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What Makes US Diplomats Talk Of Caucasus Crisis-2014?

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  • What Makes US Diplomats Talk Of Caucasus Crisis-2014?

    WHAT MAKES US DIPLOMATS TALK OF CAUCASUS CRISIS-2014?

    The Voice of Russia
    June 16 2014

    US experts and diplomats have been warning of a new security crisis
    that could break out in the South Caucasus in autumn of 2014. How good
    is the forecast and is there any evidence the region is really headed
    for a new war? Or is it rather a threat aimed at disrupting these
    countries' ties with Russia? We are discussing the issue with Razi
    Nurullayev, Azerbaijani political analyst and the head of "Region"
    International Analytical Centre, and Sevak Sarukhanyan, deputy head
    of the Noravank think tank in Yerevan.

    On October 5, 2012, Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian presented a lecture
    in Los Angeles titled "Arab Awakening, The Turkish Role in The Region
    and The Future of Armenians in the Middle East". According to the 'USA
    Armenian Life' reporting, he claimed that "2014 is a potentially deadly
    deadline for Armenia and Armenians worldwide imposed by Azerbaijan." He
    sternly cautioned Diaspora Armenians about the so-called "Azerbaijan
    deadline" for political settlement of the Artsakh (Karabagh) conflict
    by 2014... He tersely warned that a formidable military buildup by
    Azerbaijan spelled trouble for Armenia.

    This year Ambassador Richard Morningstar, the US envoy to Azerbaijan,
    issued a similarly stern warning to Baku, promising it a "Maidan"
    if the government doesn't loosen its grip on the opposition.

    In both cases, the Ambassadors suggested that Armenia and Azerbaijan
    had to adopt more "open" policies towards the West and scale down
    their contacts with Russia. Or face the consequences?

    Razi Nurullayev, Azerbaijani political analyst and the head of "Region"
    International Analytical Centre:

    I would say the Caucasian explosion is always pending. The Caucasus
    is a very sensitive area, both geopolitically and economically. And
    that is why I think it is not only the matter of autumn, but that is
    a matter of all the time.

    We remember the case of war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, in
    August. And after that a lot of things happened in the Caucasus. And
    the Caucasus has been the point of interest not only for Russia that
    comes from the fact that it is its political, but also for the West,
    including the US and the EU country.

    And of course, we cannot forget about the issue of Turkey. Turkey also
    is very bound to the Caucasus region historically and it also has
    its own interests. And Turkey's interests in the Caucasus are being
    implemented with the help of Azerbaijan, both brotherly countries.

    So, in autumn the Caucasian explosion may happen, but I can't say on
    what perspective Mr. Ambassador has said that. Georgia is going to
    conclude the association agreement with the EU this month, Ukraine
    does the same and Armenia is going to join the Eurasian Union. So,
    this tangles this paradox of the developments in the Caucasus and
    really creates such an environment in which an explosion might happen.

    Another point, Azerbaijan is also invited to the Eurasian Union and,
    on the other hand, the EU has a big pressure on Azerbaijan to sign
    an association agreement with the EU. So, in this context I think
    the interests have collided between Russia and the West.

    So, it may depend on the further developments and I would actually
    put more focus on the Ukrainian events. It depends on how Ukraine
    is going to get out of the situation which it found itself in. And
    depending on that situation the fate of Caucasus may also be cleared.

    Actually, with the Ukrainian events the eastern partnership initiated
    by the EU has been severely damaged. The other countries of the
    eastern partnership, including Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus
    feel that the EU is more of an economic union and when it comes to
    conflicts and the collision of interests with Russia, the EU cannot
    defend either of the countries, which has now produced a radical
    change in the minds of the countries, in their policies.

    The Azerbaijan President said in last December that Azerbaijan would
    not in any way sign an association agreement with the EU and Azerbaijan
    would prefer an equal strategic partnership between the two sides,
    in which the EU is not interested.

    So, here the connection is - if Russia is more confident and keeps the
    status quo as it is now in Ukraine, then it would somehow pursue the
    successful policy in the Caucasus as well. If the West - the US and
    the EU countries - are successful in Ukraine (which I can't believe
    can ensure its territorial integrity and bring peace to its eastern
    provinces), then it might give a motivation to the other eastern
    partnership countries to pursue the European integration policy,
    which I believe is a hard task for now.

    So, Ukraine in this context is a point where all the other countries
    look at and draw the lessons from there.

