilitate
    the development of solar power. Renewable energy would be a boon for
    the remote villages which could draw upon locally produced energy. In
    addition Artsakh's balance of payments situation would benefit by
    eliminating or reducing payments for energy imports.

    Potential sectors of the economy

    Artsakh's farmers should be able to produce a wide variety of field
    and tree crops (including viti culture). Some specialized products
    would include processed and comb honey, a variety of berries, nuts,
    and fresh-cut flowers. Natural and upgraded pastures could support
    commercial dairy farming including poultry and egg production, cattle
    and sheep rearing and hog raising. In addition, the by-products
    associated with each animal are able to support a variety of economic
    activities. A recent trade report cited the shortage of pork
    production in China (a potential market). Given present technology, a
    hog carcass in Artsakh can be deboned and cut-up to reduce its weight
    and bulk, flash frozen, vacuumed sealed in `cryovac' and boxed to be
    economically air lifted to a foreign market. Historically the region
    was home to the Karabagh horse. No reason why rearing horses could not
    be reintroduced on a much larger scale.

    Given the emphasis on the agricultural sector the processing industry
    could be an important source for exports. In North America there are
    significant nodes of Armenian population-Boston, New York,
    Philadelphia, DC, Los Angeles, Montreal, and Toronto-that could be
    developed as markets for some of Artsakh's products including wine,
    vodka, brandy, bottled water and beer. This would require appropriate
    advertising and maintaining trade representatives possibly in New York
    and Los Angeles. These markets could also serve as conduits to
    introduce Artsakh's products to a wider geographic area and a larger
    population. If the Stepanakert International Airport could become
    operational, it would be a significant political and economic triumph
    that would give Artsakh the potential for direct links to the world.
    Is it no wonder that Azerbaijan is so vehement in its opposition.

    Artsakh's forests could support an important domestic construction
    materials industry which would include such products as dimension
    lumber and timbers, composition board, specialty wood products, and
    roofing materials as well as furniture manufacturing. This could be
    augmented by quarrying for building stone, sand and gravel, limestone
    for cement, and the manufacturing of ceramics and glass. Given its
    resource base and an educated workforce, Artsakh has many options to
    pursue in developing a viable economy including an expansion of its
    incipient information technology industry.

    Finally, Artsakh's history, its ancient structures, archeological
    sites, breath-taking scenery, and mineral springs are ideal for
    tourism. Not to be overlooked are the gracious, friendly people and
    the cuisine. Tourism is a means for visitors, diasporan Armenians
    included, to become acquainted with the people and their country.
    Tourism is a catalyst that generates the need for better roads,
    transport facilities, lodgings, publications, a multitude of support
    services, a wide range of goods to meet the needs of the tourists, and
    most importantly, occupational opportunities. Although tourism does
    not generate high paying jobs, it does provide valuable experiences
    for first time employees to learn various skills as a way to move up
    the employment ladder. It is also a means to improve the balance of
    payments situation.

    Several years ago I wrote an article entitled, `Artsakh: The Key to
    Armenia's Political and Economic Future' (The Armenian Weekly, January
    2010 Special Magazine Issue). Three years later I am even more bullish
    on Artsakh's prospects after having witnessed the tremendous progress
    its people have made. Artsakh is a land of unlimited opportunity that
    can and will become our nation's future frontier beckoning Armenians
    to return home to participate in rebuilding an ancient land that has
    been reborn.



    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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