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WHY DID NOT THE BLACK SEA EVOLVE INTO A ZONE OF COOPERATION?
Journal of Turkish Weekly
June 24 2014
Selcuk Colakoglu
Leaders from 11 countries came together on June 5, 1992, publishing
the Istanbul Declaration, the founding document for the Organization
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). BSEC's primary goal was
to declare to the world that the Black Sea Basin was no longer a zone
of polarization and rivalry, but one of cooperation and integration.
Uncertainties surrounding the region in the aftermath of the Cold War,
due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc at
large, were to be eliminated in order to establish a solid ground
for cooperation.
Turkey and Russia were historically opposed to each other based
on long lasting tensions, such as the rivalry between the Ottoman
Empire and Tsarist Russia, and the Cold War rivalry between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. A new initiative aimed at enhancing cooperation and
paving the way for peaceful coexistence in the Black Sea Basin was
jointly pioneered in 1992 by Turkey and Russia. Moreover, countries of
the Balkans and South Caucasus were also included under the umbrella
of BSEC, meaning that the organization covered a key region broader
than Black Sea littoral. Turkey even offered Greece, with which it was
experiencing continued tensions over Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea, to
become a founding member of BSEC, a risky move that clearly indicated
a prevailing mood of optimism conducive to enhanced cooperation.
Likewise, Azerbaijan and Armenia also took the plunge and joined
the initiative at the same time, despite the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Indeed, another goal of BSEC was to allow for countries which had
territorial disputes and cross-border minority issues to gradually
sink their differences through peaceful means via regular contact. The
shared hope of all parties was to witness the gradual resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia,
Georgia's problems with the federal states of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the Chechnian conflict confronting Russia, and the dispute
over Transnistria in Moldova, through efficient diplomacy and joint
efforts in which enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea Basin would
result. Likewise, problems which emerged after the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and the consequent civil war in Bosnia could have been
resolved through the BSEC mechanism. In fact, it was even thought
that such a spirit of cooperation and peaceful dialogue around the
Black Sea Basin could result in a new engagement process between
Athens and Ankara. Moreover, the U.S. and the EU also gave indirect
support to the foundation of BSEC, thus demonstrating their willingness
to assist countries in the region to join forces. Therefore, it is
accurate to say that Turkey and Russia were clearly on the right side
of history when BSEC was founded, as the organization was supported
by all prominent actors in regional and global politics.
Russia's return to its 'near abroad'
After a while, the initial mood of optimism that prevailed over the
Black Sea Basin during the first half of the 1990s was replaced by
a context marked by divergent interests and policies. That is, BSEC
and other regional bodies were unable to gain momentum despite all
efforts. Even though BSEC evolved into a regional organization with
a permanent secretariat in Istanbul by 1999, cooperation could not
be deepened.
A major reason why enhanced cooperation could not be achieved was
due to the fact that Russia, which overcame the shock caused by the
collapse of the Soviet Union within only in a couple of years, began to
exert its Soviet-era influence once again. In this respect, Russia did
not wish to see Turkey and other Western countries playing an active
role in a region which it considered its hinterland. Moscow was also
afraid of former Soviet republics pursuing an independent foreign
policy and possibly attaining total economic independence from Russia.
Based on such a perspective, as Moscow recurred its power, Russia
gradually expanded its clout over these newly independent states
thanks to its political, military, and economic capacities, and
managed to balance developed Western countries' rising influence in
the region. In its close neighborhood, Russia froze the conflicts in
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, in order
to keep a tight rein on Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
Furthermore, when the pro-Western government in Georgia led by Mikheil
Saakashvili "crossed the line" and tried to reassert its control over
South Ossetia in 2008, Russia entered into a war with Georgia as an
act of punishment. Seeing that Georgia could not resist Russia on its
own, it was disappointed that NATO and the EU were unable to provide
necessary support. After all, Russia managed to "punish" Georgia once
again by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
>From such a perspective, what is currently going on in Ukraine is a
clear indication of a Russian strategy that is aimed at penalizing
countries in its near abroad which refuse to abide by the rules of
the game set by Moscow.
Independent policies of NATO and the EU
Countries in the region which feel insecure due to Russia's
resurgence, prefer to engage with NATO rather than counting on regional
organizations like BSEC. This is because they consider NATO a powerful
actor which can shield them from security threats, whereas regional
organizations such as BSEC are rather ineffective. NATO became the sole
organization upon which countries in the region of the Black Sea Basin
relied for maintaining security; for NATO's capabilities were affirmed
on several key occasions, such as the Civil War in Bosnia and the
crisis in Kosovo, where it intervened successfully. Romania, Bulgaria,
and Albania, which are all BSEC members, became NATO members in due
course in order to guarantee their territorial integrity. Similarly,
the prospects of NATO membership became all the more attractive in
the eyes of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia on the grounds that
these countries could not maintain amiable relations with Russia
after 1990. Correspondingly, the subject of NATO membership acquired
currency in Ukraine when pro-Western governments came to power there.
Under such circumstances, EU membership also became a priority for
countries located in the Black Sea Basin because of the prospects it
offered in terms of economic development and prosperity. The EU became
littoral to the Black Sea after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria
to the Union. Later on, the EU expanded its membership perspective
to cover all Balkan countries. For Turkey, which received candidate
status in 1999, the EU took priority over any other international
organization, including BSEC.
Western countries began to ignore BSEC only one or two years after
its establishment in 1992, despite the fact that they were initially
supportive. Neither BSEC nor any other regional initiatives were
mentioned in the expansion and partnership programs promoted by
the EU and NATO in the greater Black Sea Region. Therefore, BSEC was
unable to develop common strategies with NATO or the EU. Additionally,
unilateral policies formulated and implemented by NATO and the EU with
the aim of eastward enlargement caused Russia to feel threatened,
and as a result Moscow distanced itself from cooperation-oriented
policies. On the other hand, although NATO and the EU enfranchised
some Black Sea countries, they were unable to put forth any tangible
vision with regard to policies to be pursued if Georgia, Ukraine,
Moldova, or Azerbaijan were threatened, consequently exposing these
countries to increased Russian interference.
As a result, Russia's relentless efforts to expand its influence once
again, in addition to coordinated unilateral enlargement initiatives
put into action by NATO and the EU, inevitably undermined BSEC's
promise and potential to establish a solid ground for regional
cooperation. Today, it is polarization and war, instead of cooperation
and peace, that characterize the current context around the Black Sea
region. In this respect, the course of the Ukrainian crisis will act
as a serious litmus test that will reveal the true prospects of the
"greater European idea".
http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3891/why-did-not-the-black-sea-evolve-into-a-zone-of-cooperation.html
Journal of Turkish Weekly
June 24 2014
Selcuk Colakoglu
Leaders from 11 countries came together on June 5, 1992, publishing
the Istanbul Declaration, the founding document for the Organization
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). BSEC's primary goal was
to declare to the world that the Black Sea Basin was no longer a zone
of polarization and rivalry, but one of cooperation and integration.
Uncertainties surrounding the region in the aftermath of the Cold War,
due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc at
large, were to be eliminated in order to establish a solid ground
for cooperation.
Turkey and Russia were historically opposed to each other based
on long lasting tensions, such as the rivalry between the Ottoman
Empire and Tsarist Russia, and the Cold War rivalry between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. A new initiative aimed at enhancing cooperation and
paving the way for peaceful coexistence in the Black Sea Basin was
jointly pioneered in 1992 by Turkey and Russia. Moreover, countries of
the Balkans and South Caucasus were also included under the umbrella
of BSEC, meaning that the organization covered a key region broader
than Black Sea littoral. Turkey even offered Greece, with which it was
experiencing continued tensions over Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea, to
become a founding member of BSEC, a risky move that clearly indicated
a prevailing mood of optimism conducive to enhanced cooperation.
Likewise, Azerbaijan and Armenia also took the plunge and joined
the initiative at the same time, despite the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Indeed, another goal of BSEC was to allow for countries which had
territorial disputes and cross-border minority issues to gradually
sink their differences through peaceful means via regular contact. The
shared hope of all parties was to witness the gradual resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia,
Georgia's problems with the federal states of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the Chechnian conflict confronting Russia, and the dispute
over Transnistria in Moldova, through efficient diplomacy and joint
efforts in which enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea Basin would
result. Likewise, problems which emerged after the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and the consequent civil war in Bosnia could have been
resolved through the BSEC mechanism. In fact, it was even thought
that such a spirit of cooperation and peaceful dialogue around the
Black Sea Basin could result in a new engagement process between
Athens and Ankara. Moreover, the U.S. and the EU also gave indirect
support to the foundation of BSEC, thus demonstrating their willingness
to assist countries in the region to join forces. Therefore, it is
accurate to say that Turkey and Russia were clearly on the right side
of history when BSEC was founded, as the organization was supported
by all prominent actors in regional and global politics.
