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In the Shadow of 1915: Reflections on Hrant's Assassination
By Taner Akcam on July 21, 2014
The Armenian Weekly April 2014 Magazine
Seven years have passed since Hrant Dink's assassination and those who
planned his murder remain free. While the search for justice continues
with a second round of trials, there seems to be insufficient
political will to uncover the truth. With these new trials, I am
reminded of Karl Marx's famous adage about history repeating
itself'the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. Frustrating as
this may be, political will is precisely what prevents the Turkish
justice system from discovering the guilty parties.
Friends and admirers of Hrant are understandably angry: How can the
conspirators responsible for his assassination still be unknown? How
can a single murder case last so long? The reasons are suggested in a
`Tweet' posted by Prime Ministerial Advisor Hamdi Kilic on Jan. 2,
2014: `There is something known as `state tradition' in this country;
it still exists. It's enough to read a little history to understand
this.'
Kilic is right; the obstruction of justice in the Hrant Dink case is
one of these disturbing `reflexes.' If we had simply read a little
history, we would have understood what was transpiring in the trials
of Hrant's attackers. For a long time, Turks protesting Hrant's murder
resisted seeing the connection with the Armenian Genocide of 1915.
Some were even angered by those who tried to suggest such a link. Yet,
his assassins were well aware of this connection, and that is why they
killed him. In deconstructing some of the founding myths of the
Turkish state, Hrant threatened its traditions, and that is why his
real killers remain free. His murder, as Kilic recognized, was an
example of the Turkish state's `traditional' reflexes.
Hrant murdered in revenge for Talat Pasha
Hrant Dink was killed in revenge for the assassination of Talat Pasha,
the architect of the Armenian Genocide. Everything about his murder
suggested a `vengeance operation' for the 1921 conspiracy to
assassinate Talat Pasha in Berlin. This, for example, accounts for the
decision to murder Hrant Dink in public rather than to kidnap him,
kill him, and throw his remains in some remote location'the way all
the other `unknown perpetrator' crimes have been committed in Turkey.
The conspirators deliberately chose to come up from behind and to
shoot him in the head on the street, in front of Agos, the newspaper
he edited. The operation mirrored precisely how Talat Pasha was
killed. His attackers wanted revenge for the murder of Talat Pasha,
and they did so by targeting Hrank Dink.
As 2015 approaches¦ the Turkish state will undertake a search for
so-called `Good Armenians''and it will find them! It will use these
puppets as a counter-weight to the `intransigent,' `belligerent,' and
`uncompromising' Armenians in the diaspora.
We know that when Yasin Hayal, one of Hrant's assassins, was released
from prison after serving his sentence for the 2004 McDonalds bombing
in Trabzon, he spoke with his father about Talat Pasha. `Do you know
how Talat Pasha was killed?' he asked his father, adding, `Did you
know that the person who killed Talat Pasha wasn't punished? He was
set free.'
Soghomon Tehlirian, a young man who witnessed the murder of his family
during the genocide, assassinated Talat Pasha in broad daylight on
March 15, 1921, on a Berlin street. The assailant approached Talat
and, after confirming his identity, fired his pistol at the former
Ottoman Interior Minister's head. Hrant was killed in the same
fashion.
This isn't the only similarity between the killings: Although
Tehlirian attempted to flee the scene of the crime, he was quickly
apprehended. In fact, those who planned the attack on Talat wanted him
to remain at the scene and to surrender himself to the authorities.
Likewise, documents connected to the investigation surrounding Hrant
Dink's murder suggest that the plan was for his young assailant, Ogun
Samast, to remain at the murder scene instead of fleeing. Everything
was supposed to be just as in 1921. The aim was both to take revenge
for Talat Pasha's murder and to remind the Armenians that the genocide
of 1915 had been carried out in order to silence them. The plotters
were saying, `We established this Republic on the foundation of the
Armenians' annihilation, and since 1915 we do not give Armenians the
right to speak freely on these lands.'
Muammer Guler and Dr. Resit
The case of Dr. Mehmed Resit, the Unionist governor of Diyarbakir
during the Armenian Genocide, further demonstrates the connection
between the events of 1915 and the murder of Hrant Dink. I would like
to compare this man, who was personally responsible for the deaths of
tens of thousands of innocent Armenians, with Muammer Guler, who was
the governor of Istanbul at the time of Hrant's assassination in 2007
and was complicit in creating a climate conducive to the crime. It is
then possible to extend the comparison of past and present figures to
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Talat Pasha. The comparison works despite the
fact that Prime Minister Erdogan attempted to resolve the Kurdish
problem through peaceful means and has apologized'albeit
half-heartedly and with the actual intention of needling the
Republican Peoples Party and earning credit with voters'on behalf of
the state for the massacres at Dersim in 1937-38.
