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Politkom (in Russian), Russia
Jan 23 2014
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey: Geopolitical Triangle With Hidden Corners
by Sergey Minasyan, deputy director of the Armenian think tank
Caucasus Institute
On 20 January 2014, as part of his first official visit to Turkey, the
newly elected president of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili, will meet
[tense as published; article is dated 23 January] with his
counterpart, Abdullah Gul. During the visit, he is also due to meet
with Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan and other Turkish
officials. This visit, which is likely to be followed shortly
afterwards by the new Georgian president's official visit to another
neighbouring country, Azerbaijan, again highlights the problem of
analysing the dynamics of relations in the so-called
Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku "geopolitical triangle."
The three countries already have the format of permanent tripartite
meetings at the level of the presidents, prime ministers, foreign
ministers, and so on, which is one of the most important means of
coordinating their political and economic policies in the region. This
trend was institutionalized around the beginning of 2007, when, during
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's official visit to Georgia, a
trilateral meeting was held between the Azerbaijani and Georgian
presidents, and Prime Minister Erdogan. Subsequently, a few more
productive meetings were held (in June 2012 and March 2013), during
which several documents forming the basis of the countries' tripartite
activities in the sphere of regional policy were signed.
It should be noted that during almost all such meetings, formal
declarations and statements by the parties contained wording regarding
the Karabakh conflict that suited Azerbaijan, such as references to
its "territorial integrity," etc. The importance that official Baku
attaches to the Karabakh factor in its dialogue with Tbilisi
manifested itself quite clearly at the end of 2012, when Azerbaijan
reacted very nervously to the new Georgian authorities announcing the
possibility of the Abkhazian railroad being restored and reopened (as
a means of improving relations between Moscow and Tbilisi). This was
due to the fairly obvious fear that the resumption of rail services
through Abkhazia would reduce the scope of the communication blockade
of Armenia and thus strengthen its hand in the Karabakh conflict.
Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan seek to coordinate their positions
during votes and public declarations of their approaches at various
international forums and organizations (the UN General Assembly, PACE
[Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe], the OSCE, BSEC
[Black Sea Economic Cooperation], etc), as well as in the settlement
of regional ethnic-political conflicts and on domestic issues. At the
same time, Turkey and Azerbaijan always try to refrain from strong
language with respect to Russia, which is something the Georgian side
has always insisted on, for example, during votes on the Abkhazian
problem at the UN General Assembly.
However, it should be emphasized that neither in the trilateral
(Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) format nor multilaterally (for example, as
part of cooperation with NATO) do the three countries' armed forces
have any commitment to joint deployment and coordination at
operational level. And, of course, there are no mutual security and
mutual defence guarantees between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia at
the political level (except, to some extent, for some provisions of
the Kars Treaty of 1921, by which Ankara, along with Moscow, is the
guarantor of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria). Nor are
there any grounds at all, so far, to speak of
Azerbaijani-Turkish-Georgian relations in terms of a fully fledged
strategic military and political alliance with clear objectives and
commitments by the parties, or, even more so, to try to portray these
relations as being at a level that is higher than the current
"strategic partnership."
Cooperation between the three countries has recently increased in the
tourism sector, which is largely due to the fact that Georgian seaside
resorts attract tourists from Turkey and Azerbaijan more because they
are more affordable. However, the main format of cooperation lies in
the socioeconomic sphere and, quite naturally, concerns the transit of
Azerbaijani energy resources through Georgian territory to Turkey.
The Georgian side seeks to use what in many ways is its monopoly
transit and communication position with respect to Azerbaijan by
trying to derive maximum dividends from the use of its territory to
pump Caspian energy resources. For example, Georgia, in addition to
the actual fees for the transit of energy resources, also receives
part of Azerbaijan's own share for oil transit through its territory
[sentence as published]. In addition, Georgia is able to pay
preferential rates for gas thanks to the transit of Azerbaijani gas
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline (approximately $135 per
1,000 cubic meters) and receive some gas as payment for transit.
Among the energy projects being considered for the future is the
construction of a new gas pipeline to supply Azerbaijani gas (as part
of the development of the so-called second stage of the Sah Daniz
[Shah Deniz II] gas field) through Georgia and Turkey to EU countries.
In June 2013, following the failure of the idea to build a bigger gas
pipeline, Nabucco (which was supposed to include Turkmen gas through
the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline), it was decided to
make do with a less ambitious project, TAP [Trans Adriatic Pipeline],
involving gas only from Azerbaijani gas fields in the Caspian Sea (Sah
Daniz), which raises questions about its profitability.
Another project fitting into the logic of the strategy of the
communication and transport "strangulation" of Armenia, which
Azerbaijan is considering, is the construction of the
Azerbaijani-funded Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad. This involves the
construction of a railroad replacing the existing Kars-Gyumri rail
link (which has been closed since 1993 on Turkey's initiative) in
order to bypass Armenian territory and connect the transport systems
of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.
