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Foreign Policy
March 21 2014
Were the Ottomans the "good" imperialists?
by Hannah Gais
In an article entitled "In Defense of Empire" published on March 19,
chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor and national correspondent for
the Atlantic Robert Kaplan argues we ought to bring back a form of
American "imperialism." Imperialism, he argues, is both misunderstood
and an effective governing tool. While I don't intend to focus on the
full article here, I will focus on the protection of minority rights
under the Ottomans. After all, as Kaplan notes: "The early modern
empires of Hapsburg Austria and Ottoman Turkey were well known for
their relative tolerance and protection of minorities, including the
Jews."
The Ottomans relegated some powers of self-governance to "the people
of the book": Christians and Jews. The Ottoman's millet ("nation")
system compartmentalized the empire into a series of minority groups
with limited legislative powers on a confessional basis. Because the
leader of a millet answered directly to the sultan, it effectively
solidified the sultan's place as the ultimate hierarch. Most
importantly, the millet system divided the empire on the basis of
religion, not ethnic identity. The Orthodox millet was dubbed the Rum
(Roman) millet-an indicator of their faith, as well as a hat tip to
what the Byzantines self-identified as: Romans.
This "nonliberal model of pluralism" may have allowed for limited
freedoms for minority groups; however, it did not mean that members of
the Christian or Jewish millet were: a.) equal to their Muslim
counterparts; b.) given these rights for any other reason than sheer
practicality; c.) protected minorities.
Inequality was the bedrock of the Ottomans' treatment of religious
minorities. It expressed itself in a number of different ways,
particularly for the Christianity community. Despite the fact that
millets were supposed to govern themselves in religious matters, the
sultan could and did restructure ecclesial bodies. He overstepped the
boundaries on state interference in ecclesial matters by granting the
Orthodox Church's Holy Synod, the body of metropolitans from the
surrounding area that elected the patriarch, more power than it
traditionally was alloted. Under the Ottomans, the Synod was
essentially given "veto" power over patriarchal decrees--i.e., no
decree could go into effect without the Synod's consent. In addition
to restructuring traditional ecclesial bodies, the Ottomans gave
themselves the power to deny permits for church repairs and
construction, implemented a distinctive dress code to identify
Christian and Jews from Muslims, and effectively denied Muslims the
right to convert to another religion by making apostasy punishable by
death.
Limited self-rule was permitted for practical, not ideological,
purposes. By providing limited freedoms, the sultan could provide
enough breathing room to limit frustrations and stave off uprisings.
Additionally, allowing for some form of self-governance made it much
easier to hold a community accountable if it did something the sultan
did not approve of. Each millet, headed by a single leader who
answered directly to the sultan, provided a chain of command that made
it easier to quash dissent and hold communities accountable by
targeting their heart and soul. For the Christian community, this
precisely what why the Ottomans targeted the office of the Ecumenical
Patriarch when the Ottomans reacted to the Greek uprising by hanging
Patriarch Gregorios V on April 10, 1821.
Finally, and most importantly, the millet system was not designed to
provide protection for minorities. To quote one author: "millets are
not minorities, and the very unique and dynamic millet system is not a
regime of protecting minorities." Simply because a millet was granted
the opportunity to collect some taxes or educate its flock did not
make its people a protected minority under the law. "Protection" in
the form of ensuring religious freedom, in fact, only formally comes
to the empire in 1856, when the Ottoman Reform Edict is passed. Even
after 1856, minorities were still not protected from state
interference or oppression--indeed, the Ottomans began a targeted
extermination of Armenian, as well as Greek and Assyrian, minority
groups in 1915. At least 1.5 million died.
The Ottomans may not have been the "Belgians in the 19th-century Congo
and the Russians throughout modern history in Eurasia," but the
imperial structure was far from ideal for minorities. Perhaps instead
of glossing over anachronistic views of minority protections, is
high-time we ask: Why exactly do we find the idea of empire so
appealing?
