Salem News, Oregon
March 9 2014
Resisters of Sykes-Picot Land Grab Perform Key Fighting Roles in Syria
Dr. Franklin Lamb Salem-News.com
"Syria will not kneel to the Zionist-Arab project to destroy the unity
and independence of the Syrian Arab Republic" - PFLI fighters
(NORTH OF LATAKIA, Syria) - Every school kid here in Syria learns at
an early age about the various colonial land grabs that have lopped
off key parts of their ancient country, and they receive instruction
about their national duty to recover this sacred territory. The
concept applies equally to still-occupied Palestine, or at least it
did before the 2011 uprising got started, albeit since then a degree
of resentment has arisen over participation by some Palestinians with
rebel groups seeking to topple the Syrian government.
Be that as it may, one such land grab historically remembered, and
which is currently galvanizing resistance on behalf of Syria, is that
of Iskenderun, north of Latakia, in a disputed Syria-Turkish border
area. As Turkish, Saudi, and Qatari-sponsored jihadists continue to
enter the country, well worth remembering is it that Iskenderun is
rich in natural resources and that for thousands of years it was part
of Syria. But that status changed more than half a century ago when
France cut it off from Syria and grafted it onto Turkey--and now some
pro-government militias are fighting to get it back.
The name derives from Alexander the Great, who around 333 BC encamped
in the area and ordered a city be built, although the exact site of
the historic city is subject to dispute. At any rate, the strategic
importance of Iskenderun comes from its geographical relation to
Syrian Gates, the easiest approach to the open ground of Hatay
Province and Aleppo, and the dispute over it has been heating up
recently, partly as a result of the current crisis.
Occupied Iskenderun
It all started on July 5, 1938, when Turkish forces under Colonel
Sukril Kanath launched an aggression, with French approval, and
ethnically cleansed the local Armenian Christian and Allawi
populations. The Turkish invasion was enabled by the French, partners
with Britain in Sykes-Picot, who had remained as illegal occupiers of
Syria, a holdover from the League of Nations mandate. The French were
complicit in a rigged referendum, essentially ceding to Turkey this
Syrian territory, which by then was referred to as the Republic of
Hatay. It was a land grab. Pure and simple. And it was part of a
secret deal to secure Turkey's help with the fast approaching war with
Germany. Paris and Ankara struck a deal: Turkey, while not joining the
allies against Germany, declared neutrality and essentially sat out
World War II.
Syria, rather than being expansionist, as it is sometimes accused of
by Turkey and the Zionist regime, has actually been losing territory,
not gaining it. "We lost northern Palestine in 1918, Lebanon in 1920,
and the Iskenderun area through French duplicity," said a retired
diplomat here. "Surely Lebanon must also be returned to Syria. It was
never a real country and it never will be as far as I am concerned. It
is part of Syria!" Indeed, as Robert Fisk points out, after the First
World War, most Lebanese wished their land to remain part of Syria
(see the results of the King-Crane Commission) rather than live in a
separate "nation" under French domination. As we parted, the gentleman
shook my hand and declared: "Of course Iskendurun is part of Syria. No
honest person can deny this!"
Enter one remarkable Syrian nationalist, Ali Kayali, aka "Abu Zaki".
So how did a polite gentleman from this region of Turkish-occupied
Syria end up leading one of the most effective resistance militias in
the northern theater in the current Syrian crisis? Basically he did it
the same way as untold numbers of Palestinians supporting young Syrian
men during the early 1980's. Ali went to Beirut to resist the 1982
Zionist aggression. There he was baptized by fire, so to speak,
carrying the banner of his new group, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Iskenderun (PFLI) under the tutelage of Dr. George
Habash and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
Ali fought in a number of south Lebanon fronts, and also inside West
Beirut, but then after the PLO withdrawal (on 8/20/82), he returned to
Syria, to Tartous, joining the rebellion against PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat. Near Bedwari camp he fought, as part of the Fatah Intifada
uprising, this following the PLO split along -pro-Arafat and pro-Hafez
Assad cleavages.
