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FINLANDIZATION OF THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Russia in Global Affairs (English)
June 10, 2014 Tuesday 5:00 AM EST
Jun 07, 2014
Russia in Global Affairs (English):http://eng.globalaffairs.ru
The Ukrainian crisis created a new political situation drawing a
line under not just post-Soviet history but probably world politics
after the Cold War. Armenia, as other former Soviet republics,
will have to reconfigure its relations with leading geopolitical
actors. As geopolitics returns to the post-Soviet space, we might
expect an increased demand for new, or, to be precise, well-forgotten
Realpolitik concepts and approaches.
THE CRIMEAN PRECEDENT AND ARMENIA: A CHOICELESS CHOICE
Armenia, like all its neighbors in the post-Soviet space, appeared to
be absolutely unprepared for a spate of Ukrainian events, as shown by a
long absence of the official position on the issue. Ukraine is home to
more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians and Armenian citizens (unofficial
statistics put their number at some 300,000) who found themselves on
different sides of the conflict. A large Armenian community numbering
12,000 to 15,000 has lived in Crimea for centuries, and Russia's
Armenian diaspora numbers some two million people. Consequently,
any false move in public or premature demonstration of Yerevan's
position would have created a danger to ethnic Armenians and Armenian
citizens. That is why it was only after a month-long silence that
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan supported the Crimean referendum,
during a telephone conversation with Russian leader Vladimir Putin
on March 19, 2014.
At the March 27 session of the UN General Assembly, Armenia was among
11 countries that voted against the resolution upholding Ukraine's
territorial integrity and declaring the Crimean referendum invalid.
The UN voted 100-11, with 58 abstentions. Another 24 countries did not
take part in the vote refusing to support the anti-Russian document.
The reaction of Armenian political forces to the UN vote was more
positive than negative. A majority of parliamentary opposition parties
supported Yerevan's position. Meanwhile, the consolidation of Armenia's
authorities and the opposition had nothing to do with the feelings
toward Ukraine, although Kiev has been a key arms supplier to Baku
since the Karabakh war of the first half of the 1990s.
Furthermore, as a GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova)
member, Ukraine voted for the anti-Armenian resolutions on
Nagorno-Karabakh at the UN General Assembly in 2008 and 2012. And
yet Yerevan's present-day position is not revenge for the past
wrongs: after all, Armenia and Ukraine have always been very close,
historically and culturally. 'Nothing personal,' as they say.
Pro-Western students and non-governmental organizations criticized
Armenia's UN vote, thinking that Armenia had sided with Russia to come
out against Western countries at the UN General Assembly. Explaining
their decision, the Armenian authorities and political forces said
the provisions in the UN resolution declaring the Crimean referendum
invalid and stating that it had not been sanctioned by Ukraine could
have a negative impact on Yerevan's position on the Karabakh issue.
Proceeding from this standpoint, the Armenian authorities made
a conscious decision to support Russia, instead of abstaining or
refusing to participate in the vote, because in that case their
positions in the Karabakh conflict would have become more vulnerable.
The case points to a connection with Nagorno-Karabakh's referendum
on independence held in 1991, as well as with the Madrid principles,
the only negotiable peace settlement document on Nagorno-Karabakh. The
principles, drawn by the countries co-chairing the Minsk Group of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the United
States, France, and Russia) view a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh as
the key mechanism for settling the conflict and legalizing the final
status of the enclave.
The Crimean events undermined the hallowed idea of the inviolability
of post-Soviet borders. This is the result of a deep crisis of
international law which was unable to adapt to world politics after the
end of the Cold War. In the wake of the Crimean case, the political
practice of self-determination - at least in the post-Soviet space -
will obviously prevail over the scholastic idea of the inviolability
of erstwhile administrative borders which by now have become state
borders. Consequently, the new precedent in the post-Soviet space,
regardless of the reaction to it from part of the international
community, might be added to Armenia's array of diplomatic and
political tools.