In July 1915, the German Consul at Mosul reported to his superiors
that some 2,000 Christians in Mardin and Diyarbakir, the majority of
them Armenians, had been taken from their cities overnight and
`slaughtered like sheep.'1 The consul claimed to have received this
information from the district governor of Mardin and demanded that
measures be taken to prevent such crimes. The German Embassy in
Istanbul passed the information on to Interior Minister Talat Pasha,
who then sent a cable to Governor Mehmed Resit, in which he repeated
the information he had received, including the phrase `slaughtered
like sheep.' Clarifying the target of the massacres, he issued the
following order: `It is categorically prohibited for disciplinary
measures imposed in regard to the Armenians to be implemented against
other Christians.' And he demanded an immediate cessation to such
measures `that might endanger the lives of [other] Christians.'2
Despite this cable, the indiscriminate massacres of Christians in the
Diyarbakir province continued. In a July 22 telegram, Talat wrote to
Dr. Resit stressing that the government's policy of annihilation
should be implemented against the Armenians, and no other Christians.
He mentioned that `complaints are being received' and ordered the
provincial governor to cease this practice, which `will put us in a
difficult situation.'3
Armenians seeking recognition of the Armenian Genocide seek justice.
Turks striving for democracy and human rights strive for freedom. The
relationship between these goals is complex because they address
separate problems. The attainment of one does not automatically bring
about the righting of past injustices.
Nonetheless, Resit continued the massacres without differentiating
between Armenians and other Christians. Finally, on Aug. 2, Talat sent
a third telegram, complaining that reports of massacres continued to
be received and that, `despite our having sent numerous cables, the
Christians in the province continue to be killed.' He repeated that
the government viewed the situation as intolerable. In the message,
Talat reminded Resit that he was an official of the state and `as a
[state] official, he was therefore obligated to carry out the orders
he received without exception.' Finally, there was an explicit
warning: Resit would be held directly responsible `for all activities
and incidents by bandits and armed gangs.'4
These cables were transmitted in coded form. Their content was
intelligible to only a few people, including Talat, Resit, and the
government functionaries who sent or decoded them. No investigations
transpired and no sanctions were imposed against Dr. Resit as a
consequence of opposing or ignoring government orders that resulted in
upwards of 2,000 persons being `slaughtered like sheep.' Indeed, the
outcomes were the very opposite. Hilmi, the Mardin District's
official, who was opposed to the murderous actions of Governor Resit
and who informed the German Consul of these crimes, was removed from
his position.5 Even more significant, on account of their `successful'
implementation of anti-Armenian policies in Diyarbakir, the security
personnel who worked under Resit were awarded medals. A July 28, 1915
telegram orders the `promotion of some of the police and commissars
who were instrumental in the arrest of Armenian committee leaders and
other members in the province of Diyarbakir;' others received monetary
awards or medals.6
Resit, who deported and killed thousands of Syriac and Armenian
Christians from Diyarbakir and its environs, was eventually called to
account'not for the mass murders he had ordered, but for keeping
precious jewelry and other valuables from the deportation. An official
message demanded that he `send to the capital' the confiscated items,
as he had promised. An Oct. 6, 1915 telegram, with the special note
`to be handled personally,' informed Resit that the government `has
received reports that you have confiscated' monies, jewels, and other
items belonging `to the Armenians who were deported and subjected to
attack on the way.' The cable demanded information on the amount of
gold and jewelry present, as well as the manner in which their records
were kept. The subject that interested Talat was not the annihilation
of these Christians, but the fate of the valuables confiscated from
them.7
Eventually, Resit was rewarded with an appointment as governor of
Ankara in recognition of his services. Yet, he was ultimately removed
from this post and subjected to a criminal investigation for the
misappropriation of the confiscated Armenian property and possessions.
It seems that Resit attempted to purchase a seaside mansion in
Istanbul with the Armenian jewelry he had confiscated, but when Talat
caught word of this he had him removed from his position. The
journalist Suleyman Nazif summed up the situation succinctly: `The
same Resit that Talat Pasha had esteemed as a murderer¦he removed from
office for being a thief.'8 As Prime Ministerial Advisor Hamdi Kilic
said, `There is something known as `state tradition' in this country;
it still exists. It's enough to read a little history to understand
this.' History shows that while the Armenian Genocide was taking
place, the state praised Resit and others for murdering Christians,
but condemned him for theft.
Returning to the comparison between Istanbul Governor Muammer Guler
and Diyarabakir Governor Mehmed Resit, we find a similar lack of
accountability. Like Resit, Guler was never called to account for the
murder, but rather was rewarded for his loyal service'first with a
seat as an AKP parliamentarian and later, by being appointed as
Interior Minister. Ironically, he too was subsequently removed from
his post for bribery and corruption. Nor was the situation different
in the case of the police officials involved in Hrant's case. All
received promotions in the wake of the murder, just as in Diyarbakir
in 1915. With history as our guide, we can appreciate why the real
culprits in Hrant Dink's murder have not been found.
Ninety years of state-sponsored denial have so blinded the public that
we cannot conceive of the relationship between the 1915 genocide and
the murder of Hrant Dink. But while the Turkish government has pushed
us to forget the events of 1915, state officials have not forgotten.
