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"IMPERIAL MINDSETS SURVIVE EMPIRES": GERARD LIBARIDIAN ON SOUTH CAUCASUS AFTER USSR COLLAPSED
07.16.2014 13:40 epress.am
Imperial mindsets survive empires, as do imperial rivalries in
collective memory, in historiography and in policy making often
long after empires are gone. This was said by former senior advisor
to the president of Armenia (1994-1997) Gerard (Jirayr) Libaridian
(pictured) during his keynote speech at a conference titled "The Clash
of Empires: World War I and the Middle East" held in Cambridge, UK,
from June 13-14.
Turning his attention to the collapse of the USSR, Libaridian notes
that in 1991, it seemed to some that there was a "power vacuum"
in some parts of the world.
"Let's take the South Caucasus, a region I know better than I know
others. So we reach the end of 1991 and there is no longer a USSR;
the former superpower has been reduced to less than a third rate
power, except for its nuclear arsenal, and is withdrawing militarily
from the South Caucasus, though not completely. What did the other
former empires, Iran and Turkey do? They sensed a vacuum and reverted
immediately back to their imperial past and thought of the region as
a prize to be won, a region where they could reassert their influence,
even if as a shadow of their former selves.
"This was the beginning of the nostalgia for empire which got nowhere
because the absence of Russia in the region was a temporary setback,
if not an illusion. But the imperial past was not an illusion for
these two so-called nation-states. It was a model that was suggesting
certain policies," he said.
According to the Armenian-American historian, more recently, the
governments of these three former empires (Iran, Turkey, and Russia)
express such behavior that transcends the feeling of nostalgia:
"in some cases they have graduated from the sphere of sentimental
attachment to actual policies of re-creation, in some form or another,
of empires. Particularly in Russia and Turkey we now have governments
that consider their imperial heritage a positive capital that justifies
their renewed attempts at domination over neighbors."
"Let me also state that in my view this nostalgia is due not so much
to the greatness of these empires but to the failure of the political
imagination of major players on the world stage -- the US, Russia,
Europe and China -- who did not know how to benefit from the window
of opportunity for a new world order created by the collapse of the
Soviet Union," he said.
In Libaridian's view, if there had been a serious critique of the
imperial past of these states, we might've had a different model
of behavior.
"Iranian policy makers and scholars looked upon Persian rule over the
South Caucasus until 1828 as a period of benevolent government where
Armenians and Muslims did not fight as they were now doing in Karabakh,
where a fatherly and benevolent metropolis had managed differences
wisely. And Turkish scholars argued that the Ottoman millet system had
been a most benevolent system that tolerated non-Muslims to exist, as a
favor, that Ottoman period was a good one, even if at the end even some
of their subject peoples were denied their existence. And they implied,
as did policy makers, that the extension of Turkish influence on the
new republics could be the basis for peace, security and stability
in the South Caucasus. Just as the Iranians had argued. Except that
the Iranians had argued in favor of the restoration of an Iranian
influence based on an economic common space. Turkey, more attuned to
NATO terminology, promoted the idea of a common 'security' space.
"We know that none of that came to pass, although Iran kept an even
presence in all three republics and Turkey made headways in Georgia
and Azerbaijan. But at the end none of that translated into a new
Iranian or Turkish sphere of influence. The latter may have happened
if Turkey had resolved its problems with Armenia for the sake of
greater stakes in the region.
"Fast forward to a decade or more. Russia has come back with a
vengeance. Not that it was absent during this period; it is just that
it was biding its time, trying to find the right leader, the right
moment, the right justification.
"And now we have a slightly different situation in two ways. The vague
notion of influence is replaced in Russia and Turkey with a genuine
sense of nostalgia for the lost empires. In Erdogan and Putin we
have leaders whose visions correspond roughly to the lost empires,
the Ottoman and Russian/Soviet. And make no mistake about it, these
are visions, fed by nostalgia but not limited to it. History--which
includes the mess these empires left behind them- is being used to
promote policies that are inspired by visions of empire redux in
the name of whatever can be used: protection of ethnic Russians,
Russian speakers, if not inherited natural rights over peoples and
territories," he said.
The historian concludes his speech by raising the following questions:
"What is the responsibility of historians and social scientists in
the resurgence of imperial solutions to evaluate the present based
on the past through critical lenses? Could things have been different
in Russia and Turkey had historians and other social scientists been
more critical assessors of imperial history, especially when educating
the new generations in schools?"
He concludes: "First, we do not do well as historians when we take
for granted the values of the people and institutions we are supposed
to study. Second, to the extent that differences in the presentation
of history are engendered by actual differences in the understanding
of history and not by politics, we should find ways to bridge those
differences by going deeper into history, by filling in the lacunae
in our knowledge and by questioning the biases in our perspectives and
not by expecting that we split the difference. And third, what we say
about the past may have an impact on the future; successor states to
empires with nostalgic feelings and impulse for empire may be relying
on us to legitimize the imperial past and justify current policies.
What we say and what we write matters for the future and not just
the past."
http://www.epress.am/en/2014/07/16/imperial-mindsets-survive-empires-gerard-libaridian-on-south-caucasus-after-ussr-collapsed.html
07.16.2014 13:40 epress.am
Imperial mindsets survive empires, as do imperial rivalries in
collective memory, in historiography and in policy making often
long after empires are gone. This was said by former senior advisor
to the president of Armenia (1994-1997) Gerard (Jirayr) Libaridian
(pictured) during his keynote speech at a conference titled "The Clash
of Empires: World War I and the Middle East" held in Cambridge, UK,
from June 13-14.
Turning his attention to the collapse of the USSR, Libaridian notes
that in 1991, it seemed to some that there was a "power vacuum"
in some parts of the world.
"Let's take the South Caucasus, a region I know better than I know
others. So we reach the end of 1991 and there is no longer a USSR;
the former superpower has been reduced to less than a third rate
power, except for its nuclear arsenal, and is withdrawing militarily
from the South Caucasus, though not completely. What did the other
former empires, Iran and Turkey do? They sensed a vacuum and reverted
immediately back to their imperial past and thought of the region as
a prize to be won, a region where they could reassert their influence,
even if as a shadow of their former selves.
"This was the beginning of the nostalgia for empire which got nowhere
because the absence of Russia in the region was a temporary setback,
if not an illusion. But the imperial past was not an illusion for
these two so-called nation-states. It was a model that was suggesting
certain policies," he said.
According to the Armenian-American historian, more recently, the
governments of these three former empires (Iran, Turkey, and Russia)
express such behavior that transcends the feeling of nostalgia:
"in some cases they have graduated from the sphere of sentimental
attachment to actual policies of re-creation, in some form or another,
of empires. Particularly in Russia and Turkey we now have governments
that consider their imperial heritage a positive capital that justifies
their renewed attempts at domination over neighbors."
"Let me also state that in my view this nostalgia is due not so much
to the greatness of these empires but to the failure of the political
imagination of major players on the world stage -- the US, Russia,
Europe and China -- who did not know how to benefit from the window
of opportunity for a new world order created by the collapse of the
Soviet Union," he said.
In Libaridian's view, if there had been a serious critique of the
imperial past of these states, we might've had a different model
of behavior.
"Iranian policy makers and scholars looked upon Persian rule over the
South Caucasus until 1828 as a period of benevolent government where
Armenians and Muslims did not fight as they were now doing in Karabakh,
where a fatherly and benevolent metropolis had managed differences
wisely. And Turkish scholars argued that the Ottoman millet system had
been a most benevolent system that tolerated non-Muslims to exist, as a
favor, that Ottoman period was a good one, even if at the end even some
of their subject peoples were denied their existence. And they implied,
as did policy makers, that the extension of Turkish influence on the
new republics could be the basis for peace, security and stability
in the South Caucasus. Just as the Iranians had argued. Except that
the Iranians had argued in favor of the restoration of an Iranian
influence based on an economic common space. Turkey, more attuned to
NATO terminology, promoted the idea of a common 'security' space.
"We know that none of that came to pass, although Iran kept an even
presence in all three republics and Turkey made headways in Georgia
and Azerbaijan. But at the end none of that translated into a new
Iranian or Turkish sphere of influence. The latter may have happened
if Turkey had resolved its problems with Armenia for the sake of
greater stakes in the region.
"Fast forward to a decade or more. Russia has come back with a
vengeance. Not that it was absent during this period; it is just that
it was biding its time, trying to find the right leader, the right
moment, the right justification.
"And now we have a slightly different situation in two ways. The vague
notion of influence is replaced in Russia and Turkey with a genuine
sense of nostalgia for the lost empires. In Erdogan and Putin we
have leaders whose visions correspond roughly to the lost empires,
the Ottoman and Russian/Soviet. And make no mistake about it, these
are visions, fed by nostalgia but not limited to it. History--which
includes the mess these empires left behind them- is being used to
promote policies that are inspired by visions of empire redux in
the name of whatever can be used: protection of ethnic Russians,
Russian speakers, if not inherited natural rights over peoples and
territories," he said.
The historian concludes his speech by raising the following questions:
"What is the responsibility of historians and social scientists in
the resurgence of imperial solutions to evaluate the present based
on the past through critical lenses? Could things have been different
in Russia and Turkey had historians and other social scientists been
more critical assessors of imperial history, especially when educating
the new generations in schools?"
He concludes: "First, we do not do well as historians when we take
for granted the values of the people and institutions we are supposed
to study. Second, to the extent that differences in the presentation
of history are engendered by actual differences in the understanding
of history and not by politics, we should find ways to bridge those
differences by going deeper into history, by filling in the lacunae
in our knowledge and by questioning the biases in our perspectives and
not by expecting that we split the difference. And third, what we say
about the past may have an impact on the future; successor states to
empires with nostalgic feelings and impulse for empire may be relying
on us to legitimize the imperial past and justify current policies.
What we say and what we write matters for the future and not just
the past."
http://www.epress.am/en/2014/07/16/imperial-mindsets-survive-empires-gerard-libaridian-on-south-caucasus-after-ussr-collapsed.html