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A DIFFERENT NARRATIVE FOR THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI CONFLICT
The Christian Science Monitor
June 18, 2014 Wednesday
We take issue with Svante E. Cornell's characterization of the
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artaskh in Armenian) conflict in his June 10 op-ed
"Why America must step up its role in resolving Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict."
by Vilen Khlgatyan Op-ed contributor, Armen Sahakyan Op-ed contributor
With the recent developments happening in and around Ukraine, Svante
E. Cornell's June 10 op-ed "Why America must step up its role in
resolving Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict" attempts to compare the
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian) conflict with Crimea. This
attempted comparison disregards important historical, geographic,
legal, and political differences that exist between the two conflicts.
The Artsakh conflict has deep historical and legal roots with various
junctures along the way. The most recent phase of the conflict began in
February of 1988, when the citizens of the Armenian Soviet Socialist
Republic and Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) began peaceful
demonstrations to once again petition the Soviet authorities in Moscow
for re-unification of NKAO with the Armenian SSR. Tensions rose rapidly
after the anti-Armenian pogroms in the Azerbaijani cities of Baku
(the capital), Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Maragha, among others.
Tensions spilled eventually turned into a full-scale war that lasted
until 1994.
Shortly after the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement (signed by the
representatives of Azerbaijan, Artsakh, and Armenia) came into force
in 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group began its operations with the task of
mediating the conflict. France, Russia, and the United States are the
co-chairs of the Minsk Group and work hand-in-hand attempting to help
the parties to the conflict reach a lasting peace agreement.
Moscow's role (both under the USSR and the Russian Federation) in the
Artsakh conflict mediation is usually overemphasized. At the same
time, the genuine desire of the people of Artsakh Republic to live
in a state and society of their own choosing is often disregarded.
Although Russia has been active in the Artsakh peace process, their
motivation is not nearly as nefarious as Dr. Cornell claims.
During the Artsakh-Azerbaijan war, Baku recruited Afghan mujahideen and
Chechen insurgents to fight on its side, many of whom would end up in
Russia's North Caucasus region in pursuit of jihad, thus presenting
a direct national security threat to Russia. Given its geographic
proximity and Russia's own problems in its North Caucasus region,
Moscow could not and cannot disregard the Artsakh peace process.
The US has also been active in the mediation process of the Artsakh
conflict within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship,
which is the only agreed upon international format for the peace
talks. One notable example was the US-organized talks in Key West
in the summer of 2001, which was the closest the parties had ever
come to reaching a peace deal since the ceasefire agreement seven
years earlier.
A number of targeted public relations stunts have attempted to present
Azerbaijan as a model partner for the West. However, Azerbaijan's
allegiance to the Western international order is dubious, especially
when it comes to democratic norms, rule of law, and respect for human
rights. In recent times, experienced analysts of the South Caucasus
and government officials, such as Richard Kauzlarich, Thomas De Waal,
Eric Rubin, and others have criticized Azerbaijan's faulty human
rights track record, its attempt to lead on both the West and Russia,
and its waning importance as a US ally.
Recent examples of Baku's crackdown on critics both foreign and
domestic include: criticism of the US ambassador to Baku, Richard
Morningstar; criticism of OSCE Minsk Group US co-chairman James
Warlick; and government jailings of and crackdowns on representatives
of the National Democratic Institute, Radio Free Europe, and other
organizations operating in Azerbaijan, etc.
Human Right Watch periodically reports on egregious arrests of bloggers
and journalists, including the recent airport detainment of prominent
human rights defender Leyla Yunus and her husband. Another example
is the extradition of Rauf Mirkadirov, a Turkey-based Azerbaijani
journalist, who, due to his critical stance against the Baku regime,
is now potentially facing a life-imprisonment based on questionable
espionage charges.
Another factor that presents a challenge to the premise that Azerbaijan
is a reliable Western ally is its recent major arms acquisitions from
Russia, valued at $4 billion. Moreover, the geopolitical significance
of the country is blown out of proportion.
For instance its gas supplies to Europe are negligible in the larger
picture (only 2 percent of EU demand) and could not replace Russia's
volumes. And within the context of improving relations between the
West and Iran, Azerbaijan's role will likely shrink further. The
US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the recent shale gas revolution,
and the general pivot to Asia add additional reasons why the South
Caucasus will lose its strategic significance for the US and the West
in general.