Turks grow uneasy at the mention of `genocide,' and calls for
`genocide recognition' cause us to flee in terror before some unknown
retribution. We resist using Hrant's death as an opportunity to face
up to history, to see the connection between that history and the
killing of an Armenian newspaper editor. We are made to forget Hrant
although he is the key'the key to the 40th chamber in the Arabian
Nights fable, the one that others do not want opened, the key that is
given to the heroes of those tales. We have a treasure chamber in our
old houses where all of our secrets are kept. And Hrant is the key to
that room. If the Hrant Dink murder case is ever solved, the secrets
behind the establishment of the Turkish Republic will be revealed.
But, sadly, in the present government, there is neither the courage
nor the will to furnish the key, because the government is heir to
these `state traditions,' and the `keepers of its secrets.'
Hrant and the diaspora
I predict that as 2015 approaches, Turkey will attempt to create an
atmosphere of `reconciliation.' Appearing ready to resolve the
Armenian issue, Turkey will portray Armenians in the diaspora as
uncompromising `sectarians.' For this purpose, the Turkish state will
undertake a search for so-called `Good Armenians''and it will find
them! It will use these puppets as a counter-weight to the
`intransigent,' `belligerent,' and `uncompromising' Armenians in the
diaspora. They will seek to pit their `Good' Armenians against the
`Bad' Armenians of the diaspora. And they will use Hrant for this
purpose, too. They will find the criticisms Hrant leveled at the
Armenian Diaspora and use them without hesitation. Hrant's own words
will be exploited as a part of a new wave of hostility toward the
Armenian Diaspora.
Do not be duped by this cynical scenario! Hrant criticized certain
circles within the Armenian Diaspora, and some Diasporan Armenians
criticized him. But he did so because he recognized that some diaspora
groups could not see that the final struggle for the recognition of
the Armenian Genocide would ultimately be fought and won within Turkey
itself, in Anatolia. When we spoke by telephone, he frequently urged
me to `tell those friends of yours that they should come and be part
of the struggle here. The genocide took place on these lands, and its
recognition will also occur here.'
Diasporan Armenians don't readily appreciate that the struggle for
recognition of the genocide is linked to the struggle for democracy in
Turkey. At the same time, some Turks fail to grasp that the diaspora's
struggle to attain recognition is part of the Turkish struggle for
democracy. The majority of those in the diaspora are uninterested in
the Turkish struggle to achieve democracy and human rights; and many
struggling for democracy within Turkey are hostile toward the Armenian
Diaspora's insistence on genocide recognition.
These tensions derive from the conflation of complementary goals.
Armenians seeking recognition of the Armenian Genocide seek justice.
Turks striving for democracy and human rights strive for freedom. The
relationship between these goals is complex because they address
separate problems. The attainment of one does not automatically bring
about the righting of past injustices. The United States, for example,
is a free and democratic country, yet its Native American population
continues to pursue justice. And the search for justice by the
indigenous peoples of Australia and Canada also continues. Thus, we
need to both see and understand this one thing: In Turkey today it is
essential that we not juxtapose freedom and justice; we must instead
create a shared language and intellectual foundation in our search for
both. We do not have to sacrifice one in our search for the other.
Hrant sought to construct a shared language for his struggle and that
of the diaspora. He dreamed of staging a large diaspora conference for
this purpose. Hrant's murder demonstrated the absolute necessity for
this `shared language,' as well as the error of attempting to conceive
of the struggle for freedom in Turkey at the expense of recognition
and acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide. It has shown us that
this recognition must be a shared demand of people in both the
diaspora and in Turkey. The struggles for freedom and justice complete
one another and must not be seen as either contradicting or opposing.
If we understand what Hrant was trying to do, we must bring together
these two struggles as one: the diaspora's demand for recognition of
the Armenian Genocide with the struggle in Turkey for human rights and
democracy. Those wishing for a democratic Turkey that respects human
rights must merge their struggle with that of the Armenian Diaspora.
They must invite diasporans to Turkey and join their struggle to have
the Armenian Genocide recognized abroad. And they must remember: The
Armenian Diaspora is not their enemy but their friend, a valuable
colleague who, due to the decades of denial by the Turkish state, has
unfortunately grown accustomed to looking at things through cynical
and mistrusting eyes.
If Hrant had lived, he would have joined the Armenian Diaspora. This
is not idle speculation; I know of that which I speak. Hrant was never
ignorant of 1915 the way many of us were. Every day of his life, he
experienced the connection between the genocide and what he had to
face; he felt it in his very bones. When his sentence was approved, he
was serious about wanting to leave Turkey and walking, with his entire
family, from his hometown of Malatya, on the path of deportation taken
by his ancestors, all the way to the Der-Zor desert in northeastern
Syria. `Just like my forefathers, they don't want me to remain here,'
he would say. `And if so, then there's no point in my doing so. I'll
travel the path that they took.' In other words, Hrant saw the
Armenian Diaspora as one of his options. With him, we must understand
that some categories are meaningless and incorrect, like the
categorization of a monolithic Armenian Diaspora, single-mindedly
fixed on revenge and of the overarching conception of the `evil Turk.'
