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US ANALYST: AZERBAIJAN MIGHT REGAIN SOME TERRITORY, LOSE INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION, IF JOINS EURASIA UNION
Turan Information Agency, Azerbaijan
October 20, 2014 Monday
Alakbar Raufoglu, Washington, DC
As Russian-lead the Eurasian Union just welcomed its fourth member
country - Armenia, last week, many in the region and abroad focus on
Azerbaijan's attitudes in its neighborhood.
For many western analysts, Baku's strategy of plotting a course between
Moscow and the EU has left it even more vulnerable to Russian pressure
to join the Eurasian Union.
TURAN's Washington correspondent interviewed Michael Tkacik, Professor
of Government, and Director of the School of Honors at the Stephen F.
Austin State University, who closely follow Azerbaijan policy, over
recent developments in the country and the region.
Q. Discussions about Azerbaijan's possible future membership to Eurasia
Union seem tocontinue to percolate in the Baku expert community.Some
commentaries on the topic have focused on the role of the Kremlin's
propaganda in the region in creating a new sense of USSR. If that is
the case, what are the best directions for Azerbaijan to follow?
A. There is little doubt that a successful Eurasian Union -- the
"Union" -- helps Russia to reassert its historically dominant role
across the region. Russia's economy is the largest and most central
in the region. Its military is far and away the most powerful. And
its leadership is the most aggressive.
To understand what the best approach for Azerbaijan is, it makes sense
to examine Azerbaijan's goals in light of Russia's desires. Primarily,
does Azerbaijan value greater independence but no solution to
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), or would Azerbaijan sacrifice some freedom
of action in order to resolve NK? By "resolve," I mean reclamation
of some, but not all territory. This is what Russia might offer
implicitly - some less than perfect resolution to NK in exchange
for Azerbaijan joining the Union and eventually following Russia's
dictates on issues Russia considers important.
Of course, if Azerbaijan rejects this opportunity, it might find
itself under increasing Russian pressure, and in this case, Russia
would play favorite to Armenia. So then, there is no good solution
regarding the political impact of joining the Union, only solutions
of varying degrees of unpleasantness.
IF Azerbaijan were to join the Eurasian Union, Azerbaijan's leadership
would need assurances that Russia would work toward resolving the
situation in NK favorably. As I previously indicated in our interview
last year that Russia would prevent resolution of NK - that Russia
would set itself up as the only player that could "deliver" NK -
and this has come to pass.
On a secondary level, beyond the issue of security, belonging to
some sort of customs union would likely be beneficial to Azerbaijan's
economy. There will be increased economic growth because of the Union,
though how much growth will be siphoned off through corruption is
unclear. In addition to the political cost of less independence for
Azerbaijan, there would likely be some economic price to pay. For
example, Russia would seek greater input into oil and gas decision
making in Azerbaijan, as well as the pipeline networks. It is possible,
of course, that joining the Union could harm economic ties with the
West. But I do not believe Kazakhstan has seen its economic ties to
the West harmed. Western businesses make very rational cost/benefit
decisions on investment. The key here is for Azerbaijan to avoid any
action that would lead to Western sanctions. Barring that, economic
ties with the West should be maintained, while opportunities with
the Union should increase.
Q. Although Azeri government hasn't yet expressed any interest in the
Eurasia Union, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu visited Baku last week
and signaled fresh defense contracts between the two. The idea of a
"collective defense" system for the Caspian Sea and airspace was also
brought up, with joint naval exercises solidified for next year. This
comes at the time when Azeri government seems to be tightening its
relations with the western countries by cracking down on the civil
society and the US-linked organizations. Many in the region worry
about the country's security future, as Russia might try to benefit
from this situation by attempting to sway Azerbaijan from a Western
alliance over its defense projects and Customs Union, which could hurt
energy projects directed at Europe and undermine economic freedom and
overall prosperity in the South Caucasus. What actually does Moscow
offer to Azerbaijan in terms of security and its future?
A. Moscow offers what we would call a negative security assurance. To
wit, Moscow will not destabilize Azerbaijan or otherwise harm
Azerbaijan's security interests -- such as NK, -- if Azerbaijan
comes to heel and joins the Union. Azerbaijan gives up some level of
independence in exchange for this assurance.
But any agreement with Russia is ultimately a Faustian Bargain. Once
Russia ensnares Azerbaijan in the Union, Moscow will slowly but
surely more deeply tie Azerbaijan to Russia. Azerbaijan will again
find itself tied to Russia's security interests and to it military
industrial complex. It may be imperceptible at first, but eventually
Baku will realize it has lost significant independence of action. One
might argue that, given Azerbaijan's size, and given the geographic
neighborhood, this will happen eventually, no matter what Azerbaijan's
choice. Perhaps -- and only perhaps -- this is the case. But if so,
Azerbaijan should think very clearly and explicitly about whom it is
getting in bed with.
