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EXTERNAL MOTIVATIONS RELATING TO KARABAKH WAR
Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Comments - Wednesday, 11 June 2014, 14:20
More and more external motivations for Karabakh War II are occurring
in the result of a serious geopolitical U-turn.
Prior to the acute confrontation between Russia and the West the
motivations of the external parties in Karabakh War II appeared more
hypothetical than a concrete scenario. Since Armenians are not good
enough at making scenarios, even on the eve of the war that is fully
realistic the society remains in a state of optimistic expectations.
On the whole, the country does not have a real debate on a new war,
while occasional remarks are exotics. Since the external parties help
up settlement between the conflict parties for a long time and tried
to present their policy as that of peace making, the population of
the country was charmed by those messages, confident of a positive
attitude of the external environment in its own country.
In the meantime, those key changes of the geopolitical arrangement come
along with negative developments in our country due to increasing
uncertainty in relations with the West. The country's political
leadership is also well-aware of this whose trump card was prevention
of war. Now this circumstance is obsolete, and the threat of a new
war is more than real.
The United States and its partners in NATO are following a policy of
isolation and blockade of Russia, and one of its important directions
in the South Caucasus. The leading politicians of the West find that
they are conducting a flexible policy on Russia and keep its doors
open. At the same time, there is the understanding that containment
of Russian expansion will be one of the Euro-Atlantic policies.
The South Caucasus is the most complicated and detached region,
and there is no action plan on this dimension because the interests
of different powers clash in the region. However, the west has the
experience of failure of several Russian intentions and projects,
and even the most compromise-prone politicians understand that the
region needs to be reviewed otherwise it will hinder the expansion
of the European security conditions.
There is an institutional solution to this issue - first integration,
then accession of the countries of the region to the Euro-Atlantic
organizations. Practically, this means strengthening the military
and political presence of NATO and the European Union in the Black
Sea and the Caucasus. However, the South Caucasus is strongly linked
to Russia (including Georgia), and the West has an objective to push
out the Russians.
The best way to do this would be demonstration of Russia's inability
to carry out the role of guarantor and ally of the states of the
region. The West is well aware that this is an illusion that needs
to be dispersed. In this respect Azerbaijan's military success is
the best way of achieving these goals.
It needs to be understood that the United States and NATO have shed
responsibility for the security of Armenia, and are demonstrating it
in a way that even the political leadership has understood this.
Earlier the United States and NATO clearly stated their positions in
a possible resumption of military actions in the area of Karabakh, as
well as explained in simple terms their position on Turkey's military
intervention in the new war but now there is minimum understanding
of the extent to which the West sticks to the previous position.
The West does not need to ease Russia's tasks and encourage
unscrupulousness of Armenian leaders and the process of vassalization
chosen by them and supported by the Armenian society.
The West suspended the process of supply of weapons to Armenia
despite the continuing cooperation on deployment of Armenian troops
in conflict areas. Formally, relations with NATO continue, and thanks
to the efforts of the Armenian military, mostly friendly relations
are maintained with NATO but the United States and NATO are now
indifferent to the destiny of Armenia not because they have "fallen
out of love" but because they have no reason to pay attention to it,
worry about its security.
Significant changes happened in the relations of the United States and
NATO with Turkey in the recent months which are related to objectives
relating to containment of Russian expansion. If immediately after
the occupation of Crimea Turkey demonstrated full loyalty to the
United States and the west, it apparently made a decision soon to
not deepen relations with them and balance between the West and Russia.
This or maybe something more serious and long-term did not allow the
United States to involve Turkey more deeply in blocking Russia.
Moreover, the decision on strengthening the military presence of
NATO in Eastern Europe allowed reviewing the objectives of blockade
of Russia without services and participation of Turkey.
In another situation this circumstance would have been highly favorable
for Armenia because it indicates intensification of the strategy of
"double containment" by the United States and NATO towards Turkey
and Russia, as well as emerging of the "third force" in the Black Sea
and the South Caucasus. Now, however, this situation means weakening
of mutual dependence of NATO and Turkey and lack of interests of the
United States and NATO in containing the confrontation between Turkey
and Russia without any additional commitments to Turkey beyond the
relations within NATO.