These need to be discarded into the dustbin of history.
Hrant and the word `genocide'
When speaking with Turks, Hrant was polite and gracious enough to
avoid the word `genocide.' `I know what was done to my people,' he
would say, `but if my use of the word `genocide' will be used against
me as an excuse not to listen to the things I have to say, then I
won't use it.' Despite his extreme sensitivity and gentility in the
matter, the authorities wanted to punish him anyway, claiming that he
had used it'once! Before he was murdered, Hrant told me that he wanted
to turn his trial for using the word `genocide' into an historical
showcase. `I will state that `Yes, 1915 was a genocide,' and I will
then turn the trial into a history course.' But they didn't give him
the chance.
Hrant Dink was murdered because he wanted to deconstruct Turkey's
founding myths. Those who planned the murder'the real culprits'have
received promotions and praise for doing so. The sensitivity the
government expressed over the confiscation of Armenian property was
never shown toward the lives of Armenians. On the contrary, they
oversaw the annihilation of a people. And the situation today is not
so different! 1.5 million-plus-1. Hrant is the `plus-1.' Failing to
recognize this, we cannot understand the crime or hope to solve it. As
we approach the year 2015, the 100-year anniversary of the Armenian
deportations and genocide, we won't be able to confront this crime
without first admitting to ourselves that, `Yes, 1915 was a genocide
and it must be acknowledged as such.' And that `Hrant was murdered
because he reminded us of the million-plus Hrants of 1915.'
Let Hrant Dink be a symbol for us. Let him be our Martin Luther King.
Even as others in the past have gathered closely around Talat Pasha
and his ilk, and even as they today gather around Erdogan and his, let
us hold fast to Hrant. Let Hrant and the `1.5 million-plus-1' be our
point of divergence between our republic and their republic. This is
the only way that we can claim our Islamic selves, our Turkishness
and/or our Kurdishness from the hands of murders 'those of yesterday
and of today.
Notes
[1]) The full text of the telegram reads: `Reshid Bey, the Governor of
Diyarbakir, is raging among the Christians of his province like a
champion bloodhound; he recently had a gendarmerie [force] specially
dispatched from Diyarbakir collect 700 Christians (mostly Armenians)
in Mardin¦in one night and allowed them to be slaughtered like sheep.
Reshid Bey is continuing his murderous work against innocent persons,
with the district governor [of Mardin] having assured me that the
number of his victims has exceeded 2,000.' (DE/PA-AA/BoKon/169, From
the Vice-Consul in Mosul (Holstein) to the Embassy in Constantinople,
Mosul, July 10, 1915; URL:
http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1915-07-10-DE-011).
2) Here is the full text of the telegram: `Since the disciplinary and
political measures adopted vis-aÌ-vis the Armenians do not in any way
apply to the other Christians, an immediate end should be put to such
events, which will have an extremely negative effect on public opinion
and which randomly threaten the lives of Christians in particular;
please provide an accurate report of the present situation.' Thus the
policies deliberately enacted against the Armenians were explicitly to
exclude other Christian groups. BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 54/406, coded
telegram from Interior Minister Talat to the province of Diyarbakir,
dated July 12, 1915.
3) Here is the full text of the telegram: `Despite the firm and
explicit instructions within the province,' he wrote, `one hears that
operations have been undertaken against the Armenians and all other
Christian [groups] without exception, and that this situation, which
was repeatedly a cause for complaint, is now spreading to the
surrounding provinces. The continuation of this situation¦which will
leave the government in a difficult position in the future, is
entirely unacceptable.' BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 54-A/73, coded telegram from
Interior Minister Talat to the province of Diyarbakir, dated July 22,
1915.
4) Here is the full text of telegram: `Despite firm and explicit
instructions, certain armed gangs within the province have continued
persecuting and killing Christians' and that, `as it was previously
announced, the continuation of this situation is absolutely
unacceptable¦ It must not be forgotten that as a responsible
representative of the present government, you are obliged to carry out
the orders and instructions that are handed down from here,
unconditionally and in accordance with our interpretation [of their
meaning].' Talat concluded with a clear warning that his governor
would be held responsible `for every action and incident in which
bandits or armed gangs are involved.' BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 54-A/248, coded
telegram from Interior Minister Talat to the province of Diyarbakir,
dated Aug. 2, 1915.
5) David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors:Muslim-Christian
Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I (Gorgias Press: New
Jersey, 2006), 170.
6) BOA/DH.EUM.MEM, no. 2042/67/31/1333.N.15, July 28, 1915.
7) Here is the full text of the telegram: `It has been reported by
parliamentary deputies that the money, jewels, and other possessions
belonging to the Armenians who were deported and attacked along the
way have not been lost but rather secured and sent to the capital due
to the measures that you have taken. Please report back on the
quantity [of valuables] and the manner in which they were recorded.'
BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 56/315, coded telegram from the Interior Ministry to
the province of Diyarbakir, dated Oct. 6, 1915.
8) Hadisat, Feb. 8, 1919.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/07/21/shadow-1915-reflections-hrants-assassination/
From: A. Papazian
By Taner Akcam on July 21, 2014
The Armenian Weekly April 2014 Magazine
Seven years have passed since Hrant Dink's assassination and those who
planned his murder remain free. While the search for justice continues
with a second round of trials, there seems to be insufficient
political will to uncover the truth. With these new trials, I am
reminded of Karl Marx's famous adage about history repeating
itself'the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. Frustrating as
this may be, political will is precisely what prevents the Turkish
justice system from discovering the guilty parties.
Friends and admirers of Hrant are understandably angry: How can the
conspirators responsible for his assassination still be unknown? How
can a single murder case last so long? The reasons are suggested in a
`Tweet' posted by Prime Ministerial Advisor Hamdi Kilic on Jan. 2,
2014: `There is something known as `state tradition' in this country;
it still exists. It's enough to read a little history to understand
this.'
Kilic is right; the obstruction of justice in the Hrant Dink case is
one of these disturbing `reflexes.' If we had simply read a little
history, we would have understood what was transpiring in the trials
of Hrant's attackers. For a long time, Turks protesting Hrant's murder
resisted seeing the connection with the Armenian Genocide of 1915.
Some were even angered by those who tried to suggest such a link. Yet,
his assassins were well aware of this connection, and that is why they
killed him. In deconstructing some of the founding myths of the
Turkish state, Hrant threatened its traditions, and that is why his
real killers remain free. His murder, as Kilic recognized, was an
example of the Turkish state's `traditional' reflexes.
Hrant murdered in revenge for Talat Pasha
Hrant Dink was killed in revenge for the assassination of Talat Pasha,
the architect of the Armenian Genocide. Everything about his murder
suggested a `vengeance operation' for the 1921 conspiracy to
assassinate Talat Pasha in Berlin. This, for example, accounts for the
decision to murder Hrant Dink in public rather than to kidnap him,
kill him, and throw his remains in some remote location'the way all
the other `unknown perpetrator' crimes have been committed in Turkey.
The conspirators deliberately chose to come up from behind and to
shoot him in the head on the street, in front of Agos, the newspaper
he edited. The operation mirrored precisely how Talat Pasha was
killed. His attackers wanted revenge for the murder of Talat Pasha,
and they did so by targeting Hrank Dink.
As 2015 approaches¦ the Turkish state will undertake a search for
so-called `Good Armenians''and it will find them! It will use these
puppets as a counter-weight to the `intransigent,' `belligerent,' and
`uncompromising' Armenians in the diaspora.
We know that when Yasin Hayal, one of Hrant's assassins, was released
from prison after serving his sentence for the 2004 McDonalds bombing
in Trabzon, he spoke with his father about Talat Pasha. `Do you know
how Talat Pasha was killed?' he asked his father, adding, `Did you
know that the person who killed Talat Pasha wasn't punished? He was
set free.'
Soghomon Tehlirian, a young man who witnessed the murder of his family
during the genocide, assassinated Talat Pasha in broad daylight on
March 15, 1921, on a Berlin street. The assailant approached Talat
and, after confirming his identity, fired his pistol at the former
Ottoman Interior Minister's head. Hrant was killed in the same
fashion.
This isn't the only similarity between the killings: Although
Tehlirian attempted to flee the scene of the crime, he was quickly
apprehended. In fact, those who planned the attack on Talat wanted him
to remain at the scene and to surrender himself to the authorities.
Likewise, documents connected to the investigation surrounding Hrant
Dink's murder suggest that the plan was for his young assailant, Ogun
Samast, to remain at the murder scene instead of fleeing. Everything
was supposed to be just as in 1921. The aim was both to take revenge
for Talat Pasha's murder and to remind the Armenians that the genocide
of 1915 had been carried out in order to silence them. The plotters
were saying, `We established this Republic on the foundation of the
Armenians' annihilation, and since 1915 we do not give Armenians the
right to speak freely on these lands.'
Muammer Guler and Dr. Resit
The case of Dr. Mehmed Resit, the Unionist governor of Diyarbakir
during the Armenian Genocide, further demonstrates the connection
between the events of 1915 and the murder of Hrant Dink. I would like
to compare this man, who was personally responsible for the deaths of
tens of thousands of innocent Armenians, with Muammer Guler, who was
the governor of Istanbul at the time of Hrant's assassination in 2007
and was complicit in creating a climate conducive to the crime. It is
then possible to extend the comparison of past and present figures to
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Talat Pasha. The comparison works despite the
fact that Prime Minister Erdogan attempted to resolve the Kurdish
problem through peaceful means and has apologized'albeit
half-heartedly and with the actual intention of needling the
Republican Peoples Party and earning credit with voters'on behalf of
the state for the massacres at Dersim in 1937-38.
