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THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: FALLING APART AT THE SEAMS?
http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/03/14/the-south-caucasus-falling-apart-at-the-seams/
March 14, 2014-
By Bulent Aras
Border skirmishes and casualties at the Azerbaijani-Armenian border
have raised fears about the possibility of a new war in the South
Caucasus. The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 brought
an end to the extended cold war in the region. No new order has been
established since, and uncertainty prevails.
In the wake of the 2008 war, external and internal actors alike have
been in search of a regional design. Attempts by Russia, the European
Union, and Turkey to establish regional order, together with the
survival strategies pursued by the nation states that comprise the
Caucasus, have shaped the geopolitical landscape of the region since
2008. The United States, unable to reach out to support Georgia,
has remained outside this picture.
Russia's current policy towards the Caucasus seems similar to the
Soviet nationalities policy, which entailed redrawing maps based on
ethnic relocation and the creation of enclaves within countries. In
2008, Moscow recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
positioning them as de facto states in the region. With Karabakh's
status pending, the South Caucasus has virtually broken up into six
separate states.
Moscow has succeeded in shifting attention away from the North
Caucasus, and the challenge of dealing with fundamentalist terrorism
is now an internal matter for Russia. A "cold peace" was enough
to suspend the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict at a manageable level
of tension. Russia's only concern has been the prevention of a hot
conflict between Baku and Yerevan, and it regularly brings the two
heads of state together to sign non-aggression agreements.
Turkey's policy aims to contain the crises, promote regional
ownership, and find a solution in the spirit of political and
economic integration. Turkish policy in the aftermath of the war
between Russia and Georgia prevented the problem from escalating
into an international crisis. By imposing limits on the passage of
vessels through the Bosphorus strait, Ankara blocked a potential
U.S./NATO-Russia encounter in the Black Sea and curbed U.S.
involvement while bolstering its own regional legitimacy for an
integrationist approach.
Ankara also initiated a Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Platform,
bringing together Russia, Turkey, and the three Caucasian states with
the aim of building up an inclusive order in the region.
The third strand of Turkey's policy was to attempt to normalize
relations with Armenia and reopen the border, which has been
closed since 1993. This diplomacy was tied to progress in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, and aimed to achieve simultaneous progress
on both fronts.
The EU's approach is based on soft-power capabilities and entails a
refined and focused version of its "neighborhood policy" towards the
Caucasus. The 2008 crisis engaged the EU's interest, causing it to
recognize its lack of presence in the region. During the crisis, the
EU failed to develop a concrete policy initiative. The only exception
was Germany's failed mediation attempt.
In 2009, the EU launched its Eastern Partnership initiative to improve
EU engagement and support for political and economic stability in
the Caucasus. The EU's role in promoting rule of law, civil-society
capacity-building, structural reforms, and the regional economy
has increased, though slowly, since the creation of this new policy
framework.
The nation states of the Caucasus also have their own survival
strategies for dealing with the post-2008 situation. Georgia is
trying to reintegrate its de facto separated territories, and is
working towards political and economic stability.
Armenia tied its economic and political future to Russia, but Russian
assistance has fallen short of what Armenia actually needs to address
its problems. The Armenian economy is weakening, and emigration rates
are increasing year on year.
Azerbaijan benefits from oil and gas resources, and utilizes these
riches for economic reform and political stability at home. Azerbaijan
has increased its role in regional energy geopolitics and used this
leverage to rally support for the liberation of the Armenian-occupied
territories.
Ultimately, the EU's initiative was both delayed and slow, Turkey's
efforts failed to bring real change to the regional landscape, and
Russian policies have aggravated the situation. The status quo in the
Caucasus is unsustainable, and a regional war is a real danger. This
instability could rapidly spread to the North Caucasus, mobilizing
fundamentalist elements.
Russia, the EU, and Turkey should agree on - or at least should
not oppose - measures to eliminate the risk of war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. Armenia's withdrawal from occupied regions, for
instance - deferring a decision on the legal status of Karabakh -
would be a positive step, and would pave the way for the opening of
the Turkish-Armenian border. Armenia would consequently be brought
out of its isolation and reap the economic benefits of normalized
relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. For Georgia, economic incentives
and political targets would help improve stability.
Russia, the EU, and Turkey have the opportunity to implement these
initiatives. Russia would not consider this to be detrimental to
its interests, since even Moscow is not in a position to deal with a
new war in the Caucasus. There is no visible U.S. role, apart from
the region's energy issues, though U.S. support for constructive
diplomatic attempts would certainly provide a good deal of incentive
for the three Caucasian states.
The situation in the Caucasus needs immediate action. To prevent
another regional war, Russia, the EU, and Turkey must address the
situation as soon as possible.
Bulent Aras is the academic adviser to Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. He also served as director
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research
(SAM), while also serving as chairman at the Diplomacy Academy,
between 2010 and 2013.
