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ANKARA: Why Did Not The Black Sea Evolve Into A Zone Of Cooperation?

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  • ANKARA: Why Did Not The Black Sea Evolve Into A Zone Of Cooperation?

    WHY DID NOT THE BLACK SEA EVOLVE INTO A ZONE OF COOPERATION?

    Journal of Turkish Weekly
    June 24 2014

    Selcuk Colakoglu

    Leaders from 11 countries came together on June 5, 1992, publishing
    the Istanbul Declaration, the founding document for the Organization
    of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). BSEC's primary goal was
    to declare to the world that the Black Sea Basin was no longer a zone
    of polarization and rivalry, but one of cooperation and integration.

    Uncertainties surrounding the region in the aftermath of the Cold War,
    due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc at
    large, were to be eliminated in order to establish a solid ground
    for cooperation.

    Turkey and Russia were historically opposed to each other based
    on long lasting tensions, such as the rivalry between the Ottoman
    Empire and Tsarist Russia, and the Cold War rivalry between NATO and
    the Warsaw Pact. A new initiative aimed at enhancing cooperation and
    paving the way for peaceful coexistence in the Black Sea Basin was
    jointly pioneered in 1992 by Turkey and Russia. Moreover, countries of
    the Balkans and South Caucasus were also included under the umbrella
    of BSEC, meaning that the organization covered a key region broader
    than Black Sea littoral. Turkey even offered Greece, with which it was
    experiencing continued tensions over Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea, to
    become a founding member of BSEC, a risky move that clearly indicated
    a prevailing mood of optimism conducive to enhanced cooperation.

    Likewise, Azerbaijan and Armenia also took the plunge and joined
    the initiative at the same time, despite the conflict over
    Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Indeed, another goal of BSEC was to allow for countries which had
    territorial disputes and cross-border minority issues to gradually
    sink their differences through peaceful means via regular contact. The
    shared hope of all parties was to witness the gradual resolution
    of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia,
    Georgia's problems with the federal states of Abkhazia and South
    Ossetia, the Chechnian conflict confronting Russia, and the dispute
    over Transnistria in Moldova, through efficient diplomacy and joint
    efforts in which enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea Basin would
    result. Likewise, problems which emerged after the dissolution of
    Yugoslavia and the consequent civil war in Bosnia could have been
    resolved through the BSEC mechanism. In fact, it was even thought
    that such a spirit of cooperation and peaceful dialogue around the
    Black Sea Basin could result in a new engagement process between
    Athens and Ankara. Moreover, the U.S. and the EU also gave indirect
    support to the foundation of BSEC, thus demonstrating their willingness
    to assist countries in the region to join forces. Therefore, it is
    accurate to say that Turkey and Russia were clearly on the right side
    of history when BSEC was founded, as the organization was supported
    by all prominent actors in regional and global politics.

    Russia's return to its 'near abroad'

    After a while, the initial mood of optimism that prevailed over the
    Black Sea Basin during the first half of the 1990s was replaced by
    a context marked by divergent interests and policies. That is, BSEC
    and other regional bodies were unable to gain momentum despite all
    efforts. Even though BSEC evolved into a regional organization with
    a permanent secretariat in Istanbul by 1999, cooperation could not
    be deepened.

    A major reason why enhanced cooperation could not be achieved was
    due to the fact that Russia, which overcame the shock caused by the
    collapse of the Soviet Union within only in a couple of years, began to
    exert its Soviet-era influence once again. In this respect, Russia did
    not wish to see Turkey and other Western countries playing an active
    role in a region which it considered its hinterland. Moscow was also
    afraid of former Soviet republics pursuing an independent foreign
    policy and possibly attaining total economic independence from Russia.

    Based on such a perspective, as Moscow recurred its power, Russia
    gradually expanded its clout over these newly independent states
    thanks to its political, military, and economic capacities, and
    managed to balance developed Western countries' rising influence in
    the region. In its close neighborhood, Russia froze the conflicts in
    Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, in order
    to keep a tight rein on Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.

    Furthermore, when the pro-Western government in Georgia led by Mikheil
    Saakashvili "crossed the line" and tried to reassert its control over
    South Ossetia in 2008, Russia entered into a war with Georgia as an
    act of punishment. Seeing that Georgia could not resist Russia on its
    own, it was disappointed that NATO and the EU were unable to provide
    necessary support. After all, Russia managed to "punish" Georgia once
    again by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

    >From such a perspective, what is currently going on in Ukraine is a
    clear indication of a Russian strategy that is aimed at penalizing
    countries in its near abroad which refuse to abide by the rules of
    the game set by Moscow.

    Independent policies of NATO and the EU

    Countries in the region which feel insecure due to Russia's
    resurgence, prefer to engage with NATO rather than counting on regional
    organizations like BSEC. This is because they consider NATO a powerful
    actor which can shield them from security threats, whereas regional
    organizations such as BSEC are rather ineffective. NATO became the sole
    organization upon which countries in the region of the Black Sea Basin
    relied for maintaining security; for NATO's capabilities were affirmed
    on several key occasions, such as the Civil War in Bosnia and the
    crisis in Kosovo, where it intervened successfully. Romania, Bulgaria,
    and Albania, which are all BSEC members, became NATO members in due
    course in order to guarantee their territorial integrity. Similarly,
    the prospects of NATO membership became all the more attractive in
    the eyes of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia on the grounds that
    these countries could not maintain amiable relations with Russia
    after 1990. Correspondingly, the subject of NATO membership acquired
    currency in Ukraine when pro-Western governments came to power there.

    Under such circumstances, EU membership also became a priority for
    countries located in the Black Sea Basin because of the prospects it
    offered in terms of economic development and prosperity. The EU became
    littoral to the Black Sea after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria
    to the Union. Later on, the EU expanded its membership perspective
    to cover all Balkan countries. For Turkey, which received candidate
    status in 1999, the EU took priority over any other international
    organization, including BSEC.

    Western countries began to ignore BSEC only one or two years after
    its establishment in 1992, despite the fact that they were initially
    supportive. Neither BSEC nor any other regional initiatives were
    mentioned in the expansion and partnership programs promoted by
    the EU and NATO in the greater Black Sea Region. Therefore, BSEC was
    unable to develop common strategies with NATO or the EU. Additionally,
    unilateral policies formulated and implemented by NATO and the EU with
    the aim of eastward enlargement caused Russia to feel threatened,
    and as a result Moscow distanced itself from cooperation-oriented
    policies. On the other hand, although NATO and the EU enfranchised
    some Black Sea countries, they were unable to put forth any tangible
    vision with regard to policies to be pursued if Georgia, Ukraine,
    Moldova, or Azerbaijan were threatened, consequently exposing these
    countries to increased Russian interference.

    As a result, Russia's relentless efforts to expand its influence once
    again, in addition to coordinated unilateral enlargement initiatives
    put into action by NATO and the EU, inevitably undermined BSEC's
    promise and potential to establish a solid ground for regional
    cooperation. Today, it is polarization and war, instead of cooperation
    and peace, that characterize the current context around the Black Sea
    region. In this respect, the course of the Ukrainian crisis will act
    as a serious litmus test that will reveal the true prospects of the
    "greater European idea".

    http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3891/why-did-not-the-black-sea-evolve-into-a-zone-of-cooperation.html

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