    Of course, we know that Caucasus is an extremely important region, and
    at the same time, it is a very delicate region in terms of balances
    that are now kept, but could so easily be tipped. Who of all players
    could really be interested in creating a stir in that region, in
    destabilizing it?

    Actually, it is a very hard question and it is not very easy to just
    simply answer it. I think the Caucasus is now a place of the war of
    interests between Russia and the West. That is why at the moment,
    it is my personal view, Russia would be interested in the Caucasus
    to be peaceful, to be economically and geopolitically stable unless
    it answers its interests.

    So, if Russia has an influence over the Caucasus and Russia's
    interests are pursued and ensured in the Caucasus, then Russia would
    be interested in bringing the stability to Caucasus, and would also
    be interested in the resolution of the frozen conflicts.

    As far as the EU is concerned, broadly speaking the EU and the US,
    until now they did not seem to be active and very interested in peace
    in the Caucasus. It was out of their very close point of interest.

    They wanted peace, but never did anything for peace in the region.

    But now, after the Ukrainian events the West thinks that the unstable
    and conflict-fledged Caucasus solely serves the Russian interests. In
    this context the West, and in particular the US have mobilized their
    efforts for peace in the Caucasus.

    In particular, I remember some high-ranking officials' statements
    from the US about Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So, they now have become
    more active and try to bring the sides to the round table and find
    the solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which I think is not
    possible without the Russia's consent and participation."

    Sevak Sarukhanyan, deputy head of the Noravank think tank in Yerevan:

    "To my mind, just now I don't see any reasons for a sudden blast,
    because the world and the region is quite busy with the things which
    are going on in Ukraine. And now every country in the region and also
    the international actors, they cannot provide any kind of forecast
    for what will happen in the Caucasus if anything happens. That's why
    there are no international actors who are interested in any kind of
    instability here.

    And in 2014 I don't see any kind of reasons for that, if we talk
    about countries, Georgia is quite stable after the presidential and
    parliamentary elections. Armenia is on its route of integration into
    the Eurasian Union and Azerbaijan is trying to find its new place
    in the European and American market out of the Ukrainian crisis,
    because Azerbaijan is becoming part of the total European interest
    in the non-Russian natural gas and oil. From this point of view each
    country in the region is not interested in such kind of a blast.

    But of course the processes which are going on in the wider region,
    I mean, for example, Syria, Iran, somehow Turkey, they can also
    influence and bring something sudden, which cannot be forecasted just
    now, at this moment."

    In one of his recent interviews US Ambassador to Baku Richard
    Morningstar was warning of a possible 'Maidan' scenario in Baku....

    Actually, I must say that for example Azerbaijan has a lot of
    differences in comparison with Ukraine, because Azerbaijan is a
    more eastern country with more government control over political
    and economic processes in the country. And from this point of view,
    of course, Aliev is better controlling the situation than Yanukovych
    did in Ukraine, which limits the possibilities of the opposition to
    organize something.

    And from the other point of view the opposition doesn't have the
    freedom of action, because the political process is not democratic, as
    in many countries in the former Soviet Union. To my mind the American
    approach is dictated by the Baku's policy, which is that Aliev doesn't
    want to chose any kind of geopolitical side, because his policy is
    quite pro-Western, but it is not an anti-Russian, actually.

    And Azerbaijan's decision now is a decisive one for Caspian region
    new energy project. For example, if the West needs Turkmen gas or gas
    from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, oil from Kazakhstan passing not through
    the territory of Russia, Azerbaijan's decisions must be considered
    as the most important ones, because Azerbaijan is the main transit
    route for the Caspian energy resources.

    >From this point of view I think the American embassy's approach is
    somehow dictated by the fact that Azerbaijan now doesn't want to take
    any kind of direct anti-Russian steps, which means that Azerbaijan
    doesn't want to make the process of construction of pipelines through
    this territory in a fast way.

    So, I think Azerbaijan, if it keeps its policy of tossing between
    powers, will get more critics from Washington and from the West. But,
    at the same time, Azerbaijan is a reliable partner of the West in
    energy resources export and import. The whole situation is that the
    West wants from Baku more than Baku can give.

    And from this point of view I think that the critics over Azerbaijan's
    democracy and human rights processes in this country will become more
    and more from the Western side. But actually I don't see any reasons
    for the Maidan movement, because, I must repeat, the Government of
    Azerbaijan is controlling the situation.

    Of course, there is a small part of processes which are out of control,
    but they have no connection with the West. I'm speaking, first of
    all, about the new Islamic movements which are now Azerbaijan. Mostly
    Iran was supporting the Shia resistance and the renaissance of Shia
    Islam in Azerbaijan. And some Islamic groups are out of control of
    the Azerbaijani Government.

    Of course, they have a lot of other religious organizations which
    are supported from Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi groups. And we see a
    lot of people fighting in Syria. And these groups also are in some
    kind of opposition to the Government, which is a secular one. But
    to talk about them in terms of Maidan is not correct, because they
    are living in other kind of political ideology. And their opposition
    can be wilder than what was in Kiev, but in Kiev we also had a lot
    of victims of the protests.

    It is interesting that you've just mentioned the presence of the
    Islamist factor. Do I get you right that it has been growing over
    the past years?

    It is growing and it is a logical process for these countries, because
    these things like Islamism and radicalism, they are becoming more
    competitive in the areas where the level of education and the level
    of society is going down. Of course, the socio economic situation
    and the conditions for the majority of the population are creating
    relevant grounds for the renaissance of such kinds of movements.

    And the post-Soviet Union territory is somehow a new territory for
    Islamic radicalism. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan,
    Uzbekistan and all the other states are somehow suffering from that. I
    think that the only tool to provide secularism in these counties is
    to promote real democratic institutions, because if you are closing
    officially secular political parties because they are in opposition
    to you, you are creating a good fundament for the radicals who can
    take the place of these secular oppositionists.

    The thing which happened in Iran, before the revolution the last
    Iranian Shah was arresting the oppositionists - the liberals,
    the democrats - and in the 1970 the people who were against the
    government, they found that the only secure places for meetings
    were mosques. And that is why the political Islam became the main
    instrument of protesting the government and creating any kind of base
    for the opposition.

    So, I think that the Islamic fundamentalists are getting more positions
    in the region because of two reasons - bad socio-economic conditions
    of the population and the non-democratic character of the governance.

    And in that sense I cannot help asking you a question about another
    huge Islamic country with an increasingly Islamist government, which
    is Turkey. If we have been talking about the Shia groups present in
    Azerbaijan, Turkey has got a huge Sunni influence. Is it active in
    the region too?

    Actually, it is active. But the Turkish political Islam is an
    interesting one because it is part of a political process. We should
    say that not the people of religion are doing politics in Turkey, but
    the politicians who are religious are creating the political process.

    That is a very big difference of Turkey when we compare this country
    with Iran.

    >From this point of view, it has some advantages and disadvantages. For
    example, for the Iranians it is quite easy to enter the region
    through the religious organizations. But for the Turks, for example,
    the official political institutions and economic activities, they
    are the most effective tools for entering the region.

    The Turks in that sense, for example, in Georgia are huge, especially
    in the Adjara region. They have a very high level of cooperation
    with Azerbaijan. But at the same time, we should say that for
    example the Azeri investments in Turkey are higher than the Turkish
    investments are in Azerbaijan. The construction of the TANAP pipeline,
    the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which is going to be constructed for
    Azeri investments. The level of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey
    will become higher.

    So, at this moment we cannot say that Turkey has some kind of decisive
    influence on the Azerbaijani Government, because Azerbaijan has its own
    share of influence in Turkey. And also the Turks have some limitation
    of entering the region, because the closed Armenian-Turkish border,
    it is a closed border for the Turkish entrance to the region.

    You can invest a lot, you can be active in Azerbaijan, in Georgia,
    but if your border is closed with Armenia, it makes you not a regional
    country. You are partly a part of the region, because Armenia is
    a quite important country from the geographic point of view. And
    for Turkey, from the economic point of view, Armenia is much more
    important than Georgia, because Armenia and Turkey are now connected
    with railways, they are connected with high voltage transmission lines.

    So, if we compare Turkey, for example, with Iran, Iran is more
    effective in the region as a region, because Iran has investments both
    in Armenia, Azerbaijan, in Georgia. But in the case of Turkey there is
    only a triangle - Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Somehow it is also
    a geopolitical alliance which does not let us to talk that Turkey has
    a joint or a common south Caucasian strategy. The south Caucasus for
    Turkey is only Georgia and Azerbaijan, which is also limiting the
    Turkish possibilities and instruments of influence in the region."

    Ekaterina Kudashkina

    http://voiceofrussia.com/radio_broadcast/25298789/273601295/

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