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UKRAINE: OMINOUS WORLD WAR II PARALLELS?
Al-Jazeera, Qatar
March 14 2014
As world leaders call each other 'Nazis' and 'fascists', clarity is
needed on the application of international law.
Last updated: 14 Mar 2014 06:24 Vartan Oskanian
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former
foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.
This year marks the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I.
Historians, analysts and pundits have stretched their imagination
to draw parallels between the geopolitical situation then and now,
hinting at a likelihood that history may repeat itself.
Among many real and perceived parallels, British-German rivalry
then is compared to American-Chinese competition now, and today's
globalised world is seen to be similar to the turn-of-the-century's
interconnectedness and maritime action.
For World War II, this year is not a significant anniversary, neither
for its start nor its end, but listening to the rhetoric on Ukraine,
one may easily get the impression that the world today is more similar,
simultaneously, to both the beginning and the end of the second war.
US to stand by Ukraine on Crimea annexation
If the comparisons with WWI are done by non-policymakers and remain
purely an intellectual exercise, the WWII parallels are emanating
from those in positions of power and influence, and it's heard in
real time, as the situation evolves.
Recently, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton likened President
Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler. And a few days back, on BBC's Hardtalk,
Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said of the Russian presence
in Crimea: "We all know where invasion under the pretext of protecting
minorities leads to." He was referring to Hitler's occupying the
Czech Sudetenland in order "to protect" the German population there.
The Russian side is calling the new authorities in Kiev "Nazis" and
"fascists". Other Western leaders liken the rivalry over Ukraine to
the power politics carving territories, creating buffer zones and
spheres of influence around competing powers and opposing poles,
evoking memories of the cold politics of, ironically, Yalta and beyond.
The truth is that the world today is hugely different from what it
was in 1914, 1945 and 1991. First, today's world has seen, in the
span of one century, two devastating and tragic world wars and one
detrimental and costly Cold War. It is the lingering consequences
of those wars that should guide the world leaders rather than the
underlying seeds and currents of potential conflict today.
Second, nuclear weapons have rendered war between countries possessing
them highly unlikely. Until the advent of the nuclear age, countries
went to war because the consequences of defeat and even of compromise
were deemed worse than those of war. If war ever breaks out, that
would be the result of incompetence, gross negligence, hubris and
short sightedness on the part of those who are in leadership positions.
Tangled alliances, militarism, imperialism
There is always the temptation to explain wars by the more obvious
factors, such as tangled alliances, militarism, imperialism and
natural resources among many others. But one hardly looks at the
hidden underlying disagreements among major players.
There are two kinds of such disagreements today in the international
system that, unless addressed and overcome, will continue to be a
source of tension between states: One is moral and behavioural and
the other is formal and legalistic.
In my extensive dealings with Russia, Europe and the United States,
the contrasting positions were palpable. In discussions with US
and Europe, along with foreign policy issues - Nagorno Karabagh
peace process, relations with Turkey, with Iran and on many other
topics - Armenia's domestic issues (democracy, elections, rule of
law and reforms) were not only discussed but also conditioned to
foreign aid and assistance. Not once in my meetings with Russia were
non-foreign-policy issues ever raised and discussed, let alone made
subject to trade-offs.
If my experience with the West is any indication of the West's approach
towards other former Soviet states, including Russia and Ukraine,
it's possible to see where the Russian displeasure and resentment
toward the West come from.
When foreign policy toward Russia is identified with shaping Russian
domestic politics, the ability to influence the external conduct of
the Russian state is weakened.
So much for behavioural contradictions. The formal and legalistic
discrepancies are two fold and more often intertwined. Those are the
double standards applied by major powers to the justification of use
of force and the de jure recognition granted to self-determination
movements out of political expediency and geopolitical interests. The
problem is further compounded when use of force is the consequence
of political expediency or vice versa.
The Charter of the UN expressly prohibits member states from using
force against each other, allowing only two exceptions: Self-defence
and military measures authorised by the security council. During the
Cold War, states violated these rules countless times, and a paralysed
Security Council watched.
Since the end of the Cold War, despite the yearning for an
international system governed by international law, there is no
evidence that humanity has made serious headways in that regard.
The maintenance of world peace and security depends importantly on
there being a common global understanding of when the application
of force is both legal and legitimate. Only legal or only legitimate
will always weaken the international legal order.
NATO's intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 was deemed by
some illegal but legitimate. The US invasion of Iraq was considered by
many to be both illegal and illegitimate. The West considers Russia's
stealth presence today in Crimea illegal.
Counting the Cost - The price of military intervention
Kosovo is recognised by most in the West as an independent state,
while South Ossetia and Abkhazia are recognised as independent by
Russia and just a few others. In both cases, one side accuses the
other of violating the international law.
When Kosovo conducted a referendum for independence, the West
determined that Serbia's consent was not required.
Yet Crimea's upcoming referendum is considered illegal by the West,
mainly because of the absence of Kiev's consent.
Indeed, the line between the legality and legitimacy for use of force
or the absence of it, on one hand and the legality and non legality
of people's right to determine their own fate and destiny through a
referendum, have been so blurred, that it confuses the honest observer
or the broker about the state of affairs in the world.
I am not here in the defence of one side or the other; I am here for
the defence of clarity, consistency, honesty, and international rule
of law.
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former
foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.
1417
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/ukraine-ominous-world-war-ii-pa-201431372034569427.html
Al-Jazeera, Qatar
March 14 2014
As world leaders call each other 'Nazis' and 'fascists', clarity is
needed on the application of international law.
Last updated: 14 Mar 2014 06:24 Vartan Oskanian
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former
foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.
This year marks the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I.
Historians, analysts and pundits have stretched their imagination
to draw parallels between the geopolitical situation then and now,
hinting at a likelihood that history may repeat itself.
Among many real and perceived parallels, British-German rivalry
then is compared to American-Chinese competition now, and today's
globalised world is seen to be similar to the turn-of-the-century's
interconnectedness and maritime action.
For World War II, this year is not a significant anniversary, neither
for its start nor its end, but listening to the rhetoric on Ukraine,
one may easily get the impression that the world today is more similar,
simultaneously, to both the beginning and the end of the second war.
US to stand by Ukraine on Crimea annexation
If the comparisons with WWI are done by non-policymakers and remain
purely an intellectual exercise, the WWII parallels are emanating
from those in positions of power and influence, and it's heard in
real time, as the situation evolves.
Recently, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton likened President
Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler. And a few days back, on BBC's Hardtalk,
Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said of the Russian presence
in Crimea: "We all know where invasion under the pretext of protecting
minorities leads to." He was referring to Hitler's occupying the
Czech Sudetenland in order "to protect" the German population there.
The Russian side is calling the new authorities in Kiev "Nazis" and
"fascists". Other Western leaders liken the rivalry over Ukraine to
the power politics carving territories, creating buffer zones and
spheres of influence around competing powers and opposing poles,
evoking memories of the cold politics of, ironically, Yalta and beyond.
The truth is that the world today is hugely different from what it
was in 1914, 1945 and 1991. First, today's world has seen, in the
span of one century, two devastating and tragic world wars and one
detrimental and costly Cold War. It is the lingering consequences
of those wars that should guide the world leaders rather than the
underlying seeds and currents of potential conflict today.
Second, nuclear weapons have rendered war between countries possessing
them highly unlikely. Until the advent of the nuclear age, countries
went to war because the consequences of defeat and even of compromise
were deemed worse than those of war. If war ever breaks out, that
would be the result of incompetence, gross negligence, hubris and
short sightedness on the part of those who are in leadership positions.
Tangled alliances, militarism, imperialism
There is always the temptation to explain wars by the more obvious
factors, such as tangled alliances, militarism, imperialism and
natural resources among many others. But one hardly looks at the
hidden underlying disagreements among major players.
There are two kinds of such disagreements today in the international
system that, unless addressed and overcome, will continue to be a
source of tension between states: One is moral and behavioural and
the other is formal and legalistic.
In my extensive dealings with Russia, Europe and the United States,
the contrasting positions were palpable. In discussions with US
and Europe, along with foreign policy issues - Nagorno Karabagh
peace process, relations with Turkey, with Iran and on many other
topics - Armenia's domestic issues (democracy, elections, rule of
law and reforms) were not only discussed but also conditioned to
foreign aid and assistance. Not once in my meetings with Russia were
non-foreign-policy issues ever raised and discussed, let alone made
subject to trade-offs.
If my experience with the West is any indication of the West's approach
towards other former Soviet states, including Russia and Ukraine,
it's possible to see where the Russian displeasure and resentment
toward the West come from.
When foreign policy toward Russia is identified with shaping Russian
domestic politics, the ability to influence the external conduct of
the Russian state is weakened.
So much for behavioural contradictions. The formal and legalistic
discrepancies are two fold and more often intertwined. Those are the
double standards applied by major powers to the justification of use
of force and the de jure recognition granted to self-determination
movements out of political expediency and geopolitical interests. The
problem is further compounded when use of force is the consequence
of political expediency or vice versa.
The Charter of the UN expressly prohibits member states from using
force against each other, allowing only two exceptions: Self-defence
and military measures authorised by the security council. During the
Cold War, states violated these rules countless times, and a paralysed
Security Council watched.
Since the end of the Cold War, despite the yearning for an
international system governed by international law, there is no
evidence that humanity has made serious headways in that regard.
The maintenance of world peace and security depends importantly on
there being a common global understanding of when the application
of force is both legal and legitimate. Only legal or only legitimate
will always weaken the international legal order.
NATO's intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 was deemed by
some illegal but legitimate. The US invasion of Iraq was considered by
many to be both illegal and illegitimate. The West considers Russia's
stealth presence today in Crimea illegal.
Counting the Cost - The price of military intervention
Kosovo is recognised by most in the West as an independent state,
while South Ossetia and Abkhazia are recognised as independent by
Russia and just a few others. In both cases, one side accuses the
other of violating the international law.
When Kosovo conducted a referendum for independence, the West
determined that Serbia's consent was not required.
Yet Crimea's upcoming referendum is considered illegal by the West,
mainly because of the absence of Kiev's consent.
Indeed, the line between the legality and legitimacy for use of force
or the absence of it, on one hand and the legality and non legality
of people's right to determine their own fate and destiny through a
referendum, have been so blurred, that it confuses the honest observer
or the broker about the state of affairs in the world.
I am not here in the defence of one side or the other; I am here for
the defence of clarity, consistency, honesty, and international rule
of law.
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former
foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.
1417
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/ukraine-ominous-world-war-ii-pa-201431372034569427.html