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ARMENIA AFTER THE VILNIUS SUMMIT: IT IS JUST THE BEGINNING OF THE STRUGGLE FOR "HEARTS AND MINDS"
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12623
21.03.2014
Sergei Sargsyan
Deputy Head, Centre for the Political Studies, Noravank Foundation
As the February events in the Republic of Moldova (Gagauzia referendum)
and Ukraine (ouster of Yanukovych) showed, signing or refusing to
sign an EU Association Agreement by itself does not completely take
off the table the issue of the direction for foreign political and
economic integration for the EU Eastern Partnership countries.
In Gagauzia the initialing of the Agreement was viewed as a threat
to the autonomy. Fearing that the Constitutional Court of Moldova
may at any time abolish the Article 4 of the Law on Gagauz Autonomy
that "in case of a change in the Republic of Moldova status as
an independent state the people of Gagauzia reserve the right for
external self-determination" and that in such case it would take at
least two months to organize a referendum on the issue, a preventive
referendum was conducted in February 2014. Participation was record
high (over 70.4% of the registered voters) and the results showed
that 98.4% are for integration with the Customs Union with 1.5%
against it. At the same time 2.5% voted for joining the EU and 97.4%
were against. The idea of "the deferred status of the autonomy",
whereby Gagauzia reserves its right to self-determination in case
Moldova loses its independence, was supported by 98.8% of the voters.
This is not only about Gagauzia. The Bulgarians of Taraclia region
in south of Moldova, other towns and cities in Moldova, such as
Bessarabka, Cahul and the industrial center and "northern capital" of
the country BÄ~ClÈ~[i are also likely to join to the Gagauz initiative.
However, since the Constitution stipulates no local referendums, most
likely they will conduct those under the pretense of "opinion polls."
These will bear no legal effects, but will uncover the population's
mindset towards the prospect of Chisinau signing an Association
Agreement with the EU. The results will certainly be used in the
parliament election campaigns that, in fact, have already started.
In Ukraine a sudden, unprepared and weakly reasoned refusal of the
cabinet to follow the very course it supported for several years
toward closer relations with the EU, including establishment of a
free trade zone, sparked an outburst of protests, which culminated in
Maidan-2013. It further evolved into Maidan-2014 with fewer, but more
radically inclined supporters, which resulted in an armed standoff and
over 80 casualties, seizure of the executive power in the country,
ouster of president Yanukovych and revival of the urgency to sign
the EU Association Agreement.
After the Vilnius summit doubts were cast on further continuation of
the Eastern Partnership Program in its existing format. After all,
despite an apparent success with Moldova and Georgia, the Program
failed not only in Azerbaijan and Belarus (signs for which were visible
even before), but also in Armenia and most surprisingly, in Ukraine.
In early February 2014 thirteen EU countries prepared a document
dubbed "European package" that is supposed to lay foundations for
further cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries under
the "post-Vilnius" realities. This document widens the areas of the
Program activities, including accelerating conclusion of Association
Agreements with Georgia and Moldova, more frequent visits of Program
officials to participating countries, more active dialogue with Russia
and strengthening Europe's role in resolution of the long-lasting
conflicts. In essence, this is about reinforcing the information
support of the Program and increasing informational pressure on
its participating countries. This will be carried out through the
structures established within the framework of the renewed European
Neighborhood, through the Eastern Partnership Program, EURONEST
Parliamentary Assembly, European Foundation for Democracy, EC Civil
Society Fund with its platforms in the countries, as well as most
likely through some new structures.
Generally, within the framework of the Eastern Partnership program
and under tutelage of the EU, in participating countries there is
an already established and actively operating network of government
organizations, which:
- receives intense political, organizational and technical support
from European institutions;
- is fully or considerably out of the government control in a given
country, and in the long term is financially independent;
- monitors (in fact controls) implementation of the bilateral and
multilateral agreements and commitments of the governments in relation
to the EU; and
- is managed and coordinated by centers in Europe.