Q. President Obama last month raised his voice on Azerbaijan's
narrowing window for civil society and NGOs, but it seems like Baku
officials dismissed Washington's concerns. Most recently, this week
Azeri government condemned US for 'interfering into its internal
affairs.' How would you describe Washington's alarm on recent situation
in Azerbaijan, and what lesson should the Azgov. take from it with
regard to the future of US - Azeri relationship?
A. As your readers well know, this is a continuing message coming
out of Washington, and a continuing response coming from Baku. What
is interesting about Obama's speech is the policy changes he discussed.
He intends, through executive order, to provide greater and more overt
support for civil society groups. But one should also recognize that
in America an executive order can be changed by later presidents.
Currently, however, we can look forward to stronger support by the
US for NGOs.
I think there is little doubt that the people of Azerbaijan would
benefit from greater rule of law, less corruption, and enhanced civil
society. Those opposed to greater civil society really have only
their narrow interests in mind. We see the same dynamic throughout
the world, from China's response to protests in China, to Russia's
response to a relatively unknown female rock band in Moscow.
Q. While some observers believe that oil rich Azerbaijan charts a third
course between Russia and the West, local critics argues that what
is going on in the country has deeper roots than that. The government
propaganda allows some Azeris to feel united with anyone who believes
that the country is developing and nobody on the outside likes it,
and view the world not as "gray" and full of problems in which they are
"losers" but as one of bright colors in which they are winners... Where
do you think the country is heading to with this trend?
A. I cannot comment directly on domestic issues in Azerbaijan. It
strikes me that there are some people who do not understand the
complexity of some issues. It is always in the interests of some
elites to simplify things in order to mobilize political support from
those who do not understand the complexity of the world. This is most
easily achieved by painting the world in terms of "us versus them."
In America we too have people who always simplify reality for their
own selfish purposes. Reality, however, is complex and almost always
shades of grey. Arguing that "the world is against us," oversimplifies
things. It is the role of those with greater understanding and
greater access to information is to remove the deception engaged in
by self-interested parties.
Q. Although Azerbaijan and Ukraine used to have many common interests
in the region, including energy transit, security, but they do not
share the same view on the role of strong civil society. Among the
questions that the local observers increasingly raise after Russia's
invention to Crimea, are "are border changes among former Soviet
republics possible?" As no country in the post-Soviet space is more
concerned about such possibility than Azerbaijan, given the Karabakh
conflict, what would be your suggestions to the Azeri people and the
government given the current dynamism and reality of the region.
A. Clearly border changes are possible. And Russia seems to be the key
to achieving those changes - either in a state's interests or against
a state's interests. This is the Faustian Bargain to which I alluded
earlier. Is NK so important that Azerbaijan is willing to sacrifice
its independence? Russia can and will prevent peace in NK. The
road to reacquiring NK, if it can be done, goes through Moscow. But
the price will be steep. The alternative is to stay independent of
Russia and hope that Azerbaijan can prevent an undesired settlement
of NK. In other words, can Azerbaijan play the spoiler as Russia
has so far? Can Azerbaijan make itself essential to any solution,
and therefore create bargaining power? This is unclear. One begins
to tread dark paths here when one explores how Azerbaijan might make
any undesired settlement of the issue too costly for the other parties.
Unfortunately for Azerbaijan, it lacks the allies to challenge Russia
and Armenia directly if they were to grant Armenia control over NK.
Turkey is one potential ally, but Turkey is occupied with its southern
borders. Iran is another potential ally, but of course relations
between the two states are complex and even an informal partnership
would bring many problems. The US is a third potential ally, but is
unlikely to be helpful until Azerbaijan liberalizes. Even with outside
help, it is not clear that any of these allies can stop Russia from
formalizing Armenia's seizure of NK, if it chooses to do so. In the
end, only Azerbaijan could so increase the costs to make "swallowing
NK" unpalatable to Russia and Armenia.
There are two positives from Azerbaijan's point of view. First, Russia
cannot afford another round of sanctions. It has its hands full right
now in Ukraine. Second, even after the Ukrainian issue dies down,
Russia has less overt interest in NK. So it may be possible that
this reduced interest, combined with the international community's
distaste for such aggression, may temper Russia's behavior. Still,
the solution to NK must go through Russia. Even more so after Armenia
joins the Union, only Russia can force the sort of compromise necessary
to resolve NK.
From: Baghdasarian
Turan Information Agency, Azerbaijan
October 20, 2014 Monday
Alakbar Raufoglu, Washington, DC
As Russian-lead the Eurasian Union just welcomed its fourth member
country - Armenia, last week, many in the region and abroad focus on
Azerbaijan's attitudes in its neighborhood.
For many western analysts, Baku's strategy of plotting a course between
Moscow and the EU has left it even more vulnerable to Russian pressure
to join the Eurasian Union.
TURAN's Washington correspondent interviewed Michael Tkacik, Professor
of Government, and Director of the School of Honors at the Stephen F.
Austin State University, who closely follow Azerbaijan policy, over
recent developments in the country and the region.
Q. Discussions about Azerbaijan's possible future membership to Eurasia
Union seem tocontinue to percolate in the Baku expert community.Some
commentaries on the topic have focused on the role of the Kremlin's
propaganda in the region in creating a new sense of USSR. If that is
the case, what are the best directions for Azerbaijan to follow?
A. There is little doubt that a successful Eurasian Union -- the
"Union" -- helps Russia to reassert its historically dominant role
across the region. Russia's economy is the largest and most central
in the region. Its military is far and away the most powerful. And
its leadership is the most aggressive.
To understand what the best approach for Azerbaijan is, it makes sense
to examine Azerbaijan's goals in light of Russia's desires. Primarily,
does Azerbaijan value greater independence but no solution to
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), or would Azerbaijan sacrifice some freedom
of action in order to resolve NK? By "resolve," I mean reclamation
of some, but not all territory. This is what Russia might offer
implicitly - some less than perfect resolution to NK in exchange
for Azerbaijan joining the Union and eventually following Russia's
dictates on issues Russia considers important.
Of course, if Azerbaijan rejects this opportunity, it might find
itself under increasing Russian pressure, and in this case, Russia
would play favorite to Armenia. So then, there is no good solution
regarding the political impact of joining the Union, only solutions
of varying degrees of unpleasantness.
IF Azerbaijan were to join the Eurasian Union, Azerbaijan's leadership
would need assurances that Russia would work toward resolving the
situation in NK favorably. As I previously indicated in our interview
last year that Russia would prevent resolution of NK - that Russia
would set itself up as the only player that could "deliver" NK -
and this has come to pass.
On a secondary level, beyond the issue of security, belonging to
some sort of customs union would likely be beneficial to Azerbaijan's
economy. There will be increased economic growth because of the Union,
though how much growth will be siphoned off through corruption is
unclear. In addition to the political cost of less independence for
Azerbaijan, there would likely be some economic price to pay. For
example, Russia would seek greater input into oil and gas decision
making in Azerbaijan, as well as the pipeline networks. It is possible,
of course, that joining the Union could harm economic ties with the
West. But I do not believe Kazakhstan has seen its economic ties to
the West harmed. Western businesses make very rational cost/benefit
decisions on investment. The key here is for Azerbaijan to avoid any
action that would lead to Western sanctions. Barring that, economic
ties with the West should be maintained, while opportunities with
the Union should increase.
Q. Although Azeri government hasn't yet expressed any interest in the
Eurasia Union, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu visited Baku last week
and signaled fresh defense contracts between the two. The idea of a
"collective defense" system for the Caspian Sea and airspace was also
brought up, with joint naval exercises solidified for next year. This
comes at the time when Azeri government seems to be tightening its
relations with the western countries by cracking down on the civil
society and the US-linked organizations. Many in the region worry
about the country's security future, as Russia might try to benefit
from this situation by attempting to sway Azerbaijan from a Western
alliance over its defense projects and Customs Union, which could hurt
energy projects directed at Europe and undermine economic freedom and
overall prosperity in the South Caucasus. What actually does Moscow
offer to Azerbaijan in terms of security and its future?
A. Moscow offers what we would call a negative security assurance. To
wit, Moscow will not destabilize Azerbaijan or otherwise harm
Azerbaijan's security interests -- such as NK, -- if Azerbaijan
comes to heel and joins the Union. Azerbaijan gives up some level of
independence in exchange for this assurance.
But any agreement with Russia is ultimately a Faustian Bargain. Once
Russia ensnares Azerbaijan in the Union, Moscow will slowly but
surely more deeply tie Azerbaijan to Russia. Azerbaijan will again
find itself tied to Russia's security interests and to it military
industrial complex. It may be imperceptible at first, but eventually
Baku will realize it has lost significant independence of action. One
might argue that, given Azerbaijan's size, and given the geographic
neighborhood, this will happen eventually, no matter what Azerbaijan's
choice. Perhaps -- and only perhaps -- this is the case. But if so,
Azerbaijan should think very clearly and explicitly about whom it is
getting in bed with.
