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From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine

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  • From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine

    http://www.rightsidenews.com/2014032534044/world/geopolitical/from-estonia-to-azerbaijan-american-strategy-after-ukraine.html

    >From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine
    by George Friedman
    Tuesday, 25 March 2014 09:24

    As I discussed last week, the fundamental problem that Ukraine poses
    for Russia, beyond a long-term geographical threat, is a crisis in
    internal legitimacy. Russian President Vladimir Putin has spent his
    time in power rebuilding the authority of the Russian state within
    Russia and the authority of Russia within the former Soviet Union.
    The events in Ukraine undermine the second strategy and potentially
    the first. If Putin cannot maintain at least Ukrainian neutrality,
    then the world's perception of him as a master strategist is
    shattered, and the legitimacy and authority he has built for the
    Russian state is, at best, shaken.

    Whatever the origins of the events in Ukraine, the United States is
    now engaged in a confrontation with Russia. The Russians believe that
    the United States was the prime mover behind regime change in
    Ukraine. At the very least, the Russians intend to reverse events in
    Ukraine. At most, the Russians have reached the conclusion that the
    United States intends to undermine Russia's power. They will resist.
    The United States has the option of declining confrontation, engaging
    in meaningless sanctions against individuals and allowing events to
    take their course. Alternatively, the United States can choose to
    engage and confront the Russians.

    A failure to engage at this point would cause countries around
    Russia's periphery, from Estonia to Azerbaijan, to conclude that with
    the United States withdrawn and Europe fragmented, they must reach an
    accommodation with Russia. This will expand Russian power and open
    the door to Russian influence spreading on the European Peninsula
    itself. The United States has fought three wars (World War I, World
    War II and the Cold War) to prevent hegemonic domination of the
    region. Failure to engage would be a reversal of a century-old
    strategy.

    The American dilemma is how to address the strategic context in a
    global setting in which it is less involved in the Middle East and is
    continuing to work toward a "pivot to Asia." Nor can the United
    States simply allow events to take their course. The United States
    needs a strategy that is economical and coherent militarily,
    politically and financially. It has two advantages. Some of the
    countries on Russia's periphery do not want to be dominated by her.
    Russia, in spite of some strengths, is inherently weak and does not
    require U.S. exertion on the order of the two World Wars, the Cold War
    or even the Middle East engagements of the past decade.

    The Russian and U.S. Positions

    I discussed Russian options on Ukraine last week. Putin is now in a
    position where, in order to retain with confidence his domestic
    authority, he must act decisively to reverse the outcome. The problem
    is there is no single decisive action that would reverse events.
    Eventually, the inherent divisions in Ukraine might reverse events.
    However, a direct invasion of eastern Ukraine would simply solidify
    opposition to Russia in Kiev and trigger responses internationally
    that he cannot predict. In the end, it would simply drive home that
    although the Russians once held a dominant position in all of
    Ukraine, they now hold it in less than half. In the long run, this
    option -- like other short-term options -- would not solve the
    Russian conundrum.

    Whatever Putin does in Ukraine, he has two choices. One is simply to
    accept the reversal, which I would argue that he cannot do. The
    second is to take action in places where he might achieve rapid
    diplomatic and political victories against the West -- the Baltics,
    Moldova or the Caucasus -- while encouraging Ukraine's government to
    collapse into gridlock and developing bilateral relations along the
    Estonia-Azerbaijan line. This would prevent a U.S. strategy of
    containment -- a strategy that worked during the Cold War and one
    that the Europeans are incapable of implementing on their own. This
    comes down to the Americans.

    The United States has been developing, almost by default, a strategy
    not of disengagement but of indirect engagement. Between 1989 and
    2008, the U.S. strategy has been the use of U.S. troops as the
    default for dealing with foreign issues. From Panama to Somalia,
    Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States followed a policy of
    direct and early involvement of U.S. military forces. However, this
    was not the U.S. strategy from 1914 to 1989. Then, the strategy was
    to provide political support to allies, followed by economic and
    military aid, followed by advisers and limited forces, and in some
    cases pre-positioned forces. The United States kept its main force in
    reserve for circumstances in which (as in 1917 and 1942 and, to a
    lesser degree, in Korea and Vietnam) allies could not contain the
    potential hegemon. Main force was the last resort.

    This was primarily a strategy of maintaining the balance of power. The
    containment of the Soviet Union involved creating an alliance system
    comprising countries at risk of Soviet attack. Containment was a
    balance of power strategy that did not seek the capitulation of the
    Soviet Union as much as increasing the risks of offensive action
    using allied countries as the first barrier. The threat of full U.S.
    intervention, potentially including nuclear weapons, coupled with the
    alliance structure, constrained Soviet risk-taking.