Armenia, an outspoken Russian military and strategic partner during
the UN vote on the Crimean referendum (and at PACE in April) hopes
for more substantial political support from Moscow on the Karabakh
and other issues. In this connection, Moscow's sharp response in late
March to the attack by Islamic militants on the Armenian settlement
of Kessab in northern Syria was noteworthy. The tragedy caused en
masse deportation of the small Armenian community of the descendants
of Armenian refugees who had fled Turkey's genocide during World War I.
In the new conditions, Armenia will find it much more difficult to
keep balance in its foreign policy between the West and Russia,
without causing fits of jealousy from all sides. In other words,
it will be a test for its policy of balanced complementarism, the
calling card of Armenia's diplomacy in the post-Soviet period. Some
groups in Armenia and other former Soviet republics fear that further
strengthening of Moscow and its tougher rivalry with the West will make
problems for the independence of Russia's neighbors threatening the
loss of their sovereignty. Hence, Armenia needs balanced involvement
of the European Union and the United States, but not to the extent
where it might again face the threat of unsafe geopolitical choice.
In the foreseeable future, the European Union is unlikely to offer
Armenia security guarantees comparable to Russian guarantees in
the Karabakh issue or in relations with Turkey. But if Yerevan
and the EU somehow manage to take the edge off the geopolitical
confrontation in their relations, turning to pure technical measures
towards intensifying economic and political interaction, Armenia
might succeed in combining European integration with military and
strategic partnership with Russia.
In any case, Armenia will refuse to become a place of geopolitical
confrontation, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and partly
Azerbaijan. Unlike these countries - participants in the Eastern
Partnership program -
Armenia might face the price of not just secession of several areas
but geopolitical and humanitarian catastrophe and even loss of
statehood. After Russia brought in Crimea, Armenia has remained the
only Eastern Partnership member (except Belarus, an Eastern Partnership
participant in name only) in full control of its territory.
During the Five-Day War in August 2008, Armenia managed to keep
neutrality between Russia, its key military and political ally, and
Georgia, its close neighbor and key transportation links partner. In
the Ukrainian crisis however, Moscow, aside from direct pressure,
can use other arguments, while Armenia's room for maneuver is quite
limited. In terms of scale and possible consequences for Russia's
relations with the West, the Ukrainian crisis cannot be compared with
the Russian-Georgian war. Upcoming events will show if the world is
facing the threat of backtracking to a new Cold War, but the process
will have far-reaching consequences anyway. Russia and the West will
be locked in an increasingly tougher struggle for the spheres of
influence in the post-Soviet space, including in the South Caucasus.
If the case turns as a comeback of the Cold War (in the post-Soviet
space and adjacent territories at best) - even if in a fuzzy form -
the participants in the process will have to react accordingly. For
example, they might adopt political approaches and concepts which
proved their effectiveness during the classical period of bipolar
confrontation.
Finlandization of the foreign policy of some former Soviet republics
could be one of such approaches, which is particularly obvious in
Armenia's case.
FINLANDIZATION OF ARMENIA: EXAMPLE OR EXCEPTION?
Finlandization of Armenia became obvious in the spring of 2014. This
approach, rooted in the period of Armenia's gaining independence,
became to be known as 'complementarism' when Vardan Oskanyan was
foreign minister (1998-2008). Back at the height of the Karabakh war,
Yerevan, using a unique foreign policy situation, received weapons and
military equipment from Russia, the funding for economic development
from Americans and food and humanitarian assistance from Europeans
(even Turkey had been one of the supply routes until March 1993). The
fuel for its army that was fighting at the time came from Iran.
Later, Armenia turned complementarism into a refined technique of
'sitting on two chairs at the same time.' It would help Yerevan in
balancing Moscow's influence at one time and deterring the U.S. or
Europeans at another, for example at certain stages of the Karabakh
talks.
Conceptually, Armenia's foreign policy had much in common with
the course pursued by post-war Finland. Helsinki actively followed
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line from the 1950s till the breakup of the
Communist bloc and the USSR, balancing between NATO and the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, which enabled it to not only preserve its
independence and sovereignty but also receive considerable economic
dividends.
Finland, which avoided 'sovietization' and involvement in the
confrontation between the antagonistic blocs, played a special role in
European policy largely because of trusting relations it simultaneously
had with the USSR/Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. It was Helsinki
that hosted the negotiations in 1973-1975 and the signing of the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
symbolizing detente between the USSR and the West and codifying the
principles of effective international law.
Finlandization does not imply a calculated or perfect balance between
foreign policy partners. Depending on political expediency, it is
a demonstration of preferences and support for one of the poles of
power in this or that period. This is precisely what Armenia did
at the height of the Ukrainian crisis. Conceptually, nothing new
has happened. Yerevan's policy line merely swung to one side due to
obvious military and political prevalence of one of the key elements
(Russia in this particular case) of the system of political balancing.
Curiously, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
adopted a resolution on Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire,
urging the president to pursue an appropriate policy with respect
to Armenia and Turkey on April 10, 2014, the day when the Armenian
delegation at PACE voted against the resolution limiting the powers
of the Russian delegation. Chairman of a dedicated Senate committee
Robert Menendez, a severe critic of Russia, was one of the advocates
of the pro-Armenian resolution.
Finlandization is not the ideal or most advantageous foreign policy
line, yet it is the safest method at the very least. As Finland refused
to participate in the Marshall Plan under pressure from Moscow during
the Cold War, so will Armenia have to give more regard to Russia's
opinion now and then, facing a sharper reaction from the United States
and the European Union.
Can other former Soviet republics view Armenia's Finlandization as
an example or a foreign policy model, or is it some kind of special
exception? As was already mentioned, a single-line foreign policy was
pursued in different periods of post-Soviet history by the Baltic
States, Azerbaijan (in the first half of 1990s), Georgia, Ukraine
(under Yushchenko and after Yanukovich), and Moldova. Pro-Russian
sentiment was noticeable until the beginning of the 2000s in Central
Asia countries and Belarus. At present, pro-Russian feelings in
their pure form only exist in three of the four de-facto states in
the post-Soviet space (Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
except Nagorno-Karabakh, and also in Belarus, because the West
rejects Lukashenko's regime. Multivectorism is another type of foreign
policy, quite similar to Armenia's complementarism with elements of
Finlandization. Ukraine has largely stuck to this policy since the
late 1990s (except for the period of Yushchenko's presidency and after
the Euromaidan), as has Azerbaijan and some Central Asia countries.
Azerbaijan (especially under Abulfaz Elchibey and in the early
period of Heydar Aliyev's rule until the mid-1990s) was absolutely
pro-Western, emphasizing relations with Turkey. The brief membership
in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (1994-1999) coinciding
with the beginning of implementation of oil projects together with
Western companies made Baku balance the trend.
In Central Asia, the West did not have much influence, the resources
of Turkey and Iran trying to be active in the region were insufficient
while China caused too much apprehension and fear to be considered
a reliable foreign policy partner. It was only because of indistinct
Russian foreign policy in the 1990s that Central Asia did not become
irrevocably pro-Russian.
The term 'multivectorism' (especially in Kazakhstan's case) was coined
as a euphemism, meant to disguise alienation from Russia. More likely,
foreign policy diversification occurred under the influence of the
September 11, 2001 events and the beginning of the U.S.-led operation
in Afghanistan, than as a result of a conscious foreign policy choice.
That is why the multivectorism parameters might change in Central Asia
after the United States completes the withdrawal of its troops from
Afghanistan, with countries in the region finding it more difficult
to maintain this approach. Hence, elements of Finlandization in case
of Azerbaijan and Central Asia can be implemented while accounting
for their special eastern specifics.
Until the 2014 crisis, the Ukrainian policy had been conceptually very
close to Armenia's (despite the difference in the size of territory
and geographic location).
A considerable advantage of Armenia's complementarism is the presence
of numerous Armenian communities in Russia, America and Europe, as
well as quite influential diasporas in Iran and some Middle East
countries. This factor enables Yerevan to adjust from within the
policy of the above states towards Armenia and the region. In turn,
these countries can influence Yerevan's approaches through the
Armenian diaspora.