Among other things, the "European Package" entails implementation of
comparative studies to assess Eastern Partnership countries' prospects
in case of signing an EU Association Agreement or, conversely, joining
the Customs Union. Hence, with this the EU intensifies competition
with Russia to attract new countries to alternative integration
projects and pushes this competition into the information space,
where Europe has a lot more experience than Russia does and hence,
Brussels plans to outperform Moscow there.
The West has been systematically and constantly operating in the
information space of the region since long ago. On the contrary,
Russia started doing the same only recently, time to time and through
one-time events, which at best result in a short-term surge of sympathy
among a limited number of participants.
Admittedly though, Moscow managed to win Brussels in the first round
of the information struggle (not information warfare yet). However,
this was not really because Moscow played well, but because Europe
played poorly, when it abandoned its declared principles of openness
and transparency by keeping the texts of Association Agreements under
lock and key, away from the public eyes in the signatory states.
As a whole, all of this means that struggle "for the hearts and minds"
of the people in Eastern Partnership countries has only begun.
As far as the "hearts" are concerned, since this is about the emotional
condition of the societies, the struggle outcome will depend on
quantitative parameters of the information flow, perseverance and bias
of the representatives and charismatic speakers of the media, as well
as in what proportion they will be divided along the East-West axis
(for South Caucasus it is the North-West axis).
As for the struggle for "minds", it is a lot more serious, because
here one has to do with the facts, and as it is well known, facts are
non-ductile. As an example, there is a widespread and continuously
planted idea that Armenia abandoned its intentions to prepare and
sign the EU Association Agreement only under the Russian pressure
and out of a sheer concern for its own military security, despite
the government has shown clear interest in such agreement since 2010.
However, a thorough analysis of the outlooks for the proposed
alternative integration projects along with their pre-stated depth
of integration brings to a conclusion that Yerevan's decision in
favor of the Customs Union was based on economic arguments at least
to the same extent as military and political ones. In particular,
many experts and analysts in and outside Armenia have brought
to attention examples of differing approaches of CU and EU to the
largest and most promising projects that are directly related not only
to economic development, but also national security. For instance,
Brussels has stated on numerous occasions about the necessity to shut
down the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, whereas Russia has offered to
prolong its operation under international support to increase its safe
functioning and also supported Yerevan's plans of constructing a new
nuclear power plant with modern technologies to replace the old one.
Given the differences in Brussels' and Moscow's approaches to
Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia conflict and development
prospects for trans-regional communications in South Caucasus, Russia
is the only global actor truly interested for objective reasons in
opening the railroad traffic through Abkhazia, Georgia and Armenia.
Turkey and Azerbaijan are implementing a project to construct
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku (KATB) railway, which has significant
geopolitical and anti-Armenian component in it. At the same time,
for Iran a railway corridor through Armenia would not be the only one
connecting it to Georgia and Russia among the existing and projected
North-South communications lines.
Washington's efforts to suspend the KATB project that excludes Armenia
from yet another regional communications project somewhat slowed
down the construction, but failed to stop it, thus allowing Turkey to
continue the blockade of the existing alternative Gyumri-Kars railroad.
Thus, because of Armenia's prospects for regional integration
without compromising national security interests of the Republic
of Armenia and Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in terms of unilateral
concessions to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to
Turkey in terms of the Genocide recognition, it is beneficial for
Yerevan to join projects where Russia is interested and which it
lobbies. This concerns both ensuring reliable supply to the Russian
military base 102 in Armenia and full-capacity operation of Russian-
and jointly-owned export-oriented industrial facilities in Armenia,
whether currently idle, operating or to be built. Among those the
largest ones are worth mentioning, such as Mars, Armenal and Nairit
factories, for which reconstruction and increased scope of production
with Russian participation are now actively discussed.
In addition, not everything is simple with the Russian gas imports,
which have a key role in energy security of Armenia.
