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  • Nagorno-Karabakh - The Not-So-Frozen Conflict

    NAGORNO-KARABAKH - THE NOT-SO-FROZEN CONFLICT

    TransConflict
    Oct 21 2014

    In recent months, the 'frozen' Karabakh conflict has been more fire
    than ice. With outside powers stoking the flames, what are the chances
    of finally securing peace?

    By Neil Melvin

    During the summer months, as international headlines were dominated
    by the crisis in Ukraine, Eurasia experienced another serious conflict.

    In late July, violent clashes between the armed forces of Azerbaijan
    and those of the non-recognised state of Nagorno-Karabakh, supported
    by Armenia, escalated dangerously. By early August, the fighting
    reached an intensity not seen for 20 years.

    Despite an official ceasefire agreed back in 1994, violence has
    remained a regular feature between the two opposing forces. Dozens
    have been killed by snipers, in small-scale exhanges of fire, and
    from mines in the region; and hundreds of military personnel and
    civilians have been injured.

    Summer 2014

    The violence during the summer of 2014, however, was notably different
    from the previous instances of conflict. While the precise trigger
    for this round of violence is disputed by each side, fighting quickly
    intensified and soon led to the deaths of more than 20 combatants in
    the fiercest clashes since the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

    The fighting occurred both along the 'Line of Contact' - the
    160-mile-long, heavily militarised ceasefire line that marks the
    boundary between Azerbaijani forces and Armenian-held areas in and
    around Karabakh - and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani state border. The
    fighting also involved high-calibre weapons, not just small arms, as
    had previously been the case. As the death toll mounted, both sides
    became involved in fierce exchanges of rhetoric, with Ilham Aliyev,
    the president of Azerbaijan, at one point appearing to threaten war
    via social media, to restore his country's 'territorial integrity.'

    Faced with the prospect of a return to full-scale warfare,
    international mediators, in the form of two of the three co-chairs
    of the Minsk Group, drawn from the Organisation for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - Russia and the US - called for the
    ceasefire to be respected, and launched urgent efforts to dampen
    down the violence. Concern over the fighting has been particularly
    acute because, increasingly, the struggle over Karabakh forms part
    of a destabilising regional security competition, stretching from the
    South Caucasus into Eastern Europe, and involving both Russia and the
    'transatlantic community.' This raises the prospect that unless a
    breakthrough can be made in peace negotiations, the status quo that
    has existed around the Karabakh conflict since the mid-1990s may
    destabilise further, risking a wider regional confrontation.

    An old fight

    The contemporary origins of the Karabakh conflict lie in the final
    years of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that both sides employ
    arguments based on historical claims stretching back hundreds, if
    not thousands, of years. In 1987, a group of Karabakh Armenians,
    the majority population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
    within the then Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, began demanding
    unification of the region with Armenia. At the time, Karabakh contained
    a significant Azeri minority community and an Armenian majority.

    Tensions mounted and both sides began to mobilise politically, leading
    to clashes. The conflict quickly spilled beyond Karabakh into the rest
    of Azerbaijan and into neighbourng Armenia, precipitating widespread
    violence and ethnic cleansing, and, ultimately, full-scale war, from
    1991-94. The conflict is estimated to have caused a total of 25,000
    to 30,000 casualties on both sides. It also resulted in 750,000
    internally displaced persons within Azerbaijan, and around 360,000
    Armenian refugees who fled Azerbaijan.

    The internationally unrecognised Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, a
    de facto independent state with an overwhelmingly ethnic Armenian
    population of 140,000, was the outcome of this war. To guarantee
    strategic depth and create a security buffer zone, the Armenian
    forces occupied seven Azeri districts (15 % of Azeri territory)
    surrounding Karabakh, including a land link to Armenia. Throughout
    the remainder of Azerbaijan and in Armenia, ancient histories and
    cultures of co-existence and cooperation have been destroyed, as
    societies have been ethnically unmixed - often at the point of a gun.

    A Gordian knot

    The OSCE Minsk Group (today co-chaired by France, the US and the
    Russian Federation) was launched in 1992 in an effort to find a
    peaceful settlement to the conflict. Over the last two decades there
    have been repeated efforts to find solutions, and the sides have even
    appeared close to agreement - most notably during the 2001 Key West
    meeting, when the US made its biggest push to resolve the conflict.

    More recently, in 2011, then Russian president Dmitri Medvedev led an
    ultimately unsuccessful dialogue that culminated in a meeting between
    Aliyev and Armenia's president, Serzh Sargsyan, in Kazan.

    Other efforts have been made to cut through the Gordian knot of the
    conflict. From 2007 to 2010, Turkey and Armenia were engaged in a
    dialogue to normalise relations, backed by the US, that could have
    significantly advanced the Karabakh peace process. But like all other
    high-level initiatives, the process foundered. In recent years, there
    have been efforts to engage civil society and develop people-to-people
    contacts as part of the peace process, but such relationships could
    take years to mature.

    Despite more than two decades of international mediation efforts,
    the Karabakh conflict has remained immune to a political solution. By
    and large, the region's leaderships and the 'international community'
    have lacked the neccessary interest to find peace.

    Between fire and ice

    Caught in limbo between war and peace, and raised solely on
    state-sanctioned versions of the conflict, generations of Armenians and
    Azeris have grown up with an increasing hostility towards one another.

    At state level, the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan have also
    hardened, in part because elites in both countries have sought to
    manage internal dissent and to divert attention away from social
    problems by invoking nationalist sentiment in regard to Karabakh. An
    erosion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in both
    countries has made challenging the official narratives of the conflict
    a risky business. Ideas of pluralism, cooperation, and shared interests
    have been framed as a lack of loyalty and even treachery.

    Stepanakert (capital of Nagorno-Karabakh) authorities have come to
    view the seven occupied territories (deemed vital to water security)
    as an extension of the Karabakh region, making the return of this land
    to Baku even more diffcult. Azerbaijan has sought to challenge this
    status quo on the back of its new-found oil wealth by funding an arms
    race aimed at bankrupting the Armenian economy. Armenia has responded
    much as expected by increasing its own arms purchases. Against this
    backdrop, the region has become increasingly militarised. Today it
    is estimated that some 40,000 heavily armed Armenian and Azerbaijani
    troops face each other, risking military confrontation.

    The popular designation of Karabakh as a frozen conflict has been based
    upon the absence of full-scale war, backed by conventional military
    deterrence and an arms race; and with a fragile self-regulation by
    the conflict parties. After the failure of so many peace initiatives,
    the 'international community' increasingly seems to have opted for
    an approach to Karabakh focusing on conflict management and long-term
    peacebuilding.

    The elements of the status quo that has operated for the past
    two decades around Karabakh are, however, coming under increasing
    pressure. A conflict that began in local ethnic and socio-economic
    issues, has increasingly taken on an inter-state character centred upon
    the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A return to war between
    these two countries could quickly descend into a full-out regional
    conflict pulling in international powers from both East and West;
    powers which have long made their interests in the region known.

    Moscow

    Almost from the outset, Moscow has played a key role in the Karabakh
    conflict. In the final years of the USSR and the early post-Soviet
    years, first the Soviet authorities and then the newly-formed Russian
    government sought to shape the struggle around its own interests,
    but largely failed, and found itself simply reacting to developments
    on the ground. At the same time, armed groups from the Russian North
    Caucasus, elements of the Soviet military under Moscow's control, and
    the newly established Russian military were involved in the fighting.

    As the conflict progressed, a Russian position gradually emerged,
    focused on support for Armenia as a key ally in the Caucasus. Military
    aid; the basing of Russian troops in Armenia; an expansion of
    Russian-owned business into the republic; and the inclusion of Armenia
    within Russian integration projects, became the central planks of
    Russia's southern Caucasus policy. From Armenia's standpoint, its
    security relationship with Russia has become even more important as
    Azerbaijan has built up its military forces.

    The collapse of the Soviet Union opened the Caucasus up to a variety
    of regional and international actors that had been kept out during
    the Soviet era. With one eye firmly on Caspian oil resources, the US
    and Turkey led the way in the 1990s. Azerbaijan and Georgia emerged
    as the key partners for the 'transatlantic community.' Consolidating
    the independence of these countries and promoting their emergence as
    pro-Western democracies became central goals, not least as a means of
    preventing the re-emergence of a Moscow-dominated regional order. This
    in turn paved the way for the more assertive Russian policy towards the
    Caucasus, evident under Putin. In this context of rising competition,
    the region's protracted conflicts have become of key interest for
    both sides.

    Choosing sides

    In the first phase of competition - during the last decade - the
    prospect of NATO enlargement in the region, and growing EU engagement,
    culminated in the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, which centred around
    the protracted conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The fighting
    around Karabakh this summer emerged within a new round of rivalry
    between Russia and the 'transatlantic community.'

    An Armenian soldier keeps watch. Both sides are often only 100 metres
    from each other. CC Azerbaijan-irs.comFollowing the Russia-Georgia war,
    Russia and the EU have both sought to strengthen their positions in the
    region by launching political and economic integration initiatives. For
    the Russian Federation, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation,
    the Customs Union and the emergent Eurasian Union have been developed
    to counter and rival the institutions of the EU (Eastern Partnership)
    and NATO.

    This rising competition has increasingly placed countries of Eastern
    Europe and the Caucasus into a position whereby they are forced to
    take sides in this bipolar struggle, pushing them to abandon the
    multi-vector foreign and security policies that have allowed them
    to balance competing pressures from regional powers, for much of the
    post-Soviet period.

    In 2013, Armenia found itself caught directly between these two
    geopolitical projects as the EU offered and encouraged Yerevan to sign
    up to an Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive
    Free Trade Agreement, ahead of the Third Eastern Partnership Summit in
    December 2013. Armenia was interested in the agreement and negotiated
    its terms for three years with the EU. Russia, however, concerned that
    its alliance with Armenia was being threatened, was less than keen on
    this prospect; and Moscow made sure that Armenia received the message.

    On 13 August 2013, Putin made his first trip to Baku in seven years.

    During the visit, media reports publicised the fact that Russia
    would sell weapons to Azerbaijan worth an estimated $4 billion. In
    addition, in July, Gazprom (which controls Armenia's main gas company
    ArmRosGazprom) raised gas tariffs for individual consumers in Armenia
    by 50%, after which Russia suggested that the price hike could be
    reversed if Armenia agreed to join the Customs Union.

    Following an extended bilateral meeting between Sargsyan and Putin
    on 3 September, at which the security implications of Armenia's
    decision to sign the Associated Agreement with the EU are reported
    to have been discussed, Sargsyan announced that Armenia had made the
    decision to seek accession to the Customs Union of Russia, and not
    to proceed with the EU Association Agreement.

    Armenia's decision to turn towards Moscow because of security
    considerations, and away from Brussels, did not help to stabilise the
    region. Following Armenia's announcement of its intention to join the
    Customs Union, the question emerged as to whether Karabakh would be
    part of the agreement, and whether it would be integrated into the
    Russian-led economic union, so raising alarm in Azerbaijan.

    Tensions rise

    With tensions rising in the region, violence around Karabakh began
    to pick up from January 2014. Uncertainties were further exacerbated
    following Russia's annexation of Crimea. Many in the Caucasus saw
    this Russian step as providing Armenia with a precedent - to formally
    annex Karabakh.

    At the UN General Assembly vote on 27 March 2014, on the resolution
    'Territorial integrity of Ukraine,' which called on states not to
    recognise Russia's annexation of Crimea, Armenia voted with Russia to
    oppose the resolution while Azerbaijan voted with the 'transatlantic
    community' in support.

    Despite Armenia's decision to follow Russia's lead on Ukraine,
    however, Russia appears to have signalled a readiness to rebalance
    its position between Yerevan and Baku by, for example, pursuing
    arms sales to Azerbaijan. This has caused anxiety in Armenia, which
    recognises its security dependence on Russia, particularly with regard
    to Karabakh. These overtures by Moscow, however, have failed to quell
    anxiety in Azerbaijan, which has remained resistant to any changes
    that could lead to a Pax Russica in the Caucasus.

    Azerbaijan

    In a situation of growing regional uncertainty, and with the EU and
    US focused on Ukraine, and reluctant to upset a potential supplier
    of gas to European markets, Baku's elite has looked to consolidate
    its authoritarian order at home.

    In the spring of 2014, the Azerbaijani authorities began a crackdown
    against the remnants of the country's civil society, using the idea of
    a country besieged by enemies and traitors as its leitmotif. In April
    2014, Azerbaijani journalist Rauf Mirkadirov was arrested for alleged
    espionage on behalf of Armenia - his crime was to collaborate with
    Armenian NGO colleagues. Following this, Baku launched a widespread
    crackdown on NGOs, human rights organisations, and independent media,
    targeting in particular groups that had been engaged in peace building
    activities toward Karabakh.

    In July, the leading human rights activist Leyla Yunus was arrested,
    followed in August by the detention of her husband Arif Yunus, accused
    of treason, spying for Armenia, illegal business activities, forgery,
    and fraud. Both had worked on people-to-people initiatives to rebuild
    links with Armenia over many years.

    During this period, pressure also mounted on Armenia. Sargsyan was
    embarrassed at the summit of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council
    on May 29 in Astana, where Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev read out a letter
    from the president of Azerbaijan in which he indicated that it was
    impermissible to admit Armenia to the Customs Union together with
    Nagorno-Karabakh.

    During the previous Eurasian Economic Council summit in October 2013,
    Lukashenko of Belarus had stated that Armenia would have to resolve
    its territorial dispute with Azerbaijan, and that Customs Union
    members would consider Azerbaijan's position on the issue. Despite
    originally intending to join the Customs Union in the spring of 2014,
    Armenia has repeatedly postponed the final signature.

    Fighting over peace

    The sudden escalation of violence in Karabakh has occurred in a
    political and security context that had deteriorated throughout the
    region over the previous year. Growing competition between Russia
    and the 'transatlantic community,' from the middle of 2013, and the
    wider destabilisation caused by the Ukraine conflict, are important
    factors in the worsening of relations, which have placed pressure on
    key elements of the status quo supporting the Karabakh ceasefire.

    Landmines remain a serious problem in the disputed territory of
    Nagorno-Karabakh. Photo: Onnik Krikorian via demotix (c)As the conflict
    worsened, Putin convened a meeting in Sochi with the Armenian and
    Azerbaijani leaders, but without the American and French Minsk Group
    co-chairs. Putin's initiative promoted speculation that Russia was
    seeking to downgrade the Minsk process and assert Russia as the leading
    international actor in the Karabakh peace process. Some observers also
    saw in Russia's initiative an effort to prepare the way to introduce
    Russian 'peacekeeping' forces into the Karabakh peace equation and,
    thereby, side-line the EU and the US.

    On September 4, US Secretary of State John Kerry met with the
    presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the margins of the NATO Wales
    Summit. The attendance of the Armenian president was viewed as an
    important sign that, despite Russian pressure, Armenia would like to
    keep its options open. Kerry is reported to have underlined during
    the meeting that negotiations should continue in the framework of
    the OSCE Minsk process.

    At the conclusion of the NATO Summit, NATO members issued a statement
    asserting that allies 'remain committed in their support to the
    territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia,
    Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova.' The statement
    reaffirming territorial integrity was welcomed in Azerbaijan but
    caused some anger in Armenia.

    Armenia is also growing increasingly concerned by the emerging security
    cooperation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. On 21 August,
    the defence ministers of the three countries met trilaterally for
    the first time and promised to carry out joint military exercises.

    The focus of the military cooperation is the protection of the Caucasus
    energy infrastructure; elites are concerned that instability in the
    region might spill over and threaten the emerging east-west Caucasus
    energy corridor.

    For Armenia, such cooperation potentially opens a new situation
    in its relations with Georgia. In any conflict with Azerbaijan,
    Georgia would be a vital corridor for military supplies from Russia -
    a supply route would be directly challenged by an alliance allowing
    Turkish military forces to transit Georgia to Azerbaijan.

    Breaking the status quo

    The Caucasus region is now experiencing a potentially far-reaching
    shift as a result of growing security tensions at the local, regional,
    and international level. Countries of the region are increasingly
    caught up in the competitive integration projects of the EU and Russia,
    forcing them to choose one bloc over the other. The Ukraine crisis has
    only accelerated these trends. Today, as the security situation in
    the Caucasus comes under increasing strain, there are growing signs
    that the fragile status quo that has kept the Karabakh conflict at
    a relatively low level of violence is beginning to break.

    High-level statements over the summer reflect growing international
    concern over Karabakhh and its potential to further destabilise
    Eurasia. For now, there appears to be a shared awareness that, despite
    regional competition, a further destabilisation of the Caucasus is
    not in anyone's interest.

    With this in mind, President Hollande of France has invited Aliyev
    and Sargsyan to Paris for talks at the end of October. Ahead of the
    Paris meeting, the Minsk Group co-chairs face a strategic choice:
    should their efforts be aimed at shoring up the status quo or should
    they once again try to find a political solution to the conflict?

    Some reports suggest that France is considering ways to include
    Karabakh directly in the upcoming discussions. Such a step would mark
    a major shift in the peace process but it would also bring with it
    the serious risk of confronting Azerbaijan with a situation it could
    not accept. Any long-term solution would also have to ensure that
    Russia and Turkey (and possibly Iran) did not feel threatened by the
    final agreement. A great deal of care would therefore be required
    to ensure that a new peace initiative does not trigger precisely the
    confrontation it is designed to prevent.

    The fighting of this summer is a clear warning that Karabakh can no
    longer be viewed simply as a local dispute capable of being contained
    within existing conflict management arrangements. And with fighting
    in Ukraine continuing to destabilise Central Europe and Eurasia,
    and with crises spreading and intensifying south of the Caucasus in
    Syria and Iraq, new ways of thinking and fresh approaches are urgently
    required to thaw the supposedly 'frozen' conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Neil Melvin is director of the Armed Conflict and Conflict Management
    Programme at SIPRI.

    http://www.transconflict.com/2014/10/nagorno-karabakh-frozen-conflict/




    From: A. Papazian
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