Ukrainian communities in Eastern Europe, the United States and Canada
on the one hand, and the profound sub-ethnic and 'family' integration
of the populations of Russia and Ukraine on the other helped balance
the Ukrainian foreign policy for a long time. Ukraine's division into
the west, the center and the southeast seemed to fix multivectorism
as a model without alternative. Lastly, the historical roots of
such policy (since approximately the 17th century in Ukraine and at
least since the 19th century in Armenia) were to have produced the
practicalities of foreign policy and firmed a stable tradition of
its acknowledgement in the society and political elites.
However, in the autumn of 2013 through the spring of 2014, Yerevan and
Kiev, facing similar prospects of signing association agreements with
the European Union, chose different options. In September 2013, Armenia
refused to initial the economic part of the document and expressed
readiness to join the Customs Union which Russia was creating. Yerevan
said it agreed to sign the political part, but Brussels rejected
the proposal. Victor Yanukovich's government also refused to sign
the association agreement in late November 2013, which prompted an
acute political crisis in the country. The officials who replaced
the deposed Yanukovich, made haste to accept the political part of
the agreement and allegedly are preparing to sign the economic part.
Like Armenia, Ukraine tried not to make the final choice throughout
most of the post-Soviet period. When a considerable segment of the
political class and public - through the efforts of the new elites that
seized power in late February 2014 - could not avoid the temptation
to choose, it turned the country into an arena of global political
confrontation.
The bitter irony is that the opinion of such hardline practitioners
and theorists of political realism as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew
Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer were not heard. For decades, they
had been trying to win Finland over to the West, but now called for
restraint and projecting Finlandization onto Ukraine. The warnings
by the 'knights of the Cold War' were not wanted precisely at the
moment when the very logic and practice of that time seemed to have
returned to Europe and Eurasia.
Armenia, opting for self-restraint of its own accord, minimized its
risks and losses. As to whether the Armenian-style Finlandization can
be an example for other former Soviet republics would depend not only
on their own choice. Almost everything now depends on the results
of the Ukrainian crisis and on how adequately national elites can
evaluate the new geopolitical reality.
Russia in Global Affairs (English)
June 10, 2014 Tuesday 5:00 AM EST
Jun 07, 2014
Russia in Global Affairs (English):http://eng.globalaffairs.ru
The Ukrainian crisis created a new political situation drawing a
line under not just post-Soviet history but probably world politics
after the Cold War. Armenia, as other former Soviet republics,
will have to reconfigure its relations with leading geopolitical
actors. As geopolitics returns to the post-Soviet space, we might
expect an increased demand for new, or, to be precise, well-forgotten
Realpolitik concepts and approaches.
THE CRIMEAN PRECEDENT AND ARMENIA: A CHOICELESS CHOICE
Armenia, like all its neighbors in the post-Soviet space, appeared to
be absolutely unprepared for a spate of Ukrainian events, as shown by a
long absence of the official position on the issue. Ukraine is home to
more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians and Armenian citizens (unofficial
statistics put their number at some 300,000) who found themselves on
different sides of the conflict. A large Armenian community numbering
12,000 to 15,000 has lived in Crimea for centuries, and Russia's
Armenian diaspora numbers some two million people. Consequently,
any false move in public or premature demonstration of Yerevan's
position would have created a danger to ethnic Armenians and Armenian
citizens. That is why it was only after a month-long silence that
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan supported the Crimean referendum,
during a telephone conversation with Russian leader Vladimir Putin
on March 19, 2014.
At the March 27 session of the UN General Assembly, Armenia was among
11 countries that voted against the resolution upholding Ukraine's
territorial integrity and declaring the Crimean referendum invalid.
The UN voted 100-11, with 58 abstentions. Another 24 countries did not
take part in the vote refusing to support the anti-Russian document.
The reaction of Armenian political forces to the UN vote was more
positive than negative. A majority of parliamentary opposition parties
supported Yerevan's position. Meanwhile, the consolidation of Armenia's
authorities and the opposition had nothing to do with the feelings
toward Ukraine, although Kiev has been a key arms supplier to Baku
since the Karabakh war of the first half of the 1990s.