Signing an EU Association Agreement and being in a free trade zone
together with Georgia would first of all mean shutting down the
Armenian Nuclear Power Plant in a maximally short period of time.
Secondly, it would mean liberalization and considerable
unification/regionalization of energy policies of Tbilisi and Yerevan,
which implies merging the energy markets of the two countries in
accordance with the EU energy policy "Third Package" rules, with equal
access and free competition for all participants of the agreement.
This would result in decreased Russian interest in Armenia and hike
of Russian gas prices to market levels already in the mid-term, in
turn leading to low demand for electricity generated by Armenian,
Armenian-Russian and Russian power plants (first of all the Unit 5
of the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant) caused by less expensive or at
least very competitively priced electricity from the Georgian hydro
power plants, both existing and under construction.
In economic terms this could be only welcomed. However, once Georgia
virtually becomes a monopolist in the energy market of Armenia,
the latter would be vulnerable both economically and politically,
since electricity prices may then increase due to absence of common
interests unlike in the case with Armenian-Russian relations, whereas
Georgia's strategic partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan continues
to strengthen.
Under such circumstances any disputes would have to be resolved in
Brussels, which due to own energy interests will consider the stances
of not only Tbilisi and Yerevan, but also that of Baku. Moreover,
in such situation interests of Tbilisi and Baku would match. This
would become especially relevant once the Georgian section of the
North-South gas pipeline, which has strategic importance for Armenia,
is put up for privatization. On numerous occasions Azerbaijan has
assertively expressed interest in purchasing it. It is pertinent to
recall the early 1990s, when there was a practice of blowing up this
pipeline, which passes through Marneuli region of Georgia predominantly
populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis. With the Armenian NPP shut down
and no gas storages, this had a strong psychological effect on the
population of Armenia, when the country was in an open armed conflict
with Azerbaijan. One of the consequences of the energy blockade was
mass emigration, the effects of which are still felt in Armenia.
Also, signing the EU Association Agreement would directly affect the
Armenian-Iranian relations, development of which is currently viewed
"with understanding" in Washington and Brussels. However, further
associated relations with the EU would require Armenia join the EU
and US economic sanctions against Iran. As the current outlook for
lifting the sanctions is still bleak, this would negatively affect
Armenia's situation.
***
It appears the current geopolitical situation in South Caucasus creates
conditions in which an informed, objective and established viewpoint
of Armenia's people toward the country's participation in integration
projects will be formed not so much by informational coverage of
the Armenia-EU and Armenia-CU bilateral relations, but rather by the
analysis of the military, political and economic actions that actors
playing in the region will conduct. A substantiated, balanced position
of the experts and analysts would enable the society to choose in
the wide range of suggested opinions the ones in best interests of
Armenia and mutually beneficial for its allies.
Return ________________________________ Another materials of author
THE MAIN TRENDS IN GEORGIAN POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER,
2013[23.12.2013] INTEGRATION ASPIRATIONS OF ARMENIA AND SOME ISSUES
OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SECURITY OF THE REP. OF ARMENIA AND
NKR[12.09.2013] TURKEY: THROES OF SECULARISM[31.07.2013] INTEGRATION
PROSPECTS OF POST-SOVIET STATES ON THE EXAMPLE OF KIRGIZIA AND
UKRAINE (EXPECTATIONS AND CONCERNS)[03.06.2013] INTENSIFICATION OF
RUSSIA-TURKEY INDIRECT MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONFRONTATION[25.02.2013]
GEORGIA: AN ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER IN A NARROW GAUGE[14.01.2013] SOME
ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION ROUND
THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT [02.08.2012] "IT IS NECESSARY TO RAISE
ENERGY EFFICIENCY", - says the deputy head of the Center for Political
Studies of "Noravank" Foundation Sergei SARGSYAN in his interview
to "Golos Armenii"[26.07.2012] TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE: GOALS,
PROBLEMS AND RISKS [25.06.2012] TURKEY IN THE US MISSILE DEFENCE
SYSTEM: PRIMARY ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS[13.10.2011]
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12623
21.03.2014
Sergei Sargsyan
Deputy Head, Centre for the Political Studies, Noravank Foundation
As the February events in the Republic of Moldova (Gagauzia referendum)
and Ukraine (ouster of Yanukovych) showed, signing or refusing to
sign an EU Association Agreement by itself does not completely take
off the table the issue of the direction for foreign political and
economic integration for the EU Eastern Partnership countries.
