Tweet
Hurriyet Dailiy News, Turkey
Nov 13 2014
Turkish-Armenian relations need a new game-changer
by Unal Cevikoz
As Turkey prepares itself for the centenary of Gallipoli and chairing
the G-20 summit in 2015, some other forces around the world are
perhaps preparing inconspicuous scenarios to increase the duress on
Turkey to "recognize" the events in 1915 as "genocide."
Turkish-Armenian relations, as well as Turkey's bilateral relations
with a number of other countries, will have to go through yet another
test to overcome the 2015-syndrome.
When I think of Turkish-Armenian relations, I am inclined to
characterize it as "history of missed opportunities" that has done
injustice not only to the two nations, the two peoples, the two
countries, but also to the whole Caucasus region. Unless there is
normalization in Turkish-Armenian relations we will have serious
difficulty in talking about an environment of sustainable peace and
stability in the Caucasus.
Looking at the relations between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia, one
can easily observe the complex and interrelated trilateral imbroglio.
On the one hand, Armenia and Azerbaijan are officially at war with one
another. Despite some sporadic clashes, however, the cease-fire since
1994 still holds, pending a peace agreement. On the other hand, having
closed its border with Armenia since April 3, 1993 in order to show
its solidarity with Azerbaijan as a reaction to Armenia's occupation
of 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory, Turkey cannot find a way out
through the impasse it has created. Obviously, all of these factors
make Turkish-Armenian, Armenian-Azerbaijani and Turkish-Azerbaijani
relations mutually interlocking.
The two protocols signed in 2009 have been the most important game
changers in this complex equation. First of all, for the first time
since the 1921 Kars Treaty, Turkey and Armenia undersigned two
inter-governmental instruments.
Secondly, Turkey was perceived by Armenia as pursuing a new foreign
policy approach in the Caucasus. Prior to the beginning of the
normalization talks, Armenia could hardly believe that Turkey was
genuinely interested in engaging in the normalization of bilateral
relations, instead thinking Ankara was attempting to diffuse the
initiatives of third countries to recognize Armenia's interpretation
of history. Now, Turkey is seen by Armenia as being in a serious
commitment to address the issue at its essence. Eventually, the change
in the Armenian perception has engaged Armenia in the negotiations.
Thirdly, normalization talks with Armenia indicated that Turkey was
genuinely interested in opening a new chapter in the Caucasus as well.
Turkey was aware that the normalization of bilateral relations with
Armenia would give a new momentum to other processes and bring about a
new spirit of constructive commitment to multilateral cooperation in
the region. The launching of normalization talks with Armenia,
therefore, aimed at both the progress in Turkish-Armenian relations
and in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks.
Obviously, this calculation was not misguided. Negotiations between
Turkey and Armenia created a positive impetus for the leaders of
Armenia and Azerbaijan to get together at least nine times in
2008-2009. This was unprecedented in the history of the Minsk Process,
which aimed to resolve the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
After five years, it is hard to believe that there is any substantial
way forward in the development of Turkey's relations with Armenia
other than the ratification and implementation of the two protocols.
For various reasons, this is not happening. No significant development
has taken place since 2009, except President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
message on April 23 this year, when he was still prime minister. The
important aspects of that message have to be reiterated. First of all,
it included concepts such as "condolence," "respect and compassion for
those who lost their lives" and "common pain." It emphasized
"respecting history with a perspective of just memory" and "building
our past and future together." Finally, it highlighted a free and
pluralistic environment to discuss the events of 1915 in Turkey. For
Turkey, this message is a revolutionary step in terms of content and
timing. It would be a pity if it was not taken seriously by the
Armenians. The 2015-syndrome, however, hinders taking a positive
conclusion from the message.
No matter what happens and how the two countries get through it,
obviously 2015 is not an end in itself. What is important is how
Turkey and Armenia look at their relations beyond this notorious date.
What they need is a new game changer.
In order to regain its position in the Caucasus as a pro-active
subject of regional politics, Turkey might come forward with a new
initiative to overcome the current impasse. This could be achieved by
opening its border with Armenia to test its impact on the region, on
Turkish-Armenian relations, and on Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. One
may simplistically argue that the closed Turkish-Armenian border is a
strong leverage on Armenia to engage in Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks,
suggesting that its opening before the problem is resolved would cause
Armenia to lose enthusiasm and motivation in the peace process. But it
is hard to see how the closed border remains a leverage if it has not
caused Armenia to engage in a committed negotiation with Azerbaijan in
the last 20 years. Equally, the closed border does not give Turkey the
initiative to contribute to the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem, but simply sustains Turkey and its closed border with Armenia
as an object of regional politics.
An open border, on the other hand, would become a more influential
leverage compared to a closed one if it really brings significant
gains to Armenia. Turkey, by gradually and incrementally opening the
border, would be in a position to encourage its neighbours to engage
in a new phase of negotiations, perhaps much more positively than
before. Turkey would then look at the progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh
peace process and would be able to transform the Turkish-Armenian
border into a more functional instrument in time.
Turkey, in order to become an honest broker in the Caucasus region,
particularly pertaining to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem, has to be equidistant to all actors in the region. Such an
approach would also positively change the Armenian misperception about
Turkey's will and commitments. It is time for Turkey to show a
respectable presence in the region. Such an assertive attitude would
help Armenia and Azerbaijan follow suit with similar strong
statesmanship.
Nov 13 2014
Turkish-Armenian relations need a new game-changer
by Unal Cevikoz
As Turkey prepares itself for the centenary of Gallipoli and chairing
the G-20 summit in 2015, some other forces around the world are
perhaps preparing inconspicuous scenarios to increase the duress on
Turkey to "recognize" the events in 1915 as "genocide."
Turkish-Armenian relations, as well as Turkey's bilateral relations
with a number of other countries, will have to go through yet another
test to overcome the 2015-syndrome.
When I think of Turkish-Armenian relations, I am inclined to
characterize it as "history of missed opportunities" that has done
injustice not only to the two nations, the two peoples, the two
countries, but also to the whole Caucasus region. Unless there is
normalization in Turkish-Armenian relations we will have serious
difficulty in talking about an environment of sustainable peace and
stability in the Caucasus.
Looking at the relations between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia, one
can easily observe the complex and interrelated trilateral imbroglio.
On the one hand, Armenia and Azerbaijan are officially at war with one
another. Despite some sporadic clashes, however, the cease-fire since
1994 still holds, pending a peace agreement. On the other hand, having
closed its border with Armenia since April 3, 1993 in order to show
its solidarity with Azerbaijan as a reaction to Armenia's occupation
of 20 per cent of Azerbaijani territory, Turkey cannot find a way out
through the impasse it has created. Obviously, all of these factors
make Turkish-Armenian, Armenian-Azerbaijani and Turkish-Azerbaijani
relations mutually interlocking.
The two protocols signed in 2009 have been the most important game
changers in this complex equation. First of all, for the first time
since the 1921 Kars Treaty, Turkey and Armenia undersigned two
inter-governmental instruments.
Secondly, Turkey was perceived by Armenia as pursuing a new foreign
policy approach in the Caucasus. Prior to the beginning of the
normalization talks, Armenia could hardly believe that Turkey was
genuinely interested in engaging in the normalization of bilateral
relations, instead thinking Ankara was attempting to diffuse the
initiatives of third countries to recognize Armenia's interpretation
of history. Now, Turkey is seen by Armenia as being in a serious
commitment to address the issue at its essence. Eventually, the change
in the Armenian perception has engaged Armenia in the negotiations.
Thirdly, normalization talks with Armenia indicated that Turkey was
genuinely interested in opening a new chapter in the Caucasus as well.
Turkey was aware that the normalization of bilateral relations with
Armenia would give a new momentum to other processes and bring about a
new spirit of constructive commitment to multilateral cooperation in
the region. The launching of normalization talks with Armenia,
therefore, aimed at both the progress in Turkish-Armenian relations
and in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks.
Obviously, this calculation was not misguided. Negotiations between
Turkey and Armenia created a positive impetus for the leaders of
Armenia and Azerbaijan to get together at least nine times in
2008-2009. This was unprecedented in the history of the Minsk Process,
which aimed to resolve the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
After five years, it is hard to believe that there is any substantial
way forward in the development of Turkey's relations with Armenia
other than the ratification and implementation of the two protocols.
For various reasons, this is not happening. No significant development
has taken place since 2009, except President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
message on April 23 this year, when he was still prime minister. The
important aspects of that message have to be reiterated. First of all,
it included concepts such as "condolence," "respect and compassion for
those who lost their lives" and "common pain." It emphasized
"respecting history with a perspective of just memory" and "building
our past and future together." Finally, it highlighted a free and
pluralistic environment to discuss the events of 1915 in Turkey. For
Turkey, this message is a revolutionary step in terms of content and
timing. It would be a pity if it was not taken seriously by the
Armenians. The 2015-syndrome, however, hinders taking a positive
conclusion from the message.
No matter what happens and how the two countries get through it,
obviously 2015 is not an end in itself. What is important is how
Turkey and Armenia look at their relations beyond this notorious date.
What they need is a new game changer.
In order to regain its position in the Caucasus as a pro-active
subject of regional politics, Turkey might come forward with a new
initiative to overcome the current impasse. This could be achieved by
opening its border with Armenia to test its impact on the region, on
Turkish-Armenian relations, and on Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. One
may simplistically argue that the closed Turkish-Armenian border is a
strong leverage on Armenia to engage in Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks,
suggesting that its opening before the problem is resolved would cause
Armenia to lose enthusiasm and motivation in the peace process. But it
is hard to see how the closed border remains a leverage if it has not
caused Armenia to engage in a committed negotiation with Azerbaijan in
the last 20 years. Equally, the closed border does not give Turkey the
initiative to contribute to the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem, but simply sustains Turkey and its closed border with Armenia
as an object of regional politics.
An open border, on the other hand, would become a more influential
leverage compared to a closed one if it really brings significant
gains to Armenia. Turkey, by gradually and incrementally opening the
border, would be in a position to encourage its neighbours to engage
in a new phase of negotiations, perhaps much more positively than
before. Turkey would then look at the progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh
peace process and would be able to transform the Turkish-Armenian
border into a more functional instrument in time.
Turkey, in order to become an honest broker in the Caucasus region,
particularly pertaining to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem, has to be equidistant to all actors in the region. Such an
approach would also positively change the Armenian misperception about
Turkey's will and commitments. It is time for Turkey to show a
respectable presence in the region. Such an assertive attitude would
help Armenia and Azerbaijan follow suit with similar strong
statesmanship.