In July 1915, the German Consul at Mosul reported to his superiors
that some 2,000 Christians in Mardin and Diyarbakir, the majority of
them Armenians, had been taken from their cities overnight and
`slaughtered like sheep.'1 The consul claimed to have received this
information from the district governor of Mardin and demanded that
measures be taken to prevent such crimes. The German Embassy in
Istanbul passed the information on to Interior Minister Talat Pasha,
who then sent a cable to Governor Mehmed Resit, in which he repeated
the information he had received, including the phrase `slaughtered
like sheep.' Clarifying the target of the massacres, he issued the
following order: `It is categorically prohibited for disciplinary
measures imposed in regard to the Armenians to be implemented against
other Christians.' And he demanded an immediate cessation to such
measures `that might endanger the lives of [other] Christians.'2
Despite this cable, the indiscriminate massacres of Christians in the
Diyarbakir province continued. In a July 22 telegram, Talat wrote to
Dr. Resit stressing that the government's policy of annihilation
should be implemented against the Armenians, and no other Christians.
He mentioned that `complaints are being received' and ordered the
provincial governor to cease this practice, which `will put us in a
difficult situation.'3
Armenians seeking recognition of the Armenian Genocide seek justice.
Turks striving for democracy and human rights strive for freedom. The
relationship between these goals is complex because they address
separate problems. The attainment of one does not automatically bring
about the righting of past injustices.
Nonetheless, Resit continued the massacres without differentiating
between Armenians and other Christians. Finally, on Aug. 2, Talat sent
a third telegram, complaining that reports of massacres continued to
be received and that, `despite our having sent numerous cables, the
Christians in the province continue to be killed.' He repeated that
the government viewed the situation as intolerable. In the message,
Talat reminded Resit that he was an official of the state and `as a
[state] official, he was therefore obligated to carry out the orders
he received without exception.' Finally, there was an explicit
warning: Resit would be held directly responsible `for all activities
and incidents by bandits and armed gangs.'4
These cables were transmitted in coded form. Their content was
intelligible to only a few people, including Talat, Resit, and the
government functionaries who sent or decoded them. No investigations
transpired and no sanctions were imposed against Dr. Resit as a
consequence of opposing or ignoring government orders that resulted in
upwards of 2,000 persons being `slaughtered like sheep.' Indeed, the
outcomes were the very opposite. Hilmi, the Mardin District's
official, who was opposed to the murderous actions of Governor Resit
and who informed the German Consul of these crimes, was removed from
his position.5 Even more significant, on account of their `successful'
implementation of anti-Armenian policies in Diyarbakir, the security
personnel who worked under Resit were awarded medals. A July 28, 1915
telegram orders the `promotion of some of the police and commissars
who were instrumental in the arrest of Armenian committee leaders and
other members in the province of Diyarbakir;' others received monetary
awards or medals.6
Resit, who deported and killed thousands of Syriac and Armenian
Christians from Diyarbakir and its environs, was eventually called to
account'not for the mass murders he had ordered, but for keeping
precious jewelry and other valuables from the deportation. An official
message demanded that he `send to the capital' the confiscated items,
as he had promised. An Oct. 6, 1915 telegram, with the special note
`to be handled personally,' informed Resit that the government `has
received reports that you have confiscated' monies, jewels, and other
items belonging `to the Armenians who were deported and subjected to
attack on the way.' The cable demanded information on the amount of
gold and jewelry present, as well as the manner in which their records
were kept. The subject that interested Talat was not the annihilation
of these Christians, but the fate of the valuables confiscated from
them.7
Eventually, Resit was rewarded with an appointment as governor of
Ankara in recognition of his services. Yet, he was ultimately removed
from this post and subjected to a criminal investigation for the
misappropriation of the confiscated Armenian property and possessions.
It seems that Resit attempted to purchase a seaside mansion in
Istanbul with the Armenian jewelry he had confiscated, but when Talat
caught word of this he had him removed from his position. The
journalist Suleyman Nazif summed up the situation succinctly: `The
same Resit that Talat Pasha had esteemed as a murderer¦he removed from
office for being a thief.'8 As Prime Ministerial Advisor Hamdi Kilic
said, `There is something known as `state tradition' in this country;
it still exists. It's enough to read a little history to understand
this.' History shows that while the Armenian Genocide was taking
place, the state praised Resit and others for murdering Christians,
but condemned him for theft.
Returning to the comparison between Istanbul Governor Muammer Guler
and Diyarabakir Governor Mehmed Resit, we find a similar lack of
accountability. Like Resit, Guler was never called to account for the
murder, but rather was rewarded for his loyal service'first with a
seat as an AKP parliamentarian and later, by being appointed as
Interior Minister. Ironically, he too was subsequently removed from
his post for bribery and corruption. Nor was the situation different
in the case of the police officials involved in Hrant's case. All
received promotions in the wake of the murder, just as in Diyarbakir
in 1915. With history as our guide, we can appreciate why the real
culprits in Hrant Dink's murder have not been found.
Ninety years of state-sponsored denial have so blinded the public that
we cannot conceive of the relationship between the 1915 genocide and
the murder of Hrant Dink. But while the Turkish government has pushed
us to forget the events of 1915, state officials have not forgotten.
Turks grow uneasy at the mention of `genocide,' and calls for
`genocide recognition' cause us to flee in terror before some unknown
retribution. We resist using Hrant's death as an opportunity to face
up to history, to see the connection between that history and the
killing of an Armenian newspaper editor. We are made to forget Hrant
although he is the key'the key to the 40th chamber in the Arabian
Nights fable, the one that others do not want opened, the key that is
given to the heroes of those tales. We have a treasure chamber in our
old houses where all of our secrets are kept. And Hrant is the key to
that room. If the Hrant Dink murder case is ever solved, the secrets
behind the establishment of the Turkish Republic will be revealed.
But, sadly, in the present government, there is neither the courage
nor the will to furnish the key, because the government is heir to
these `state traditions,' and the `keepers of its secrets.'
Hrant and the diaspora
I predict that as 2015 approaches, Turkey will attempt to create an
atmosphere of `reconciliation.' Appearing ready to resolve the
Armenian issue, Turkey will portray Armenians in the diaspora as
uncompromising `sectarians.' For this purpose, the Turkish state will
undertake a search for so-called `Good Armenians''and it will find
them! It will use these puppets as a counter-weight to the
`intransigent,' `belligerent,' and `uncompromising' Armenians in the
diaspora. They will seek to pit their `Good' Armenians against the
`Bad' Armenians of the diaspora. And they will use Hrant for this
purpose, too. They will find the criticisms Hrant leveled at the
Armenian Diaspora and use them without hesitation. Hrant's own words
will be exploited as a part of a new wave of hostility toward the
Armenian Diaspora.
Do not be duped by this cynical scenario! Hrant criticized certain
circles within the Armenian Diaspora, and some Diasporan Armenians
criticized him. But he did so because he recognized that some diaspora
groups could not see that the final struggle for the recognition of
the Armenian Genocide would ultimately be fought and won within Turkey
itself, in Anatolia. When we spoke by telephone, he frequently urged
me to `tell those friends of yours that they should come and be part
of the struggle here. The genocide took place on these lands, and its
recognition will also occur here.'
Diasporan Armenians don't readily appreciate that the struggle for
recognition of the genocide is linked to the struggle for democracy in
Turkey. At the same time, some Turks fail to grasp that the diaspora's
struggle to attain recognition is part of the Turkish struggle for
democracy. The majority of those in the diaspora are uninterested in
the Turkish struggle to achieve democracy and human rights; and many
struggling for democracy within Turkey are hostile toward the Armenian
Diaspora's insistence on genocide recognition.
These tensions derive from the conflation of complementary goals.
Armenians seeking recognition of the Armenian Genocide seek justice.
Turks striving for democracy and human rights strive for freedom. The
relationship between these goals is complex because they address
separate problems. The attainment of one does not automatically bring
about the righting of past injustices. The United States, for example,
is a free and democratic country, yet its Native American population
continues to pursue justice. And the search for justice by the
indigenous peoples of Australia and Canada also continues. Thus, we
need to both see and understand this one thing: In Turkey today it is
essential that we not juxtapose freedom and justice; we must instead
create a shared language and intellectual foundation in our search for
both. We do not have to sacrifice one in our search for the other.
Hrant sought to construct a shared language for his struggle and that
of the diaspora. He dreamed of staging a large diaspora conference for
this purpose. Hrant's murder demonstrated the absolute necessity for
this `shared language,' as well as the error of attempting to conceive
of the struggle for freedom in Turkey at the expense of recognition
and acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide. It has shown us that
this recognition must be a shared demand of people in both the
diaspora and in Turkey. The struggles for freedom and justice complete
one another and must not be seen as either contradicting or opposing.
If we understand what Hrant was trying to do, we must bring together
these two struggles as one: the diaspora's demand for recognition of
the Armenian Genocide with the struggle in Turkey for human rights and
democracy. Those wishing for a democratic Turkey that respects human
rights must merge their struggle with that of the Armenian Diaspora.
They must invite diasporans to Turkey and join their struggle to have
the Armenian Genocide recognized abroad. And they must remember: The
Armenian Diaspora is not their enemy but their friend, a valuable
colleague who, due to the decades of denial by the Turkish state, has
unfortunately grown accustomed to looking at things through cynical
and mistrusting eyes.
If Hrant had lived, he would have joined the Armenian Diaspora. This
is not idle speculation; I know of that which I speak. Hrant was never
ignorant of 1915 the way many of us were. Every day of his life, he
experienced the connection between the genocide and what he had to
face; he felt it in his very bones. When his sentence was approved, he
was serious about wanting to leave Turkey and walking, with his entire
family, from his hometown of Malatya, on the path of deportation taken
by his ancestors, all the way to the Der-Zor desert in northeastern
Syria. `Just like my forefathers, they don't want me to remain here,'
he would say. `And if so, then there's no point in my doing so. I'll
travel the path that they took.' In other words, Hrant saw the
Armenian Diaspora as one of his options. With him, we must understand
that some categories are meaningless and incorrect, like the
categorization of a monolithic Armenian Diaspora, single-mindedly
fixed on revenge and of the overarching conception of the `evil Turk.'
These need to be discarded into the dustbin of history.