In Gagauzia the initialing of the Agreement was viewed as a threat
to the autonomy. Fearing that the Constitutional Court of Moldova
may at any time abolish the Article 4 of the Law on Gagauz Autonomy
that "in case of a change in the Republic of Moldova status as
an independent state the people of Gagauzia reserve the right for
external self-determination" and that in such case it would take at
least two months to organize a referendum on the issue, a preventive
referendum was conducted in February 2014. Participation was record
high (over 70.4% of the registered voters) and the results showed
that 98.4% are for integration with the Customs Union with 1.5%
against it. At the same time 2.5% voted for joining the EU and 97.4%
were against. The idea of "the deferred status of the autonomy",
whereby Gagauzia reserves its right to self-determination in case
Moldova loses its independence, was supported by 98.8% of the voters.
This is not only about Gagauzia. The Bulgarians of Taraclia region
in south of Moldova, other towns and cities in Moldova, such as
Bessarabka, Cahul and the industrial center and "northern capital" of
the country BÄ~ClÈ~[i are also likely to join to the Gagauz initiative.
However, since the Constitution stipulates no local referendums, most
likely they will conduct those under the pretense of "opinion polls."
These will bear no legal effects, but will uncover the population's
mindset towards the prospect of Chisinau signing an Association
Agreement with the EU. The results will certainly be used in the
parliament election campaigns that, in fact, have already started.
In Ukraine a sudden, unprepared and weakly reasoned refusal of the
cabinet to follow the very course it supported for several years
toward closer relations with the EU, including establishment of a
free trade zone, sparked an outburst of protests, which culminated in
Maidan-2013. It further evolved into Maidan-2014 with fewer, but more
radically inclined supporters, which resulted in an armed standoff and
over 80 casualties, seizure of the executive power in the country,
ouster of president Yanukovych and revival of the urgency to sign
the EU Association Agreement.
After the Vilnius summit doubts were cast on further continuation of
the Eastern Partnership Program in its existing format. After all,
despite an apparent success with Moldova and Georgia, the Program
failed not only in Azerbaijan and Belarus (signs for which were visible
even before), but also in Armenia and most surprisingly, in Ukraine.
In early February 2014 thirteen EU countries prepared a document
dubbed "European package" that is supposed to lay foundations for
further cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries under
the "post-Vilnius" realities. This document widens the areas of the
Program activities, including accelerating conclusion of Association
Agreements with Georgia and Moldova, more frequent visits of Program
officials to participating countries, more active dialogue with Russia
and strengthening Europe's role in resolution of the long-lasting
conflicts. In essence, this is about reinforcing the information
support of the Program and increasing informational pressure on
its participating countries. This will be carried out through the
structures established within the framework of the renewed European
Neighborhood, through the Eastern Partnership Program, EURONEST
Parliamentary Assembly, European Foundation for Democracy, EC Civil
Society Fund with its platforms in the countries, as well as most
likely through some new structures.
Generally, within the framework of the Eastern Partnership program
and under tutelage of the EU, in participating countries there is
an already established and actively operating network of government
organizations, which:
- receives intense political, organizational and technical support
from European institutions;
- is fully or considerably out of the government control in a given
country, and in the long term is financially independent;
- monitors (in fact controls) implementation of the bilateral and
multilateral agreements and commitments of the governments in relation
to the EU; and
- is managed and coordinated by centers in Europe.