For Armenia this means a "green light" for the resumption of
military actions. In addition, if earlier, i.e. before mass supply
of Russian weapons to Azerbaijan, Russian support meant to Armenia
its participation in containment of Turkish military intervention,
currently it means "avoidance" from Azerbaijani aggression because
the Russian policy has resulted in change of balance in favor of
Azerbaijan.
In the current situation that is nearing a catastrophe for Russia it
is not interested in the start of military actions against Armenia
but only now when it is not clear how far ahead the United States
and NATO will go in Eastern Europe, including the South Caucasus. If
the deployment of the United States and NATO in the Black Sea and
Caucasus starts threatening Russia's positions, a more effective
means of containment of expansion will be the war in the region,
first of all between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In the result of this war Russia will be trying to implement its old
plans of deployment of its troops in the area of the Karabakh conflict
which will expand to an unintelligible space. Russia has been able to
prepare this war and prepare grounds and legitimacy of Azerbaijan's
ambitions because supply of arms to Azerbaijan means legitimacy of
its military aggression.
The Russians suppose that in this situation they will manage to avoid
intervention and keep the processes manageable. The former experience
drives its actions in this direction but only as NATO moves towards
Eastern Europe, as well as negative changes in relations between Iran
and Russia will create high uncertainty.
Turkey is hardly interested in the start of Karabakh War II because
it fears being involved in a war waged by other's rules and scenarios.
However, if they are provoked into a war, nothing will be left to do
but assist Azerbaijan in any way, including direct participation in
the military actions.
Iran does not seem to be interested in change of status quo in the
South Caucasus but considering Iran's interest in escalation between
NATO and Russia, Iran may be interested in a war between Azerbaijan
and Armenia, at least for loss of Russian positions in the region.
- See more at:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/32573#sthash.4Hnp31d1.dpuf
Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Comments - Wednesday, 11 June 2014, 14:20
More and more external motivations for Karabakh War II are occurring
in the result of a serious geopolitical U-turn.
Prior to the acute confrontation between Russia and the West the
motivations of the external parties in Karabakh War II appeared more
hypothetical than a concrete scenario. Since Armenians are not good
enough at making scenarios, even on the eve of the war that is fully
realistic the society remains in a state of optimistic expectations.
On the whole, the country does not have a real debate on a new war,
while occasional remarks are exotics. Since the external parties help
up settlement between the conflict parties for a long time and tried
to present their policy as that of peace making, the population of
the country was charmed by those messages, confident of a positive
attitude of the external environment in its own country.
In the meantime, those key changes of the geopolitical arrangement come
along with negative developments in our country due to increasing
uncertainty in relations with the West. The country's political
leadership is also well-aware of this whose trump card was prevention
of war. Now this circumstance is obsolete, and the threat of a new
war is more than real.
The United States and its partners in NATO are following a policy of
isolation and blockade of Russia, and one of its important directions
in the South Caucasus. The leading politicians of the West find that
they are conducting a flexible policy on Russia and keep its doors
open. At the same time, there is the understanding that containment
of Russian expansion will be one of the Euro-Atlantic policies.
The South Caucasus is the most complicated and detached region,
and there is no action plan on this dimension because the interests
of different powers clash in the region. However, the west has the
experience of failure of several Russian intentions and projects,
and even the most compromise-prone politicians understand that the
region needs to be reviewed otherwise it will hinder the expansion
of the European security conditions.
There is an institutional solution to this issue - first integration,
then accession of the countries of the region to the Euro-Atlantic
organizations. Practically, this means strengthening the military
and political presence of NATO and the European Union in the Black
Sea and the Caucasus. However, the South Caucasus is strongly linked
to Russia (including Georgia), and the West has an objective to push
out the Russians.