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/03/21/were-the-ottomans-the-good-imperialists/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
March 21 2014
Were the Ottomans the "good" imperialists?
by Hannah Gais
In an article entitled "In Defense of Empire" published on March 19,
chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor and national correspondent for
the Atlantic Robert Kaplan argues we ought to bring back a form of
American "imperialism." Imperialism, he argues, is both misunderstood
and an effective governing tool. While I don't intend to focus on the
full article here, I will focus on the protection of minority rights
under the Ottomans. After all, as Kaplan notes: "The early modern
empires of Hapsburg Austria and Ottoman Turkey were well known for
their relative tolerance and protection of minorities, including the
Jews."
The Ottomans relegated some powers of self-governance to "the people
of the book": Christians and Jews. The Ottoman's millet ("nation")
system compartmentalized the empire into a series of minority groups
with limited legislative powers on a confessional basis. Because the
leader of a millet answered directly to the sultan, it effectively
solidified the sultan's place as the ultimate hierarch. Most
importantly, the millet system divided the empire on the basis of
religion, not ethnic identity. The Orthodox millet was dubbed the Rum
(Roman) millet-an indicator of their faith, as well as a hat tip to
what the Byzantines self-identified as: Romans.
This "nonliberal model of pluralism" may have allowed for limited
freedoms for minority groups; however, it did not mean that members of
the Christian or Jewish millet were: a.) equal to their Muslim
counterparts; b.) given these rights for any other reason than sheer
practicality; c.) protected minorities.
Inequality was the bedrock of the Ottomans' treatment of religious
minorities. It expressed itself in a number of different ways,
particularly for the Christianity community. Despite the fact that
millets were supposed to govern themselves in religious matters, the
sultan could and did restructure ecclesial bodies. He overstepped the
boundaries on state interference in ecclesial matters by granting the
Orthodox Church's Holy Synod, the body of metropolitans from the
surrounding area that elected the patriarch, more power than it
traditionally was alloted. Under the Ottomans, the Synod was
essentially given "veto" power over patriarchal decrees--i.e., no
decree could go into effect without the Synod's consent. In addition
to restructuring traditional ecclesial bodies, the Ottomans gave
themselves the power to deny permits for church repairs and
construction, implemented a distinctive dress code to identify
Christian and Jews from Muslims, and effectively denied Muslims the
right to convert to another religion by making apostasy punishable by
death.
Limited self-rule was permitted for practical, not ideological,
purposes. By providing limited freedoms, the sultan could provide
enough breathing room to limit frustrations and stave off uprisings.
Additionally, allowing for some form of self-governance made it much
easier to hold a community accountable if it did something the sultan
did not approve of. Each millet, headed by a single leader who
answered directly to the sultan, provided a chain of command that made
it easier to quash dissent and hold communities accountable by
targeting their heart and soul. For the Christian community, this
precisely what why the Ottomans targeted the office of the Ecumenical
Patriarch when the Ottomans reacted to the Greek uprising by hanging
Patriarch Gregorios V on April 10, 1821.
Finally, and most importantly, the millet system was not designed to
provide protection for minorities. To quote one author: "millets are
not minorities, and the very unique and dynamic millet system is not a
regime of protecting minorities." Simply because a millet was granted
the opportunity to collect some taxes or educate its flock did not
make its people a protected minority under the law. "Protection" in
the form of ensuring religious freedom, in fact, only formally comes
to the empire in 1856, when the Ottoman Reform Edict is passed. Even
after 1856, minorities were still not protected from state
interference or oppression--indeed, the Ottomans began a targeted
extermination of Armenian, as well as Greek and Assyrian, minority
groups in 1915. At least 1.5 million died.
The Ottomans may not have been the "Belgians in the 19th-century Congo
and the Russians throughout modern history in Eurasia," but the
imperial structure was far from ideal for minorities. Perhaps instead
of glossing over anachronistic views of minority protections, is
high-time we ask: Why exactly do we find the idea of empire so
appealing?
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/03/21/were-the-ottomans-the-good-imperialists/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress