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FOR KIN OR COUNTRY: WHY THE CRIMEA CRISIS IS NOT ABOUT A GREATER RUSSIA PROJECT
Washington Post Blog
March 6 2014
By R. William Ayres and Stephen Saideman
R. William Ayres is associate dean of the Graduate School at Wright
State University. Stephen M. Saideman is the Paterson chair in
international affairs at Carleton University. They co-authored "For
Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism and War" (Columbia University
Press, 2008). Saideman's most recent book (with David Auerswald) is
"NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone" (Princeton
University Press, 2014).
News out of Crimea raises the possibility of irredentism. Irredentism
is the effort to reunify a "lost" territory inhabited by ethnic kin
with either a mother country or with other territories also inhabited
by ethnic kin (think of Kurds in multiple countries creating a Greater
Kurdistan). So, if Crimea is detached from Ukraine and becomes part
of Russia, it would be a successful case of irredentism. We have not
seen one of these since Armenia gained hunks of Azerbaijan as the
Soviet Union fell apart, and, yes, Russia helped the Armenians.
As the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was much concern about the
approximately 25 million Russians left outside of Russia, including
those in Ukraine. Yet, for the most part, Russia did far less than
what observers feared. In our book "For Kin or Country: Xenophobia,
Nationalism and War," we considered Russia to be in the category of
East European/Former Soviet cases that could have but did not engage
in irredentism -- the silent dog s-- which also included Hungary and
Romania. Our actively irredentist cases were Serbia, Croatia and
Armenia. Our book came out in 2008 just before the Russia/Georgia
conflict that could be seen as irredentism. So, our narcissistic
question would be: were we wrong? The less self-centered and far
more important question is: do the events of recent days suggest that
Putin's Russia is likely to engage in further acts of irredentism?
Our answer to that is: probably not. Why? Because some of the key
dynamics in irredentist efforts which we identified more than six
years ago are still relevant.
First, the plight of the kin is over-rated. We found that the relative
danger facing the kin in the "lost" territory mattered less than
people thought. So, while Ukrainian assurances to the ethnic Russians
in Crimea and elsewhere are a good idea, the mother country (Russia
in this case) may move aggressively even if the kin are safe, or they
may not act even if the kin are in danger. While Putin has played up
reports of ethnic Russians being harmed, most credible observers do
not think this is the case. There certainly is no history in recent
years of Russian-speakers in Crimea being mistreated by the Ukrainian
government. Moreover, it is not yet clear if the Crimean parliament
was acting in coordination with Moscow -- it could be that they are
asking for something that they will not get, as irredentism requires
the mother country to accept the territory.
Second, we argued in the book that Russian irredentism was not so
likely because Russia has an identity crisis: who counts as Russian?
Putin asserted his responsibility to protect all Russian speakers
(his statement was very similar to Hungary's Jozeff Antall saying
he was the leader of fifteen million Hungarians when the population
of Hungary was about ten million in 1990), but not all those living
in Russia agree that Russian nationalism includes Russophones as
members of the Russian nation. Indeed, the existing survey evidence
suggests that this crisis is not very popular back in Russia. Those
in Russia, especially those who vote in the next elections, may not
want yet another basket-case to drain the country's coffers (Crimean
supporters of annexation are unlikely to be future net contributors).
Indeed, a core part of our argument is that there will be nationalist
forces that are against some irredentist efforts because success means
including more "others" in one's country. Annexing Crimea means not
just more ethnic Russians in Russia but more Ukrainians and more
Tatars. Taking on further territories, like the Donetsk region,
raise even more problems of mixed populations. So, those who focus
more on intolerance in their nationalist identities may not want more
foreigners in the country.
Third, it is not clear that Putin is doing any of this for domestic
political purposes. That is, he is currently not seriously facing
strong competition from someone who claims to be a better Russian
nationalist, and he has a variety of tools at his disposal to deal with
domestic opposition, including arresting journalists and repressing
dissent. Oh, and corruption to buy off potential opponents. There
may be a domestic political payoff, in that the minority of Russians
who support annexing Crimea may care more than the majority who are
opposed, but there's no obvious reason why Putin needs that extra
margin of support.
Fourth, even if Russia does try to annex Crimea, it is still likely
to be the exception and not the rule. It will not be the start of
endless irredentism campaigns targeting the Russians in the rest of
the "near abroad." In our book, Crimea did stand out, as it combined
both national interests (the Black Sea fleet) with a group of kin
that was more interested than others in the Greater Russia project.
So, this crisis is not about a Greater Russia project, even if Crimea
ends up in either a semi-status a la Nagorno-Karabakh or annexed
in reality, as the policies focused here are unlikely to play out
in other places where ethnic Russians reside, such as the Baltic
Republics or even other parts of eastern Ukraine. As other writers at
the Monkey Cage have argued, this is really a second-best (if that)
effort by Putin to have influence in Ukraine after his preferred
non-irredentist one, keeping President Yanukovych in power, failed.