It was previously announced that the railroad would start operation in
2011, but for various reasons the project kept being delayed.
Following the victory of the opposition Georgian Dream bloc in the
October 2012 parliamentary elections, Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina
Ivanishvili said that since the construction of this railroad could
harm the operation of Georgian ports, he was not sure if it would be
expedient to build the Kars-Akhalkalaki link, which seriously alarmed
the Azerbaijani authorities. However, later, on a visit to Baku in
December 2012, he said that he had changed his mind. Nevertheless, in
the summer of 2013, the then Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili,
said that the completion of the railroad was being delayed for two
years, as a result of which the country "may lose its role as a
regional centre."
As far as ethnic and religious processes are concerned, it is worth
noting that Turkey is trying to step up its religious and social
activity among Georgia's Azerbaijanis. In particular, with Turkish
assistance, a mosque has been built not far from Red Bridge on the
border with Azerbaijan, which is a symbol of Turkey and Iran vying
with each other for influence over Georgia's Azerbaijani community.
Along with this, it is not clear whether or not the activity of
Turkish religious organizations in the Azerbaijani-populated areas of
Georgia is accompanied by the activity of so-called Nursists
[followers of 20th-century Islamic scholar Said Nursi], that is
followers of Fethullah Gulen [US-based Turkish Muslim preacher].
>From time to time, Azerbaijan and Turkey also try to draw official
Tbilisi's attention to the problems of the Meskhetian Turks and their
return to Georgia. By the way, this issue was again discussed during
the latest meeting between the Turkish and Georgian presidents on 20
January 2014. This is mainly due not just to the factor of ethnic
affinity, but also to the fact that most of these Meskhetians (and
their descendants) wishing to return to Georgia are currently settled
in Azerbaijan following the pogroms and deportations from Central Asia
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Presently, the number of
Meskhetians in Azerbaijan, including those who have acquired that
country's citizenship, is approximately 100,000. However, only a few
hundred of them may have a real opportunity to settle in Georgia. The
Georgian side is trying to create various obstacles to the mass
migration of Meskhetians to Georgia (despite its existing commitments
to international organizations), while Azerbaijan is not particularly
putting pressure on the Georgian side over this issue, given that it
would be politically inexpedient to allow issues that are "not of
major importance" to spoil relations with official Tbilisi.
Georgia's National Security Concept, adopted in 2011, refers to
relations with Azerbaijan as strategic partnership (unlike relations
with Armenia, in whose case the document makes no such references).
However, it is also interesting to note that the Georgian side views
strategic partnership with Azerbaijan almost exclusively in the
context of the implementation of energy and communication projects. It
is also noteworthy that the same document refers to Turkey as
Georgia's main partner in the region and the regional leader,
relations with which are important to Georgia from both socioeconomic
and military-political viewpoints.
However, we must not forget that Georgia's current position on the
general format of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey may change
somewhat. Their sharp intensification during Mikheil Saakashvili's
rule was due to two most important factors. The first of these was the
construction (or commissioning) of most important energy transit and
communication projects by the two countries. However, the general
dynamic of relations in the energy transit and communication areas
over the next few years suggests that, at best, only the
Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad will be completed at some unspecified point,
as well as the gas transit project TAP in 2019-2020 (providing it is
implemented in reality). The second factor was the previous Georgian
authorities' tough anti-Russian policy, which, given the benevolent
attitude to it by Ankara and Baku, created a political and even
ideological basis for their development [sentence as published]. It is
quite apparent that the new Georgian authorities will abandon the
overly radical anti-Russian policies, which may also lead to some
softening of their policy towards Armenia.
Finally, it should be noted that concerns about the asymmetry of
Azerbaijani-Georgian and Turkish-Georgian relations are present in the
perceptions of a substantial section of the Georgian political elite
and the public. According to that perception, Azerbaijan and Turkey,
having taken advantage of the anti-Russian policy of former President
Saakashvili, have gained inappropriately strong positions in Georgia's
domestic and foreign policy as well as its economic life. This is also
compounded by Georgia's growing geopolitical dependence on the
implementation of Azerbaijani energy and communication projects, even
though, in principle, it is precisely Georgia that should derive more
benefit from its monopoly transit position as regards Azerbaijan and
Turkey (in the case of the latter, this [fear] primarily concerns the
growth of Turkish influence in Ajaria).
The anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim protests and statements that have
been made in Ajaria and Samtskhe-Javakheti Province's Adigeni District
since Ivanishvili's supporters came to power in Georgia may be a sign
of such sentiments within the Georgian elite and the public. It
appears that this factor, given a certain course of events, may also
play some role in the future of Azerbaijani-Turkish-Georgian
relations.
