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THE CAUCASIAN FACTOR IN EURASIAN INTEGRATION
Russia in Global Affairs, Russia
March 21 2014
21 march 2014
Sergei Markedonov
When Two Allies Have Problems Finding a Third One
Sergei Markedonov, Ph.D. (History), is assistant professor at the
Regional Studies and Foreign Policy department of the Russian State
University for Humanities.
Resume: Moscow has made the largest progress in Eurasian integration
with Armenia. It has had no integration plans (given numerous
constraints) with regard to Azerbaijan or Georgia. Yet Russia's
victory cannot be regarded complete or unequivocal.
Eurasian integration is one of Russia's key foreign policy priorities
at present, viewed as an instrument to bolster its influence in the
international arena. As President Vladimir Putin said, "We propose
a model of a powerful, supranational union, capable of becoming one
of the poles of the modern world and playing an effective role in
linking Europe to the thriving Asia-Pacific region."
Prospects for a major reconfiguration of the post-Soviet space
emerged after the Customs Union agreement became effective in July
2010. It was followed by three-and-half-years efforts by Russia and
its closest partners Belarus and Kazakhstan to institutionalize the
Eurasian integration project, which opened the possibility of other
former Soviet republics joining the core "union of three."
In the recent months, the problems and prospects for Eurasian
integration have been largely discussed against the backdrop of unrest
in Ukraine. Kyiv backed out of the initialed Association Agreement
with the European Union on the eve of the EU and Eastern Partnership
members' summit in Vilnius, provoking a major domestic political
crisis. However, there were other causes behind it not necessarily
related to international problems. The crisis again highlighted
the standoff between Russia and the West, with the former viewing
the post-Soviet space as a region of its special and privileged
interests and the latter aiming to promote its "geopolitical and
energy pluralism" there, naturally at the expense of minimizing
Russia's leading and sometimes exclusive role.
THE MOST TURBULENT REGION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Discussions about possibilities and constraints of the Eurasian
integration project cannot be limited to Ukrainian events no matter
how significant they look. In 2013, developments in Russian-Armenian
relations showed that the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) had no less
importance in reconfiguring the post-Soviet space. Whereas possible
ethno-political conflicts and Ukraine's hypothetical breakup are just
topics for discussion, the Caucasus even now can be viewed as the most
dangerous and unpredictable hotbed in the former Soviet Union. The
Caucasus accounts for six of eight armed conflicts, and none of
them can be considered settled. Furthermore, there are different
interpretations of what the settlement of an ethno-political conflict
is. For Russia, the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is a way out of the conflict, but Georgia sees this
solution as occupation. For Armenia, the self-determination of the
Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh is the only way to resolve the
standoff with Azerbaijan, which, for its part, assumes that the only
opportunity is to reintegrate the breakaway area.
Three of the four existing de-facto states are located in the region.
It was the Caucasus that created the first precedent of recognition of
former autonomous areas as independent states. Although the process
of their international legitimization has slowed down, even vehement
opponents of official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
acknowledge their significance for settling conflicts and for the
stabilization (or de-stabilization) of the Caucasus. This is evidenced
in participation of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's representatives in
Geneva security talks launched in 2008, as part of the accords between
the Russian and French presidents that ended the Georgian-Russian
"five-day war."
It is only in this part of the former USSR that neighboring states have
no diplomatic relations with each other. These states are Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia, and Armenia and Turkey. Armenia's
borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed. The inauguration
in 2015 of the regional Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, currently under
construction, will increase Armenia's isolation. At the same time,
Nakhichevan remains Azerbaijan's exclave, with which it only has an
air link.
The South Caucasus has a particular significance for Russia, which
itself is a "Caucasian" country - the aggregate territory of its
North Caucasian republics is larger than that of all independent
states in Transcaucasia. The ethno-political conflicts in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the spread of radical
Islamist views, have direct bearing on Russia's internal security. The
problem of ethnic enclaves and exclaves, a most sensitive issue in
relations between Moscow and Baku, impacts the situation in Russia's
North Caucasus.