Furthermore, as a GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova)
member, Ukraine voted for the anti-Armenian resolutions on
Nagorno-Karabakh at the UN General Assembly in 2008 and 2012. And
yet Yerevan's present-day position is not revenge for the past
wrongs: after all, Armenia and Ukraine have always been very close,
historically and culturally. 'Nothing personal,' as they say.
Pro-Western students and non-governmental organizations criticized
Armenia's UN vote, thinking that Armenia had sided with Russia to come
out against Western countries at the UN General Assembly. Explaining
their decision, the Armenian authorities and political forces said
the provisions in the UN resolution declaring the Crimean referendum
invalid and stating that it had not been sanctioned by Ukraine could
have a negative impact on Yerevan's position on the Karabakh issue.
Proceeding from this standpoint, the Armenian authorities made
a conscious decision to support Russia, instead of abstaining or
refusing to participate in the vote, because in that case their
positions in the Karabakh conflict would have become more vulnerable.
The case points to a connection with Nagorno-Karabakh's referendum
on independence held in 1991, as well as with the Madrid principles,
the only negotiable peace settlement document on Nagorno-Karabakh. The
principles, drawn by the countries co-chairing the Minsk Group of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the United
States, France, and Russia) view a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh as
the key mechanism for settling the conflict and legalizing the final
status of the enclave.
The Crimean events undermined the hallowed idea of the inviolability
of post-Soviet borders. This is the result of a deep crisis of
international law which was unable to adapt to world politics after the
end of the Cold War. In the wake of the Crimean case, the political
practice of self-determination - at least in the post-Soviet space -
will obviously prevail over the scholastic idea of the inviolability
of erstwhile administrative borders which by now have become state
borders. Consequently, the new precedent in the post-Soviet space,
regardless of the reaction to it from part of the international
community, might be added to Armenia's array of diplomatic and
political tools.
Armenia, an outspoken Russian military and strategic partner during
the UN vote on the Crimean referendum (and at PACE in April) hopes
for more substantial political support from Moscow on the Karabakh
and other issues. In this connection, Moscow's sharp response in late
March to the attack by Islamic militants on the Armenian settlement
of Kessab in northern Syria was noteworthy. The tragedy caused en
masse deportation of the small Armenian community of the descendants
of Armenian refugees who had fled Turkey's genocide during World War I.
In the new conditions, Armenia will find it much more difficult to
keep balance in its foreign policy between the West and Russia,
without causing fits of jealousy from all sides. In other words,
it will be a test for its policy of balanced complementarism, the
calling card of Armenia's diplomacy in the post-Soviet period. Some
groups in Armenia and other former Soviet republics fear that further
strengthening of Moscow and its tougher rivalry with the West will make
problems for the independence of Russia's neighbors threatening the
loss of their sovereignty. Hence, Armenia needs balanced involvement
of the European Union and the United States, but not to the extent
where it might again face the threat of unsafe geopolitical choice.
In the foreseeable future, the European Union is unlikely to offer
Armenia security guarantees comparable to Russian guarantees in
the Karabakh issue or in relations with Turkey. But if Yerevan
and the EU somehow manage to take the edge off the geopolitical
confrontation in their relations, turning to pure technical measures
towards intensifying economic and political interaction, Armenia
might succeed in combining European integration with military and
strategic partnership with Russia.
In any case, Armenia will refuse to become a place of geopolitical
confrontation, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and partly
Azerbaijan. Unlike these countries - participants in the Eastern
Partnership program -
Armenia might face the price of not just secession of several areas
but geopolitical and humanitarian catastrophe and even loss of
statehood. After Russia brought in Crimea, Armenia has remained the
only Eastern Partnership member (except Belarus, an Eastern Partnership
participant in name only) in full control of its territory.