While countries containing some of the 25 million lost Russians
are concerned, they should not panic as Putin is not Hitler (almost
the original irredentist), and he is not even Milosevic of Greater
Serbia fame.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/06/for-kin-or-country-why-the-crimea-crisis-is-not-about-a-greater-russia-project/
Washington Post Blog
March 6 2014
By R. William Ayres and Stephen Saideman
R. William Ayres is associate dean of the Graduate School at Wright
State University. Stephen M. Saideman is the Paterson chair in
international affairs at Carleton University. They co-authored "For
Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism and War" (Columbia University
Press, 2008). Saideman's most recent book (with David Auerswald) is
"NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone" (Princeton
University Press, 2014).
News out of Crimea raises the possibility of irredentism. Irredentism
is the effort to reunify a "lost" territory inhabited by ethnic kin
with either a mother country or with other territories also inhabited
by ethnic kin (think of Kurds in multiple countries creating a Greater
Kurdistan). So, if Crimea is detached from Ukraine and becomes part
of Russia, it would be a successful case of irredentism. We have not
seen one of these since Armenia gained hunks of Azerbaijan as the
Soviet Union fell apart, and, yes, Russia helped the Armenians.
As the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was much concern about the
approximately 25 million Russians left outside of Russia, including
those in Ukraine. Yet, for the most part, Russia did far less than
what observers feared. In our book "For Kin or Country: Xenophobia,
Nationalism and War," we considered Russia to be in the category of
East European/Former Soviet cases that could have but did not engage
in irredentism -- the silent dog s-- which also included Hungary and
Romania. Our actively irredentist cases were Serbia, Croatia and
Armenia. Our book came out in 2008 just before the Russia/Georgia
conflict that could be seen as irredentism. So, our narcissistic
question would be: were we wrong? The less self-centered and far
more important question is: do the events of recent days suggest that
Putin's Russia is likely to engage in further acts of irredentism?
Our answer to that is: probably not. Why? Because some of the key
dynamics in irredentist efforts which we identified more than six
years ago are still relevant.
First, the plight of the kin is over-rated. We found that the relative
danger facing the kin in the "lost" territory mattered less than
people thought. So, while Ukrainian assurances to the ethnic Russians
in Crimea and elsewhere are a good idea, the mother country (Russia
in this case) may move aggressively even if the kin are safe, or they
may not act even if the kin are in danger. While Putin has played up
reports of ethnic Russians being harmed, most credible observers do
not think this is the case. There certainly is no history in recent
years of Russian-speakers in Crimea being mistreated by the Ukrainian
government. Moreover, it is not yet clear if the Crimean parliament
was acting in coordination with Moscow -- it could be that they are
asking for something that they will not get, as irredentism requires
the mother country to accept the territory.
Second, we argued in the book that Russian irredentism was not so
likely because Russia has an identity crisis: who counts as Russian?
Putin asserted his responsibility to protect all Russian speakers
(his statement was very similar to Hungary's Jozeff Antall saying
he was the leader of fifteen million Hungarians when the population
of Hungary was about ten million in 1990), but not all those living
in Russia agree that Russian nationalism includes Russophones as
members of the Russian nation. Indeed, the existing survey evidence
suggests that this crisis is not very popular back in Russia. Those
in Russia, especially those who vote in the next elections, may not
want yet another basket-case to drain the country's coffers (Crimean
supporters of annexation are unlikely to be future net contributors).
Indeed, a core part of our argument is that there will be nationalist
forces that are against some irredentist efforts because success means
including more "others" in one's country. Annexing Crimea means not
just more ethnic Russians in Russia but more Ukrainians and more
Tatars. Taking on further territories, like the Donetsk region,
raise even more problems of mixed populations. So, those who focus
more on intolerance in their nationalist identities may not want more
foreigners in the country.
Third, it is not clear that Putin is doing any of this for domestic
political purposes. That is, he is currently not seriously facing
strong competition from someone who claims to be a better Russian
nationalist, and he has a variety of tools at his disposal to deal with
domestic opposition, including arresting journalists and repressing
dissent. Oh, and corruption to buy off potential opponents. There
may be a domestic political payoff, in that the minority of Russians
who support annexing Crimea may care more than the majority who are
opposed, but there's no obvious reason why Putin needs that extra
margin of support.
Fourth, even if Russia does try to annex Crimea, it is still likely
to be the exception and not the rule. It will not be the start of
endless irredentism campaigns targeting the Russians in the rest of
the "near abroad." In our book, Crimea did stand out, as it combined
both national interests (the Black Sea fleet) with a group of kin
that was more interested than others in the Greater Russia project.
So, this crisis is not about a Greater Russia project, even if Crimea
ends up in either a semi-status a la Nagorno-Karabakh or annexed
in reality, as the policies focused here are unlikely to play out
in other places where ethnic Russians reside, such as the Baltic
Republics or even other parts of eastern Ukraine. As other writers at
the Monkey Cage have argued, this is really a second-best (if that)
effort by Putin to have influence in Ukraine after his preferred
non-irredentist one, keeping President Yanukovych in power, failed.
While countries containing some of the 25 million lost Russians
are concerned, they should not panic as Putin is not Hitler (almost
the original irredentist), and he is not even Milosevic of Greater
Serbia fame.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/06/for-kin-or-country-why-the-crimea-crisis-is-not-about-a-greater-russia-project/