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Asharq Alawsat (English)
January 18, 2014 Saturday
Debate: Turkey can no longer play an active role in the Middle East
Written by : Mohamed Noureddine
Turkey is an example of a country whose regional and international
role skyrocketed in a short time, before collapsing dramatically in
less than three years.
Before the Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged, Turkey, for
more than 80 years, had turned its back on the Middle-Eastern, Arab
and Islamic countries, content to be a stooge of the Western camp and
its spearhead, Israel.
The AKP's vision, which is based on a "strategic depth," was developed
by Ahmet Davutoglu, who has been the country's foreign minister since
2009. This strategy is based on the country's openness to its regional
environment, from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Arab and Muslim countries were at the heart of this strategy. A "Zero
Problems" policy unleashed the Turkish giant, and led to Ankara having
excellent ties with the whole Arab world without exception, as well as
Iran, Armenia, Cyprus and Israel.
On the one hand, Turkey pursued this policy in order to expand its
economic ties with everyone, bringing about economic integration with
Iraq and Syria and mutual investments with the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. On the other, this policy helped Turkey
consolidate its role through various mechanisms, most importantly its
intermediary role in solving problems between countries and even
within individual countries. Turkey, thanks to this policy, gained the
trust and respect of global public opinion and became an example of a
politically and economically successful country. However, the
so-called Arab Spring uprisings, which Turkey welcomed, represented a
turning point in terms of Turkey's own view of its policies, role and
position.
Turkey abandoned its policy of remaining equidistant from all
countries, and started showing bias towards some countries against
others, as well as towards specific groups within specific countries.
Later, it began to consider itself as part of the internal conflicts
in each of these countries, thus shedding its neutral image.
By supporting the Muslim Brotherhood not only in the countries that
witnessed the Arab Spring but also in other countries within the GCC,
Turkey has given precedence to its ideological tendencies. With this
support, Turkey has provoked the GCC and Jordan and thus weakened its
once-strong ties with them.
What raised suspicions about Turkey's role is that, by capitalizing on
the tensions in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the AKP believed it
could seize the opportunity to break its regional partnership with
Iran, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt and consequently monopolize power in
the new Middle East, which it would draw up and lead. This is
evidenced by Davutoglu's famous speech to the Turkish parliament on
April 27, 2012, in which he said that Turkey would "be the owner,
pioneer and the servant of this new Middle East," and Ankara's desire
to revive the Ottoman dream, which neither Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan nor his top diplomat have tried to conceal. The prospects of
the return of the Ottoman colonisation to the region has touched a
nerve for Arabs and non-Arabs alike.
Turkey has failed in its assessment and interpretation of the events
unfolding. Ankara did not expect Russia and China to continue their
firm position on Syria. It also failed to take into account the
considerations that govern the US stance towards the developments,
particularly its position on Al-Qaeda-linked organizations, Egypt, and
its relationship with Iran.
Ankara's regional policies reflected badly on its economy, and created
ethnic, religious and political tensions within the country. As a
result of this, Turkey found itself, three years into the Arab Spring,
an isolated country, no longer friends with all of the countries it
once had cooperative and integrative ties with. On the one hand, it
lost Syria, Iraq and Iran. On the other, it lost Jordan, Saudi Arabia
and the GCC countries, with the exception of Qatar. Most
significantly, with its loss of Cairo, the second strategic pillar of
its Ottoman-Brotherhood project collapsed. Furthermore, Turkey's ties
with Israel remained tense, with no sign of improvement. Its ties with
Russia reached a record level of tension. This is not to mention the
ongoing tensions between Ankara and Washington over several issues,
particularly the relationship with Israel, Turkey's support of
fundamentalist groups and Erdogan's undemocratic handling of the
protests in Taksim Square. In the light of its loss of all of these
friendships, it was normal that Turkey would no longer be able to
perform an influential role in the region.
The variables on the ground in Syria have brought Turkey face-to-face
with emerging unexpected risks to its national security. The
appearance of a Kurdish entity in Syria along a long stretch of the
borders with Turkey comes at the forefront of these challenges.
Moreover, with the fundamentalist groups controlling the remaining
parts of its borders with Syria, Turkey's political and military
influence has suffered in Syria, its most significant front. Turkey's
desire to extend bridges to the Kurds in the region, particularly in
Iraqi Kurdistan, may not be enough to compensate for its loss of
influence in the region, given its phobia regarding the future of the
Kurds. With this loss, Turkey has become almost paralysed. Perhaps
Turkey's most significant loss is that its return to the region after
eight decades of absence has been short-lived, and the trust it built
with everyone during those few years has collapsed and will be
difficult to restore in the foreseeable future.
All Turkey can do today is reduce the losses it has incurred through
its policies. Any maneuver on the part of Turkey to reposition itself
and compensate for what it has missed will take time. In any case, any
future relations between Turkey and its opponents should be based on
pure competition and national interest rather than on sloganeering
along the lines of "the common fate of the region's people" or "the
brotherhood of Muslims." Whatever the AKP leaders attempt to do to
patch up relations and change its policies, Turkey's regional status
cannot be restored unless those who formulated Ankara's foreign policy
over the past three years-turning Turkey into an isolated and helpless
country-resign.
The counterpoint to this article can be read here:
http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/article55327346
http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/article55327353
January 18, 2014 Saturday
Debate: Turkey can no longer play an active role in the Middle East
Written by : Mohamed Noureddine
Turkey is an example of a country whose regional and international
role skyrocketed in a short time, before collapsing dramatically in
less than three years.
Before the Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged, Turkey, for
more than 80 years, had turned its back on the Middle-Eastern, Arab
and Islamic countries, content to be a stooge of the Western camp and
its spearhead, Israel.
The AKP's vision, which is based on a "strategic depth," was developed
by Ahmet Davutoglu, who has been the country's foreign minister since
2009. This strategy is based on the country's openness to its regional
environment, from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Arab and Muslim countries were at the heart of this strategy. A "Zero
Problems" policy unleashed the Turkish giant, and led to Ankara having
excellent ties with the whole Arab world without exception, as well as
Iran, Armenia, Cyprus and Israel.
On the one hand, Turkey pursued this policy in order to expand its
economic ties with everyone, bringing about economic integration with
Iraq and Syria and mutual investments with the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. On the other, this policy helped Turkey
consolidate its role through various mechanisms, most importantly its
intermediary role in solving problems between countries and even
within individual countries. Turkey, thanks to this policy, gained the
trust and respect of global public opinion and became an example of a
politically and economically successful country. However, the
so-called Arab Spring uprisings, which Turkey welcomed, represented a
turning point in terms of Turkey's own view of its policies, role and
position.
Turkey abandoned its policy of remaining equidistant from all
countries, and started showing bias towards some countries against
others, as well as towards specific groups within specific countries.
Later, it began to consider itself as part of the internal conflicts
in each of these countries, thus shedding its neutral image.
By supporting the Muslim Brotherhood not only in the countries that
witnessed the Arab Spring but also in other countries within the GCC,
Turkey has given precedence to its ideological tendencies. With this
support, Turkey has provoked the GCC and Jordan and thus weakened its
once-strong ties with them.
What raised suspicions about Turkey's role is that, by capitalizing on
the tensions in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the AKP believed it
could seize the opportunity to break its regional partnership with
Iran, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt and consequently monopolize power in
the new Middle East, which it would draw up and lead. This is
evidenced by Davutoglu's famous speech to the Turkish parliament on
April 27, 2012, in which he said that Turkey would "be the owner,
pioneer and the servant of this new Middle East," and Ankara's desire
to revive the Ottoman dream, which neither Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan nor his top diplomat have tried to conceal. The prospects of
the return of the Ottoman colonisation to the region has touched a
nerve for Arabs and non-Arabs alike.
Turkey has failed in its assessment and interpretation of the events
unfolding. Ankara did not expect Russia and China to continue their
firm position on Syria. It also failed to take into account the
considerations that govern the US stance towards the developments,
particularly its position on Al-Qaeda-linked organizations, Egypt, and
its relationship with Iran.
Ankara's regional policies reflected badly on its economy, and created
ethnic, religious and political tensions within the country. As a
result of this, Turkey found itself, three years into the Arab Spring,
an isolated country, no longer friends with all of the countries it
once had cooperative and integrative ties with. On the one hand, it
lost Syria, Iraq and Iran. On the other, it lost Jordan, Saudi Arabia
and the GCC countries, with the exception of Qatar. Most
significantly, with its loss of Cairo, the second strategic pillar of
its Ottoman-Brotherhood project collapsed. Furthermore, Turkey's ties
with Israel remained tense, with no sign of improvement. Its ties with
Russia reached a record level of tension. This is not to mention the
ongoing tensions between Ankara and Washington over several issues,
particularly the relationship with Israel, Turkey's support of
fundamentalist groups and Erdogan's undemocratic handling of the
protests in Taksim Square. In the light of its loss of all of these
friendships, it was normal that Turkey would no longer be able to
perform an influential role in the region.
The variables on the ground in Syria have brought Turkey face-to-face
with emerging unexpected risks to its national security. The
appearance of a Kurdish entity in Syria along a long stretch of the
borders with Turkey comes at the forefront of these challenges.
Moreover, with the fundamentalist groups controlling the remaining
parts of its borders with Syria, Turkey's political and military
influence has suffered in Syria, its most significant front. Turkey's
desire to extend bridges to the Kurds in the region, particularly in
Iraqi Kurdistan, may not be enough to compensate for its loss of
influence in the region, given its phobia regarding the future of the
Kurds. With this loss, Turkey has become almost paralysed. Perhaps
Turkey's most significant loss is that its return to the region after
eight decades of absence has been short-lived, and the trust it built
with everyone during those few years has collapsed and will be
difficult to restore in the foreseeable future.
All Turkey can do today is reduce the losses it has incurred through
its policies. Any maneuver on the part of Turkey to reposition itself
and compensate for what it has missed will take time. In any case, any
future relations between Turkey and its opponents should be based on
pure competition and national interest rather than on sloganeering
along the lines of "the common fate of the region's people" or "the
brotherhood of Muslims." Whatever the AKP leaders attempt to do to
patch up relations and change its policies, Turkey's regional status
cannot be restored unless those who formulated Ankara's foreign policy
over the past three years-turning Turkey into an isolated and helpless
country-resign.
The counterpoint to this article can be read here:
http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/article55327346
http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/article55327353