A related aspect of Azerbaijan's PR campaign has been to conflate the
Artsakh conflict with the separate issue of Armenia-Turkey bilateral
relations. This is yet another attempt at misdirection that some
observers have tried to make. Turkey and Azerbaijan are separate
states, with different ethnic identities, divergent strains of Islam,
and do not have identical national interests. It took Azerbaijani
threats of raising the price of natural gas it supplies to Turkey
as well as a fierce public diplomacy campaign to rally support among
Turks for their "little brother" Azerbaijan in order to place Turkey's
peace protocols with Armenia in limbo.
Several events, including the pardon and promotion of the axe-murderer
Ramil Safarov, the destruction of Armenian cultural sites in
Azerbaijan, the declaration by Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev
that "Armenians of the world" are the number one enemy of Azerbaijan,
the regular cross border sniper shootings on civilian populations,
and many other incidents are not properly condemned by the US and
other OSCE Minsk Group co-chair states.
Convincing Baku to remove the snipers from the line of contact (to
which they do not agree) and to establish an international monitoring
system for ceasefire violations (both of which Armenia and Artsakh have
repeatedly agreed to) would be a positive step forward, and the US can
spearhead those initiatives within the Minsk Group co-chairmanship
framework. Reinstatement of the Artsakh Republic representation at
the negotiations table is also imperative, as no durable peace is
possible without the involvement of the people affected the most.
The US needs to play an active role in the mediation process, together
with the other co-chair countries. But a final agreement to end
the Artsakh conflict cannot be imposed from the outside and needs
to be reached by the three parties themselves exclusively through
peaceful means.
Vilen Khlgatyan is vice-chairman of Political Developments Research
Center (PDRC), a virtual think tank based in Yerevan, Armenia.
Armen Sahakyan is executive director of the Eurasian Research and
Analysis (ERA) Institute (Washington, D.C. branch) and an analyst
of Eurasian Affairs at PDRC. He previously served as an adviser to
the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Armenia to the UN in
New York.
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Readers-Respond/2014/0618/A-different-narrative-for-the-Armenian-Azerbaijani-conflict
The Christian Science Monitor
June 18, 2014 Wednesday
We take issue with Svante E. Cornell's characterization of the
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artaskh in Armenian) conflict in his June 10 op-ed
"Why America must step up its role in resolving Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict."
by Vilen Khlgatyan Op-ed contributor, Armen Sahakyan Op-ed contributor
With the recent developments happening in and around Ukraine, Svante
E. Cornell's June 10 op-ed "Why America must step up its role in
resolving Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict" attempts to compare the
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian) conflict with Crimea. This
attempted comparison disregards important historical, geographic,
legal, and political differences that exist between the two conflicts.
The Artsakh conflict has deep historical and legal roots with various
junctures along the way. The most recent phase of the conflict began in
February of 1988, when the citizens of the Armenian Soviet Socialist
Republic and Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) began peaceful
demonstrations to once again petition the Soviet authorities in Moscow
for re-unification of NKAO with the Armenian SSR. Tensions rose rapidly
after the anti-Armenian pogroms in the Azerbaijani cities of Baku
(the capital), Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Maragha, among others.
Tensions spilled eventually turned into a full-scale war that lasted
until 1994.
Shortly after the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement (signed by the
representatives of Azerbaijan, Artsakh, and Armenia) came into force
in 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group began its operations with the task of
mediating the conflict. France, Russia, and the United States are the
co-chairs of the Minsk Group and work hand-in-hand attempting to help
the parties to the conflict reach a lasting peace agreement.
Moscow's role (both under the USSR and the Russian Federation) in the
Artsakh conflict mediation is usually overemphasized. At the same
time, the genuine desire of the people of Artsakh Republic to live
in a state and society of their own choosing is often disregarded.
Although Russia has been active in the Artsakh peace process, their
motivation is not nearly as nefarious as Dr. Cornell claims.
During the Artsakh-Azerbaijan war, Baku recruited Afghan mujahideen and
Chechen insurgents to fight on its side, many of whom would end up in
Russia's North Caucasus region in pursuit of jihad, thus presenting
a direct national security threat to Russia. Given its geographic
proximity and Russia's own problems in its North Caucasus region,
Moscow could not and cannot disregard the Artsakh peace process.