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Caucasian-Factor-in-Eurasian-Integration-16500
Russia in Global Affairs, Russia
March 21 2014
21 march 2014
Sergei Markedonov
When Two Allies Have Problems Finding a Third One
Sergei Markedonov, Ph.D. (History), is assistant professor at the
Regional Studies and Foreign Policy department of the Russian State
University for Humanities.
Resume: Moscow has made the largest progress in Eurasian integration
with Armenia. It has had no integration plans (given numerous
constraints) with regard to Azerbaijan or Georgia. Yet Russia's
victory cannot be regarded complete or unequivocal.
Eurasian integration is one of Russia's key foreign policy priorities
at present, viewed as an instrument to bolster its influence in the
international arena. As President Vladimir Putin said, "We propose
a model of a powerful, supranational union, capable of becoming one
of the poles of the modern world and playing an effective role in
linking Europe to the thriving Asia-Pacific region."
Prospects for a major reconfiguration of the post-Soviet space
emerged after the Customs Union agreement became effective in July
2010. It was followed by three-and-half-years efforts by Russia and
its closest partners Belarus and Kazakhstan to institutionalize the
Eurasian integration project, which opened the possibility of other
former Soviet republics joining the core "union of three."
In the recent months, the problems and prospects for Eurasian
integration have been largely discussed against the backdrop of unrest
in Ukraine. Kyiv backed out of the initialed Association Agreement
with the European Union on the eve of the EU and Eastern Partnership
members' summit in Vilnius, provoking a major domestic political
crisis. However, there were other causes behind it not necessarily
related to international problems. The crisis again highlighted
the standoff between Russia and the West, with the former viewing
the post-Soviet space as a region of its special and privileged
interests and the latter aiming to promote its "geopolitical and
energy pluralism" there, naturally at the expense of minimizing
Russia's leading and sometimes exclusive role.
THE MOST TURBULENT REGION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Discussions about possibilities and constraints of the Eurasian
integration project cannot be limited to Ukrainian events no matter
how significant they look. In 2013, developments in Russian-Armenian
relations showed that the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) had no less
importance in reconfiguring the post-Soviet space. Whereas possible
ethno-political conflicts and Ukraine's hypothetical breakup are just
topics for discussion, the Caucasus even now can be viewed as the most
dangerous and unpredictable hotbed in the former Soviet Union. The
Caucasus accounts for six of eight armed conflicts, and none of
them can be considered settled. Furthermore, there are different
interpretations of what the settlement of an ethno-political conflict
is. For Russia, the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is a way out of the conflict, but Georgia sees this
solution as occupation. For Armenia, the self-determination of the
Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh is the only way to resolve the
standoff with Azerbaijan, which, for its part, assumes that the only
opportunity is to reintegrate the breakaway area.
Three of the four existing de-facto states are located in the region.
It was the Caucasus that created the first precedent of recognition of
former autonomous areas as independent states. Although the process
of their international legitimization has slowed down, even vehement
opponents of official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
acknowledge their significance for settling conflicts and for the
stabilization (or de-stabilization) of the Caucasus. This is evidenced
in participation of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's representatives in
Geneva security talks launched in 2008, as part of the accords between
the Russian and French presidents that ended the Georgian-Russian
"five-day war."
It is only in this part of the former USSR that neighboring states have
no diplomatic relations with each other. These states are Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia, and Armenia and Turkey. Armenia's
borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed. The inauguration
in 2015 of the regional Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, currently under
construction, will increase Armenia's isolation. At the same time,
Nakhichevan remains Azerbaijan's exclave, with which it only has an
air link.
The South Caucasus has a particular significance for Russia, which
itself is a "Caucasian" country - the aggregate territory of its
North Caucasian republics is larger than that of all independent
states in Transcaucasia. The ethno-political conflicts in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the spread of radical
Islamist views, have direct bearing on Russia's internal security. The
problem of ethnic enclaves and exclaves, a most sensitive issue in
relations between Moscow and Baku, impacts the situation in Russia's
North Caucasus.
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Caucasian-Factor-in-Eurasian-Integration-16500