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Ukraine crisis: Russia's neighbours are nervous - but the huge costs
of intervention beyond Crimea are likely to make Moscow think twice
Despite the fears of small states, President Putin is unlikely to seek
to redraw his country's borders
MARY DEJEVSKY
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-russias-neighbours-are-nervous--but-the-huge-costs-of-intervention-beyond-crimea-are-likely-to-make-moscow-think-twice-9179093.html
Sunday 09 March 2014
There is a view, expressed in Brussels last week with much passion by
President Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania, that, having occupied
Crimea, Russia will try to redraw the borders of its neighbouring
states, starting with Moldova and the Baltic states. But how realistic
is such a proposition?
Paradoxically, it is probably least likely in the Baltic states, the
very place that Russian expansionism is feared the most. It was
recognised in Moscow, even before the Soviet Union broke up, that the
annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was of dubious legality
and that the three states should be allowed to break away. That they
are now members of both the EU and Nato affords them exactly the
protection they sought when they applied to join.
Estonia, as the closest to Russia and the one with a Russian minority
concentrated at the border, might be seen as the most at risk. Russia
could, for instance, invoke the same "responsibility to protect" as it
has threatened to invoke in eastern Ukraine. Two factors militate
against this. Nato's Article 5 - an attack on one is treated as an
attack on all - is the first. The second is the border treaty recently
agreed between Estonia and Russia, which means that the frontier is no
longer disputed.
Moving east, there is Belarus. Like Ukraine, it has developed a sense
of its own nationhood in the 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Like Ukraine, too, its economic ties with Russia - energy
dependence, in particular - have not changed to reflect that new
reality. But there is no need at all for Russia to use force to tie
Belarus to Moscow more closely, partly because Belarus has no
equivalent of the western Ukraine which hankers after a future in the
EU, and partly because ties of all kinds could hardly be closer.
Moldova is in many ways the most vulnerable, not least because, like
Ukraine, it looks both ways and, were Romania to push for closer
relations with Moldova, Russia might interpret this as a threat.
Against that, Russia has done nothing about Romania issuing passports
to Moldovans. Nor has Moldova made any move to incorporate the mainly
Russian-speaking territory of Transnistria - whether for lack of will
or lack of power. This makes it hard for Moscow to claim security as a
pretext for seizing Transnistria with which it has no common border.
Would Russia try to reincorporate the republics of the Transcaucasus?
It had its chance to occupy and effect regime change in Georgia in
2008, but settled for leaving its troops in the two contested Russian
enclaves. Armenia is independent-minded, with a strong sense of
identity, but also relatively compliant. Azerbaijan prefers to grow
rich from oil than engage in international politics.
Different considerations apply to the five central Asian states, but
the conclusion has to be the same. Intervention would be more trouble
than it was worth. There is a large, but declining, Russian minority
in Kazakhstan that might one day seek protection from the Kazakh
majority, but the logistics would be horrendous. Russia had an
opportunity to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, but to the surprise of
many, declined.
The only possible reason for Russia to become more actively engaged
militarily in central Asia would be to combat the influence of China,
but that is some way down the line. The comparative poverty of these
states, booming populations and distance from Moscow would make them
more of a liability than an asset to Russia in almost every way.
A factor contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union was the
reluctance of Russians to continue supporting the poor and populous
south. That same sentiment is now directed against the subsidies being
funnelled to Chechnya. Ukraine is unique in its combination of a
divided population, its strategic position and its age-old ties to
Russia. But even here, the huge costs - not just in financial terms -
of intervention beyond Crimea are likely to make Moscow think twice.
of intervention beyond Crimea are likely to make Moscow think twice
Despite the fears of small states, President Putin is unlikely to seek
to redraw his country's borders
MARY DEJEVSKY
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-russias-neighbours-are-nervous--but-the-huge-costs-of-intervention-beyond-crimea-are-likely-to-make-moscow-think-twice-9179093.html
Sunday 09 March 2014
There is a view, expressed in Brussels last week with much passion by
President Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania, that, having occupied
Crimea, Russia will try to redraw the borders of its neighbouring
states, starting with Moldova and the Baltic states. But how realistic
is such a proposition?
Paradoxically, it is probably least likely in the Baltic states, the
very place that Russian expansionism is feared the most. It was
recognised in Moscow, even before the Soviet Union broke up, that the
annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was of dubious legality
and that the three states should be allowed to break away. That they
are now members of both the EU and Nato affords them exactly the
protection they sought when they applied to join.
Estonia, as the closest to Russia and the one with a Russian minority
concentrated at the border, might be seen as the most at risk. Russia
could, for instance, invoke the same "responsibility to protect" as it
has threatened to invoke in eastern Ukraine. Two factors militate
against this. Nato's Article 5 - an attack on one is treated as an
attack on all - is the first. The second is the border treaty recently
agreed between Estonia and Russia, which means that the frontier is no
longer disputed.
Moving east, there is Belarus. Like Ukraine, it has developed a sense
of its own nationhood in the 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Like Ukraine, too, its economic ties with Russia - energy
dependence, in particular - have not changed to reflect that new
reality. But there is no need at all for Russia to use force to tie
Belarus to Moscow more closely, partly because Belarus has no
equivalent of the western Ukraine which hankers after a future in the
EU, and partly because ties of all kinds could hardly be closer.
Moldova is in many ways the most vulnerable, not least because, like
Ukraine, it looks both ways and, were Romania to push for closer
relations with Moldova, Russia might interpret this as a threat.
Against that, Russia has done nothing about Romania issuing passports
to Moldovans. Nor has Moldova made any move to incorporate the mainly
Russian-speaking territory of Transnistria - whether for lack of will
or lack of power. This makes it hard for Moscow to claim security as a
pretext for seizing Transnistria with which it has no common border.
Would Russia try to reincorporate the republics of the Transcaucasus?
It had its chance to occupy and effect regime change in Georgia in
2008, but settled for leaving its troops in the two contested Russian
enclaves. Armenia is independent-minded, with a strong sense of
identity, but also relatively compliant. Azerbaijan prefers to grow
rich from oil than engage in international politics.
Different considerations apply to the five central Asian states, but
the conclusion has to be the same. Intervention would be more trouble
than it was worth. There is a large, but declining, Russian minority
in Kazakhstan that might one day seek protection from the Kazakh
majority, but the logistics would be horrendous. Russia had an
opportunity to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, but to the surprise of
many, declined.
The only possible reason for Russia to become more actively engaged
militarily in central Asia would be to combat the influence of China,
but that is some way down the line. The comparative poverty of these
states, booming populations and distance from Moscow would make them
more of a liability than an asset to Russia in almost every way.
A factor contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union was the
reluctance of Russians to continue supporting the poor and populous
south. That same sentiment is now directed against the subsidies being
funnelled to Chechnya. Ukraine is unique in its combination of a
divided population, its strategic position and its age-old ties to
Russia. But even here, the huge costs - not just in financial terms -
of intervention beyond Crimea are likely to make Moscow think twice.