    Because the current Russian Federation is much weaker than the Soviet
    Union was at its height and because the general geographic principle
    in the region remains the same, a somewhat analogous balance of power
    strategy is likely to emerge after the events in Ukraine. Similar to
    the containment policy of 1945-1989, again in principle if not in
    detail, it would combine economy of force and finance and limit the
    development of Russia as a hegemonic power while exposing the United
    States to limited and controlled risk.

    The coalescence of this strategy is a development I forecast in two
    books, The Next Decade and The Next 100 Years, as a concept I called
    the Intermarium. The Intermarium was a plan pursued after World War I
    by Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski for a federation, under Poland's
    aegis, of Central and Eastern European countries. What is now
    emerging is not the Intermarium, but it is close. And it is now
    transforming from an abstract forecast to a concrete, if still
    emergent, reality.
    Forces Leading to the Alliance's Emergence

    A direct military intervention by the United States in Ukraine is not
    possible. First, Ukraine is a large country, and the force required to
    protect it would outstrip U.S. capabilities. Second, supplying such a
    force would require a logistics system that does not exist and would
    take a long time to build. Finally, such an intervention would be
    inconceivable without a strong alliance system extending to the West
    and around the Black Sea. The United States can supply economic and
    political support, but Ukraine cannot counterbalance Russia and the
    United States cannot escalate to the point of using its own forces.
    Ukraine is a battleground on which Russian forces would have an
    advantage and a U.S. defeat would be possible.

    If the United States chooses to confront Russia with a military
    component, it must be on a stable perimeter and on as broad a front
    as possible to extend Russian resources and decrease the probability
    of Russian attack at any one point out of fear of retaliation
    elsewhere. The ideal mechanism for such a strategy would be NATO,
    which contains almost all of the critical countries save Azerbaijan
    and Georgia. The problem is that NATO is not a functional alliance.
    It was designed to fight the Cold War on a line far to the west of the
    current line. More important, there was unity on the principle that
    the Soviet Union represented an existential threat to Western Europe.

    That consensus is no longer there. Different countries have different
    perceptions of Russia and different concerns. For many, a replay of
    the Cold War, even in the face of Russian actions in Ukraine, is
    worse than accommodation. In addition, the end of the Cold War has
    led to a massive drawdown of forces in Europe. NATO simply lacks the
    force unless there is a massive and sudden buildup. That will not
    occur because of the financial crisis, among other reasons. NATO
    requires unanimity to act, and that unanimity is not there.

    The countries that were at risk from 1945 to 1989 are not the same as
    those at risk today. Many of these countries were part of the Soviet
    Union then, and the rest were Soviet satellites. The old alliance
    system was not built for this confrontation. The Estonia-Azerbaijan
    line has as its primary interest retaining sovereignty in the face of
    Russian power. The rest of Europe is not in jeopardy, and these
    countries are not prepared to commit financial and military efforts
    to a problem they believe can be managed with little risk to them.
    Therefore, any American strategy must bypass NATO or at the very least
    create new structures to organize the region.

    Characteristics of the Alliance


    Each of the various countries involved is unique and has to be
    addressed that way. But these countries share the common danger that
    events in Ukraine could spread and directly affect their national
    security interests, including internal stability. As I observed, the
    Baltics, Moldova and the Caucasus are areas where the Russians could
    seek to compensate for their defeat. Because of this, and also
    because of their intrinsic importance, Poland, Romania and Azerbaijan
    must be the posts around which this alliance is built.

    The Baltic salient, 145 kilometers (90 miles) from St. Petersburg in
    Estonia, would be a target for Russian destabilization. Poland
    borders the Baltics and is the leading figure in the Visegrad
    battlegroup, an organization within the European Union. Poland is
    eager for a closer military relationship with the United States, as
    its national strategy has long been based on third-power guarantees
    against aggressors. The Poles cannot defend themselves and the
    Baltics, given the combat capabilities necessary for the task.

    The Dniester River is 80 kilometers from Odessa, the main port on the
    Black Sea for Ukraine and an important one for Russia. The Prut River
    is about 200 kilometers from Bucharest, the capital of Romania.
    Moldova is between these two rivers. It is a battleground region, at
    least of competing political factions. Romania must be armed and
    supported in protecting Moldova and in organizing southeastern Europe.
    In Western hands, Moldova threatens Odessa, Ukraine's major port also
    used by Russia on the Black Sea. In Russian hands, Moldova threatens
    Bucharest.

    At the far end of the alliance structure I am envisioning is
    Azerbaijan, on the Caspian Sea bordering Russia and Iran. Should
    Dagestan and Chechnya destabilize, Azerbaijan -- which is Islamic and
    majority Shiite but secular -- would become critical for limiting the
    regional spread of jihadists. Azerbaijan also would support the
    alliance's position in the Black Sea by supporting Georgia and would
    serve as a bridge for relations (and energy) should Western relations
    with Iran continue to improve. To the southwest, the very pro-Russian
    Armenia -- which has a Russian troop presence and a long-term treaty
    with Moscow -- could escalate tensions with Azerbaijan in
    Nagorno-Karabakh. Previously, this was not a pressing issue for the
    United States. Now it is. The security of Georgia and its ports on
    the Black Sea requires Azerbaijan's inclusion in the alliance.