During the Five-Day War in August 2008, Armenia managed to keep
neutrality between Russia, its key military and political ally, and
Georgia, its close neighbor and key transportation links partner. In
the Ukrainian crisis however, Moscow, aside from direct pressure,
can use other arguments, while Armenia's room for maneuver is quite
limited. In terms of scale and possible consequences for Russia's
relations with the West, the Ukrainian crisis cannot be compared with
the Russian-Georgian war. Upcoming events will show if the world is
facing the threat of backtracking to a new Cold War, but the process
will have far-reaching consequences anyway. Russia and the West will
be locked in an increasingly tougher struggle for the spheres of
influence in the post-Soviet space, including in the South Caucasus.
If the case turns as a comeback of the Cold War (in the post-Soviet
space and adjacent territories at best) - even if in a fuzzy form -
the participants in the process will have to react accordingly. For
example, they might adopt political approaches and concepts which
proved their effectiveness during the classical period of bipolar
confrontation.
Finlandization of the foreign policy of some former Soviet republics
could be one of such approaches, which is particularly obvious in
Armenia's case.
FINLANDIZATION OF ARMENIA: EXAMPLE OR EXCEPTION?
Finlandization of Armenia became obvious in the spring of 2014. This
approach, rooted in the period of Armenia's gaining independence,
became to be known as 'complementarism' when Vardan Oskanyan was
foreign minister (1998-2008). Back at the height of the Karabakh war,
Yerevan, using a unique foreign policy situation, received weapons and
military equipment from Russia, the funding for economic development
from Americans and food and humanitarian assistance from Europeans
(even Turkey had been one of the supply routes until March 1993). The
fuel for its army that was fighting at the time came from Iran.
Later, Armenia turned complementarism into a refined technique of
'sitting on two chairs at the same time.' It would help Yerevan in
balancing Moscow's influence at one time and deterring the U.S. or
Europeans at another, for example at certain stages of the Karabakh
talks.
Conceptually, Armenia's foreign policy had much in common with
the course pursued by post-war Finland. Helsinki actively followed
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line from the 1950s till the breakup of the
Communist bloc and the USSR, balancing between NATO and the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, which enabled it to not only preserve its
independence and sovereignty but also receive considerable economic
dividends.
Finland, which avoided 'sovietization' and involvement in the
confrontation between the antagonistic blocs, played a special role in
European policy largely because of trusting relations it simultaneously
had with the USSR/Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. It was Helsinki
that hosted the negotiations in 1973-1975 and the signing of the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
symbolizing detente between the USSR and the West and codifying the
principles of effective international law.
Finlandization does not imply a calculated or perfect balance between
foreign policy partners. Depending on political expediency, it is
a demonstration of preferences and support for one of the poles of
power in this or that period. This is precisely what Armenia did
at the height of the Ukrainian crisis. Conceptually, nothing new
has happened. Yerevan's policy line merely swung to one side due to
obvious military and political prevalence of one of the key elements
(Russia in this particular case) of the system of political balancing.
Curiously, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
adopted a resolution on Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire,
urging the president to pursue an appropriate policy with respect
to Armenia and Turkey on April 10, 2014, the day when the Armenian
delegation at PACE voted against the resolution limiting the powers
of the Russian delegation. Chairman of a dedicated Senate committee
Robert Menendez, a severe critic of Russia, was one of the advocates
of the pro-Armenian resolution.
Finlandization is not the ideal or most advantageous foreign policy
line, yet it is the safest method at the very least. As Finland refused
to participate in the Marshall Plan under pressure from Moscow during
the Cold War, so will Armenia have to give more regard to Russia's
opinion now and then, facing a sharper reaction from the United States
and the European Union.
Can other former Soviet republics view Armenia's Finlandization as
an example or a foreign policy model, or is it some kind of special
exception? As was already mentioned, a single-line foreign policy was
pursued in different periods of post-Soviet history by the Baltic
States, Azerbaijan (in the first half of 1990s), Georgia, Ukraine
(under Yushchenko and after Yanukovich), and Moldova. Pro-Russian
sentiment was noticeable until the beginning of the 2000s in Central
Asia countries and Belarus. At present, pro-Russian feelings in
their pure form only exist in three of the four de-facto states in
the post-Soviet space (Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
except Nagorno-Karabakh, and also in Belarus, because the West
rejects Lukashenko's regime. Multivectorism is another type of foreign
policy, quite similar to Armenia's complementarism with elements of
Finlandization. Ukraine has largely stuck to this policy since the
late 1990s (except for the period of Yushchenko's presidency and after
the Euromaidan), as has Azerbaijan and some Central Asia countries.