Later, Ali undertook study on his own in Tartous (Tripoli, Syria), and
at one point escaped from prison in Turkey where he had been jailed
for demonstrating against the fascist regime in Ankara. Returning to
Syria, he joined Syrian Army battles against the Bilal Shaaban-led Al
Tawhid Islamic (Muslim Brotherhood ), following which he and the PFLI
moved to the area of Halba in Akkar, Lebanon, and organized a
resistance training camp. Eventually, however, he returned to Syria to
continue the fight to liberate the Syrian territory of Iskenderun, and
while supported by Syrian citizens, the Kayali-led group was not
formally part of the Syrian security/resistance apparatus.
Speaking with non-government analysts in Latkia, this observer was
repeatedly told that the PFLI has the reputation of understanding the
geography and politics of the Syrian coast area where its fighters are
currently active, including Aleppo, Banias, between Tartous and the
countryside around Latakia, as well as the Idlib, Homs and Damascus
areas.
As PFLI fighters and officials put it, "Syria will not kneel to the
Zionist-Arab project to destroy the unity and independence of the
Syrian Arab Republic." According to one PFLI spokesperson, the group
"supports and stands in the same trench, hand in hand with the state,
confronting two foreign projects--the first being to destroy the
achievements of the Syrian people and Syria's social fabric and
multi-cultural heritage, and the second being to infiltrate foreign
intruders."
One place the PFLI is currently fighting is the strategic rebel
bastion of Yabrud, in the Qalamoun Mountains, north of Damascus, near
the Lebanese border. On 3/3/14, during a meeting with this observer
and some of his associates, Ali Kyali received a phone call relaying
information that Sahel village, about four miles from Yabrud, had come
under control of Syrian and pro-Syrian forces, including the PFLI.
Remarkably open with battlefield details, Ali explained that pro-Syria
forces do not want to occupy Yabrud, but rather the strategy is to
control the villages surrounding it in order to trap al Nursa and
other rebel militia inside. Asked about the trapped local population
and reminded of the fate of the inner city populations of Aleppo, Homs
and a dozen other locations, Ali shrugged and turned up his palms.
Commander Ali discussing PFLI positions 3/4/14
Today (3/7/14) the PFLI is fighting to try to cut off the road linking
Yabrud to Arsal in eastern Lebanon, whose majority population supports
the Syrian revolt. PFIL fighters were involved last week with the fall
of Al-Sahl, a town a little over a mile south of Yabrud, and now are
fighting in and around Yaboud, preparing for the anticipated final
assault. According to Ali's personal bodyguards, they are facing
Al-Qaida's Syria affiliate, al-Nusra Front. Some of PFLI's 3000 troops
are also fighting this week in Douma, Jobar, Aleppo, the countryside
around Lattakia, and Deralcia near Nubek on the main Damascus-Homs
highway. They also played a key role earlier in Baniyas, in the battle
between Tartous and Latakia. One YouTube clip being given to visitors
to the PFLI HQ in Latakia shows the group's participation, including
women, in a recent important battle against the ISIS:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghmBIn-yjH8.
The PFLI organization receives a variety of random and sporadic
support from the local community, according to Mr. Kayali and his
staff, but they, like most militia, need money and weapons and regular
supplies of food. Also needed are places for the fighters to sleep, as
well as more uniforms to accommodate a sharp influx of applicants
seeking to join their ranks. Additionally there is the matter of
funding death benefit payments for the families of PFLI men and women
killed during resistance.
PFLI fighters are not paid salaries, which sets them apart financially
from many Gulf-backed and Western-trained militia, who can garner
monthly salaries from $500-$1,000. By contrast, pro-government popular
committees, numbering approximately 5,000, and National Defense units,
whose fighters number around 25,000, receive approximately 20,000
Syrian Pounds, or $126 a month. Footing much of this bill are Syrian
businessmen such as Rami Mahlouf, cousin of President Bashar Assad.
Regular Syrian army recruits get only 3000 Syrian pounds, or about $20
monthly, but they also receive food and lodging and health and travel
benefits. Syrian army reservists are said to receive approximately
$10.50 per month.
For Ali Kayali, the PFLI is also a family matter. His wife and
daughter and two sons are deeply connected with its resistance goals.
