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CRIMEA - RUSSIA - SOUTH CAUCASUS
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
March 26 2014
26 March 2014 - 9:21am
Alexei Vlasov, exclusively for Vestnik Kavkaza
The events in Ukraine are reflected in the internal political climate
in republics of the South Caucasus. It concerns not only perception
of the Kremlin's new international line by the ruling elites, but
also a deeper level of the public attitude to the events happening
in Crimea and the whole post-Soviet space.
The rather moderate and careful position of Baku toward the Ukrainian
crisis is explained by the fact that the foreign political course of
Azerbaijan, which was started under Heydar Aliyev, can be effective
only if the main international actors do not try to throw the former
Soviet republics into a dilemma - for the red team or for the white
team.
A successful realization of the multisided course as the main condition
demands "geopolitical silence," i.e. an opportunity to balance between
Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and Ankara.
>From this point of view, Armenia has no less difficult situation
than Azerbaijan, but for different reasons. Yerevan understands that
Russia and its role for the country will grow, as Armenia will move
to the Customs Union and confrontation between Russia and the West
will escalate.
The Georgian situation is beyond all-Caucasus trends, despite
Saakashvili's resignation. However, even though official Tbilisi
promises absolute loyalty to the West, it cannot be completely
protected from attempts by foreign forces to improve influence on
the foreign political course of the country through organization of a
Rose Revolution-2. So, a possibility of Saakashvili's return supported
by foreign sponsors influences public statements and declarations of
young Georgian leaders.
As for pro-Western non-governmental organizations and the mass media
which became numerous in Armenia and Azerbaijan for 2-3 years, there
is no surprise in them. As the information war becomes stricter,
masks are torn off and the authors who used to write about democracy,
struggle against corruption, and a national idea appear to have a
single goal only - imposing an image of Russia as the only threat to
the South Caucasus and the whole post-Soviet space on people.
All possible means are implemented to reach the goal - from fake
publications to interviews with nonexistent experts.
Speaking about Azerbaijan, publications in several local websites
hardly influence an attitude to Russia of the Azerbaijani society.
Official propaganda strives to a neutral thoughtful position without
hysteria or attempts to present Russia as "an enemy and occupant"
for all free nations.
I believe the position of official Baku in the current situation is
the best that we could expect from the conflict between Russia and the
West in the difficult time of rapid changes in the international arena.
Obviously, the Russian expert society should estimate prospects of
the Russian-Azerbaijani relations in the post-crisis period in the
same wise and thoughtful manner, rather than presenting a view of
5-6 involved Azerbaijani experts as the ultimate truth, moreover,
many of them don't live in Azerbaijan.
I agree with a view of Maxim Shevchenko that Azerbaijan is one of
Russia's partners in the Caspian region. I would like to add that the
basis of the cooperation is not only an energy dialogue or a strong
army of Azerbaijan. Finally, the problem of an attitude to Russia is
a problem of Russia's image in societies of the post-Soviet countries.
And I think our task is to explain principles of the Russian foreign
policy toward Ukraine and Crimea to residents of the South Caucasus,
addressing civil societies of the countries, common citizens of
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Our geopolitical rivals are working
in this field.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/53146.html
From: Baghdasarian
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
March 26 2014
26 March 2014 - 9:21am
Alexei Vlasov, exclusively for Vestnik Kavkaza
The events in Ukraine are reflected in the internal political climate
in republics of the South Caucasus. It concerns not only perception
of the Kremlin's new international line by the ruling elites, but
also a deeper level of the public attitude to the events happening
in Crimea and the whole post-Soviet space.
The rather moderate and careful position of Baku toward the Ukrainian
crisis is explained by the fact that the foreign political course of
Azerbaijan, which was started under Heydar Aliyev, can be effective
only if the main international actors do not try to throw the former
Soviet republics into a dilemma - for the red team or for the white
team.
A successful realization of the multisided course as the main condition
demands "geopolitical silence," i.e. an opportunity to balance between
Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and Ankara.
>From this point of view, Armenia has no less difficult situation
than Azerbaijan, but for different reasons. Yerevan understands that
Russia and its role for the country will grow, as Armenia will move
to the Customs Union and confrontation between Russia and the West
will escalate.
The Georgian situation is beyond all-Caucasus trends, despite
Saakashvili's resignation. However, even though official Tbilisi
promises absolute loyalty to the West, it cannot be completely
protected from attempts by foreign forces to improve influence on
the foreign political course of the country through organization of a
Rose Revolution-2. So, a possibility of Saakashvili's return supported
by foreign sponsors influences public statements and declarations of
young Georgian leaders.
As for pro-Western non-governmental organizations and the mass media
which became numerous in Armenia and Azerbaijan for 2-3 years, there
is no surprise in them. As the information war becomes stricter,
masks are torn off and the authors who used to write about democracy,
struggle against corruption, and a national idea appear to have a
single goal only - imposing an image of Russia as the only threat to
the South Caucasus and the whole post-Soviet space on people.
All possible means are implemented to reach the goal - from fake
publications to interviews with nonexistent experts.
Speaking about Azerbaijan, publications in several local websites
hardly influence an attitude to Russia of the Azerbaijani society.
Official propaganda strives to a neutral thoughtful position without
hysteria or attempts to present Russia as "an enemy and occupant"
for all free nations.
I believe the position of official Baku in the current situation is
the best that we could expect from the conflict between Russia and the
West in the difficult time of rapid changes in the international arena.
Obviously, the Russian expert society should estimate prospects of
the Russian-Azerbaijani relations in the post-crisis period in the
same wise and thoughtful manner, rather than presenting a view of
5-6 involved Azerbaijani experts as the ultimate truth, moreover,
many of them don't live in Azerbaijan.
I agree with a view of Maxim Shevchenko that Azerbaijan is one of
Russia's partners in the Caspian region. I would like to add that the
basis of the cooperation is not only an energy dialogue or a strong
army of Azerbaijan. Finally, the problem of an attitude to Russia is
a problem of Russia's image in societies of the post-Soviet countries.
And I think our task is to explain principles of the Russian foreign
policy toward Ukraine and Crimea to residents of the South Caucasus,
addressing civil societies of the countries, common citizens of
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Our geopolitical rivals are working
in this field.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/53146.html
From: Baghdasarian