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AZERBAIJAN: PURSUING A THAW WITH IRAN?
EurasiaNet.org
July 17 2014
July 17, 2014 - 2:01pm, by Eldar Mamedov
Eurasianet Commentary
The recent announcement that Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehqan
will visit Baku in September is the latest indicator that a thaw in
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations is underway.
The first signs of warming relations appeared in early April, when
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Iran, where he met with
his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, and the Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. While the details of that visit remain murky,
a number of agreements were reportedly signed concerning economic
and cultural affairs.
The visit marked a significant departure from the tensions that had
characterized Azerbaijani-Iranian relations in recent years. Mutual
rancour reached the point that officials in Baku publicly complained
about Iranian meddling in Azerbaijan's internal religious affairs,
while Tehran expressed concern about Azerbaijani strategic cooperation
with Israel, the Islamic Republic's implacable foe.
Changing regional dynamics seem to be making a new, more constructive
era possible in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. First, there has
been a change of guard in Iran. After years of ideological stridency
and a confrontational policy conducted by former president Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's administration, the election of Rouhani has brought
moderates and pragmatists back into the foreign policy establishment.
Some of the people now in charge of Iran's foreign relations are
veterans of the pragmatist Rafsanjani administration. When confronting
the collapse of the Soviet Union back in 1991, the Rafsanjani team's
top priority was ensuring stability on Iran's northern borders. It's
no coincidence, then, that Rouhani has himself reached out to Baku
by emphasizing the need to have good-neighborly relations.
Second, the government in Baku realizes the Obama administration is
serious about reaching a nuclear deal with Iran, which might, in due
course, promote a broader rapprochement between the two countries.
Baku is hedging its bets not to be left on the outside of this
potentially momentous strategic shift in the Middle East. This
calculation, of course, has implications for Israeli ties. But so far,
Baku's tighter relationship with Israel has not brought it any tangible
benefits, in terms of bringing Baku closer to its top foreign policy
goal of solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia.
Israel has no leverage in this conflict, and for the pro-Israeli lobby
in Washington, which was the primary target of Azerbaijani courtship,
Nagorno-Karabakh is a non-issue.
Third, both Azerbaijan and Iran have a common interest in preventing
a resurgent Russia from expanding and solidifying its influence in
the South Caucasus. Russia's annexation of Crimea, along with ongoing
confrontation in eastern Ukraine, set alarm bells ringing in Tehran.
Despite their overtly good bilateral relationship, Tehran doesn't
trust Moscow, given the long history of Russian interference in
Iranian affairs. In this sense Iran has a strategic interest in the
existence of viable and independent states in the South Caucasus --
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan -- serving as a buffer against Russia.
This desire for a buffer may prompt Iran to play a more active role
in Karabakh-conflict resolution. Iran is especially eager to avoid
the possibility of renewed warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
a development that would not only create instability on Iran's
northern border, but also provide Russia a pretext to intervene
directly and move closer to Iranian borders. Iran is not a member
of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is tasked with leading the currently
stalemated peace talks. If Baku plays its cards smartly, it could use
its re-established Iranian connections to exert influence on Armenia,
given Tehran's warm relations with Yerevan.
Fourth, as recent events in Syria and Iraq show, both Azerbaijan and
Iran, as two Shi'a-majority countries, confront a shared challenge in
the form of Salafist-inspired extremism and terrorism. About a hundred
of Azerbaijanis are reported to have died fighting the regime of Bashar
Assad in Syria. Nobody knows how many more Salafist-inspired Azeris
have joined "the jihad" in Syria and Iraq. Even if it is a relatively
small number, it could mean trouble down the road for Azerbaijan, if
some militants return home and decide to use their military experience
acquired in Syria and Iraq against Aliyev's administration.
By alienating Iran for a better part of the post-Soviet era,
Azerbaijanis themselves have contributed to the emergence of the
Salafist problem, but now is the time to address it. The Iranian
government, which faces its own Salafi-inspired terrorists in the
shape of the Jaish Al-Adl organization operating in predominantly
Baluchi areas, can be a vital ally in containing this security threat.
All this makes it clear that there are strong incentives for both
Azerbaijan and Iran to improve bilateral relations. At this critical
point in time for security and stability in the Middle East, South
Caucasus and Russia, these troubled lands need more cooperation,
not less.
Editor's note: Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists &
Democrats Group in the European Parliament. He writes in his personal
capacity.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69081
EurasiaNet.org
July 17 2014
July 17, 2014 - 2:01pm, by Eldar Mamedov
Eurasianet Commentary
The recent announcement that Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehqan
will visit Baku in September is the latest indicator that a thaw in
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations is underway.
The first signs of warming relations appeared in early April, when
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Iran, where he met with
his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, and the Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. While the details of that visit remain murky,
a number of agreements were reportedly signed concerning economic
and cultural affairs.
The visit marked a significant departure from the tensions that had
characterized Azerbaijani-Iranian relations in recent years. Mutual
rancour reached the point that officials in Baku publicly complained
about Iranian meddling in Azerbaijan's internal religious affairs,
while Tehran expressed concern about Azerbaijani strategic cooperation
with Israel, the Islamic Republic's implacable foe.
Changing regional dynamics seem to be making a new, more constructive
era possible in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. First, there has
been a change of guard in Iran. After years of ideological stridency
and a confrontational policy conducted by former president Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's administration, the election of Rouhani has brought
moderates and pragmatists back into the foreign policy establishment.
Some of the people now in charge of Iran's foreign relations are
veterans of the pragmatist Rafsanjani administration. When confronting
the collapse of the Soviet Union back in 1991, the Rafsanjani team's
top priority was ensuring stability on Iran's northern borders. It's
no coincidence, then, that Rouhani has himself reached out to Baku
by emphasizing the need to have good-neighborly relations.
Second, the government in Baku realizes the Obama administration is
serious about reaching a nuclear deal with Iran, which might, in due
course, promote a broader rapprochement between the two countries.
Baku is hedging its bets not to be left on the outside of this
potentially momentous strategic shift in the Middle East. This
calculation, of course, has implications for Israeli ties. But so far,
Baku's tighter relationship with Israel has not brought it any tangible
benefits, in terms of bringing Baku closer to its top foreign policy
goal of solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia.
Israel has no leverage in this conflict, and for the pro-Israeli lobby
in Washington, which was the primary target of Azerbaijani courtship,
Nagorno-Karabakh is a non-issue.
Third, both Azerbaijan and Iran have a common interest in preventing
a resurgent Russia from expanding and solidifying its influence in
the South Caucasus. Russia's annexation of Crimea, along with ongoing
confrontation in eastern Ukraine, set alarm bells ringing in Tehran.
Despite their overtly good bilateral relationship, Tehran doesn't
trust Moscow, given the long history of Russian interference in
Iranian affairs. In this sense Iran has a strategic interest in the
existence of viable and independent states in the South Caucasus --
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan -- serving as a buffer against Russia.
This desire for a buffer may prompt Iran to play a more active role
in Karabakh-conflict resolution. Iran is especially eager to avoid
the possibility of renewed warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
a development that would not only create instability on Iran's
northern border, but also provide Russia a pretext to intervene
directly and move closer to Iranian borders. Iran is not a member
of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is tasked with leading the currently
stalemated peace talks. If Baku plays its cards smartly, it could use
its re-established Iranian connections to exert influence on Armenia,
given Tehran's warm relations with Yerevan.
Fourth, as recent events in Syria and Iraq show, both Azerbaijan and
Iran, as two Shi'a-majority countries, confront a shared challenge in
the form of Salafist-inspired extremism and terrorism. About a hundred
of Azerbaijanis are reported to have died fighting the regime of Bashar
Assad in Syria. Nobody knows how many more Salafist-inspired Azeris
have joined "the jihad" in Syria and Iraq. Even if it is a relatively
small number, it could mean trouble down the road for Azerbaijan, if
some militants return home and decide to use their military experience
acquired in Syria and Iraq against Aliyev's administration.
By alienating Iran for a better part of the post-Soviet era,
Azerbaijanis themselves have contributed to the emergence of the
Salafist problem, but now is the time to address it. The Iranian
government, which faces its own Salafi-inspired terrorists in the
shape of the Jaish Al-Adl organization operating in predominantly
Baluchi areas, can be a vital ally in containing this security threat.
All this makes it clear that there are strong incentives for both
Azerbaijan and Iran to improve bilateral relations. At this critical
point in time for security and stability in the Middle East, South
Caucasus and Russia, these troubled lands need more cooperation,
not less.
Editor's note: Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists &
Democrats Group in the European Parliament. He writes in his personal
capacity.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69081