[Translated from Russian]
Jan 23 2014
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey: Geopolitical Triangle With Hidden Corners
by Sergey Minasyan, deputy director of the Armenian think tank
Caucasus Institute
On 20 January 2014, as part of his first official visit to Turkey, the
newly elected president of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili, will meet
[tense as published; article is dated 23 January] with his
counterpart, Abdullah Gul. During the visit, he is also due to meet
with Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan and other Turkish
officials. This visit, which is likely to be followed shortly
afterwards by the new Georgian president's official visit to another
neighbouring country, Azerbaijan, again highlights the problem of
analysing the dynamics of relations in the so-called
Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku "geopolitical triangle."
The three countries already have the format of permanent tripartite
meetings at the level of the presidents, prime ministers, foreign
ministers, and so on, which is one of the most important means of
coordinating their political and economic policies in the region. This
trend was institutionalized around the beginning of 2007, when, during
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's official visit to Georgia, a
trilateral meeting was held between the Azerbaijani and Georgian
presidents, and Prime Minister Erdogan. Subsequently, a few more
productive meetings were held (in June 2012 and March 2013), during
which several documents forming the basis of the countries' tripartite
activities in the sphere of regional policy were signed.
It should be noted that during almost all such meetings, formal
declarations and statements by the parties contained wording regarding
the Karabakh conflict that suited Azerbaijan, such as references to
its "territorial integrity," etc. The importance that official Baku
attaches to the Karabakh factor in its dialogue with Tbilisi
manifested itself quite clearly at the end of 2012, when Azerbaijan
reacted very nervously to the new Georgian authorities announcing the
possibility of the Abkhazian railroad being restored and reopened (as
a means of improving relations between Moscow and Tbilisi). This was
due to the fairly obvious fear that the resumption of rail services
through Abkhazia would reduce the scope of the communication blockade
of Armenia and thus strengthen its hand in the Karabakh conflict.
Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan seek to coordinate their positions
during votes and public declarations of their approaches at various
international forums and organizations (the UN General Assembly, PACE
[Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe], the OSCE, BSEC
[Black Sea Economic Cooperation], etc), as well as in the settlement
of regional ethnic-political conflicts and on domestic issues. At the
same time, Turkey and Azerbaijan always try to refrain from strong
language with respect to Russia, which is something the Georgian side
has always insisted on, for example, during votes on the Abkhazian
problem at the UN General Assembly.
However, it should be emphasized that neither in the trilateral
(Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey) format nor multilaterally (for example, as
part of cooperation with NATO) do the three countries' armed forces
have any commitment to joint deployment and coordination at
operational level. And, of course, there are no mutual security and
mutual defence guarantees between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia at
the political level (except, to some extent, for some provisions of
the Kars Treaty of 1921, by which Ankara, along with Moscow, is the
guarantor of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria). Nor are
there any grounds at all, so far, to speak of
Azerbaijani-Turkish-Georgian relations in terms of a fully fledged
strategic military and political alliance with clear objectives and
commitments by the parties, or, even more so, to try to portray these
relations as being at a level that is higher than the current
"strategic partnership."
Cooperation between the three countries has recently increased in the
tourism sector, which is largely due to the fact that Georgian seaside
resorts attract tourists from Turkey and Azerbaijan more because they
are more affordable. However, the main format of cooperation lies in
the socioeconomic sphere and, quite naturally, concerns the transit of
Azerbaijani energy resources through Georgian territory to Turkey.
The Georgian side seeks to use what in many ways is its monopoly
transit and communication position with respect to Azerbaijan by
trying to derive maximum dividends from the use of its territory to
pump Caspian energy resources. For example, Georgia, in addition to
the actual fees for the transit of energy resources, also receives
part of Azerbaijan's own share for oil transit through its territory
[sentence as published]. In addition, Georgia is able to pay
preferential rates for gas thanks to the transit of Azerbaijani gas
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline (approximately $135 per
1,000 cubic meters) and receive some gas as payment for transit.
Among the energy projects being considered for the future is the
construction of a new gas pipeline to supply Azerbaijani gas (as part
of the development of the so-called second stage of the Sah Daniz
[Shah Deniz II] gas field) through Georgia and Turkey to EU countries.
In June 2013, following the failure of the idea to build a bigger gas
pipeline, Nabucco (which was supposed to include Turkmen gas through
the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline), it was decided to
make do with a less ambitious project, TAP [Trans Adriatic Pipeline],
involving gas only from Azerbaijani gas fields in the Caspian Sea (Sah
Daniz), which raises questions about its profitability.
Another project fitting into the logic of the strategy of the
communication and transport "strangulation" of Armenia, which
Azerbaijan is considering, is the construction of the
Azerbaijani-funded Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad. This involves the
construction of a railroad replacing the existing Kars-Gyumri rail
link (which has been closed since 1993 on Turkey's initiative) in
order to bypass Armenian territory and connect the transport systems
of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.
It was previously announced that the railroad would start operation in
2011, but for various reasons the project kept being delayed.
Following the victory of the opposition Georgian Dream bloc in the
October 2012 parliamentary elections, Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina
Ivanishvili said that since the construction of this railroad could
harm the operation of Georgian ports, he was not sure if it would be
expedient to build the Kars-Akhalkalaki link, which seriously alarmed
the Azerbaijani authorities. However, later, on a visit to Baku in
December 2012, he said that he had changed his mind. Nevertheless, in
the summer of 2013, the then Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili,
said that the completion of the railroad was being delayed for two
years, as a result of which the country "may lose its role as a
regional centre."
As far as ethnic and religious processes are concerned, it is worth
noting that Turkey is trying to step up its religious and social
activity among Georgia's Azerbaijanis. In particular, with Turkish
assistance, a mosque has been built not far from Red Bridge on the
border with Azerbaijan, which is a symbol of Turkey and Iran vying
with each other for influence over Georgia's Azerbaijani community.
Along with this, it is not clear whether or not the activity of
Turkish religious organizations in the Azerbaijani-populated areas of
Georgia is accompanied by the activity of so-called Nursists
[followers of 20th-century Islamic scholar Said Nursi], that is
followers of Fethullah Gulen [US-based Turkish Muslim preacher].
>From time to time, Azerbaijan and Turkey also try to draw official
Tbilisi's attention to the problems of the Meskhetian Turks and their
return to Georgia. By the way, this issue was again discussed during
the latest meeting between the Turkish and Georgian presidents on 20
January 2014. This is mainly due not just to the factor of ethnic
affinity, but also to the fact that most of these Meskhetians (and
their descendants) wishing to return to Georgia are currently settled
in Azerbaijan following the pogroms and deportations from Central Asia
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Presently, the number of
Meskhetians in Azerbaijan, including those who have acquired that
country's citizenship, is approximately 100,000. However, only a few
hundred of them may have a real opportunity to settle in Georgia. The
Georgian side is trying to create various obstacles to the mass
migration of Meskhetians to Georgia (despite its existing commitments
to international organizations), while Azerbaijan is not particularly
putting pressure on the Georgian side over this issue, given that it
would be politically inexpedient to allow issues that are "not of
major importance" to spoil relations with official Tbilisi.
Georgia's National Security Concept, adopted in 2011, refers to
relations with Azerbaijan as strategic partnership (unlike relations
with Armenia, in whose case the document makes no such references).
However, it is also interesting to note that the Georgian side views
strategic partnership with Azerbaijan almost exclusively in the
context of the implementation of energy and communication projects. It
is also noteworthy that the same document refers to Turkey as
Georgia's main partner in the region and the regional leader,
relations with which are important to Georgia from both socioeconomic
and military-political viewpoints.
However, we must not forget that Georgia's current position on the
general format of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey may change
somewhat. Their sharp intensification during Mikheil Saakashvili's
rule was due to two most important factors. The first of these was the
construction (or commissioning) of most important energy transit and
communication projects by the two countries. However, the general
dynamic of relations in the energy transit and communication areas
over the next few years suggests that, at best, only the
Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad will be completed at some unspecified point,
as well as the gas transit project TAP in 2019-2020 (providing it is
implemented in reality). The second factor was the previous Georgian
authorities' tough anti-Russian policy, which, given the benevolent
attitude to it by Ankara and Baku, created a political and even
ideological basis for their development [sentence as published]. It is
quite apparent that the new Georgian authorities will abandon the
overly radical anti-Russian policies, which may also lead to some
softening of their policy towards Armenia.
Finally, it should be noted that concerns about the asymmetry of
Azerbaijani-Georgian and Turkish-Georgian relations are present in the
perceptions of a substantial section of the Georgian political elite
and the public. According to that perception, Azerbaijan and Turkey,
having taken advantage of the anti-Russian policy of former President
Saakashvili, have gained inappropriately strong positions in Georgia's
domestic and foreign policy as well as its economic life. This is also
compounded by Georgia's growing geopolitical dependence on the
implementation of Azerbaijani energy and communication projects, even
though, in principle, it is precisely Georgia that should derive more
benefit from its monopoly transit position as regards Azerbaijan and
Turkey (in the case of the latter, this [fear] primarily concerns the
growth of Turkish influence in Ajaria).
The anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim protests and statements that have
been made in Ajaria and Samtskhe-Javakheti Province's Adigeni District
since Ivanishvili's supporters came to power in Georgia may be a sign
of such sentiments within the Georgian elite and the public. It
appears that this factor, given a certain course of events, may also
play some role in the future of Azerbaijani-Turkish-Georgian
relations.
[Translated from Russian]