Q. President Obama last month raised his voice on Azerbaijan's
narrowing window for civil society and NGOs, but it seems like Baku
officials dismissed Washington's concerns. Most recently, this week
Azeri government condemned US for 'interfering into its internal
affairs.' How would you describe Washington's alarm on recent situation
in Azerbaijan, and what lesson should the Azgov. take from it with
regard to the future of US - Azeri relationship?
A. As your readers well know, this is a continuing message coming
out of Washington, and a continuing response coming from Baku. What
is interesting about Obama's speech is the policy changes he discussed.
He intends, through executive order, to provide greater and more overt
support for civil society groups. But one should also recognize that
in America an executive order can be changed by later presidents.
Currently, however, we can look forward to stronger support by the
US for NGOs.
I think there is little doubt that the people of Azerbaijan would
benefit from greater rule of law, less corruption, and enhanced civil
society. Those opposed to greater civil society really have only
their narrow interests in mind. We see the same dynamic throughout
the world, from China's response to protests in China, to Russia's
response to a relatively unknown female rock band in Moscow.
Q. While some observers believe that oil rich Azerbaijan charts a third
course between Russia and the West, local critics argues that what
is going on in the country has deeper roots than that. The government
propaganda allows some Azeris to feel united with anyone who believes
that the country is developing and nobody on the outside likes it,
and view the world not as "gray" and full of problems in which they are
"losers" but as one of bright colors in which they are winners... Where
do you think the country is heading to with this trend?
A. I cannot comment directly on domestic issues in Azerbaijan. It
strikes me that there are some people who do not understand the
complexity of some issues. It is always in the interests of some
elites to simplify things in order to mobilize political support from
those who do not understand the complexity of the world. This is most
easily achieved by painting the world in terms of "us versus them."
In America we too have people who always simplify reality for their
own selfish purposes. Reality, however, is complex and almost always
shades of grey. Arguing that "the world is against us," oversimplifies
things. It is the role of those with greater understanding and
greater access to information is to remove the deception engaged in
by self-interested parties.
Q. Although Azerbaijan and Ukraine used to have many common interests
in the region, including energy transit, security, but they do not
share the same view on the role of strong civil society. Among the
questions that the local observers increasingly raise after Russia's
invention to Crimea, are "are border changes among former Soviet
republics possible?" As no country in the post-Soviet space is more
concerned about such possibility than Azerbaijan, given the Karabakh
conflict, what would be your suggestions to the Azeri people and the
government given the current dynamism and reality of the region.
A. Clearly border changes are possible. And Russia seems to be the key
to achieving those changes - either in a state's interests or against
a state's interests. This is the Faustian Bargain to which I alluded
earlier. Is NK so important that Azerbaijan is willing to sacrifice
its independence? Russia can and will prevent peace in NK. The
road to reacquiring NK, if it can be done, goes through Moscow. But
the price will be steep. The alternative is to stay independent of
Russia and hope that Azerbaijan can prevent an undesired settlement
of NK. In other words, can Azerbaijan play the spoiler as Russia
has so far? Can Azerbaijan make itself essential to any solution,
and therefore create bargaining power? This is unclear. One begins
to tread dark paths here when one explores how Azerbaijan might make
any undesired settlement of the issue too costly for the other parties.
Unfortunately for Azerbaijan, it lacks the allies to challenge Russia
and Armenia directly if they were to grant Armenia control over NK.
Turkey is one potential ally, but Turkey is occupied with its southern
borders. Iran is another potential ally, but of course relations
between the two states are complex and even an informal partnership
would bring many problems. The US is a third potential ally, but is
unlikely to be helpful until Azerbaijan liberalizes. Even with outside
help, it is not clear that any of these allies can stop Russia from
formalizing Armenia's seizure of NK, if it chooses to do so. In the
end, only Azerbaijan could so increase the costs to make "swallowing
NK" unpalatable to Russia and Armenia.
There are two positives from Azerbaijan's point of view. First, Russia
cannot afford another round of sanctions. It has its hands full right
now in Ukraine. Second, even after the Ukrainian issue dies down,
Russia has less overt interest in NK. So it may be possible that
this reduced interest, combined with the international community's
distaste for such aggression, may temper Russia's behavior. Still,
the solution to NK must go through Russia. Even more so after Armenia
joins the Union, only Russia can force the sort of compromise necessary
to resolve NK.
From: Baghdasarian