    Azerbaijan serves a more strategic purpose. Most of the countries in
    the alliance are heavy importers of Russian energy; for instance, 91
    percent of Poland's energy imports and 86 percent of Hungary's come
    from Russia. There is no short-term solution to this problem, but
    Russia needs the revenue from these exports as much as these
    countries need the energy. Developing European shale and importing
    U.S. energy is a long-term solution. A medium-term solution,
    depending on pipeline developments that Russia has tended to block in
    the past, is sending natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. Until now,
    this has been a commercial issue, but it has become a strategically
    critical issue. The Caspian region, of which Azerbaijan is the
    lynchpin, is the only major alternative to Russia for energy.
    Therefore, rapid expansion of pipelines to the heart of Europe is as
    essential as providing Azerbaijan with the military capability to
    defend itself (a capability it is prepared to pay for and, unlike
    other allied countries, does not need to be underwritten).

    The key to the pipeline will be Turkey's willingness to permit
    transit. I have not included Turkey as a member of this alliance.
    Its internal politics, complex relations and heavy energy dependence
    on Russia make such participation difficult. I view Turkey in this
    alliance structure as France in the Cold War. It was aligned yet
    independent, militarily self-sufficient yet dependent on the
    effective functioning of others. Turkey, inside or outside of the
    formal structure, will play this role because the future of the Black
    Sea, the Caucasus and southeastern Europe is essential to Ankara.

    These countries, diverse as they are, share a desire not to be
    dominated by the Russians. That commonality is a basis for forging
    them into a functional military alliance. This is not an offensive
    force but a force designed to deter Russian expansion. All of these
    countries need modern military equipment, particularly air defense,
    anti-tank and mobile infantry. In each case, the willingness of the
    United States to supply these weapons, for cash or credit as the
    situation requires, will strengthen pro-U.S. political forces in each
    country and create a wall behind which Western investment can take
    place. And it is an organization that others can join, which unlike
    NATO does not allow each member the right to veto.

    The Practicality of the U.S. Strategy

    There are those who would criticize this alliance for including
    members who do not share all the democratic values of the U.S. State
    Department. This may be true. It is also true that during the Cold
    War the United States was allied with the Shah's Iran, Turkey and
    Greece under dictatorship and Mao's China after 1971. Having
    encouraged Ukrainian independence, the United States -- in trying to
    protect that independence and the independence of other countries in
    the region -- is creating an alliance structure that will include
    countries, such as Azerbaijan, that have been criticized. However, if
    energy does not come from Azerbaijan, it will come from Russia, and
    then the Ukrainian events will dissolve into tragic farce. The State
    Department must grapple with the harsh forces its own policies have
    unleashed. This suggests that the high-mindedness borne of benign
    assumptions now proven to be illusions must make way for realpolitik
    calculations.

    The balance of power strategy allows the United States to use the
    natural inclination of allies to bolster its own position and take
    various steps, of which military intervention is the last, not the
    first. It recognizes that the United States, as nearly 25 percent of
    the world's economy and the global maritime hegemon, cannot evade
    involvement. Its very size and existence involves it. Nor can the
    United States confine itself to gestures like sanctions on 20 people.
    This is not seen as a sign of resolve as much as weakness. It does
    mean that as the United States engages in issues like Ukraine and must
    make strategic decisions, there are alternatives to intervention --
    such as alliances. In this case, a natural alliance structure
    presents itself -- a descendant of NATO but shaped for this crisis,
    much like the alliance I forecast previously.

    In my view, Russian power is limited and has flourished while the
    United States was distracted by its wars in the Middle East and while
    Europe struggled with its economic crisis. That does not mean Russia
    is not dangerous. It has short-term advantages, and its insecurity
    means that it will take risks. Weak and insecure states with
    temporary advantages are dangerous. The United States has an interest
    in acting early because early action is cheaper than acting in the
    last extremity. This is a case of anti-air missiles, attack
    helicopters, communications systems and training, among other things.
    These are things the United States has in abundance. It is not a case
    of deploying divisions, of which it has few. The Poles, Romanians,
    Azerbaijanis and certainly the Turks can defend themselves. They need
    weapons and training, and that will keep Russia contained within its
    cauldron as it plays out a last hand as a great power.



    George Friedman is the Chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in
    1996 that is now a leader in the field of global intelligence.
    Friedman guides Stratfor's strategic vision and oversees the
    development and training of the company's intelligence unit.

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