This article first appeared in www.themarknews.com
http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/03/14/the-south-caucasus-falling-apart-at-the-seams/
March 14, 2014-
By Bulent Aras
Border skirmishes and casualties at the Azerbaijani-Armenian border
have raised fears about the possibility of a new war in the South
Caucasus. The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 brought
an end to the extended cold war in the region. No new order has been
established since, and uncertainty prevails.
In the wake of the 2008 war, external and internal actors alike have
been in search of a regional design. Attempts by Russia, the European
Union, and Turkey to establish regional order, together with the
survival strategies pursued by the nation states that comprise the
Caucasus, have shaped the geopolitical landscape of the region since
2008. The United States, unable to reach out to support Georgia,
has remained outside this picture.
Russia's current policy towards the Caucasus seems similar to the
Soviet nationalities policy, which entailed redrawing maps based on
ethnic relocation and the creation of enclaves within countries. In
2008, Moscow recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
positioning them as de facto states in the region. With Karabakh's
status pending, the South Caucasus has virtually broken up into six
separate states.
Moscow has succeeded in shifting attention away from the North
Caucasus, and the challenge of dealing with fundamentalist terrorism
is now an internal matter for Russia. A "cold peace" was enough
to suspend the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict at a manageable level
of tension. Russia's only concern has been the prevention of a hot
conflict between Baku and Yerevan, and it regularly brings the two
heads of state together to sign non-aggression agreements.
Turkey's policy aims to contain the crises, promote regional
ownership, and find a solution in the spirit of political and
economic integration. Turkish policy in the aftermath of the war
between Russia and Georgia prevented the problem from escalating
into an international crisis. By imposing limits on the passage of
vessels through the Bosphorus strait, Ankara blocked a potential
U.S./NATO-Russia encounter in the Black Sea and curbed U.S.
involvement while bolstering its own regional legitimacy for an
integrationist approach.
Ankara also initiated a Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Platform,
bringing together Russia, Turkey, and the three Caucasian states with
the aim of building up an inclusive order in the region.
The third strand of Turkey's policy was to attempt to normalize
relations with Armenia and reopen the border, which has been
closed since 1993. This diplomacy was tied to progress in the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, and aimed to achieve simultaneous progress
on both fronts.
The EU's approach is based on soft-power capabilities and entails a
refined and focused version of its "neighborhood policy" towards the
Caucasus. The 2008 crisis engaged the EU's interest, causing it to
recognize its lack of presence in the region. During the crisis, the
EU failed to develop a concrete policy initiative. The only exception
was Germany's failed mediation attempt.
In 2009, the EU launched its Eastern Partnership initiative to improve
EU engagement and support for political and economic stability in
the Caucasus. The EU's role in promoting rule of law, civil-society
capacity-building, structural reforms, and the regional economy
has increased, though slowly, since the creation of this new policy
framework.
The nation states of the Caucasus also have their own survival
strategies for dealing with the post-2008 situation. Georgia is
trying to reintegrate its de facto separated territories, and is
working towards political and economic stability.
Armenia tied its economic and political future to Russia, but Russian
assistance has fallen short of what Armenia actually needs to address
its problems. The Armenian economy is weakening, and emigration rates
are increasing year on year.
Azerbaijan benefits from oil and gas resources, and utilizes these
riches for economic reform and political stability at home. Azerbaijan
has increased its role in regional energy geopolitics and used this
leverage to rally support for the liberation of the Armenian-occupied
territories.
Ultimately, the EU's initiative was both delayed and slow, Turkey's
efforts failed to bring real change to the regional landscape, and
Russian policies have aggravated the situation. The status quo in the
Caucasus is unsustainable, and a regional war is a real danger. This
instability could rapidly spread to the North Caucasus, mobilizing
fundamentalist elements.
Russia, the EU, and Turkey should agree on - or at least should
not oppose - measures to eliminate the risk of war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. Armenia's withdrawal from occupied regions, for
instance - deferring a decision on the legal status of Karabakh -
would be a positive step, and would pave the way for the opening of
the Turkish-Armenian border. Armenia would consequently be brought
out of its isolation and reap the economic benefits of normalized
relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. For Georgia, economic incentives
and political targets would help improve stability.
Russia, the EU, and Turkey have the opportunity to implement these
initiatives. Russia would not consider this to be detrimental to
its interests, since even Moscow is not in a position to deal with a
new war in the Caucasus. There is no visible U.S. role, apart from
the region's energy issues, though U.S. support for constructive
diplomatic attempts would certainly provide a good deal of incentive
for the three Caucasian states.
The situation in the Caucasus needs immediate action. To prevent
another regional war, Russia, the EU, and Turkey must address the
situation as soon as possible.
Bulent Aras is the academic adviser to Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. He also served as director
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research
(SAM), while also serving as chairman at the Diplomacy Academy,
between 2010 and 2013.
This article first appeared in www.themarknews.com