His sons are fighters, as are his wife and daughter when called upon,
though in-between time they do other resistance projects. Nicked-named
"Joan of Arc," his 22-year-old daughter attends medical school, but
reportedly is also a ferocious fighter and adept battlefield
tactician, with dramatic results in a number of battles against rebels
over the past nearly two years. She is a strong, no-nonsense feminist
and told me she loves to shock takfiris, who sometimes appear amazed
to see her and her female unit chasing them up the side of some
mountain.
"Joan of arc" with part of her Resistance family
It is said that an army (or a militia, for that matter) travels on its
stomach. This observer was treated to an impromptu roadside lunch with
half a dozen PFLI fighters last week. Their favorite cook, Mahmoud, a
small guy who always seems to wear the same blue shirt, invited us.
Within minutes, Mahmoud gathered some twigs and small chunks of wood,
lit a small fire, covered it with a metal grate, grabbed a bag of
flour, mixed in water, kneaded it a bit, and shaped and roasted some
small, irregular round loaves. On these he sprinkled, from another
plastic bag, some handfuls of spices. His fast and hot food was
delicious, constituting Mhamra manouche (roasted pita bread with spicy
red pepper sauce), Zaatar manouche (oregano, thyme, & sesame seeds),
and Jibneh (cheese) manouche.
Roadside lunch with Mahmoud and PFLI fighters 3/4/14
Captagon Jihad?
Sitting in the lobby of a run-down, less-than-one-star, dockside hotel
opposite the Mediterranean, a lodging establishment occasionally used
as quarters by various militia, this observer and his companion spoke
leisurely one early morning with one of Ali Kyali's sons and a
companion. When not fighting jihadists (in "Have AK-47, Will
Travel"-mode), they are among his father's bodyguards. I have for a
while been interested in claims by Western governments that they are
supplying "humanitarian non-lethal aid" to rebel groups, including
night goggles, telecommunication equipment, and GPS devices. This
observer views all such equipment as misnamed and indeed lethal
inasmuch as they facilitate one side killing the other via night
snipers or through expedition of troop movements. I was a bit
surprised to learn what PFLI fighters thought of this kind of
equipment being given to their adversaries and labeled 'humanitarian
aid.'
"Not having night goggles, except for some we take off the enemy, is
not much of a problem for us because we can sense where al Nusra
fighters are, and they tend not to fight at night," Ali's son told me.
I asked why the reluctance to fight at night, thinking maybe it had
something to do with a religious edict of some sort, but once more I
was mistaken.
"No it's not that, it's because they are too paranoid and exhausted,
from taking captagon and even stronger drugs, to fight at night."
According the guys I was sitting with, some with more than two years
fighting experience with the PFLI, many, if not most, of the
Gulf-sponsored jihadists are given bags of pills to enhance their
battlefield courage. And it works to a degree. At dawn each day,
jihadists take drugs, including large doses of captagon and other
widely available drugs. There also are some particularly potent drugs,
known locally as "baltcon," "afoun," and "zolm," as well as opium,
heroin, cocaine, and hashish. The main drug routes into the Syrian
battle zones, I was advised, run from Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Lebanon, with lesser amounts coming via Turkey, Iraq and Jordan.
Lebanon's Bekaa valley apparently produces large amounts of captagon
pills for shipment to the Gulf, and now to Syria. Jihadists high on
drugs apparently feel invincible, and hostile, and do not fear death.
Many are indeed ferocious and fearless fighters during the day, as
many media sources have reported. But by nightfall, when the drug
wears off, the fighters become exhausted and sometimes are found
asleep on the very scene of battle they were fighting from.
Captagon, a popular 'battlefield courage booster'
"Many of the 'Gulfies' are in fact heavily addicted to strong
heroin-like drugs. They crave them, and sometimes they even fight with
their fellow militiamen to get their 'fixes.' We are told by some we
capture that sometimes, when one of their comrades is killed, the
fallen fighter's 'friends' will descend on his body, not particularly
to pray over it, but to rummage his pockets for his drugs."