Hrant and the word `genocide'
When speaking with Turks, Hrant was polite and gracious enough to
avoid the word `genocide.' `I know what was done to my people,' he
would say, `but if my use of the word `genocide' will be used against
me as an excuse not to listen to the things I have to say, then I
won't use it.' Despite his extreme sensitivity and gentility in the
matter, the authorities wanted to punish him anyway, claiming that he
had used it'once! Before he was murdered, Hrant told me that he wanted
to turn his trial for using the word `genocide' into an historical
showcase. `I will state that `Yes, 1915 was a genocide,' and I will
then turn the trial into a history course.' But they didn't give him
the chance.
Hrant Dink was murdered because he wanted to deconstruct Turkey's
founding myths. Those who planned the murder'the real culprits'have
received promotions and praise for doing so. The sensitivity the
government expressed over the confiscation of Armenian property was
never shown toward the lives of Armenians. On the contrary, they
oversaw the annihilation of a people. And the situation today is not
so different! 1.5 million-plus-1. Hrant is the `plus-1.' Failing to
recognize this, we cannot understand the crime or hope to solve it. As
we approach the year 2015, the 100-year anniversary of the Armenian
deportations and genocide, we won't be able to confront this crime
without first admitting to ourselves that, `Yes, 1915 was a genocide
and it must be acknowledged as such.' And that `Hrant was murdered
because he reminded us of the million-plus Hrants of 1915.'
Let Hrant Dink be a symbol for us. Let him be our Martin Luther King.
Even as others in the past have gathered closely around Talat Pasha
and his ilk, and even as they today gather around Erdogan and his, let
us hold fast to Hrant. Let Hrant and the `1.5 million-plus-1' be our
point of divergence between our republic and their republic. This is
the only way that we can claim our Islamic selves, our Turkishness
and/or our Kurdishness from the hands of murders 'those of yesterday
and of today.
Notes
[1]) The full text of the telegram reads: `Reshid Bey, the Governor of
Diyarbakir, is raging among the Christians of his province like a
champion bloodhound; he recently had a gendarmerie [force] specially
dispatched from Diyarbakir collect 700 Christians (mostly Armenians)
in Mardin¦in one night and allowed them to be slaughtered like sheep.
Reshid Bey is continuing his murderous work against innocent persons,
with the district governor [of Mardin] having assured me that the
number of his victims has exceeded 2,000.' (DE/PA-AA/BoKon/169, From
the Vice-Consul in Mosul (Holstein) to the Embassy in Constantinople,
Mosul, July 10, 1915; URL:
http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1915-07-10-DE-011).
2) Here is the full text of the telegram: `Since the disciplinary and
political measures adopted vis-aÌ-vis the Armenians do not in any way
apply to the other Christians, an immediate end should be put to such
events, which will have an extremely negative effect on public opinion
and which randomly threaten the lives of Christians in particular;
please provide an accurate report of the present situation.' Thus the
policies deliberately enacted against the Armenians were explicitly to
exclude other Christian groups. BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 54/406, coded
telegram from Interior Minister Talat to the province of Diyarbakir,
dated July 12, 1915.
3) Here is the full text of the telegram: `Despite the firm and
explicit instructions within the province,' he wrote, `one hears that
operations have been undertaken against the Armenians and all other
Christian [groups] without exception, and that this situation, which
was repeatedly a cause for complaint, is now spreading to the
surrounding provinces. The continuation of this situation¦which will
leave the government in a difficult position in the future, is
entirely unacceptable.' BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 54-A/73, coded telegram from
Interior Minister Talat to the province of Diyarbakir, dated July 22,
1915.
4) Here is the full text of telegram: `Despite firm and explicit
instructions, certain armed gangs within the province have continued
persecuting and killing Christians' and that, `as it was previously
announced, the continuation of this situation is absolutely
unacceptable¦ It must not be forgotten that as a responsible
representative of the present government, you are obliged to carry out
the orders and instructions that are handed down from here,
unconditionally and in accordance with our interpretation [of their
meaning].' Talat concluded with a clear warning that his governor
would be held responsible `for every action and incident in which
bandits or armed gangs are involved.' BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 54-A/248, coded
telegram from Interior Minister Talat to the province of Diyarbakir,
dated Aug. 2, 1915.
5) David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors:Muslim-Christian
Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I (Gorgias Press: New
Jersey, 2006), 170.
6) BOA/DH.EUM.MEM, no. 2042/67/31/1333.N.15, July 28, 1915.
7) Here is the full text of the telegram: `It has been reported by
parliamentary deputies that the money, jewels, and other possessions
belonging to the Armenians who were deported and attacked along the
way have not been lost but rather secured and sent to the capital due
to the measures that you have taken. Please report back on the
quantity [of valuables] and the manner in which they were recorded.'
BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 56/315, coded telegram from the Interior Ministry to
the province of Diyarbakir, dated Oct. 6, 1915.
8) Hadisat, Feb. 8, 1919.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/07/21/shadow-1915-reflections-hrants-assassination/
From: A. Papazian