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THE BIRTH OF EURASIASKEPTICISM
Russia in Global Affairs, Russia
March 21 2014
21 march 2014
Evgeny Vinokurov
Are There Reasons for Panic?
Evgeny Vinokurov, Ph.D (Economics), is Director of the Center for
Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank.
Resume: Skepticism is normal in any project development and it will
naturally continue to accompany the Eurasian integration project.
Regular monitoring of public opinion will help uncover sore points. To
curb skepticism, systemic preventive measures are needed, such as
an earnest and well-balanced dialogue with the public and business
community.
Skepticism is increasing in the post-Soviet space about the Eurasian
Union (EAU). Similar to doubts surrounding the European Union, the
public, government officials, and business and expert communities are
growing less enthusiastic about the success of the Eurasian project.
As euphoria over the launch of the Customs Union and the Common
Economic Space dies down, attitudes towards the Eurasian project
are becoming progressively sober and public support for the emerging
Eurasian Economic Union is shrinking.
People have criticized attempts to reintegrate post-Soviet space ever
since the break-up of the Soviet Union some twenty-three years ago.
Critics have expressed doubts over the objectives and methods of the
unification processes, both from inside (in the three core countries
of the integration project - Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) and out.
However, the current skepticism is markedly different: it is swelling
as an organic part of the project, which now encompasses the Customs
Union, the Single Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAU), and both its supporters and opponents recognize it as a fait
accompli.
Skepticism towards the Customs Union is still in the nascent
state. A sociological survey (the Eurasian Development Bank's (EDB)
Integration Barometer) found that an average of 68% of people living
in EAU member-states supported that organization in 2013 (down two
points from 2012). Compared to the 50% support for the European Union
registered by a Eurobarometer pan-European survey, this means that
Eurasian integration still has some credibility and durability. Yet
the critical perception of the Customs Union, the Single Economic
Space, and the EAU (the latter is still in the process of formation)
is likely to increase in the next several years. And we all have to
reconcile ourselves to that fact.
THE EVOLVEMENT OF EURASIASKEPTICISM
This article uses data provided by the Integration Barometer project,
which is based on research conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank
on a regular basis. The surveys pose a series of diverse questions,
ranging from the commodities people prefer in post-Soviet countries to
investment partners in educational/socio-cultural institutions. Thus,
the surveys mirror annual shifts in the moods of people living in the
CIS. These indicators help to identify which spheres of integration
are doing well and which are showing signs for concern.
One of the central points of study is public opinion about the
feasibility of accession to the Customs Union and the Single Economic
Space, and the overall perception of those associations. In the polls,
the wording of questions differs depending on whether a country is
a member of a particular association or not. Consequently, people
from member-states were asked about their attitudes towards the
Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, while respondents from
non-affiliated countries were asked about the possibility of accession
to those organizations.
The public's approval of the Customs Union and the Single Economic
Space is relatively high (see Diagram 1): in 2013, support in
Kazakhstan stood at 73% (down 7% from 80% in 2012). The drop in support
was due to an increase in the number of local residents who expressed
indifference to Kazakhstan's participation in both associations (15%
in 2013 compared to 10% in 2012). Six percent responded negatively
about joining either organization.
In 2013, support in Russia for participation in both associations
dipped to 67% from 72% in the previous year. In addition, Russia
showed the biggest growth of indifferent attitudes, which rose to 24%
from 17% in 2012. The percentage of Russians treating these processes
negatively remained at 5%.
In Belarus, support increased for membership in the Customs Union
(to 65% from 60%) and grew closer to the level of support in
Russia. This change occurred amid an economic rebound and financial
aid from Russia. The percentage of Belarusians indifferent to the
Customs Union dropped to 23% from 28%, but, like in Russia, support
still remains relatively high. The percentage of those who responded
negatively towards integration fell to 3% from 6%
Diagram 1. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia formed a Customs Union
and abolished customs duties between the three countries. The three
countries also formed a Single Economic Space, which, in essence,
is a common market. What is your attitude towards that decision?
Source: Integration Barometer
Other questions revealed a more critical approach, especially
in the categories of commodity preferences, science, technology,
and education.
Compared to 2012, goods produced in CIS countries were in less demand
among Russians (12%) and Belarusians (8%) in 2013. "Other countries,"
i.e., countries outside of the Eurasian Union and the CIS, were named
as the most preferable sources of foreign investment. Investment
by post-Soviet neighbors (which actually means Russia) was not a
priority. One possible explanation for this is that Russian investment
is not associated in the public mind with technological progress or
industrial modernization (although the actual situation is much more
nuanced. See the data on Russia's diversified direct investment in
the CIS provided by the EDB's another annual report on the Monitoring
of Mutual Investments).
A question about priority partners in science and technology has
revealed a similar picture. Respondents from all CIS countries
mentioned Japan, the U.S., and Germany as priority partners. One of
the reasons may be the perception of Russia as a country that has
lost many of its leading positions in science and technology over
the past two decades.
Negative long-term trends are characteristic of educational exchanges.
Although many recognized educational centers in Moscow, St.
Petersburg, Kiev, Minsk, Almaty, Yekaterinburg, and Omsk could compete
successfully with Western universities in the 1990s in the cost to
quality grounds, current polls suggest that those institutions have
lost that advantage. Also, grassroots chauvinism, which is another
factor unrelated to the quality of education, still impacts Russia. Of
course, one should reckon with persistent trends in education that
relate to the two post-Soviet decades, not to the short history of
the Customs Union.
Diagram 2. To which of the countries below would you like to go to
study or for other educational purposes (or to send your children
for study)?
Source: Integration Barometer.
>From this point on, in diagrams depicting the categories "Former
Soviet republics," "EU countries," and "Other countries," the
indicators account for the percentage of respondents who named at
least one country in an appropriate category. For instance, in this
diagram, 52% of Tajiks mentioned at least one former Soviet republic;
18% at least one EU country; and 51% at least one "other" country
(see data for Tajikistan in 2013).
Preferences indicating the most attractive countries for cooperation
in science and technology are especially important because they
directly relate to long-term strategic competitiveness. Therefore,
it should be alarming that the CIS population shows little interest
in neighboring states in these areas.
Equally worrying in terms of the Eurasian integration project is
the relatively high level of "autonomous approach" to development
with some post-Soviet countries, which is manifest in the lack of
respondents' interest in any country on the list (see Diagram 3). The
term "autonomous approach" implies that people concentrate on their
home countries' internal problems and resources. They show a relative
lack of interest in interacting with the world in a wide range of
areas, including trade, investment, and culture. The general tendency
is: the wealthier a country, the more inclined its citizens are to
develop on their own. Kazakhstan, which is open to the outside world,
is an exception to that rule.
Diagram 3. The level of public interest in autonomous development in
countries taking part in the project (the mean value of the total
percentages of 'No such countries' and 'Undecided' in answers to
questions asked in each country)
Source: Integration Barometer
Overall, people living in Customs Union countries and their neighbors
are fairly optimistic. For instance, three-thirds or more respondents
in the three core nations believe that the integration project will
either develop further or maintain current achievements, but the
project will definitely not collapse.
Diagram 4. Do you think there will be a rapprochement or estrangement
among CIS countries in the next five years?
THE EXPERIENCE OF EUROSKEPTICISM
>From the beginning skepticism has accompanied the discussions of
post-Soviet integration. While Eurasiaskepticism is no more than a
year old, concerns about the EU have been around for a long time.
Thus, it makes sense to compare the two phenomena on the basis of
sociological data.
Eurobarometer polling conducted in EU countries reveals a lower
percentage of those who approve of integration. People living in
incumbent EU member-states gave a relatively positive assessment of the
gains in their respective countries from involvement in the European
common market, yet the share of positive answers does not exceed 50%
(see Diagram 5). It is noteworthy that the level of approval was much
higher in the first half of the 2000s, while support dropped later
during a financial crisis in the eurozone. The number of negative
assessments now approaches the amount of positive assessments in
Britain, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Greece, and Cyprus, and sometimes
the results are even higher. Thus, the public no longer assesses all
of the blame to national governments for short-sighted fiscal policies
and bloated non-production assets, but blames Brussels instead.
Overall, the perception of economic integration within the post-Soviet
space is more positive than within the EU. However, we should bear
in mind that since the questions of the two "barometers" differ, the
responses can neither be directly compared nor provide an accurate
analysis. Importantly, Europeans were asked about what they had already
gained from the EU. Naturally, during the economic crisis Europeans
were not inclined towards favorably assessing the impact of integration
on their lives. Simultaneously, respondents from post-Soviet countries
were asked about their general attitudes towards the establishment
of the Customs Union. Since it has not had a significant influence
on their lives so far, their judgments were based on more general
perceptions ("It is a good and appropriate thing to be together and
be friends.")
Diagram 5. Overall, has your country gained or lost from membership
in the EU (the Common Market)?
Source: Eurobarometer. This question was asked in EU countries in
May 2011, and in candidate countries in November 2012.
A similar conclusion can be drawn by comparing the results of
polling in countries that are not members in associations. Macedonia
and Montenegro were the only two of the six candidate countries in
November 2012 where more than 50% of respondents spoke favorably of
participating in the European common market. In the case of Turkey,
the figure accounts for decades of unsuccessful attempts to join a
united Europe. The Serbian response was mostly negative in the wake
of the EU's support for the forces that had broken up the former
Yugoslavia. Icelanders reacted to the 'hard landing' of 2008. As for
post-Soviet space, the only negative assessments came in Azerbaijan,
where 53% of respondents indicated that they would not like to
join the Customs Union, while only 37% supported such a move. This
is a consequence of the Karabakh syndrome. In other CIS countries
the percentage of those who support economic integration was much
larger and reached three-thirds of the population in some cases (72%
in Kyrgyzstan, 75% in Tajikistan, and 77% in Uzbekistan).
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Birth-of-Eurasiaskepticism-16498
Russia in Global Affairs, Russia
March 21 2014
21 march 2014
Evgeny Vinokurov
Are There Reasons for Panic?
Evgeny Vinokurov, Ph.D (Economics), is Director of the Center for
Integration Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank.
Resume: Skepticism is normal in any project development and it will
naturally continue to accompany the Eurasian integration project.
Regular monitoring of public opinion will help uncover sore points. To
curb skepticism, systemic preventive measures are needed, such as
an earnest and well-balanced dialogue with the public and business
community.
Skepticism is increasing in the post-Soviet space about the Eurasian
Union (EAU). Similar to doubts surrounding the European Union, the
public, government officials, and business and expert communities are
growing less enthusiastic about the success of the Eurasian project.
As euphoria over the launch of the Customs Union and the Common
Economic Space dies down, attitudes towards the Eurasian project
are becoming progressively sober and public support for the emerging
Eurasian Economic Union is shrinking.
People have criticized attempts to reintegrate post-Soviet space ever
since the break-up of the Soviet Union some twenty-three years ago.
Critics have expressed doubts over the objectives and methods of the
unification processes, both from inside (in the three core countries
of the integration project - Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) and out.
However, the current skepticism is markedly different: it is swelling
as an organic part of the project, which now encompasses the Customs
Union, the Single Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAU), and both its supporters and opponents recognize it as a fait
accompli.
Skepticism towards the Customs Union is still in the nascent
state. A sociological survey (the Eurasian Development Bank's (EDB)
Integration Barometer) found that an average of 68% of people living
in EAU member-states supported that organization in 2013 (down two
points from 2012). Compared to the 50% support for the European Union
registered by a Eurobarometer pan-European survey, this means that
Eurasian integration still has some credibility and durability. Yet
the critical perception of the Customs Union, the Single Economic
Space, and the EAU (the latter is still in the process of formation)
is likely to increase in the next several years. And we all have to
reconcile ourselves to that fact.
THE EVOLVEMENT OF EURASIASKEPTICISM
This article uses data provided by the Integration Barometer project,
which is based on research conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank
on a regular basis. The surveys pose a series of diverse questions,
ranging from the commodities people prefer in post-Soviet countries to
investment partners in educational/socio-cultural institutions. Thus,
the surveys mirror annual shifts in the moods of people living in the
CIS. These indicators help to identify which spheres of integration
are doing well and which are showing signs for concern.
One of the central points of study is public opinion about the
feasibility of accession to the Customs Union and the Single Economic
Space, and the overall perception of those associations. In the polls,
the wording of questions differs depending on whether a country is
a member of a particular association or not. Consequently, people
from member-states were asked about their attitudes towards the
Customs Union and the Single Economic Space, while respondents from
non-affiliated countries were asked about the possibility of accession
to those organizations.
The public's approval of the Customs Union and the Single Economic
Space is relatively high (see Diagram 1): in 2013, support in
Kazakhstan stood at 73% (down 7% from 80% in 2012). The drop in support
was due to an increase in the number of local residents who expressed
indifference to Kazakhstan's participation in both associations (15%
in 2013 compared to 10% in 2012). Six percent responded negatively
about joining either organization.
In 2013, support in Russia for participation in both associations
dipped to 67% from 72% in the previous year. In addition, Russia
showed the biggest growth of indifferent attitudes, which rose to 24%
from 17% in 2012. The percentage of Russians treating these processes
negatively remained at 5%.
In Belarus, support increased for membership in the Customs Union
(to 65% from 60%) and grew closer to the level of support in
Russia. This change occurred amid an economic rebound and financial
aid from Russia. The percentage of Belarusians indifferent to the
Customs Union dropped to 23% from 28%, but, like in Russia, support
still remains relatively high. The percentage of those who responded
negatively towards integration fell to 3% from 6%
Diagram 1. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia formed a Customs Union
and abolished customs duties between the three countries. The three
countries also formed a Single Economic Space, which, in essence,
is a common market. What is your attitude towards that decision?
Source: Integration Barometer
Other questions revealed a more critical approach, especially
in the categories of commodity preferences, science, technology,
and education.
Compared to 2012, goods produced in CIS countries were in less demand
among Russians (12%) and Belarusians (8%) in 2013. "Other countries,"
i.e., countries outside of the Eurasian Union and the CIS, were named
as the most preferable sources of foreign investment. Investment
by post-Soviet neighbors (which actually means Russia) was not a
priority. One possible explanation for this is that Russian investment
is not associated in the public mind with technological progress or
industrial modernization (although the actual situation is much more
nuanced. See the data on Russia's diversified direct investment in
the CIS provided by the EDB's another annual report on the Monitoring
of Mutual Investments).
A question about priority partners in science and technology has
revealed a similar picture. Respondents from all CIS countries
mentioned Japan, the U.S., and Germany as priority partners. One of
the reasons may be the perception of Russia as a country that has
lost many of its leading positions in science and technology over
the past two decades.
Negative long-term trends are characteristic of educational exchanges.
Although many recognized educational centers in Moscow, St.
Petersburg, Kiev, Minsk, Almaty, Yekaterinburg, and Omsk could compete
successfully with Western universities in the 1990s in the cost to
quality grounds, current polls suggest that those institutions have
lost that advantage. Also, grassroots chauvinism, which is another
factor unrelated to the quality of education, still impacts Russia. Of
course, one should reckon with persistent trends in education that
relate to the two post-Soviet decades, not to the short history of
the Customs Union.
Diagram 2. To which of the countries below would you like to go to
study or for other educational purposes (or to send your children
for study)?
Source: Integration Barometer.
>From this point on, in diagrams depicting the categories "Former
Soviet republics," "EU countries," and "Other countries," the
indicators account for the percentage of respondents who named at
least one country in an appropriate category. For instance, in this
diagram, 52% of Tajiks mentioned at least one former Soviet republic;
18% at least one EU country; and 51% at least one "other" country
(see data for Tajikistan in 2013).
Preferences indicating the most attractive countries for cooperation
in science and technology are especially important because they
directly relate to long-term strategic competitiveness. Therefore,
it should be alarming that the CIS population shows little interest
in neighboring states in these areas.
Equally worrying in terms of the Eurasian integration project is
the relatively high level of "autonomous approach" to development
with some post-Soviet countries, which is manifest in the lack of
respondents' interest in any country on the list (see Diagram 3). The
term "autonomous approach" implies that people concentrate on their
home countries' internal problems and resources. They show a relative
lack of interest in interacting with the world in a wide range of
areas, including trade, investment, and culture. The general tendency
is: the wealthier a country, the more inclined its citizens are to
develop on their own. Kazakhstan, which is open to the outside world,
is an exception to that rule.
Diagram 3. The level of public interest in autonomous development in
countries taking part in the project (the mean value of the total
percentages of 'No such countries' and 'Undecided' in answers to
questions asked in each country)
Source: Integration Barometer
Overall, people living in Customs Union countries and their neighbors
are fairly optimistic. For instance, three-thirds or more respondents
in the three core nations believe that the integration project will
either develop further or maintain current achievements, but the
project will definitely not collapse.
Diagram 4. Do you think there will be a rapprochement or estrangement
among CIS countries in the next five years?
THE EXPERIENCE OF EUROSKEPTICISM
>From the beginning skepticism has accompanied the discussions of
post-Soviet integration. While Eurasiaskepticism is no more than a
year old, concerns about the EU have been around for a long time.
Thus, it makes sense to compare the two phenomena on the basis of
sociological data.
Eurobarometer polling conducted in EU countries reveals a lower
percentage of those who approve of integration. People living in
incumbent EU member-states gave a relatively positive assessment of the
gains in their respective countries from involvement in the European
common market, yet the share of positive answers does not exceed 50%
(see Diagram 5). It is noteworthy that the level of approval was much
higher in the first half of the 2000s, while support dropped later
during a financial crisis in the eurozone. The number of negative
assessments now approaches the amount of positive assessments in
Britain, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Greece, and Cyprus, and sometimes
the results are even higher. Thus, the public no longer assesses all
of the blame to national governments for short-sighted fiscal policies
and bloated non-production assets, but blames Brussels instead.
Overall, the perception of economic integration within the post-Soviet
space is more positive than within the EU. However, we should bear
in mind that since the questions of the two "barometers" differ, the
responses can neither be directly compared nor provide an accurate
analysis. Importantly, Europeans were asked about what they had already
gained from the EU. Naturally, during the economic crisis Europeans
were not inclined towards favorably assessing the impact of integration
on their lives. Simultaneously, respondents from post-Soviet countries
were asked about their general attitudes towards the establishment
of the Customs Union. Since it has not had a significant influence
on their lives so far, their judgments were based on more general
perceptions ("It is a good and appropriate thing to be together and
be friends.")
Diagram 5. Overall, has your country gained or lost from membership
in the EU (the Common Market)?
Source: Eurobarometer. This question was asked in EU countries in
May 2011, and in candidate countries in November 2012.
A similar conclusion can be drawn by comparing the results of
polling in countries that are not members in associations. Macedonia
and Montenegro were the only two of the six candidate countries in
November 2012 where more than 50% of respondents spoke favorably of
participating in the European common market. In the case of Turkey,
the figure accounts for decades of unsuccessful attempts to join a
united Europe. The Serbian response was mostly negative in the wake
of the EU's support for the forces that had broken up the former
Yugoslavia. Icelanders reacted to the 'hard landing' of 2008. As for
post-Soviet space, the only negative assessments came in Azerbaijan,
where 53% of respondents indicated that they would not like to
join the Customs Union, while only 37% supported such a move. This
is a consequence of the Karabakh syndrome. In other CIS countries
the percentage of those who support economic integration was much
larger and reached three-thirds of the population in some cases (72%
in Kyrgyzstan, 75% in Tajikistan, and 77% in Uzbekistan).
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Birth-of-Eurasiaskepticism-16498