The US has also been active in the mediation process of the Artsakh
conflict within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship,
which is the only agreed upon international format for the peace
talks. One notable example was the US-organized talks in Key West
in the summer of 2001, which was the closest the parties had ever
come to reaching a peace deal since the ceasefire agreement seven
years earlier.
A number of targeted public relations stunts have attempted to present
Azerbaijan as a model partner for the West. However, Azerbaijan's
allegiance to the Western international order is dubious, especially
when it comes to democratic norms, rule of law, and respect for human
rights. In recent times, experienced analysts of the South Caucasus
and government officials, such as Richard Kauzlarich, Thomas De Waal,
Eric Rubin, and others have criticized Azerbaijan's faulty human
rights track record, its attempt to lead on both the West and Russia,
and its waning importance as a US ally.
Recent examples of Baku's crackdown on critics both foreign and
domestic include: criticism of the US ambassador to Baku, Richard
Morningstar; criticism of OSCE Minsk Group US co-chairman James
Warlick; and government jailings of and crackdowns on representatives
of the National Democratic Institute, Radio Free Europe, and other
organizations operating in Azerbaijan, etc.
Human Right Watch periodically reports on egregious arrests of bloggers
and journalists, including the recent airport detainment of prominent
human rights defender Leyla Yunus and her husband. Another example
is the extradition of Rauf Mirkadirov, a Turkey-based Azerbaijani
journalist, who, due to his critical stance against the Baku regime,
is now potentially facing a life-imprisonment based on questionable
espionage charges.
Another factor that presents a challenge to the premise that Azerbaijan
is a reliable Western ally is its recent major arms acquisitions from
Russia, valued at $4 billion. Moreover, the geopolitical significance
of the country is blown out of proportion.
For instance its gas supplies to Europe are negligible in the larger
picture (only 2 percent of EU demand) and could not replace Russia's
volumes. And within the context of improving relations between the
West and Iran, Azerbaijan's role will likely shrink further. The
US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the recent shale gas revolution,
and the general pivot to Asia add additional reasons why the South
Caucasus will lose its strategic significance for the US and the West
in general.
A related aspect of Azerbaijan's PR campaign has been to conflate the
Artsakh conflict with the separate issue of Armenia-Turkey bilateral
relations. This is yet another attempt at misdirection that some
observers have tried to make. Turkey and Azerbaijan are separate
states, with different ethnic identities, divergent strains of Islam,
and do not have identical national interests. It took Azerbaijani
threats of raising the price of natural gas it supplies to Turkey
as well as a fierce public diplomacy campaign to rally support among
Turks for their "little brother" Azerbaijan in order to place Turkey's
peace protocols with Armenia in limbo.
Several events, including the pardon and promotion of the axe-murderer
Ramil Safarov, the destruction of Armenian cultural sites in
Azerbaijan, the declaration by Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev
that "Armenians of the world" are the number one enemy of Azerbaijan,
the regular cross border sniper shootings on civilian populations,
and many other incidents are not properly condemned by the US and
other OSCE Minsk Group co-chair states.
Convincing Baku to remove the snipers from the line of contact (to
which they do not agree) and to establish an international monitoring
system for ceasefire violations (both of which Armenia and Artsakh have
repeatedly agreed to) would be a positive step forward, and the US can
spearhead those initiatives within the Minsk Group co-chairmanship
framework. Reinstatement of the Artsakh Republic representation at
the negotiations table is also imperative, as no durable peace is
possible without the involvement of the people affected the most.
The US needs to play an active role in the mediation process, together
with the other co-chair countries. But a final agreement to end
the Artsakh conflict cannot be imposed from the outside and needs
to be reached by the three parties themselves exclusively through
peaceful means.
Vilen Khlgatyan is vice-chairman of Political Developments Research
Center (PDRC), a virtual think tank based in Yerevan, Armenia.
Armen Sahakyan is executive director of the Eurasian Research and
Analysis (ERA) Institute (Washington, D.C. branch) and an analyst
of Eurasian Affairs at PDRC. He previously served as an adviser to
the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Armenia to the UN in
New York.
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Readers-Respond/2014/0618/A-different-narrative-for-the-Armenian-Azerbaijani-conflict