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March 28 2014
Azerbaijanīs Illiberal Opposition
March 28, 2014 - 4:23pm, by Eldar Mamedov
Eurasianet Commentary
A common assumption among Western observers is that political
opponents of authoritarian leaders in the Caucasus and Central Asia
tend to be themselves relatively liberal in their political beliefs
and tolerant in social views. But several recent incidents in
Azerbaijan challenge this assumption.
Before examining the Azerbaijani examples in depth, it should be noted
that President Ilham Aliyev's administration in Baku has clamped down
in recent years on basic freedoms, closing open space in the political
arena and muzzling the press. At the same time, the political
opposition in the country lacks cohesion and doesn't seem likely to
pose a serious political challenge to Aliyev's authority anytime soon.
The weakness of the political opposition may actually help hide the
illiberal attitudes held by some of its most prominent elements: some
relatively high-profile Aliyev critics have recently voiced opinions
that are at odds with the principles of democratization.
The first incident involved the late January suicide of a young
gay-rights activist, Isa Shahmarli. In reacting to the tragedy, most
civil society activists deplored the pervasive homophobia in
Azerbaijani society that was widely seen as a factor in prompting
Shahmarli to take his life. Several opposition politicians, however,
embraced a socially conservative viewpoint: for example, Erkin
Gadirli, one of the leaders of the opposition Republican Alternative
(ReAl) stated that the homosexuality was a "choice", which is why "all
religions" condemned it. Meanwhile, another opposition activist, Murad
Gassanly, a UK-based exile who used to represent the National Council
of Democratic Forces (NCDF), an umbrella opposition organization,
criticized "ultra-liberals" for prioritizing LGBT rights, while
downplaying the "mainstream of Azerbaijani public opinion."
A few weeks later, at the end of February, again the same duo made
news. Gadirli called for the assassination of Armenian officials,
including the president of the country, for their role in ethnic
cleansing of Azeris from the village of Khojaly in Nagorno-Karabakh.
When Richard Kauzlarich, a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan,
condemned the call as "a pure incitement to terrorism," Gadirli
refused to retract and proudly announced that he was neither liberal
nor humanist. Meanwhile, Gassanly, in what looked more like a Facebook
rant than a serious counter-argument, accused Kauzlarich of
"hypocrisy" and "ultra-liberals" of being ready to "give up
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenians".
It is telling that both Gadirli and Gassanly emphatically rejected
liberalism in their comments. That, however, does not make them
non-democrats because they both endorse the principle that people
should be able to choose their rulers via the ballot box. Also, sadly,
their dismissive attitude of LGBT rights may well reflect the feelings
of many Azerbaijanis. What the incidents also show is they are not
liberal democrats in the sense that they can tolerate differences,
champion individual rights or show a willingness to protect the rights
of the minority against the will of the majority.
Azerbaijani opposition parties on the whole don't exude much of a
liberal vibe. Most are structured along the same lines as the ruling
New Azerbaijan Party (YAP); each has an unrivaled leader who expects
unquestioning obedience from the rank-and-file; and each tends to
reflect the will of its respective leader, rather than reflect a
well-defined political philosophy.
An example of an illiberal pattern that Azerbaijan could easily mimic
is Turkey. There, Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government is
becoming increasingly intolerant of dissent, trying to impose its own
religiously conservative values on society, while at the same time
undermining judicial independence and freedom of speech. And it is
doing all this in the name of the majority's will.
The reality in Azerbaijan should prompt US and European Union
officials to rethink their democratization strategy for Azerbaijan,
and perhaps for other countries in the region.
Establishing the formal institutions of democracy is relatively easy -
they already exist in Azerbaijan. But for genuine change to be
possible, it is much more important to promote liberal values. This is
going to be an inevitably long and frustrating process. It will not
satisfy those who, faced with pervasive corruption and abuse, yearn
for immediate change. But, over the long term, the spread of liberal
values would increase the odds that any future political change would
be sustainable.
The example of Turkey shows that liberalism is not a luxury, but a
basic requirement for a well-functioning society. The heavy-handed
treatment of dissent by Erdogan threatens to reverse many of the
democratic and economic gains made by Turkey over the last decade.
Editor's note:
Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists & Democrats
Group in the European Parliament. He writes in his personal capacity.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68206
March 28 2014
Azerbaijanīs Illiberal Opposition
March 28, 2014 - 4:23pm, by Eldar Mamedov
Eurasianet Commentary
A common assumption among Western observers is that political
opponents of authoritarian leaders in the Caucasus and Central Asia
tend to be themselves relatively liberal in their political beliefs
and tolerant in social views. But several recent incidents in
Azerbaijan challenge this assumption.
Before examining the Azerbaijani examples in depth, it should be noted
that President Ilham Aliyev's administration in Baku has clamped down
in recent years on basic freedoms, closing open space in the political
arena and muzzling the press. At the same time, the political
opposition in the country lacks cohesion and doesn't seem likely to
pose a serious political challenge to Aliyev's authority anytime soon.
The weakness of the political opposition may actually help hide the
illiberal attitudes held by some of its most prominent elements: some
relatively high-profile Aliyev critics have recently voiced opinions
that are at odds with the principles of democratization.
The first incident involved the late January suicide of a young
gay-rights activist, Isa Shahmarli. In reacting to the tragedy, most
civil society activists deplored the pervasive homophobia in
Azerbaijani society that was widely seen as a factor in prompting
Shahmarli to take his life. Several opposition politicians, however,
embraced a socially conservative viewpoint: for example, Erkin
Gadirli, one of the leaders of the opposition Republican Alternative
(ReAl) stated that the homosexuality was a "choice", which is why "all
religions" condemned it. Meanwhile, another opposition activist, Murad
Gassanly, a UK-based exile who used to represent the National Council
of Democratic Forces (NCDF), an umbrella opposition organization,
criticized "ultra-liberals" for prioritizing LGBT rights, while
downplaying the "mainstream of Azerbaijani public opinion."
A few weeks later, at the end of February, again the same duo made
news. Gadirli called for the assassination of Armenian officials,
including the president of the country, for their role in ethnic
cleansing of Azeris from the village of Khojaly in Nagorno-Karabakh.
When Richard Kauzlarich, a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan,
condemned the call as "a pure incitement to terrorism," Gadirli
refused to retract and proudly announced that he was neither liberal
nor humanist. Meanwhile, Gassanly, in what looked more like a Facebook
rant than a serious counter-argument, accused Kauzlarich of
"hypocrisy" and "ultra-liberals" of being ready to "give up
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenians".
It is telling that both Gadirli and Gassanly emphatically rejected
liberalism in their comments. That, however, does not make them
non-democrats because they both endorse the principle that people
should be able to choose their rulers via the ballot box. Also, sadly,
their dismissive attitude of LGBT rights may well reflect the feelings
of many Azerbaijanis. What the incidents also show is they are not
liberal democrats in the sense that they can tolerate differences,
champion individual rights or show a willingness to protect the rights
of the minority against the will of the majority.
Azerbaijani opposition parties on the whole don't exude much of a
liberal vibe. Most are structured along the same lines as the ruling
New Azerbaijan Party (YAP); each has an unrivaled leader who expects
unquestioning obedience from the rank-and-file; and each tends to
reflect the will of its respective leader, rather than reflect a
well-defined political philosophy.
An example of an illiberal pattern that Azerbaijan could easily mimic
is Turkey. There, Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government is
becoming increasingly intolerant of dissent, trying to impose its own
religiously conservative values on society, while at the same time
undermining judicial independence and freedom of speech. And it is
doing all this in the name of the majority's will.
The reality in Azerbaijan should prompt US and European Union
officials to rethink their democratization strategy for Azerbaijan,
and perhaps for other countries in the region.
Establishing the formal institutions of democracy is relatively easy -
they already exist in Azerbaijan. But for genuine change to be
possible, it is much more important to promote liberal values. This is
going to be an inevitably long and frustrating process. It will not
satisfy those who, faced with pervasive corruption and abuse, yearn
for immediate change. But, over the long term, the spread of liberal
values would increase the odds that any future political change would
be sustainable.
The example of Turkey shows that liberalism is not a luxury, but a
basic requirement for a well-functioning society. The heavy-handed
treatment of dissent by Erdogan threatens to reverse many of the
democratic and economic gains made by Turkey over the last decade.
Editor's note:
Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists & Democrats
Group in the European Parliament. He writes in his personal capacity.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68206