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PLANNED HIGHWAY, INCREASING CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS HEIGHTEN WAR RISKS BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH
IHS Global Insight
March 11, 2014
by Alex Melikishvili
The construction of a strategically important second highway connecting
Armenia to the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to become a
flashpoint of military confrontation with Azerbaijan.
The Armenian government on 5 March allocated USD3.9 million
for the rebuilding of the Vardenis-Sotk-Kalbajar section of the
planned Vardenis-Martakert highway, which will connect Armenia with
Azerbaijan's Armenian-populated breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh
- the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). At present,
the main transportation artery linking Armenia with the NKR is the
Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road, which is in need of repairs. The
Armenian government and secessionist authorities in the NKR consider
the construction of a new highway of strategic importance as it
will shorten the travel time and connect Armenia with the northern
part of the breakaway enclave. The planned 113-kilometre highway
is of particular significance from the military viewpoint as it
will allow for the transfer of armed forces in case of resumption of
hostilities with Azerbaijan. The "Hayastan" All-Armenian Fund collected
approximately USD23 million for this project from donations by the
Armenian diaspora organisations worldwide and signed contracts with
six construction companies from Armenia and the NKR. The construction
commenced in January 2014 and is scheduled for completion by the end
of 2015.
It is likely that the construction of the strategically important road
connecting Armenia with the NKR's third-largest city of Martakert
(known as Aghdara in Azerbaijan) will become a major irritant for
Azerbaijan, as its effect would be to consolidate Armenian control
of the disputed area. Similarly to the airport near the NKR's capital
Stepanakert (also known as Khankendi), which Armenia has held back from
reopening due to shootdown threats from Azerbaijan, the construction
of the second highway to the breakaway region is likely to result in
delays, due to risk of attacks, mostly with small-arms, but also the
possibility of mortars and artillery use, by the Azeri military.
In this regard, the Paravkar-Vazashen road in Armenia's northeastern
Tavush province, due to its proximity to the border with Azerbaijan,
sets a precedent, as it has become very dangerous for travelling
because of regular gunfire and sniper attacks from the Azeri side. One
of the latest incidents occurred on 18 February, when the road came
under fire from heavy machine guns, halting traffic but causing
no casualties. The constant threat of attacks forced the Armenian
government to allocate more than USD1.1 million for the construction
of a 3.2-km bypass road, which will be 14 km away from the border,
with certain sections shielded by a 2-5-metre-high special protective
fence. It is due to be completed by June 2014, according to the
Armenian Ministry of Transport and Communication.
Increasing ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact
The growing number of ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact
(LC) separating the NKR from Azerbaijan prompted the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to issue an urgent appeal on 30 January, calling
on both sides to take additional steps to stabilise the situation
in the conflict zone. This was echoed in the public statement made
by the newly appointed US co-chair of the Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, James Warlick, on
28 February, when he urged both sides to comply with the tradition
of adhering to a ceasefire during any Olympic games (in this case
the Sochi Winter Olympics in Russia between 7 and 23 February 2014,
and then the Paralympic Games on 7-16 March). However, instead of
de-escalation, on 24 January, the Azeri Ministry of Defence confirmed
that Azerbaijan had begun regular air patrols of the LC. In response,
the NKR's Ministry of Defence stated that the separatist air defence
had been put on full combat alert and was tracking Azeri fighter
jets closely. Conflicting accounts of ceasefire violations provided
by the Armenian and Azeri sides to the OSCE monitors reveal that the
situation along the LC has become extremely volatile, with near daily
gunfire exchanges and sniper attacks. Brief armed incursions by both
sides, albeit not as frequent and often unreported, have also become
more regular and are likely intended to gauge the other side's combat
readiness and rapid response capability.
Alarming pattern of Azerbaijan's military procurements
Apart from the steadily growing defence budget, which in 2014 is
supposed to reach USD3.75 billion (compared with just USD175 million
in 2004), Azerbaijan's acquisition of advanced weaponry is cause for
alarm - mostly in Armenia, but also neighbouring Georgia, Iran, Russia,
and Turkey. In 2013, in fulfilment of contracts signed in 2011-12,
Russia provided Azerbaijan with military equipment, including artillery
units, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and multiple
rocket launchers worth total between USD700 million and USD1 billion
(seeAzerbaijan: 19 June 2013:). In addition, Azerbaijan approached
South Korea with an offer to buy USD3 billion-worth of weapons,
which are mostly aimed at enhancing naval capabilities, but also
include self-propelled howitzers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and
helicopters (seeAzerbaijan: 27 August 2013:). In November 2013, Russia
supplied Mi-35 attack helicopters, as confirmed by a representative
of Russia's state-owned arms export company Rosoboronexport. On 6
March 2014, the Turkish newspaperSabahreported that Azerbaijan had
expressed interest in acquiring attack helicopters equipped with
MIZRAK-U long-range anti-tank missiles from the leading Turkish
defence company, Roketsan. This year, Turkey will also be supplying
36 self-propelled howitzers T-155 F rt na to Azerbaijan in accordance
with a contract signed in 2011.
Outlook and implications
The primary factor mitigating war risks between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over the NKR has been Russia's military presence in, and commitment
to, the latter, in the form of an August 2010 security treaty. This
was underscored in the interview given by the commander of the 102nd
Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, Colonel Andrey Ruzinsky,
on 10 October 2013. Ruzinsky stated that if Azerbaijan decided to
restore its control over the NKR by force, forces from his base
might enter the conflict in accordance with Russia's commitments
under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. This base hosts
various assets, including MiG-29 fighter jets and attack helicopters.
Azerbaijan is also constrained by Armenia's ballistic missile
capabilities, which, if hostilities were to break out, would
probably target its energy infrastructure. This much was admitted
by the head of the department of security of energy infrastructure
of Azerbaijan's Ministry of National Security, Javad Tynayev, at the
security conference in Baku on 21 November 2013. In particular, Tynayev
noted that proximity to the LC poses a threat to oil and gas pipelines.
However, Armenia's ballistic missiles are likely to lack the
accuracy to guarantee the successful targeting of the main oil
(Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and gas (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) export pipelines,
although the Sangachal terminal on the coast of the Caspian Sea would
be at greater risk.
The Azeri armed forces are likely to disrupt the construction of
the Vardenis-Martakert highway. The NKR's Martakert district is
not entirely controlled by the secessionist forces, and its parts
have been reclaimed by the Azeri troops, which only increases the
probability of attacks. Any such attempt to derail this project by
force runs the risk of potentially resulting in a miscalculation
leading to a full-scale combat. On the one hand, despite having
problems with discipline and morale, the Azeri military leadership
might be emboldened to act because of its superior weaponry. On the
other hand, the Armenian military leadership, fearing that NKR militia
is likely to be easily over-run is likely to opt for limited missile
strikes to serve as a deterrent and to forestall further escalation.
In other words, Armenia is likely to be forced by its inferiority in
conventional forces either to give in or to resort to the use of its
missiles to strike Azerbaijan. The continued acquisition of advanced
weapons by Azerbaijan has given it military superiority over Armenia,
which Russia is unable to restore by its deployments or arms transfers
to Armenia. Azerbaijan probably hopes that its growing arsenal will
force Armenia to make concessions regarding the NKR dispute, but the
changing security dynamic on the ground is likely to force both sides
to act before any semblance of accommodation materializes.
IHS Global Insight
March 11, 2014
by Alex Melikishvili
The construction of a strategically important second highway connecting
Armenia to the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to become a
flashpoint of military confrontation with Azerbaijan.
The Armenian government on 5 March allocated USD3.9 million
for the rebuilding of the Vardenis-Sotk-Kalbajar section of the
planned Vardenis-Martakert highway, which will connect Armenia with
Azerbaijan's Armenian-populated breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh
- the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). At present,
the main transportation artery linking Armenia with the NKR is the
Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road, which is in need of repairs. The
Armenian government and secessionist authorities in the NKR consider
the construction of a new highway of strategic importance as it
will shorten the travel time and connect Armenia with the northern
part of the breakaway enclave. The planned 113-kilometre highway
is of particular significance from the military viewpoint as it
will allow for the transfer of armed forces in case of resumption of
hostilities with Azerbaijan. The "Hayastan" All-Armenian Fund collected
approximately USD23 million for this project from donations by the
Armenian diaspora organisations worldwide and signed contracts with
six construction companies from Armenia and the NKR. The construction
commenced in January 2014 and is scheduled for completion by the end
of 2015.
It is likely that the construction of the strategically important road
connecting Armenia with the NKR's third-largest city of Martakert
(known as Aghdara in Azerbaijan) will become a major irritant for
Azerbaijan, as its effect would be to consolidate Armenian control
of the disputed area. Similarly to the airport near the NKR's capital
Stepanakert (also known as Khankendi), which Armenia has held back from
reopening due to shootdown threats from Azerbaijan, the construction
of the second highway to the breakaway region is likely to result in
delays, due to risk of attacks, mostly with small-arms, but also the
possibility of mortars and artillery use, by the Azeri military.
In this regard, the Paravkar-Vazashen road in Armenia's northeastern
Tavush province, due to its proximity to the border with Azerbaijan,
sets a precedent, as it has become very dangerous for travelling
because of regular gunfire and sniper attacks from the Azeri side. One
of the latest incidents occurred on 18 February, when the road came
under fire from heavy machine guns, halting traffic but causing
no casualties. The constant threat of attacks forced the Armenian
government to allocate more than USD1.1 million for the construction
of a 3.2-km bypass road, which will be 14 km away from the border,
with certain sections shielded by a 2-5-metre-high special protective
fence. It is due to be completed by June 2014, according to the
Armenian Ministry of Transport and Communication.