The best way to do this would be demonstration of Russia's inability
to carry out the role of guarantor and ally of the states of the
region. The West is well aware that this is an illusion that needs
to be dispersed. In this respect Azerbaijan's military success is
the best way of achieving these goals.
It needs to be understood that the United States and NATO have shed
responsibility for the security of Armenia, and are demonstrating it
in a way that even the political leadership has understood this.
Earlier the United States and NATO clearly stated their positions in
a possible resumption of military actions in the area of Karabakh, as
well as explained in simple terms their position on Turkey's military
intervention in the new war but now there is minimum understanding
of the extent to which the West sticks to the previous position.
The West does not need to ease Russia's tasks and encourage
unscrupulousness of Armenian leaders and the process of vassalization
chosen by them and supported by the Armenian society.
The West suspended the process of supply of weapons to Armenia
despite the continuing cooperation on deployment of Armenian troops
in conflict areas. Formally, relations with NATO continue, and thanks
to the efforts of the Armenian military, mostly friendly relations
are maintained with NATO but the United States and NATO are now
indifferent to the destiny of Armenia not because they have "fallen
out of love" but because they have no reason to pay attention to it,
worry about its security.
Significant changes happened in the relations of the United States and
NATO with Turkey in the recent months which are related to objectives
relating to containment of Russian expansion. If immediately after
the occupation of Crimea Turkey demonstrated full loyalty to the
United States and the west, it apparently made a decision soon to
not deepen relations with them and balance between the West and Russia.
This or maybe something more serious and long-term did not allow the
United States to involve Turkey more deeply in blocking Russia.
Moreover, the decision on strengthening the military presence of
NATO in Eastern Europe allowed reviewing the objectives of blockade
of Russia without services and participation of Turkey.
In another situation this circumstance would have been highly favorable
for Armenia because it indicates intensification of the strategy of
"double containment" by the United States and NATO towards Turkey
and Russia, as well as emerging of the "third force" in the Black Sea
and the South Caucasus. Now, however, this situation means weakening
of mutual dependence of NATO and Turkey and lack of interests of the
United States and NATO in containing the confrontation between Turkey
and Russia without any additional commitments to Turkey beyond the
relations within NATO.
For Armenia this means a "green light" for the resumption of
military actions. In addition, if earlier, i.e. before mass supply
of Russian weapons to Azerbaijan, Russian support meant to Armenia
its participation in containment of Turkish military intervention,
currently it means "avoidance" from Azerbaijani aggression because
the Russian policy has resulted in change of balance in favor of
Azerbaijan.
In the current situation that is nearing a catastrophe for Russia it
is not interested in the start of military actions against Armenia
but only now when it is not clear how far ahead the United States
and NATO will go in Eastern Europe, including the South Caucasus. If
the deployment of the United States and NATO in the Black Sea and
Caucasus starts threatening Russia's positions, a more effective
means of containment of expansion will be the war in the region,
first of all between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In the result of this war Russia will be trying to implement its old
plans of deployment of its troops in the area of the Karabakh conflict
which will expand to an unintelligible space. Russia has been able to
prepare this war and prepare grounds and legitimacy of Azerbaijan's
ambitions because supply of arms to Azerbaijan means legitimacy of
its military aggression.
The Russians suppose that in this situation they will manage to avoid
intervention and keep the processes manageable. The former experience
drives its actions in this direction but only as NATO moves towards
Eastern Europe, as well as negative changes in relations between Iran
and Russia will create high uncertainty.
Turkey is hardly interested in the start of Karabakh War II because
it fears being involved in a war waged by other's rules and scenarios.
However, if they are provoked into a war, nothing will be left to do
but assist Azerbaijan in any way, including direct participation in
the military actions.
Iran does not seem to be interested in change of status quo in the
South Caucasus but considering Iran's interest in escalation between
NATO and Russia, Iran may be interested in a war between Azerbaijan
and Armenia, at least for loss of Russian positions in the region.
- See more at:
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/32573#sthash.4Hnp31d1.dpuf