Among other things, the "European Package" entails implementation of
comparative studies to assess Eastern Partnership countries' prospects
in case of signing an EU Association Agreement or, conversely, joining
the Customs Union. Hence, with this the EU intensifies competition
with Russia to attract new countries to alternative integration
projects and pushes this competition into the information space,
where Europe has a lot more experience than Russia does and hence,
Brussels plans to outperform Moscow there.
The West has been systematically and constantly operating in the
information space of the region since long ago. On the contrary,
Russia started doing the same only recently, time to time and through
one-time events, which at best result in a short-term surge of sympathy
among a limited number of participants.
Admittedly though, Moscow managed to win Brussels in the first round
of the information struggle (not information warfare yet). However,
this was not really because Moscow played well, but because Europe
played poorly, when it abandoned its declared principles of openness
and transparency by keeping the texts of Association Agreements under
lock and key, away from the public eyes in the signatory states.
As a whole, all of this means that struggle "for the hearts and minds"
of the people in Eastern Partnership countries has only begun.
As far as the "hearts" are concerned, since this is about the emotional
condition of the societies, the struggle outcome will depend on
quantitative parameters of the information flow, perseverance and bias
of the representatives and charismatic speakers of the media, as well
as in what proportion they will be divided along the East-West axis
(for South Caucasus it is the North-West axis).
As for the struggle for "minds", it is a lot more serious, because
here one has to do with the facts, and as it is well known, facts are
non-ductile. As an example, there is a widespread and continuously
planted idea that Armenia abandoned its intentions to prepare and
sign the EU Association Agreement only under the Russian pressure
and out of a sheer concern for its own military security, despite
the government has shown clear interest in such agreement since 2010.
However, a thorough analysis of the outlooks for the proposed
alternative integration projects along with their pre-stated depth
of integration brings to a conclusion that Yerevan's decision in
favor of the Customs Union was based on economic arguments at least
to the same extent as military and political ones. In particular,
many experts and analysts in and outside Armenia have brought
to attention examples of differing approaches of CU and EU to the
largest and most promising projects that are directly related not only
to economic development, but also national security. For instance,
Brussels has stated on numerous occasions about the necessity to shut
down the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, whereas Russia has offered to
prolong its operation under international support to increase its safe
functioning and also supported Yerevan's plans of constructing a new
nuclear power plant with modern technologies to replace the old one.
Given the differences in Brussels' and Moscow's approaches to
Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia conflict and development
prospects for trans-regional communications in South Caucasus, Russia
is the only global actor truly interested for objective reasons in
opening the railroad traffic through Abkhazia, Georgia and Armenia.
Turkey and Azerbaijan are implementing a project to construct
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku (KATB) railway, which has significant
geopolitical and anti-Armenian component in it. At the same time,
for Iran a railway corridor through Armenia would not be the only one
connecting it to Georgia and Russia among the existing and projected
North-South communications lines.
Washington's efforts to suspend the KATB project that excludes Armenia
from yet another regional communications project somewhat slowed
down the construction, but failed to stop it, thus allowing Turkey to
continue the blockade of the existing alternative Gyumri-Kars railroad.
Thus, because of Armenia's prospects for regional integration
without compromising national security interests of the Republic
of Armenia and Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in terms of unilateral
concessions to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to
Turkey in terms of the Genocide recognition, it is beneficial for
Yerevan to join projects where Russia is interested and which it
lobbies. This concerns both ensuring reliable supply to the Russian
military base 102 in Armenia and full-capacity operation of Russian-
and jointly-owned export-oriented industrial facilities in Armenia,
whether currently idle, operating or to be built. Among those the
largest ones are worth mentioning, such as Mars, Armenal and Nairit
factories, for which reconstruction and increased scope of production
with Russian participation are now actively discussed.
In addition, not everything is simple with the Russian gas imports,
which have a key role in energy security of Armenia.
Signing an EU Association Agreement and being in a free trade zone
together with Georgia would first of all mean shutting down the
Armenian Nuclear Power Plant in a maximally short period of time.