Increasing ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact
The growing number of ceasefire violations along the Line of Contact
(LC) separating the NKR from Azerbaijan prompted the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to issue an urgent appeal on 30 January, calling
on both sides to take additional steps to stabilise the situation
in the conflict zone. This was echoed in the public statement made
by the newly appointed US co-chair of the Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, James Warlick, on
28 February, when he urged both sides to comply with the tradition
of adhering to a ceasefire during any Olympic games (in this case
the Sochi Winter Olympics in Russia between 7 and 23 February 2014,
and then the Paralympic Games on 7-16 March). However, instead of
de-escalation, on 24 January, the Azeri Ministry of Defence confirmed
that Azerbaijan had begun regular air patrols of the LC. In response,
the NKR's Ministry of Defence stated that the separatist air defence
had been put on full combat alert and was tracking Azeri fighter
jets closely. Conflicting accounts of ceasefire violations provided
by the Armenian and Azeri sides to the OSCE monitors reveal that the
situation along the LC has become extremely volatile, with near daily
gunfire exchanges and sniper attacks. Brief armed incursions by both
sides, albeit not as frequent and often unreported, have also become
more regular and are likely intended to gauge the other side's combat
readiness and rapid response capability.
Alarming pattern of Azerbaijan's military procurements
Apart from the steadily growing defence budget, which in 2014 is
supposed to reach USD3.75 billion (compared with just USD175 million
in 2004), Azerbaijan's acquisition of advanced weaponry is cause for
alarm - mostly in Armenia, but also neighbouring Georgia, Iran, Russia,
and Turkey. In 2013, in fulfilment of contracts signed in 2011-12,
Russia provided Azerbaijan with military equipment, including artillery
units, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and multiple
rocket launchers worth total between USD700 million and USD1 billion
(seeAzerbaijan: 19 June 2013:). In addition, Azerbaijan approached
South Korea with an offer to buy USD3 billion-worth of weapons,
which are mostly aimed at enhancing naval capabilities, but also
include self-propelled howitzers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and
helicopters (seeAzerbaijan: 27 August 2013:). In November 2013, Russia
supplied Mi-35 attack helicopters, as confirmed by a representative
of Russia's state-owned arms export company Rosoboronexport. On 6
March 2014, the Turkish newspaperSabahreported that Azerbaijan had
expressed interest in acquiring attack helicopters equipped with
MIZRAK-U long-range anti-tank missiles from the leading Turkish
defence company, Roketsan. This year, Turkey will also be supplying
36 self-propelled howitzers T-155 F rt na to Azerbaijan in accordance
with a contract signed in 2011.
Outlook and implications
The primary factor mitigating war risks between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over the NKR has been Russia's military presence in, and commitment
to, the latter, in the form of an August 2010 security treaty. This
was underscored in the interview given by the commander of the 102nd
Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, Colonel Andrey Ruzinsky,
on 10 October 2013. Ruzinsky stated that if Azerbaijan decided to
restore its control over the NKR by force, forces from his base
might enter the conflict in accordance with Russia's commitments
under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. This base hosts
various assets, including MiG-29 fighter jets and attack helicopters.
Azerbaijan is also constrained by Armenia's ballistic missile
capabilities, which, if hostilities were to break out, would
probably target its energy infrastructure. This much was admitted
by the head of the department of security of energy infrastructure
of Azerbaijan's Ministry of National Security, Javad Tynayev, at the
security conference in Baku on 21 November 2013. In particular, Tynayev
noted that proximity to the LC poses a threat to oil and gas pipelines.
However, Armenia's ballistic missiles are likely to lack the
accuracy to guarantee the successful targeting of the main oil
(Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and gas (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) export pipelines,
although the Sangachal terminal on the coast of the Caspian Sea would
be at greater risk.
The Azeri armed forces are likely to disrupt the construction of
the Vardenis-Martakert highway. The NKR's Martakert district is
not entirely controlled by the secessionist forces, and its parts
have been reclaimed by the Azeri troops, which only increases the
probability of attacks. Any such attempt to derail this project by
force runs the risk of potentially resulting in a miscalculation
leading to a full-scale combat. On the one hand, despite having
problems with discipline and morale, the Azeri military leadership
might be emboldened to act because of its superior weaponry. On the
other hand, the Armenian military leadership, fearing that NKR militia
is likely to be easily over-run is likely to opt for limited missile
strikes to serve as a deterrent and to forestall further escalation.
In other words, Armenia is likely to be forced by its inferiority in
conventional forces either to give in or to resort to the use of its
missiles to strike Azerbaijan. The continued acquisition of advanced
weapons by Azerbaijan has given it military superiority over Armenia,
which Russia is unable to restore by its deployments or arms transfers
to Armenia. Azerbaijan probably hopes that its growing arsenal will
force Armenia to make concessions regarding the NKR dispute, but the
changing security dynamic on the ground is likely to force both sides
to act before any semblance of accommodation materializes.