In point of fact, in 2011 alone, Lebanese authorities confiscated
three amphetamine production labs, in addition to two
Captagon-producing labs, which they claim were responsible for sending
hundreds of thousands of the pills to the Gulf. The seizure of trucks
with captagon in their chassis in Lebanon, and at Beirut airport,
shows a growing demand for these products in the Syrian militia
market. The UN recently reported that the Middle and Near East are
experiencing the majority of drug busts globally.
Al Nusra Front and ISIS--being some of the more extreme "imported
jihadists," as some here call them--claim to be better fighters than
Hezbollah, whose units set the fighting skill bar fairly high these
days. Some of them claim they have not really started their battle to
defeat Hezbollah on its own territory, but will do so when they are
ready. But as one PFLI fighter explained, and some of his buddies
nodded agreement, only when high on drugs do Qatari/Saudi jihadists
exhibit bravery and bravado. Only then do they pose a serious threat,
because they ignore normal defensive fighting tactics.
"We know many of these guys quite well. Lots of them were never even
religious. There are many who are drug addicts, who get high and lose
their fear of dying, so they are dangerous to confront, and they often
use strange tactics."
According to another PFLI source, the "imported Jihadists" die in high
numbers because they ignore the battlefield realities. Their average
number of dead in any given firefight over the past two years is
estimated to be approximately five times the number of Hezbollah
casualties, three times the number of PFLI fighters, and twice the
number of casualties than the regular Syrian army.
As the Syrian crisis enters its fourth year, with more jihadists
arriving and more militia being formed across the political and
religious spectrum, the US intelligence community and congressional
sources are now predicting the war will continue for another decade or
more. It's anyone's guess what the post-Syrian crisis period will
bring to this region given the rise of ethno-nationalism along with
demands for the return of Sykes-Picot land grabs. There are also
growing signs of a cataclysmic intifada in Palestine. When you add to
all that US intelligence predictions of the overthrow of two, and
possibly three, Gulf monarchies, another Hezbollah-Zionist war, plus
the deterioration of the social and religious fabric across the
region, the future looks bleak indeed.
First published by al Manar
http://www.salem-news.com/articles/march082014/syria-resistance-fl.php
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
March 9 2014
Resisters of Sykes-Picot Land Grab Perform Key Fighting Roles in Syria
Dr. Franklin Lamb Salem-News.com
"Syria will not kneel to the Zionist-Arab project to destroy the unity
and independence of the Syrian Arab Republic" - PFLI fighters
(NORTH OF LATAKIA, Syria) - Every school kid here in Syria learns at
an early age about the various colonial land grabs that have lopped
off key parts of their ancient country, and they receive instruction
about their national duty to recover this sacred territory. The
concept applies equally to still-occupied Palestine, or at least it
did before the 2011 uprising got started, albeit since then a degree
of resentment has arisen over participation by some Palestinians with
rebel groups seeking to topple the Syrian government.
Be that as it may, one such land grab historically remembered, and
which is currently galvanizing resistance on behalf of Syria, is that
of Iskenderun, north of Latakia, in a disputed Syria-Turkish border
area. As Turkish, Saudi, and Qatari-sponsored jihadists continue to
enter the country, well worth remembering is it that Iskenderun is
rich in natural resources and that for thousands of years it was part
of Syria. But that status changed more than half a century ago when
France cut it off from Syria and grafted it onto Turkey--and now some
pro-government militias are fighting to get it back.
The name derives from Alexander the Great, who around 333 BC encamped
in the area and ordered a city be built, although the exact site of
the historic city is subject to dispute. At any rate, the strategic
importance of Iskenderun comes from its geographical relation to
Syrian Gates, the easiest approach to the open ground of Hatay
Province and Aleppo, and the dispute over it has been heating up
recently, partly as a result of the current crisis.
Occupied Iskenderun
It all started on July 5, 1938, when Turkish forces under Colonel
Sukril Kanath launched an aggression, with French approval, and
ethnically cleansed the local Armenian Christian and Allawi
populations. The Turkish invasion was enabled by the French, partners
with Britain in Sykes-Picot, who had remained as illegal occupiers of
Syria, a holdover from the League of Nations mandate. The French were
complicit in a rigged referendum, essentially ceding to Turkey this
Syrian territory, which by then was referred to as the Republic of
Hatay. It was a land grab. Pure and simple. And it was part of a
secret deal to secure Turkey's help with the fast approaching war with
Germany. Paris and Ankara struck a deal: Turkey, while not joining the
allies against Germany, declared neutrality and essentially sat out
World War II.
Syria, rather than being expansionist, as it is sometimes accused of
by Turkey and the Zionist regime, has actually been losing territory,
not gaining it. "We lost northern Palestine in 1918, Lebanon in 1920,
and the Iskenderun area through French duplicity," said a retired
diplomat here. "Surely Lebanon must also be returned to Syria. It was
never a real country and it never will be as far as I am concerned. It
is part of Syria!" Indeed, as Robert Fisk points out, after the First
World War, most Lebanese wished their land to remain part of Syria
(see the results of the King-Crane Commission) rather than live in a
separate "nation" under French domination. As we parted, the gentleman
shook my hand and declared: "Of course Iskendurun is part of Syria. No
honest person can deny this!"
Enter one remarkable Syrian nationalist, Ali Kayali, aka "Abu Zaki".
So how did a polite gentleman from this region of Turkish-occupied
Syria end up leading one of the most effective resistance militias in
the northern theater in the current Syrian crisis? Basically he did it
the same way as untold numbers of Palestinians supporting young Syrian
men during the early 1980's. Ali went to Beirut to resist the 1982
Zionist aggression. There he was baptized by fire, so to speak,
carrying the banner of his new group, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Iskenderun (PFLI) under the tutelage of Dr. George
Habash and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
Ali fought in a number of south Lebanon fronts, and also inside West
Beirut, but then after the PLO withdrawal (on 8/20/82), he returned to
Syria, to Tartous, joining the rebellion against PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat. Near Bedwari camp he fought, as part of the Fatah Intifada
uprising, this following the PLO split along -pro-Arafat and pro-Hafez
Assad cleavages.
Later, Ali undertook study on his own in Tartous (Tripoli, Syria), and
at one point escaped from prison in Turkey where he had been jailed
for demonstrating against the fascist regime in Ankara. Returning to
Syria, he joined Syrian Army battles against the Bilal Shaaban-led Al
Tawhid Islamic (Muslim Brotherhood ), following which he and the PFLI
moved to the area of Halba in Akkar, Lebanon, and organized a
resistance training camp. Eventually, however, he returned to Syria to
continue the fight to liberate the Syrian territory of Iskenderun, and
while supported by Syrian citizens, the Kayali-led group was not
formally part of the Syrian security/resistance apparatus.
Speaking with non-government analysts in Latkia, this observer was
repeatedly told that the PFLI has the reputation of understanding the
geography and politics of the Syrian coast area where its fighters are
currently active, including Aleppo, Banias, between Tartous and the
countryside around Latakia, as well as the Idlib, Homs and Damascus
areas.
As PFLI fighters and officials put it, "Syria will not kneel to the
Zionist-Arab project to destroy the unity and independence of the
Syrian Arab Republic." According to one PFLI spokesperson, the group
"supports and stands in the same trench, hand in hand with the state,
confronting two foreign projects--the first being to destroy the
achievements of the Syrian people and Syria's social fabric and
multi-cultural heritage, and the second being to infiltrate foreign
intruders."
One place the PFLI is currently fighting is the strategic rebel
bastion of Yabrud, in the Qalamoun Mountains, north of Damascus, near
the Lebanese border. On 3/3/14, during a meeting with this observer
and some of his associates, Ali Kyali received a phone call relaying
information that Sahel village, about four miles from Yabrud, had come
under control of Syrian and pro-Syrian forces, including the PFLI.
Remarkably open with battlefield details, Ali explained that pro-Syria
forces do not want to occupy Yabrud, but rather the strategy is to
control the villages surrounding it in order to trap al Nursa and
other rebel militia inside. Asked about the trapped local population
and reminded of the fate of the inner city populations of Aleppo, Homs
and a dozen other locations, Ali shrugged and turned up his palms.
Commander Ali discussing PFLI positions 3/4/14
Today (3/7/14) the PFLI is fighting to try to cut off the road linking
Yabrud to Arsal in eastern Lebanon, whose majority population supports
the Syrian revolt. PFIL fighters were involved last week with the fall
of Al-Sahl, a town a little over a mile south of Yabrud, and now are
fighting in and around Yaboud, preparing for the anticipated final
assault. According to Ali's personal bodyguards, they are facing
Al-Qaida's Syria affiliate, al-Nusra Front. Some of PFLI's 3000 troops
are also fighting this week in Douma, Jobar, Aleppo, the countryside
around Lattakia, and Deralcia near Nubek on the main Damascus-Homs
highway. They also played a key role earlier in Baniyas, in the battle
between Tartous and Latakia. One YouTube clip being given to visitors
to the PFLI HQ in Latakia shows the group's participation, including
women, in a recent important battle against the ISIS:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghmBIn-yjH8.
The PFLI organization receives a variety of random and sporadic
support from the local community, according to Mr. Kayali and his
staff, but they, like most militia, need money and weapons and regular
supplies of food. Also needed are places for the fighters to sleep, as
well as more uniforms to accommodate a sharp influx of applicants
seeking to join their ranks. Additionally there is the matter of
funding death benefit payments for the families of PFLI men and women
killed during resistance.
PFLI fighters are not paid salaries, which sets them apart financially
from many Gulf-backed and Western-trained militia, who can garner
monthly salaries from $500-$1,000. By contrast, pro-government popular
committees, numbering approximately 5,000, and National Defense units,
whose fighters number around 25,000, receive approximately 20,000
Syrian Pounds, or $126 a month. Footing much of this bill are Syrian
businessmen such as Rami Mahlouf, cousin of President Bashar Assad.
Regular Syrian army recruits get only 3000 Syrian pounds, or about $20
monthly, but they also receive food and lodging and health and travel
benefits. Syrian army reservists are said to receive approximately
$10.50 per month.
For Ali Kayali, the PFLI is also a family matter. His wife and
daughter and two sons are deeply connected with its resistance goals.
His sons are fighters, as are his wife and daughter when called upon,
though in-between time they do other resistance projects. Nicked-named
"Joan of Arc," his 22-year-old daughter attends medical school, but
reportedly is also a ferocious fighter and adept battlefield
tactician, with dramatic results in a number of battles against rebels
over the past nearly two years. She is a strong, no-nonsense feminist
and told me she loves to shock takfiris, who sometimes appear amazed
to see her and her female unit chasing them up the side of some
mountain.
"Joan of arc" with part of her Resistance family
It is said that an army (or a militia, for that matter) travels on its
stomach. This observer was treated to an impromptu roadside lunch with
half a dozen PFLI fighters last week. Their favorite cook, Mahmoud, a
small guy who always seems to wear the same blue shirt, invited us.
Within minutes, Mahmoud gathered some twigs and small chunks of wood,
lit a small fire, covered it with a metal grate, grabbed a bag of
flour, mixed in water, kneaded it a bit, and shaped and roasted some
small, irregular round loaves. On these he sprinkled, from another
plastic bag, some handfuls of spices. His fast and hot food was
delicious, constituting Mhamra manouche (roasted pita bread with spicy
red pepper sauce), Zaatar manouche (oregano, thyme, & sesame seeds),
and Jibneh (cheese) manouche.
Roadside lunch with Mahmoud and PFLI fighters 3/4/14
Captagon Jihad?
Sitting in the lobby of a run-down, less-than-one-star, dockside hotel
opposite the Mediterranean, a lodging establishment occasionally used
as quarters by various militia, this observer and his companion spoke
leisurely one early morning with one of Ali Kyali's sons and a
companion. When not fighting jihadists (in "Have AK-47, Will
Travel"-mode), they are among his father's bodyguards. I have for a
while been interested in claims by Western governments that they are
supplying "humanitarian non-lethal aid" to rebel groups, including
night goggles, telecommunication equipment, and GPS devices. This
observer views all such equipment as misnamed and indeed lethal
inasmuch as they facilitate one side killing the other via night
snipers or through expedition of troop movements. I was a bit
surprised to learn what PFLI fighters thought of this kind of
equipment being given to their adversaries and labeled 'humanitarian
aid.'