Secondly, it would mean liberalization and considerable
unification/regionalization of energy policies of Tbilisi and Yerevan,
which implies merging the energy markets of the two countries in
accordance with the EU energy policy "Third Package" rules, with equal
access and free competition for all participants of the agreement.
This would result in decreased Russian interest in Armenia and hike
of Russian gas prices to market levels already in the mid-term, in
turn leading to low demand for electricity generated by Armenian,
Armenian-Russian and Russian power plants (first of all the Unit 5
of the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant) caused by less expensive or at
least very competitively priced electricity from the Georgian hydro
power plants, both existing and under construction.
In economic terms this could be only welcomed. However, once Georgia
virtually becomes a monopolist in the energy market of Armenia,
the latter would be vulnerable both economically and politically,
since electricity prices may then increase due to absence of common
interests unlike in the case with Armenian-Russian relations, whereas
Georgia's strategic partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan continues
to strengthen.
Under such circumstances any disputes would have to be resolved in
Brussels, which due to own energy interests will consider the stances
of not only Tbilisi and Yerevan, but also that of Baku. Moreover,
in such situation interests of Tbilisi and Baku would match. This
would become especially relevant once the Georgian section of the
North-South gas pipeline, which has strategic importance for Armenia,
is put up for privatization. On numerous occasions Azerbaijan has
assertively expressed interest in purchasing it. It is pertinent to
recall the early 1990s, when there was a practice of blowing up this
pipeline, which passes through Marneuli region of Georgia predominantly
populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis. With the Armenian NPP shut down
and no gas storages, this had a strong psychological effect on the
population of Armenia, when the country was in an open armed conflict
with Azerbaijan. One of the consequences of the energy blockade was
mass emigration, the effects of which are still felt in Armenia.
Also, signing the EU Association Agreement would directly affect the
Armenian-Iranian relations, development of which is currently viewed
"with understanding" in Washington and Brussels. However, further
associated relations with the EU would require Armenia join the EU
and US economic sanctions against Iran. As the current outlook for
lifting the sanctions is still bleak, this would negatively affect
Armenia's situation.
***
It appears the current geopolitical situation in South Caucasus creates
conditions in which an informed, objective and established viewpoint
of Armenia's people toward the country's participation in integration
projects will be formed not so much by informational coverage of
the Armenia-EU and Armenia-CU bilateral relations, but rather by the
analysis of the military, political and economic actions that actors
playing in the region will conduct. A substantiated, balanced position
of the experts and analysts would enable the society to choose in
the wide range of suggested opinions the ones in best interests of
Armenia and mutually beneficial for its allies.
Return ________________________________ Another materials of author
THE MAIN TRENDS IN GEORGIAN POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER,
2013[23.12.2013] INTEGRATION ASPIRATIONS OF ARMENIA AND SOME ISSUES
OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SECURITY OF THE REP. OF ARMENIA AND
NKR[12.09.2013] TURKEY: THROES OF SECULARISM[31.07.2013] INTEGRATION
PROSPECTS OF POST-SOVIET STATES ON THE EXAMPLE OF KIRGIZIA AND
UKRAINE (EXPECTATIONS AND CONCERNS)[03.06.2013] INTENSIFICATION OF
RUSSIA-TURKEY INDIRECT MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONFRONTATION[25.02.2013]
GEORGIA: AN ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER IN A NARROW GAUGE[14.01.2013] SOME
ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION ROUND
THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT [02.08.2012] "IT IS NECESSARY TO RAISE
ENERGY EFFICIENCY", - says the deputy head of the Center for Political
Studies of "Noravank" Foundation Sergei SARGSYAN in his interview
to "Golos Armenii"[26.07.2012] TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE: GOALS,
PROBLEMS AND RISKS [25.06.2012] TURKEY IN THE US MISSILE DEFENCE
SYSTEM: PRIMARY ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS[13.10.2011]