Russia's return to its 'near abroad'
After a while, the initial mood of optimism that prevailed over the
Black Sea Basin during the first half of the 1990s was replaced by
a context marked by divergent interests and policies. That is, BSEC
and other regional bodies were unable to gain momentum despite all
efforts. Even though BSEC evolved into a regional organization with
a permanent secretariat in Istanbul by 1999, cooperation could not
be deepened.
A major reason why enhanced cooperation could not be achieved was
due to the fact that Russia, which overcame the shock caused by the
collapse of the Soviet Union within only in a couple of years, began to
exert its Soviet-era influence once again. In this respect, Russia did
not wish to see Turkey and other Western countries playing an active
role in a region which it considered its hinterland. Moscow was also
afraid of former Soviet republics pursuing an independent foreign
policy and possibly attaining total economic independence from Russia.
Based on such a perspective, as Moscow recurred its power, Russia
gradually expanded its clout over these newly independent states
thanks to its political, military, and economic capacities, and
managed to balance developed Western countries' rising influence in
the region. In its close neighborhood, Russia froze the conflicts in
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, in order
to keep a tight rein on Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
Furthermore, when the pro-Western government in Georgia led by Mikheil
Saakashvili "crossed the line" and tried to reassert its control over
South Ossetia in 2008, Russia entered into a war with Georgia as an
act of punishment. Seeing that Georgia could not resist Russia on its
own, it was disappointed that NATO and the EU were unable to provide
necessary support. After all, Russia managed to "punish" Georgia once
again by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
>From such a perspective, what is currently going on in Ukraine is a
clear indication of a Russian strategy that is aimed at penalizing
countries in its near abroad which refuse to abide by the rules of
the game set by Moscow.
Independent policies of NATO and the EU
Countries in the region which feel insecure due to Russia's
resurgence, prefer to engage with NATO rather than counting on regional
organizations like BSEC. This is because they consider NATO a powerful
actor which can shield them from security threats, whereas regional
organizations such as BSEC are rather ineffective. NATO became the sole
organization upon which countries in the region of the Black Sea Basin
relied for maintaining security; for NATO's capabilities were affirmed
on several key occasions, such as the Civil War in Bosnia and the
crisis in Kosovo, where it intervened successfully. Romania, Bulgaria,
and Albania, which are all BSEC members, became NATO members in due
course in order to guarantee their territorial integrity. Similarly,
the prospects of NATO membership became all the more attractive in
the eyes of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia on the grounds that
these countries could not maintain amiable relations with Russia
after 1990. Correspondingly, the subject of NATO membership acquired
currency in Ukraine when pro-Western governments came to power there.
Under such circumstances, EU membership also became a priority for
countries located in the Black Sea Basin because of the prospects it
offered in terms of economic development and prosperity. The EU became
littoral to the Black Sea after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria
to the Union. Later on, the EU expanded its membership perspective
to cover all Balkan countries. For Turkey, which received candidate
status in 1999, the EU took priority over any other international
organization, including BSEC.
Western countries began to ignore BSEC only one or two years after
its establishment in 1992, despite the fact that they were initially
supportive. Neither BSEC nor any other regional initiatives were
mentioned in the expansion and partnership programs promoted by
the EU and NATO in the greater Black Sea Region. Therefore, BSEC was
unable to develop common strategies with NATO or the EU. Additionally,
unilateral policies formulated and implemented by NATO and the EU with
the aim of eastward enlargement caused Russia to feel threatened,
and as a result Moscow distanced itself from cooperation-oriented
policies. On the other hand, although NATO and the EU enfranchised
some Black Sea countries, they were unable to put forth any tangible
vision with regard to policies to be pursued if Georgia, Ukraine,
Moldova, or Azerbaijan were threatened, consequently exposing these
countries to increased Russian interference.
As a result, Russia's relentless efforts to expand its influence once
again, in addition to coordinated unilateral enlargement initiatives
put into action by NATO and the EU, inevitably undermined BSEC's
promise and potential to establish a solid ground for regional
cooperation. Today, it is polarization and war, instead of cooperation
and peace, that characterize the current context around the Black Sea
region. In this respect, the course of the Ukrainian crisis will act
as a serious litmus test that will reveal the true prospects of the
"greater European idea".
http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3891/why-did-not-the-black-sea-evolve-into-a-zone-of-cooperation.html