"Not having night goggles, except for some we take off the enemy, is
not much of a problem for us because we can sense where al Nusra
fighters are, and they tend not to fight at night," Ali's son told me.
I asked why the reluctance to fight at night, thinking maybe it had
something to do with a religious edict of some sort, but once more I
was mistaken.
"No it's not that, it's because they are too paranoid and exhausted,
from taking captagon and even stronger drugs, to fight at night."
According the guys I was sitting with, some with more than two years
fighting experience with the PFLI, many, if not most, of the
Gulf-sponsored jihadists are given bags of pills to enhance their
battlefield courage. And it works to a degree. At dawn each day,
jihadists take drugs, including large doses of captagon and other
widely available drugs. There also are some particularly potent drugs,
known locally as "baltcon," "afoun," and "zolm," as well as opium,
heroin, cocaine, and hashish. The main drug routes into the Syrian
battle zones, I was advised, run from Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Lebanon, with lesser amounts coming via Turkey, Iraq and Jordan.
Lebanon's Bekaa valley apparently produces large amounts of captagon
pills for shipment to the Gulf, and now to Syria. Jihadists high on
drugs apparently feel invincible, and hostile, and do not fear death.
Many are indeed ferocious and fearless fighters during the day, as
many media sources have reported. But by nightfall, when the drug
wears off, the fighters become exhausted and sometimes are found
asleep on the very scene of battle they were fighting from.
Captagon, a popular 'battlefield courage booster'
"Many of the 'Gulfies' are in fact heavily addicted to strong
heroin-like drugs. They crave them, and sometimes they even fight with
their fellow militiamen to get their 'fixes.' We are told by some we
capture that sometimes, when one of their comrades is killed, the
fallen fighter's 'friends' will descend on his body, not particularly
to pray over it, but to rummage his pockets for his drugs."
In point of fact, in 2011 alone, Lebanese authorities confiscated
three amphetamine production labs, in addition to two
Captagon-producing labs, which they claim were responsible for sending
hundreds of thousands of the pills to the Gulf. The seizure of trucks
with captagon in their chassis in Lebanon, and at Beirut airport,
shows a growing demand for these products in the Syrian militia
market. The UN recently reported that the Middle and Near East are
experiencing the majority of drug busts globally.
Al Nusra Front and ISIS--being some of the more extreme "imported
jihadists," as some here call them--claim to be better fighters than
Hezbollah, whose units set the fighting skill bar fairly high these
days. Some of them claim they have not really started their battle to
defeat Hezbollah on its own territory, but will do so when they are
ready. But as one PFLI fighter explained, and some of his buddies
nodded agreement, only when high on drugs do Qatari/Saudi jihadists
exhibit bravery and bravado. Only then do they pose a serious threat,
because they ignore normal defensive fighting tactics.
"We know many of these guys quite well. Lots of them were never even
religious. There are many who are drug addicts, who get high and lose
their fear of dying, so they are dangerous to confront, and they often
use strange tactics."
According to another PFLI source, the "imported Jihadists" die in high
numbers because they ignore the battlefield realities. Their average
number of dead in any given firefight over the past two years is
estimated to be approximately five times the number of Hezbollah
casualties, three times the number of PFLI fighters, and twice the
number of casualties than the regular Syrian army.
As the Syrian crisis enters its fourth year, with more jihadists
arriving and more militia being formed across the political and
religious spectrum, the US intelligence community and congressional
sources are now predicting the war will continue for another decade or
more. It's anyone's guess what the post-Syrian crisis period will
bring to this region given the rise of ethno-nationalism along with
demands for the return of Sykes-Picot land grabs. There are also
growing signs of a cataclysmic intifada in Palestine. When you add to
all that US intelligence predictions of the overthrow of two, and
possibly three, Gulf monarchies, another Hezbollah-Zionist war, plus
the deterioration of the social and religious fabric across the
region, the future looks bleak indeed.
First published by al Manar
http://www.salem-news.com/articles/march082014/syria-resistance-fl.php
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress