Tweet
RIPPLE EFFECT: UKRAINE AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
The Moscow Times
Oct 27 2014
By Maxim Suchkov
As the Ukraine crisis continues, at least three obvious and critical
facts can be ascertained. The crisis has proven the existing European
security system to be ineffective; has severely damaged relations
between Russia and the West and left diplomacy in a gridlock; and made
many international agreements obsolete, particularly the Belavezha
Accords, which established the Commonwealth of Independent States
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Echoes of these consequences
will be long felt across Eurasia.
Certain shockwaves from the crisis in Ukraine have already reached
the South Caucasus, one of the regions most susceptible to changing
dynamics between Russia and the West.
First, a great deal of skepticism about the capability of European
institutions to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet space now prevails
among South Caucasus elites. Ironically, this understanding serves
to prevent violence in the region to a certain extent: Responsible
stakeholders in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku have realized that if
there should be serious warfare in the region, there will be no
international institutions powerful enough to stop it, or any great
European powers ready for a head-on military collision to defend
their clients' interests.
At the same time, the South Caucasus states have found themselves
in an unenviable position: The Ukrainian crisis has shown that
deciding between European and Eurasian integration comes at a high
price, but that indecision is an even worse path. Thus the startling
developments in Ukraine have triggered two processes: On the one hand,
they have accelerated Georgia and Moldova's efforts to integrate into
Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, the Ukraine crisis has
pushed Armenia to seek full membership in the Russian-led Eurasian
Union and encouraged Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia to forge closer ties with Russia.
The domestic support for Eurasian integration in Armenia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia seems to have been spurred by a resurgence of national
identity. All three have a common cause: historical reunification,
an idea that has re-energized by the "Crimea precedent."
Armenian supporters of Eurasian integration have projected
"re-incorporation of Crimea into Russia" onto the disputed territory
of Nagorno-Karabakh, suggesting it is a precedent for reunification of
Armenia's historical lands. Supporters of integration in South Ossetia
might use the same logic to reincorporate their territory into Russia.
When power politics are at play, smaller states often scramble to side
with great powers. But those who expect the tit-for-tat game between
Russia and the West to continue have opted to maneuver between the
two. Azerbaijan has chosen this path, floating between the East and
West in its stance toward the crisis in Ukraine, and reaffirming its
commitment to multivector diplomacy. Yet the time may come for Baku
to make hard choices as well.
Finally, the crisis in Ukraine has had a remarkable impact on the
South Caucasus. Although it may not yet be fully recognized, the
transformed realities of Eurasian geopolitics have surely revived
the idea that there are distinct geopolitical zones -- fodder for
political and academic hard-liners who love to ponder what this might
mean for the Caucasus.
They say that when the going gets tough, the tough get going. Russia
may look like it has gone through the tough part of the Ukraine crisis,
but whatever further moves it makes in this diplomatic chess game, it
should understand the impact on its policy in Eurasia. The consequences
are already looming on the horizon.
Maxim A. Suchkov, Ph.D., a former Fulbright visiting fellow at
Georgetown University (2010-11), is currently a fellow at the Institute
for Strategic Studies (Pyatigorsk).
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/ripple-effect-ukraine-and-the-south-caucasus/510137.html
The Moscow Times
Oct 27 2014
By Maxim Suchkov
As the Ukraine crisis continues, at least three obvious and critical
facts can be ascertained. The crisis has proven the existing European
security system to be ineffective; has severely damaged relations
between Russia and the West and left diplomacy in a gridlock; and made
many international agreements obsolete, particularly the Belavezha
Accords, which established the Commonwealth of Independent States
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Echoes of these consequences
will be long felt across Eurasia.
Certain shockwaves from the crisis in Ukraine have already reached
the South Caucasus, one of the regions most susceptible to changing
dynamics between Russia and the West.
First, a great deal of skepticism about the capability of European
institutions to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet space now prevails
among South Caucasus elites. Ironically, this understanding serves
to prevent violence in the region to a certain extent: Responsible
stakeholders in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku have realized that if
there should be serious warfare in the region, there will be no
international institutions powerful enough to stop it, or any great
European powers ready for a head-on military collision to defend
their clients' interests.
At the same time, the South Caucasus states have found themselves
in an unenviable position: The Ukrainian crisis has shown that
deciding between European and Eurasian integration comes at a high
price, but that indecision is an even worse path. Thus the startling
developments in Ukraine have triggered two processes: On the one hand,
they have accelerated Georgia and Moldova's efforts to integrate into
Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, the Ukraine crisis has
pushed Armenia to seek full membership in the Russian-led Eurasian
Union and encouraged Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia to forge closer ties with Russia.
The domestic support for Eurasian integration in Armenia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia seems to have been spurred by a resurgence of national
identity. All three have a common cause: historical reunification,
an idea that has re-energized by the "Crimea precedent."
Armenian supporters of Eurasian integration have projected
"re-incorporation of Crimea into Russia" onto the disputed territory
of Nagorno-Karabakh, suggesting it is a precedent for reunification of
Armenia's historical lands. Supporters of integration in South Ossetia
might use the same logic to reincorporate their territory into Russia.
When power politics are at play, smaller states often scramble to side
with great powers. But those who expect the tit-for-tat game between
Russia and the West to continue have opted to maneuver between the
two. Azerbaijan has chosen this path, floating between the East and
West in its stance toward the crisis in Ukraine, and reaffirming its
commitment to multivector diplomacy. Yet the time may come for Baku
to make hard choices as well.
Finally, the crisis in Ukraine has had a remarkable impact on the
South Caucasus. Although it may not yet be fully recognized, the
transformed realities of Eurasian geopolitics have surely revived
the idea that there are distinct geopolitical zones -- fodder for
political and academic hard-liners who love to ponder what this might
mean for the Caucasus.
They say that when the going gets tough, the tough get going. Russia
may look like it has gone through the tough part of the Ukraine crisis,
but whatever further moves it makes in this diplomatic chess game, it
should understand the impact on its policy in Eurasia. The consequences
are already looming on the horizon.
Maxim A. Suchkov, Ph.D., a former Fulbright visiting fellow at
Georgetown University (2010-11), is currently a fellow at the Institute
for Strategic Studies (Pyatigorsk).
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/ripple-effect-ukraine-and-the-south-caucasus/510137.html