Azerbaijan (especially under Abulfaz Elchibey and in the early
period of Heydar Aliyev's rule until the mid-1990s) was absolutely
pro-Western, emphasizing relations with Turkey. The brief membership
in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (1994-1999) coinciding
with the beginning of implementation of oil projects together with
Western companies made Baku balance the trend.
In Central Asia, the West did not have much influence, the resources
of Turkey and Iran trying to be active in the region were insufficient
while China caused too much apprehension and fear to be considered
a reliable foreign policy partner. It was only because of indistinct
Russian foreign policy in the 1990s that Central Asia did not become
irrevocably pro-Russian.
The term 'multivectorism' (especially in Kazakhstan's case) was coined
as a euphemism, meant to disguise alienation from Russia. More likely,
foreign policy diversification occurred under the influence of the
September 11, 2001 events and the beginning of the U.S.-led operation
in Afghanistan, than as a result of a conscious foreign policy choice.
That is why the multivectorism parameters might change in Central Asia
after the United States completes the withdrawal of its troops from
Afghanistan, with countries in the region finding it more difficult
to maintain this approach. Hence, elements of Finlandization in case
of Azerbaijan and Central Asia can be implemented while accounting
for their special eastern specifics.
Until the 2014 crisis, the Ukrainian policy had been conceptually very
close to Armenia's (despite the difference in the size of territory
and geographic location).
A considerable advantage of Armenia's complementarism is the presence
of numerous Armenian communities in Russia, America and Europe, as
well as quite influential diasporas in Iran and some Middle East
countries. This factor enables Yerevan to adjust from within the
policy of the above states towards Armenia and the region. In turn,
these countries can influence Yerevan's approaches through the
Armenian diaspora.
Ukrainian communities in Eastern Europe, the United States and Canada
on the one hand, and the profound sub-ethnic and 'family' integration
of the populations of Russia and Ukraine on the other helped balance
the Ukrainian foreign policy for a long time. Ukraine's division into
the west, the center and the southeast seemed to fix multivectorism
as a model without alternative. Lastly, the historical roots of
such policy (since approximately the 17th century in Ukraine and at
least since the 19th century in Armenia) were to have produced the
practicalities of foreign policy and firmed a stable tradition of
its acknowledgement in the society and political elites.
However, in the autumn of 2013 through the spring of 2014, Yerevan and
Kiev, facing similar prospects of signing association agreements with
the European Union, chose different options. In September 2013, Armenia
refused to initial the economic part of the document and expressed
readiness to join the Customs Union which Russia was creating. Yerevan
said it agreed to sign the political part, but Brussels rejected
the proposal. Victor Yanukovich's government also refused to sign
the association agreement in late November 2013, which prompted an
acute political crisis in the country. The officials who replaced
the deposed Yanukovich, made haste to accept the political part of
the agreement and allegedly are preparing to sign the economic part.
Like Armenia, Ukraine tried not to make the final choice throughout
most of the post-Soviet period. When a considerable segment of the
political class and public - through the efforts of the new elites that
seized power in late February 2014 - could not avoid the temptation
to choose, it turned the country into an arena of global political
confrontation.
The bitter irony is that the opinion of such hardline practitioners
and theorists of political realism as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew
Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer were not heard. For decades, they
had been trying to win Finland over to the West, but now called for
restraint and projecting Finlandization onto Ukraine. The warnings
by the 'knights of the Cold War' were not wanted precisely at the
moment when the very logic and practice of that time seemed to have
returned to Europe and Eurasia.
Armenia, opting for self-restraint of its own accord, minimized its
risks and losses. As to whether the Armenian-style Finlandization can
be an example for other former Soviet republics would depend not only
on their own choice. Almost everything now depends on the results
of the Ukrainian crisis and on how adequately national elites can
evaluate the new geopolitical reality.